INDEPENDENT HOMELANDS: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ISSUES IN SOUTH AFRICA-HOMELAND RELATIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

Eight years after Transkei has been granted independence, the independent states have become an important component of the South African political landscape, and their existence cannot be ignored despite the fact that no other country but South Africa has recognised their independence.

This thesis is concerned with the evaluation of the choice of independence. The reasons are examined which led the South African government to grant independence to the homelands, and those which induced some of the homeland leaders to accept it. An evaluation is made of the political and economic benefits and lack thereof this choice has brought to those who made it and to their communities, with a view to the role the independent states may play in future developments in South Africa.

A descriptive-analytical approach has been adopted and the main subjects have been presented in their chronological unfolding, in order to stress the basic continuity in the aims pursued both on the part of the South African government and on the part of the homeland leaders, despite numerous tactical adaptations to the circumstances on both sides.

Most of the information has been gathered from the Hansard of the House and from reports of various commissions and government White Papers. Official documents from the independent states and the economic corporations working therein have also been extensively used. Other information and data have been gathered during a period of fieldwork in Ciskei and Transkei and through a number of interviews.

The time passed since the granting of independence to the homelands which opted for it is still too short for an exhaustive evaluation of the effects this choice had for their population. It is however possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions regarding the effects the independent states will have in the evolution of the political situation in South

Africa. The most important is that they are here to stay, bar a total defeat of the white government in an all-out war, and that they may be a factor in a still possible peaceful solution of the South African problems.

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Those of Venda are an elaboration of the Topo-cadastral maps of South Africa, Government Printer.

That of KwaNdebele is an elaboration from the map in the Third Report of the Select Committee on Co-operation and Development. (S.C. 7a - '83)

INTRODUCTION

The society and political system of South Africa are certainly unusual in the present world. Granted, South Africa is not the only country in the world where a minority of the population possesses the political power, controls the economy and enjoys far higher standards of living than the destitute and powerless majority, nor is South Africa the only country where such a minority can so clearly be circumscribed to an ethnic or racial group, to the point of identifying itself with such a group. The uniqueness of South Africa is given by its political and legislative system, in which race is, ope legis, the discriminatory criterion by which every person is given his place in the society.

This blatant infringement of the rules of non-discrimination which are accepted (in theory) in the whole world, and the wide gap in the economic, educational and social conditions between the white ruling minority and the huge non-white majority, make South Africa a potentially highly explosive society. The impossibility of maintaining a situation of sheer racial domination has long been appreciated by many white leaders, although the diffusion of this awareness to all sectors of the white group has been somewhat slow and incomplete. There can be no doubt about the long term instability of the present South African situation; thus there are no doubts about the necessity of changing the socio-political system of South Africa. The necessity to 'adapt or die' has been pointed out forcefully to the white group even by the leaders of the present government.

One of the most important aspects of the South African reality is given by the ethnic and cultural differences existing amongst the various groups which form the population of the country. These differences not only separate the four racial groups which by law constitute the population of this country, but are also present within the groups themselves, making the situation in South Africa and the solution to its problems even more complicated than it appears at first sight.

Ethnic differences have a high potential for being the source of many troubles if they are not handled with care, and even more so if they are ignored. Therefore, ethnicity is a powerful force which has to be taken into consideration and given effective practical recognition if one wants to keep peaceful a country where different ethnic groups live together.

In a country with so many ethnic groups, where racial separation and discrimination have such a long history, and where the government is the expression of the interests and fears of one of those groups, it was inevitable that ethnicity - and race - would become the inspiring principle of any political move. Even when in the light of the changing international situation the most perceptive amongst the leaders of the Afrikaner group saw the inevitability of the demise of 'baasskap' as the principle of South Africa's internal policy, the solution they could devise - the homelands - was almost obligatorily based on ethnicity.

The most important aims any South African government - being the Afrikanerdom-in-politics - may conceivably have are the maintenance of Afrikaner power over South Africa or over as great a part of South Africa as possible as a means to guarantee Afrikaner economic well-being, and, most important, the preservation of Afrikaner identity. In view of the strong belief that South Africa was given to the Afrikaner by the Will of God - a belief amazingly (at least for a foreigner) held by a large number of Afrikaners - it is possible that economic well-being would have a lower priority than the preservation of Afrikaner power over South Africa. (Of course, since the National Party is - or was - the expression of Afrikanerdom and, as such, is the best guarantee for the Afrikaner to obtain the above-quoted aims, for the present government the number one priority becomes to keep the National Party in power; but this is another story.)

In these conditions, the racial aspect is certainly important, but it is my opinion that 'white supremacy' as opposed to 'Afrikaner supremacy' is not <u>per se</u> high on this list of priorities: unless there is an Afrikaner supremacy (at least politically) in the white group, white supremacy is not that important. Certainly, it is not possible to say that we have an 'Afrikaner-ruled' South Africa with the same meaning as we give to 'white-ruled' South Africa. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that at least in the political field South Africa is Afrikaner-dominated. The other Whites (English speakers and immigrants) are part of the ruling group for many reasons, not least of them because they are Whites. The main reason, however, is that they constituted an easily co-optable reserve for the garrison of the laager, once it was assured that they could not try to take control of it.

When the pressure against the laager increases, when the Afrikaners feel that their control of South Africa may be threatened, there are two

reactions. On the one hand, they offer an alternative target and try to channel the forces in movement against them towards it - as in the case of the homelands. On the other hand, they try to enlarge the laager and to co-opt fresh forces for this garrison - as happened in the early 1960s with the encouragement given to white immigration, and as it is happening now with the new constitutional proposals. This co-option to the ruling group, however, can be taken into consideration only provided that the new comers accept a somewhat minor role and, most important, provided that they will not be able to challenge the dominant position of the Afrikaners or their security.

The first and foremost principle that inspires the actions of the government is the safeguarding and the furtherance of the Afrikaner volk. It is therefore improbable that the co-option to the halls of power of the Republic of South Africa might be extended to the Blacks: if Blacks are accepted as political equals, they will be able to take control of South Africa, merely because they are more numerous than everybody else put together. Neither the government nor the white community at large are prepared to accept this.

How, then, will it be possible to find a solution to the South African problems which will defuse the explosion that many people foresee as looming in the future of South Africa? When the government began to realise that the situation was changing and that it had become necessary for the long term defence of the Afrikaner people to find a constructive answer to the question of how the Blacks could fulfil their political aspirations, it was most likely that ethnicity would become the inspiring principle behind this aspect of the government policy too. The relatively great number of different black peoples living in South Africa, their significant differences, the historical rivalries amongst them made it easy for the government to decide that the solution lay in recognising the ethnic identity of each people and in encouraging them to assert their political aspirations within their nation. In the light of Afrikaner experience, and of the experience of many African countries, it was a sensible solution. It was even more sensible from the government's point of view, since it allowed a handbook-case application of the old divide et impera policy.

The homelands have been created with one main aim: to establish territories where the Blacks could live apart from the Whites and where

they would find an outlet for their political aspirations, so that they could not advance any claim for a participation in the political life of the 'white homeland', thus not endangering white rule over it. But although the homelands policy has been formulated by the Afrikaners in the paramount interest of the Afrikaners (in this context Afrikaner and White may be considered interchangeable - provided, of course, that Afrikaner control of the white group is assured), it may also have some benefits for its largely passive subject, the Blacks; and it is possible to say that it has already obtained some beneficial results for some of them.

In the last decade, a number of black interest groups has appeared in the South African society, most of them as a result of the homelands policy. Even more important from the political point of view, the room of manoeuvre and the freedom to criticise gained by the homeland leaders has slowly extended to other black groups and has contributed to the limited but real improvement of the general conditions of the Blacks.

The homelands and the independent states are very weak and almost helpless in comparison with South Africa, and are incapable of surviving without Pretoria's commitment to their survival. But they are strong enough to play an important role in the lives of many Blacks. Moreover, they constitute a basis of power, albeit limited, from which the Blacks can start bargaining with the Whites to improve their conditions, and also possibly to increase their political weight. They are one of the few legal instruments for representing the Blacks and this can be used by them to expound their grievances and their requests. They are the only institution which is recognized by the government as entitled to speak for the Blacks and with which the government is prepared to negotiate as between equals.

The homelands wield a tangible power, and have at their disposal resources which are not inconsiderable even though they are limited. With independence the TBVC countries have increased the scope of their power and have become autonomous actors on the political scene of Greater South Africa. The effects their decision to opt for independence had on their population and the way in which they will be able to benefit from it will have an important part in the future of South Africa. Whether or not this future will be peaceful will be determined also by the degree of success of these independent states.

This thesis is concerned with the evaluation of the choice of independence - the reasons which led the South African government to grant independence to the homelands and those which induced some of the homeland leaders to accept it, and the political and economic advantages and disadvantages this choice brought them - with a view to the role the independent states may play in future developments in South Africa.

The first part examines the historical background to the present circumstances, taking into consideration how and why the policy of separate development took shape and was implemented. This examination will identify the existence of a continuous thread in the government's attitude towards the presence of Blacks in the midst of what it liked to call a 'white man's country', and towards the threat such a presence poses to white control over South Africa. It will also point out that although the homelands as they exist now were not even in the imagination of the people leading South Africa in the years before the second World War, nor probably in that of the drafters of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, they are the result of an unbroken sequence of logical steps. It will also underline that this policy has been essentially a pragmatic policy, and that its implementation has been adapted to the other exigencies of South African politics, particularly in response to the changing international situation and in support of South African foreign policy.

In the second part I shall investigate the reasons which led the government to offer independence to the homelands and the reasons which induced some of the homeland leaders to accept it. I shall again emphasize that this policy, although firmly based on ideological convictions, was - and is - a pragmatic policy. This is one of its most important aspects, because it allowed the government to modify it in conformity to changing requirements imposed by changing circumstances (or at least in conformity to changing requirements as seen from its point of view); and because it is quite possible that changing circumstances will lead to future modifications, of which the constellation of states and the search for a new role for the urban Blacks are examples. I shall also try to show that although separate development, in its broad limits, was a logical outcome of the dominant ideology applied to this aspect of the South African reality, the influence exerted by single individuals on the elaboration and implementation of this policy has sometimes been considerable. Dr. H. Verwoerd was certainly a determining factor in the evolution of separate development as it is now. But if Verwoerd can without doubt be regarded as the most important individual in the

history of separate development, others too have played an important role. M.C.Botha, as Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, exerted a strong curbing influence; while P. Koornhof, first as deputy minister under M.C. Botha and then as Minister of Co-operation and Development, was the main representative of the verligte wing of the National Party operating in this field to revitalize and give impetus to the homelands policy. I shall also point out that the personal choices of the black leaders were the most important factors in the decision of some homelands to become independent. These leaders, however, were not aiming only at their personal interests (not all of them at any rate). They made a definite choice, evaluating the conditions in which they were operating, and the short and medium term perspectives, in the conviction that the effects of their choice would bring some benefits also to their peoples. The attitude of the homelands' population towards independence, however, has not been that hoped for by the leaders of the independent states and the South African government. The main reaction to independence has been one of apathy, with a sizeable minority of the Blacks concerned rejecting it outright, and a smaller minority accepting it with limited enthusiasm.

In Part III, I shall investigate the results the choice of independence had for the TBVC countries. I shall examine the agreements entered into between South Africa and the independent states, paying special attention to the most important of them, such as those regarding security matters and economic relations. It will be pointed out that, despite all their efforts, the black leaders did not succeed in changing South Africa's basic conditions for independence. The most vital field for the success of the whole policy, the economic field, will then be taken into consideration. The different instruments South Africa uses to give economic support to the independent states will be examined, and it will be pointed out that the homelands which chose independence had, as a result of their choice, a bigger share of South Africa's aid, although not as big as one might imagine and for a limited period only. A very short outline of the economic conditions of two of the independent states will follow, to show in brief what effects South African aid had for these countries and how far this effort still is from having a successful outcome. I shall then examine how independence affected two issues which are among the most sensitive both for the South African government and for the homeland leaders: land and citizenship. The homeland leaders who chose independence were not able to induce the South African government

to make substantial concessions regarding either of them. As far as citizenship is concerned, the South African government remained firm in its unbending stance; and it could not be otherwise because this is the basic objective of separate development. On the land issue, however, it was more malleable. The concessions it made before independence were not large, but they were not inconsiderable either. After the victory of the verligte wing in the power struggle within the National Party, the government accepted that the 1975 'final' consolidation proposals were inadequate, and since then the Commission for Co-operation and Development has worked to devise a new programme for further consolidation and enlargement of the homelands. Again, we shall not see any radical change in this regard: land is too emotive an issue to be treated lightly and lightly given away. Every acre of land given to the homelands will cost the government support and votes from amongst the Afrikaners. The granting of every acre of land thus will be painfully discussed and fought over. It is possible that those homelands which have chosen independence will be favoured in the sharing out of the limited amount of land that will be released at the end of this process. Since this land will be transferred a little at a time, because of the costs involved, it is possible that the independent states will have precedence also in the transfer. This might be one of the ways in which the choice of independence will start paying positive returns in a not too distant future.

In Chapter 10 I shall draw some conclusions from what I have examined. I shall try to determine if and within what limits the policy of separate development has up to now been successful from the government point of view; and if and within what limits the decision taken by some homeland leaders to opt for independence has had any positive consequences for the peoples concerned. This will allow a first evaluation of the role the independent states have had and will have in preventing the acceleration of the worsening of the present situation and an outcome 'too ghastly to contemplate'.

PART I

THE EVOLUTION OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL AND OTHER RIGHTS OF THE BLACKS BEFORE THE NATIONAL PARTY GOVERNMENT

The Blacks have always occupied the lowest place in South African society and discriminatory legislation against them has certainly not been a National Party invention. Even before Union their condition was the same, not only in the Boer republics, where they had no political rights at all, but also in the British colonies. Even in the 'progressive' Cape Colony various measures were in force with the aim of controlling the movements of the Blacks. These measures had not, however, a deep political meaning. Although they had been enacted to assure a steady and controlled supply of black labour, they were not part of a larger political design aimed at excluding the Blacks from the political life of the country. Indeed, in the Cape Colony the qualified franchise of the time was open to everybody who met the qualifications.

After the establishment of the Union Afrikaner nationalism could exert its influence over the whole of South Africa. However, the control of the government was only for a short time in the complete power of the nationalists. For the greatest part of the period up to 1948 the government was in the hands of the Smuts party, consisting of moderate Afrikaners and English-speakers, or of the Hertzog-Smuts coalition.

The various changes of government in this period exclude the possibility that the Native policy could have been directed by clear and unchanging ideological premises. However, the results of this policy look as if a clear objective were pursued, viz., the separation of the Blacks and their exclusion from the political life of South Africa.

In the early years of the century the Blacks had a limited franchise and were hoping to extend it; they had a relative freedom of movement; and they were beginning to acquire land in increasing quantity. When Malan's National Party came to power, the Blacks had an almost meaningless franchise on a separate voters' roll, their movements were strictly controlled and their right to live in the urban areas increasingly curbed, and the areas where they could live enjoying property rights

were rigidly demarcated. The National Party's policy brought about a change in the intensity and ideological rigidity of the application of the principle of separation rather than a totally new principle in complete contrast with the previous policy.

1.1 The 'Native Franchise'

1.1.1 Pre-Union political rights

The question of political rights for the Blacks is one of the oldest causes of dissension in South African politics. Before the formation of the Union of South Africa, the British colonies and the Boer republics followed a different path on this subject: the latter clearly stating in their constitutions that 'the people will not allow equality between Whites and Natives neither in the state nor in the Church', and the former excluding race as a discriminatory criterion for voting rights. Also between the two British colonies there were differences in the attitude towards Black franchise, the rules in Natal being far tighter than those in the Cape.

In Natal the possibility of Black franchise was regulated by Law 11 of 1865 which had the practical effect of debarring all the Blacks from the franchise, excluding those who were exempted from Native Law. In order to be admitted to the franchise a Black had to be: male; over 21 years old; resident in Natal for at least twelve years; exempted from Native Law for at least seven years; and in possession of the general Natal qualifications (literacy, property valued at at least £50, or rental of £10 p.a., or income of £96 p.a.).[1] How stringent these conditions were is proved by the fact that in 1904 only two Blacks had the right to vote in the whole of Natal.

In the Cape Colony the situation was very different. The 'Native Franchise' was introduced there by the Cape of Good Hope Constitution Ordinance of 1852 (which established representative government in the Colony), not explicity, but by implication, since among the disqualifications for the franchise race and colour were not mentioned. The qualifications for voters were the occupation for one year of property to the value of at least £25, or salary and wages of at least £50 p.a., or £25 p.a. with board and lodging.

By 1884 the number of Black voters in the Cape was large enough for them to hold the balance in some constituencies of the Eastern Cape. This caused a tightening of the qualifications, which by the Franchise and Ballot Act (No. 9 of 1892) became: the occupation of property valued at not less then £75, or the receipt of salary and wages of at least £50 p.a.; in addition every person applying for registration had to pass a literacy test. Two years later, by the Glen Grey Act (No. 25 of 1894), the tribal lands and land held under quitrent tenure in terms of the Act were not allowed to count as qualifications for the franchise. Notwithstanding this tightening of the qualifications, by 1903 there were 8 117 black voters (out of 135 168), who held the balance in seven constituencies out of forty-six.(2)

By the first decade of this century small groups of politically conscious Blacks had appeared in the four South African colonies. Within the Cape they enjoyed a limited political influence, which was nevertheless particularly strong in the Eastern part of the Colony. In the three other colonies they had to rely on moral assertions, petitions and in the last instance on appeals to the Crown. They considered the Cape system, with its common voters' roll symbolising non-racial ideals, as the prototype for a just Native policy. When, after the Treaty of Vereeniging and during the negotiations for the establishment of the Union, it became clear that the discriminatory policy of the Boer republics was by no means ended, and, to the contrary, that it was likely to remain in force and even to be extended to the Cape, black political consciousness reached new heights. Local and regional political organisations emerged and coalesced, and the foundations were laid for the emergence of a South Africa-wide black political organisation.

1.1.2 The Union of South Africa and the birth of the African National Congress

One of the most hotly debated points in the negotiations for the constitution of the Union was what kind of franchise there would be for the Blacks, and whether there should be any franchise at all. The positions were well delineated. On the one hand there was the Cape Colony with its Native Franchise, standard-bearer of the enlightened imperial traditions and ideals of 'equal rights for every civilized man';

on the other hand there were the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies, the former Boer republics, which had recently received self-government and were determined to uphold - and possibly extend to the whole Union - their policy of depriving the Blacks of any political influence. Although the Natal Colony was the most British of the four, it was more interested in keeping the Zulus under tight control than in supporting imperial ideals of equality.

Because of the evolution of the political structure of the British Empire, by 1907 the British government had come to accept an equality of status for the self-governing communities overseas. Such a recognition precluded British intervention in their domestic affairs. This evolution, designed mainly for Australia, New Zealand and Canada, had the effect of freeing the South African colonies from imperial interference in Native affairs. Since the union was thus to be negotiated and decided from within the country's own power structure, it proved impossible to convince the ex-Boer republics and Natal to accept a more enlightened attitude in Native policy.

In the end, it was agreed - and the South Africa Act was accordingly drafted - that each province was to maintain its own system, therefore confining the non-European vote to the Cape, and that membership of Parliament was to be limited to persons of European descent. On the other hand, the Cape Franchise was entrenched, since the clause recognizing it required a qualified majority to be modified. For giving some voice (in theory at least) to the Blacks of the other provinces, four of the eight nominated senators were to be selected on the ground of their knowledge of "the reasonable wants and wishes of the coloured races in South Africa".(3)

This solution did not satisfy the Afrikaner nationalists, who had tried to eliminate completely any black participation to Parliamentary elections in any province, and immediately considered the abrogation of the entrenched clause protecting the Native Franchise in the Cape as a particularly important political objective. Nor did this solution satisfy the Blacks, or at least it did not satisfy that small part of the black population which at the time was interested in such things.

In reality, since the Treaty of Vereeniging was published, the politically active Blacks started worrying about the future, and working towards the establishment of organisations which could articulate their

political aspirations. The fact that the former Boer republics were promised and a few years later granted self-government was rightly interpreted as the renunciation by Britain to extend to the north the Cape system. After the publication of the draft South Africa Act, in all four colonies Native Congresses were held to express black opinions about how the proposed union should grant them representation. These regional conventions elected delegates for a South African Native Convention which met at Bloemfontein towards the end of March 1909.

This convention pleaded in its resolutions for the retention and extension of the Cape system. It rejected the colour bar clauses and asked that the clause entrenching the Cape Franchise be made unalterable. In practice an alternative approach to black representation was required, an approach providing full and equal rights for all without distinction of class, colour or creed.

Since the Convention's requests were not accepted, a delegation nominated by it was sent to England to put its case to the "Mother of Parliaments". The delegation had however to adopt more limited goals, since the extension of the Cape system to the other provinces was out of the question. The goals were now the elimination of the clause reserving membership of the Senate and House of Assembly to persons of European descent, the strengthening of the safeguards for the Cape Franchise, and imperial rule for the Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland Protectorates. Notwithstanding some success in winning over public opinion, the delegation failed to attain its main goal of the removal of the colour bar from the South Africa Act. The Protectorates, however, were to be kept out of the Union - although the delegation's influence on this decision was irrelevant - until such time as South Africa's Native policy conformed with imperial ideals.

With the memory of the war still very much alive, the elections of 1910 were bitterly fought, and polarised white society. In such a situation, Botha's government had to tread a very careful path and had to pay particular attention to the rural Afrikaners who had an extreme attitude as far as racial issues were concerned. (This was to become a constant factor in South African politics and still conditions every move of the South African government.) Although no systematic Native policy was attempted in the years immediately following the formation of the Union, several discriminatory laws were passed[4] which gave a foretaste of how the government intended to settle its Native affairs.

Although "apathy, indifference and tribal sentiment continued to characterise the African masses",(5) the small groups which had debated the issues in the period preceding the Union were still active, albeit on a local and unco-ordinated basis. The first two years of Union gave those leaders of the black community sufficient causes for alarm: major issues of Native policy had been rasied and were being determined by the Afrikaners.

These developments led to a growing political awareness of the Blacks. In their reaction to discrimination they also became aware of the necessity of checking tribal antipathies and hostilities, and of establishing an organisation through which the development of a common black nation could be encouraged. Such an organisation was established in January 1912, when many prominent chiefs and leaders of local black organisations gathered in Bloemfontein to found the South African Native National Congress which became the S.A.A.N.C. in 1919. The essentially moderate nature of the Congress is well evinced by the statements made by some of its most important leaders in which they pointed out that the Congress had been formed "to provide a representative and responsible outlet for African opinion, and to so avoid the exploitation of Native fears and suspicions by irresponsible agitators".(6) Although the Congress was at this time respectful towards the chiefs (many of them were amongst its founding members), and envisaged establishing them in an upper house, it identified tribalism as one of the main obstacles to its aim of a united black people. The Congress was to be a supra-tribal organisation which in the end would root out tribal prejudices; and the pre-existent small and scattered organisations were to become a single body recognised as the real voice of the black people. Since the founding members were traditional leaders or the products of missionary education, the political aims of the Congress could hardly have been revolutionary. They wanted equality of opportunity in the economic life and political institutions of a society which was to be based on non-racial principles. Such a society was to be based also on the generally recognised Western principles of the time which admitted equality only amongst 'civilised' persons. How far from radical the founders of the Congreee were is demonstrated by the fact that they accepted the Cape qualified franchise as their ideal, and by their decision to use only the most legal and respectful means to air their grievances and to further their aims.

1.1.3 Introduction of the Separate Voters' Roll

That the Afrikaner nationalists considered the provisions of the South Africa Act only as a temporary solution to the Native policy problems is shown by the Natives Land Act of 1913 (See below 1.3.1) which enforced territorial separation, scheduling the areas reserved to black property. This territorial separation was seen as a prelude to a complete separation of the Blacks in the political field, and not only by the most extreme Afrikaner nationalists.(7)

The issue of black representation at central level, however, did not come to the fore of Union policy for many years, also because the World War, and the economic and social crisis which followed it, required the full attention of the government. Nevertheless this issue was never far from the mind of the Afrikaner nationalists. When, in 1924, Hertzog's National Party came into power with its programme of racial segregation, it began almost immediately to seek a way for eliminating the black presence on the voters' roll. The so-called Hertzog bills of 1926(8) were the first attempt of an organic Native policy for the whole Union and they left no doubts that this government envisaged no place at all in the central political arena for the Blacks.

Notwithstanding that the Congress in the preceding few years had shown a marked reluctance to confront the authorities openly and had even shown a certain willingness to compromise with the government on some aspects of its proposed policy of segregation, the reaction of the politically active Blacks to those bills and to the policy they presupposed was immediate and unmistakeable: the bills were unacceptable, particularly those which tampered with the Cape Franchise.

However, black opinion had little influence and the effects of its opposition were irrelevant. Nevertheless, the bills failed to go beyond the first reading when they were introduced into the House in March 1927. Since more urgent problems needed a solution, and since the Hertzog coalition did not have enough votes to overcome the entrenched clauses of the South Africa Act, for some years this question was kept quiet.

When, in 1933, a coalition government was formed between Hertzog and Smuts, and in the following year their two parties merged to form the United Party, the way for a general review of the political situation of the Blacks was open. After some bargain to gain the votes of some M.P.s for the Eastern Cape, in 1935 two bills were introduced into Parliament

which consolidated and slightly modified the previous four Hertzog bills. The year 1936 saw the enactment of those two bills in the form of two comprehensive laws that in the view of the government should have settled the 'Native' problem forever. These acts were: the Native Trust and Land Act (No. 18 of 1936) which dealt mainly with the territorial and residential aspects of the question, and the Representation of Natives Act (No. 12 of 1936) which solved (for the moment) the issue of black representation.

The Representation of Natives Act modified the South Africa Act and removed the entrenched clause protecting the Cape Franchise, eliminating any effective black influence at central level. Some kind of black franchise remained in the Cape Province, but now the Blacks were on a separate voters' roll, and they could elect only three M.P.s (for the Transkeian Territories, Eastern Cape, and the rest of the Cape Province).(9) In the Senate, four Senators remained as representative of the Blacks of the whole Union, this time indirectly elected by an electoral council composed of the Chiefs of the tribes, the local councils, the Native Advisory Boards and the electoral committees.(10) The four senators were to represent the Province of Natal, the Provinces of Transvaal and Orange Free State, the Transkeian Territories, and the Cape Province excluding the Transkeian Territories.(11) This Act established also a Native Representative Council whose functions were to consider and report upon "proposed legislation affecting the black people; any matter referred to it by the Minister; any matter specifically affecting the interests of the Natives"; and to recommend, to Parliament or to any provincial council, legislation which it considered necessary in the interest of the Blacks.(12) It was a meagre exchange for the elimination of direct black participation in the elections. The Native Representative Council was only an advisory board and, although representing all the Blacks of South Africa, it had no real power, and its opinions and suggestions could be easily ignored.

Amongst the Blacks, discussion of the proposed legislation had continued since the publication of the four original Hertzog bills but a renewed wave of opposition developed when the two modified bills were published in 1935. By the mid-thirties, however, the Congress had lost its pre-eminence in black politics and lacked both the organisation and the leadership to co-ordinate the opposition to the proposed legislation.(13) The peak of the black opposition came with the formation of the All-

African Convention in which many members of the A.N.C. played an important part. The Convention met in Bloemfontein at the end of 1935 and restated the strong opposition of the Blacks to the bills. In its resolution the Convention affirmed its opinion that the only policy which could protect the interests of all was a policy of political identity, directed to the creation of a united South African nation where the different groups would be bound together by the pursuit of common political objectives, although free to develop on their own lines.

There was no point of contact between the position of the All-African Convention and that of the government, and the two bills - again modified - were enacted with the opposition of the Blacks. Once these two laws were on the statute book, however, the A.A.C. and the A.N.C. were forced to come to terms with their existence and to elaborate a policy towards the new forms of representation. Since a wholehearted acceptance of the acts was not possible, two choices remained: a complete boycott or a participation obtorto collo in the institutions at their disposal, in the hope of using the Native Representative Council in the defence of black interests and as a platform for continuing the struggle against racial discrimination. This latter choice prevailed, although not before the frustration felt by the Blacks introduced a new element of radicalism into the thinking of many of them.

In this atmosphere of diffident readiness to collaborate, the following years saw the implementation of the Representation of Natives Act, and with some hope the Native Representative Council started its collaboration with the government. The deteriorating international situation and the war which followed took the attention of the government away from the black question, and the hoped-for collaboration between that semi-representative body of black opinion and the authorities failed for the most part to materialise.

1.2 Urbanisation and influx control

1.2.1 Pre-1936 urbanisation and early control measures

The influx of black people into the 'white', and particularly, into the urban areas of South Africa is a reality of South African society since the second half of the last century. At first it was a limited occurrence: not many Blacks moved from their tribal areas, and when they did so, it was mainly to earn enough money to pay the taxes and not to settle in those areas. In this period the movement of Blacks to the areas of white economic activity (mainly farms) was encouraged by the white authorities: the farmers needed labour and a source of it was at hand. It was only a matter of convincing the Blacks to work on the white farms, and the authorities obliged.

The trickle of black seasonal workers to the white farms began to swell after the discovery of diamonds in the Kimberley area and became an unstoppable flood of labourers after the start of the mining activity on the Reef. Again, these first waves of the black influx were the result of a definite policy on the part of the Whites rather than the result of a desire to go to the mines or to the towns on the part of the Blacks. Mining required a great deal of manpower and the rapidly growing population of the mining districts required to be fed and supplied. The need for black labourers grew and the authorities resorted to many means, fair or unfair, to assure the white farmers and the fledgling mining industry of the steady flow of labour they wanted.

Up to this time the laws and regulations which regulated the movement of Blacks to the 'white' areas and their residence therein were simply provisions for the maintenance of public order, as in the case of the measures taken against 'vagrancy', or provisions taken to defend the white territories, some of which had been established less than a generation earlier, from a still dangerous enemy. The growing number of Blacks moving into the white areas and towns as a result of the expansion of mining activities caused the authorities to exert stricter control on their movements. These first examples of pass-laws, however, were still an instrument for controlling the movements of the Blacks in order to guarantee a constant supply of labour to the mines,[14] rather

than measures for the control of a part of the population which might pose a political threat.

At the beginning of this century, an already substantial number of Blacks was living in the urban areas. Although this number was far from being politically dangerous, the implications of this demographic trend began to become apparent to the authorities. The census of 1904 in the Cape Colony showed that within the borders of 1875 plus Griqualand West (i.e., the Colony less the Transkeian Territories and British Bechuanaland) there were 431 175 'Kafirs and Bechuanas' and 118 398 'Fingoes' constituting about 29% and about 8% of the total population respectively. (See Table 1.) The number of urban Blacks within the same borders was 91 812, with an increase of 46 686 from 1891.(15) The fact the census figures underlined, i.e., that the natural demographic trends in the various areas of the Colony were being modified by the migratory movements of Blacks towards the white areas, was pointed out by the writer of the census report, who noted:

> ... another feature of the growth of the population, viz., the fact that the increase in the Native Territories between 1891 and 1904 has been by no means so great as was to be expected from the analogy of the years 1879 to 1891, whereas in the Eastern Districts of the 'Old Cape' and in 'Kaffraria' it had been much more rapid than was anticipated.

and concluded

> The primary inference ... to be drawn ... (is) ... that the natives had been leaving the Territories to settle or to find work in these Districts.(16)

The official concern about the growing number of Blacks living in the white areas may be dated to the beginning of the century, but during this period the negotiations for Union drew almost all the attention, and the movement of Blacks to the white areas was still encouraged because it was still an influx of temporary migrants and was necessary to the economic growth.

From the beginning the Native policy of the Union tended to segregation. Yet the first field to be taken into consideration by the legislative activity was that of territorial segregation in the rural areas, with the demarcation of the land reserved for the Blacks

(Natives' Land Act, 1913) and the establishment in those territories of some form of local government (Natives Affairs Act, 1920). The regulation of the influx of Blacks into the urban areas and their status therein was left to measures primarily concerned with labour regulation or the maintenance of public order. By 1921 the urban Blacks were 587 000, representing 12,5% of the total Black population of the Union. Even more significant was the fact that those 587 000 urban Blacks constituted 34% of South Africa's urban population.(17)

In this period the attitude of the government towards the presence of Blacks in the urban areas ceased to be one of indifference tempered by the need of assuring a constant flow of labour to the mines and the nascent industries. This was the period in which the 'poor Whites' phenomenon reached the explosion point. The urban Blacks were in direct competition with those 'poor Whites', most of whom were Afrikaners leaving their impoverished farms, and the government could not afford to overlook the problem any longer. The main reaction was again in the field of labour relations with the reinforcement of the colour bar, which became even more deeply entrenched through the application of the Apprenticeship Act of 1922, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and the Wages Act of 1925. Also in the field of influx control, measures were taken. The Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 (No. 21 of 1923) regulated the subject. Every urban authority of the Union had to reserve areas for black occupation, in which reserved areas property transactions were limited to the Blacks. To help in the daily administration of these black urban areas, Native Advisory Boards were established.(18) In fact this law established a residential segregation in the urban areas, and provided also for a sort of influx control, requiring the registration of the Blacks as workers or work-seekers, as a condition for their residence in the urban areas. For those who did not comply with the regulations, the consequence was deportation to their reserves.(19) This Act was amended slightly in 1930(20) and the amendments were simply a restriction of some of the existing rules.

These first attempts at controlling the movement of the Blacks into the white areas and in particular towards the towns were not very successful. As Table 3 shows, in 1936 already more than half of the total Black population was living in the white areas, outnumbering all the three other groups put together. This alone was a cause for

TABLE 1: POPULATION OF THE COLONY OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE. CENSUS OF 1904

	SECTION I[1)]	SECTION II	SECTION III	TOTAL
European or White	553 452	15 808	10 481	579 741
Malay	15 615	36	31	15 682
Hottentot	85 669	2 130	3 461	91 260
Fingo	118 398	177 990	14 332	310 720
Kafir and Bechuana	431 175	431 246	251 646	1 114 067
Mixed and Other	285 382	5 674	7 278	298 334

1) NOTE: Section I comprised the 'Colony Proper' (borders of 1875) and Griqualand West.

Section II comprised Walvis Bay, Tembuland, Transkei and Griqualand East.

Section III comprised Pondoland and British Bechuanaland.

SOURCE: Colony of Cape of Good Hope, Census of the Cape of Good Hope, 1904, Final Report G 19-1905

TABLE 2: POPULATION OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. YEARS 1911, 1921, 1936, 1946. BY RACE GROUPS.

	1911	1921	1936	1946
Total	5 973 394	6 928 580	9 589 898	11 418 349
White	1 276 242	1 519 488	2 003 857	2 372 690
Asiatic	152 203	165 731	219 691	285 260
Coloured	525 943	545 548	769 661	928 484
Black	4 019 006	4 697 813	6 596 689	7 831 915

SOURCES: Union of South Africa, Reports of the Censuses of 1911, 1921, 1936, 1946.

U.G. 32-1912; U.G. 15-'23; U.G. 37-24; U.G. 21-'38; U.G. 12/42; U.G. 51-1949.

TABLE 3: BLACK POPULATION. YEARS 1936, 1946, 1951. 'NATIVE RESERVES' AND 'WHITE AREAS'. NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION.

	1936		1946		1951	
Total	6 596 000	100	7 831 000	100	8 560 000	100
Native Reserves	2 976 000	45,1	3 261 000	41,7	3 316 000	38,8
White Areas	3 622 000	54,9	4 570 000	58,3	5 244 000	61,2

SOURCE: Benso, Black Development in South Africa, Pretoria 1976, Ch. 4.

TABLE: 4: BLACK URBAN POPULATION. YEARS 1911, 1921, 1936, 1946. BY PROVINCES, AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL URBAN POPULATION.

	1911		1921		1936		1946	
Cape	113 143		124 572		219 229		333 812	
Natal	35 967		54 548		127 920		209 568	
Transvaal	35 686		347 645		690 505		1 006 082	
OFS	42 346		60 235		103 988		139 591	
TOTAL	508 142	34,0	587 000	33,8	1 141 642	37,9	1 689 053	40,7

SOURCE: As for Table 2.

TABLE 5: BLACK URBAN POPULATION. YEARS 1911, 1921, 1936, 1946. BY SEX, NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE.

	1911		1921		1936		1946	
Male	410 161	80,7	439 707	74,9	784 769	68,7	1 097 486	65,0
Female	97 981	19,3	147 293	25,1	356 874	31,3	591 567	35,0
TOTAL	508 142	100	587 000	100	1 141 643	100	1 689 053	100

SOURCE: As for Table 2.

N.B.: It is likely that in all the censuses the Black population, particularly in the urban areas, had been underestimated.

preoccupation for the government, but the fact that almost one third of those Blacks were living in the urban areas indicated the failure of the policy of segregation that just in 1936 had been so vigorously reconfirmed. This was not all, because it was clear that the urban black population had increased at a far faster pace than the black population as a whole (Table 4). From the government's point of view, the worst aspect of all this was the fact that the greatest increase was that of black women living in the urban areas. In 1921 they were a quarter of the total urban black population. By 1936 they were almost one third, having more than doubled their absolute number (Table 5). The urban Blacks were no longer migrants with no links in the towns and no desire to stay there longer than necessary. They were becoming a community with permanent roots in the places where they lived.

1.2.2 The dynamics of influx control 1936 to 1948

For the Afrikaners the situation was alarming. But the Hertzog-Smuts government could not adopt a comprehensive policy in this regard because of the different opinions of its components on this subject as well as on many others. The main 'innovation' of this period was the introduction of the principle of the removal of 'redundant' Blacks from the urban areas by the Native Laws Amendment Act (No. 43 of 1937). However big and potentially threatening the increase of the urban Blacks might have appeared to some, after 1936 the attention of the government was increasingly drawn to the worsening international situation, and to the internal implications of this. The war and the rapid industrialization of this period made the question of black influx an issue of relatively limited importance, and this is reflected by the scarcity of legislative activity directed at regulating it.(21)

Towards the end of the war, the government took the question again into consideration, and in 1945 was enacted the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (No. 25 of 1945), which restated the most important principles established by previous legislation. It reaffirmed the prohibition to the Blacks of transactions for the acquisition of land, or the lease of land, outside the urban areas set aside for their occupation, for the non-Blacks the same applied inside those areas. It reaffirmed the residential segregation of the Blacks in the urban areas,

extending this segregation to schools and entertainment premises[22] which, if they were mainly used by Blacks, had to be moved within the areas delimited for black occupation. The right of Blacks to enter an urban area was again restricted, and the possibility of removal of 'redundant' or 'idle' Blacks, or simply of Blacks without passes, was increased.[23] To give the Blacks some kind of say in the management of the reserved areas, the Native Advisory Boards were confirmed.

Despite the tightening of the rules which allowed the Blacks to enter into the urban areas, the increased segregation within these areas, and the growing possibility of forced removals therefrom, the Blacks continued to migrate to the towns. The census of 1946 showed that while the population of the 'Native reserves' since 1936 had increased by less than 300 000 souls, the Blacks living in the 'white areas' had increased by almost one million (Table 3). More than 58% of the Blacks were living in the 'white areas', and more than one and a half million of them were in the urban areas. They constituted just a little more than 40% of the total urban population of the Union; and the proportion of women amongst them had again increased, indicating that the trend towards permanent residence was continuing.

This was the demographic background to the political battle that was being fought in the immediate post-war years. Among the nationalist Afrikaners the clamour about the 'swart gevaar' became louder and louder, and to defeat this danger the doctrine of apartheid was being elaborated. The Smuts government, however, tended to reach different conclusions. It realised that the movement of the Blacks to the cities was unarrestable, and stopping the flow, had it been possible, would have meant curtailing the booming industrial development of the country, given the reliance of the whole South African industrial system on black labour.

In this period signs appeared indicating that the government was thinking of changing its attitude towards the urban Blacks.[24] A new commission was appointed, headed by H. Fagan, to study the implications of the presence of Blacks in urban areas, and to propose modifications in the relevant legislation.[25] The conclusions arrived at by the Fagan Commission were almost revolutionary: it recognised that the process of urbanisation of the Blacks had assumed such a proportion as to become irreversible (almost 60% of the Blacks were then in the 'white areas'), and expressed its opinion that legislation should be provided to recognise

this change, thus steering the Native policy 180 degrees from the course followed till then. The proposals of the Fagan Commission were under examination when the elections of 1948 totally changed the political landscape of South Africa.

1.3 Land Ownership and the Reserves

One of the most important aspects of the South African Native policy has always been the division of the territory into 'white' and 'black' areas. Indeed the territorial separation of the two main racial groups has always been the basis of this policy. Since the earliest years of the Union, legislative measures were taken to delimit the areas reserved for black occupation and ownership. These areas were intended as the place where the Blacks would live in their traditional ways, where they would return after their working spells in the mines or in the 'white' towns, and where the traditional Bantu 'extended family' would take care of the needy, freeing the white local authorities from the burden of providing extensive social services for them.

It soon appeared that the land initially reserved for the Blacks was insufficient, and a lengthy process began, directed at increasing the extension of the reserves. When this enlargement was finally approved it was regarded by the government also as a compensation for the deprivation of voting rights for the Blacks and for the transfer of those Blacks enjoying the franchise on a separate voters' roll. The trend to consider the reserves as the only place where the Blacks could take an interest in political life was already evident in this period. Indeed, provisions had already been taken for establishing and extending some form of local government in the reserves. Although this form of local government was to be changed by the Nationalist government, the legislation of this period was designed to constitute the territorial basis on which that government would build its policy of separate development.

1.3.1 The Natives' Land Act of 1913

During the last decades of the nineteenth century the conquest of South Africa by the Whites and their appropriation of the land were completed. The only areas where the land was in black hands were the locations: generally small and scattered pieces of land (the Transkei being the most important exception), demarcated in the course of the years in the best interest of white farmers.(26) However, for some time the black peasants were able to withstand the pressure exerted on them to compel them to work for the Whites, and in some cases were able even to thrive, thanks to a modernised agriculture (in comparison with the traditional Bantu farming technique).(27) The beginning of the new century saw a rather unexpected development: well-off black peasants or tribes, helped sometimes by sympathetic Whites, began purchasing land put up for sale by Whites. This was soon perceived as injurious to the white position, and in a short while a remedy was found.

An inter-Colonial Commission (the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903-1905) was established to study and to propose solutions for the various problems regarding the black people. Amongst its recommendations the Commission said that "the purchase (of land) by Natives should in future be limited to certain areas to be defined by legislative enactment"(28) and that "the time has arrived when the lands dedicated and set apart ... as locations, reserves or otherwise, should be defined, delimited and reserved for the Natives by legislative enactment".(29)

The work of this Commission yielded its fruits after the formation of the Union in the form of the Natives' Land Act of 1913 (No. 27 of 1913). The main objects of this Act were to lay down definitely, for the whole of South Africa, the principle of separate ownership of land, to check the relatively new trend towards the acquisition of land by Blacks, and to solve the 'squatter problem'. The protection of the remaining black areas from encroachment by the economically stronger white group was also among its objectives.(30) This Act scheduled the areas in which the Blacks, and the Blacks only, could purchase or sell ownership rights over the land, and prohibited them from having any ownership rights outside those scheduled areas. In this way about 8 928 000 hectares were reserved for the Blacks, in addition to 1 207 000 hectares which already legally belonged to them.(31)

This Act, however, was intended as a temporary measure - its section 2 provided for the establishment of a commission to enquire into the land issue and to report within two years. This commission, the Natives' Land Commission - known also as the Beaumont Commission from the name of its chairman - submitted its report in 1916, after various interruptions due in part to the war. The Beaumont Commission recommended, among other things, the extension of the land reserved for the Blacks, asking for an additional 7 166 000 hectares, more than half of them in the Transvaal.(32) These proposals were presented to Parliament in 1917, in the form of a Native Affairs Administration Bill, that went as far as the second reading before being referred to the Select Committee on Native Affairs, which suggested that the enlargment of the area of the Blacks' land should be reconsidered by local or provincial committees.

The evidence taken by these committees showed how much hostility the ideas of extending the black areas aroused in the Whites. In reality, the 1913 legislation and the subsequent work of the Beaumont Commission aroused not only the hostility of the white farmers, but also that of the Blacks. The Land Act was the first important measure of Native policy to be taken by the government of the Union and it set the guidelines of this policy. The Blacks were opposed to this measure and their only political movement, the newly born Congress, voiced their opposition. The Congress' reaction to this Act contributed to the consolidation of its image amongst the Blacks, and favoured the extension of the support for the movement both amongst the chiefs and the new élite and amongst the less educated multitude.

After the Act was passed, however, the Congress' attitude changed. It decided to make the most out of the existing circumstances and started pleading for more land to be assigned to the Blacks. Some of its most prominent members even accepted in theory territorial segregation in the rural areas, but only if carried out on 'just' lines, i.e., if at least about 50% of the territory of the Union was assigned to the Blacks. After the publication of the Beaumont Commission report which suggested increasing the land reserved to the Blacks from about 7,5% to about 12% of the territory of the Union, falling thus short of the expectations of the Blacks, the Congress reassumed its original stance of rejection of any policy of segregation, asking for the repeal of the Land Act and for the extension of the Cape Franchise to the other provinces.

In relation to Congress' attitude, it is interesting to remark the fact that the Congress, although established with the aim of defending the Cape traditions of black integration in the political process, had been drawn into a temporary revision of its policy by an act its members disliked but the political reality of which they could not escape, and that many of its members were prepared - admittedly out of desperation - to accept rural land segregation and even to think in terms of a wider segregation.(33) This underlines the presence since the earliest times amongst the black nationalists of a pragmatic tendency which in different times had led many of them to collaborate with the government and partially to accept its policy, in the conviction that in the face of the existing unsatisfactory circumstances, some limited gains were better than no gain at all.

1.3.2 The Natives' Trust and Land Act of 1936

The proposed enlargement of the black areas was duly considered by the local committees and their reports were published in 1918; they recommended an amount of 6 442 000 hectares (two thirds of which were in the Transvaal and none in the Orange Free State) to be added to the areas reserved for the Blacks.

These recommendations were accepted in principle by the government, but for a long time very little was done,(34) besides establishing a Natives' Economic Commission and a Select Committee investigating the 'Native Land Question'. Commissions and committees appointed to investigate the Natives' Affairs were all agreed that separate land-ownership was essential, and that more land was needed for the Blacks because the 'scheduled areas' (the land reserved for the Blacks in 1913) were becoming overcrowded. These recommendations were accepted by the government which presented them to Parliament in 1935 in the form of a Bill. The year 1936 saw the enactment of what was at the time considered the last word on Native affairs: the Representation of Natives Act (No. 12 of 1936) (See 1.1.3), and the Natives' Trust and Land Act (No. 18 of 1936).

In terms of the latter Act an additional 6 211 000 hectares - the so-called 'released areas' - were added to the black territories (955 000 hectares fewer than what was proposed by the Beaumont Commission).

Black reaction to this Act was mainly determined by its twin on the Representation of Natives. Amongst the educated urban élite and some of the most politically conscious chiefs the opposition to the 1936 legislation was total. Once again this opposition proved to be vain, and a number of chiefs and rural people were induced to think that more land was more useful to them than the voting rights of the educated élite in the Cape.

As these 'released areas' were considered in part as a compensation for the exclusion of the Cape Blacks from the common voters' roll, the government pledged itself to acquire for the Blacks all the land released for their occupation in terms of this law. The South Africa Native Trust (S.A.N.T., later S.A.B.T., later S.A.D.T.), an incorporated body, was established to keep all the Crown land comprised within the 'scheduled' and 'released' areas in trust for the Blacks. According to the delimitation scheduled in this Act, when all the scheduled land had been transferred, the Blacks would own 16 346 000 hectares or 13,3% of the total territory of South Africa. The cost of the purchase of the land was estimated at between £10 million and £15 million.

The land purchases should have been settled as quickly as possible, but spending a perceptible quota of the budget for buying land for the Natives was at the time an unpopular action.(35) After the war broke out, the purchase of land for the Blacks sunk to an even lower level of priority. The tempo of acquisition of land remained slow for many years afterwards, and the result of this was that at the end of 1979 only 4 225 047 hectares had been purchased.(36) The slowness in implementing the 1936 Land Act resulted in a constant increase in the amount of money required for buying the remaining land, to the point that it had been claimed that with the rate of provision for this aim prevailing in the 1970's and the growing cost of land, it would never be possible to acquire all the land demarcated in that law. Such slowness also made the Blacks feel sooner the inadequacy of the extension of the land demarcated for their use, and, as will be seen later, the land question became, and still is, one of the most problematic issues in the relations between Whites and Blacks and between South Africa and the homelands.

1.3.3 Local government in the reserves

Local government for the Blacks in South Africa has quite a long history, dating back at least to the Glen Grey Act of 1894 (No. 25 of 1894). By this Act, and by the following Proclamation 352 of the same year, the so-called district council system was introduced in some districts of the Transkei.(37)

Every district council was to be composed of four elected (by all the black ratepayers) and two nominated (by the district magistrate) members and its task was to assist and advise the district magistrate in the implementation of his work in matters affecting the local black population.

In 1895 a General Council was established for the four districts with district councils, composed of the district magistrates, two members appointed by each district council from among their number, and one member from each district council appointed by the Governor-General. The General Council had the power to allocate funds (revenue for which came from a general tax levied by the district councils, the rent for quit-rent land and from the payment of other duties and fines) for the expenses of the administration and for the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, eradication of noxious weeds and establishment of agricultural and industrial schools, pounds and tolls. District councils had no separate revenues, but the General Council tried to allocate funds to each district in proportion to revenues received from it.(38)

In the following years, the system was extended to other districts and in 1903 it was in force in many districts of Transkei, Tembuland and East Griqualand.(39) In the same year the General Council was re-organised and became the Transkeian Territories General Council. The council system was extended to Pondoland too,(40) but till 1931 Eastern and Western Pondoland had a separate Pondoland General Council. In that year the councils were merged into the United Transkeian Territories General Council, sitting in Umtata.(41)

The United Transkeian Territories General Council, or Bunga, consisted of the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei, acting as chairman, the twenty-six district magistrates, three members from each district council, and the three Paramount Chiefs (of Tembuland, Eastern Pondoland and Western Pondoland) who were members ex officio. The powers of the Bunga were limited, and in reality, notwithstanding the fact that it had a large

establishment of its own and a revenue of approximately £150 000 per year,[42] it was purely an advisory board because all the actual powers in connection with Council affairs were vested in the Chief Magistrate as the chief executive officer of the Council.

This situation of impotency was resented by the Bunga, and the year after the unification of the two General Councils, a new Proclamation revised the constitution of the United Transkeian Territories General Council and extended the powers of the Bunga in a significant way.

Proclamation No. 191 of 1932 recognised as falling within the functions and the powers of the Bunga:

a) the initiation and consideration of any matter relating to the economic, industrial or social condition of the Native population of the Union, or any part thereof in so far as it affects the Natives within the area of jurisdiction of the Council;
b) the consideration of any proposed legislation or existing law which specifically affects the Natives within the area of jurisdiction of the Council;
c) the consideration of any specific matter submitted to it by the Governor-General or by the Minister (of Native Affairs);
d) the passing of resolutions on any such matter.[43]

In such matters the Bunga still had only advisory powers, but it was now transformed into a truly political body, which could express its opinion on the most important aspects of South Africa's policy affecting the black population. This was the first time the Blacks had the possibility of discussing political (as opposed to administrative) matters in a body empowered to do so by the law. To give the Bunga some real power, the Proclamation provided for the establishment of a standing Executive Committee[44] which would be responsible for the administration and control of all Council affairs regarding its own personnel (a civil service in embryo), the award of scholarships, agricultural matters, public works and the institution of legal proceedings.[45]

In the meantime, the Native Affairs Act (No. 23 of 1920) provided for an extension of the district council system to other areas of the Union. The Native Affairs Commission, which was also established by the same Act with consultative and advisory functions in any matter relating to the conduct of Native affairs and to legislation affecting the black population,[46] could recommend to the Governor-General the establishment

of local or General Native Councils whose composition and powers were also proposed by the Commission.(47) From 1927 onwards local councils began spreading in various areas of the Union. At the end of the war there were eight district councils in the Ciskei, four in the Northern Cape and Western Transvaal (parts of present-day Bophuthatswana), six in the Northern Transvaal and two in Natal. However, only one General Council was established, for the Ciskei.(48) Some of those councils had reduced powers or were composed of a greater proportion of appointed members,(49) but the area and population which enjoyed this type of local government was however almost doubled.(50)

The council system was not particularly popular(51) but it gave the Blacks the possibility of training in the administration of units larger than the tribe, and of influencing in some way the conducting of their affairs and their everyday life.

1.4 Conclusion

From the constitution of the Union to the elections of 1948, the control of the government was for long periods in the hands of people whom the extreme Afrikaner nationalists (those who came into power in 1948) often regarded as traitors to the cause. This notwithstanding, the political conditions of the Blacks steadily worsened during this period. This was certainly not what they had hoped for when the Boer republics were defeated. Indeed, in the years preceding the Union, the Blacks hoped to become, with British help, one of the components of the South African political life. In fact, thanks to the British policy, they were already a junior component of Cape politics where they had a limited but growing influence.

Although in the British colonies, but in practice only in the Cape, the political rights of the Blacks were recognised on the basis of the principle 'equal rights for every civilized man', such recognition was neither wholeheartedly given nor particularly cherished by the great majority of the Whites. Indeed, more than once, legislative measures were taken to tighten the qualifications for the franchise with the undeclared but practical effect of reducing the number of Blacks eligible

to vote and thus curtailing their political influence. Already, before the Union, in the 'progressive' Cape Colony, it is possible to see forces in action tending to control and limit the participation of the Blacks to the decision-making process.

Despite this, in the Cape the Blacks were enjoying political rights and a degree of influence that very few 'Natives' had elsewhere in the British Empire or in any other colonial empire. After the British victory over the Boer republics in a war purportedly fought to eliminate inequalities in these territories, it was understandable that the Blacks expected to see the Cape Franchise extended to all the South African territories. Instead they were sorely disappointed and all they obtained was the preservation of the franchise in the Cape Province.

In the political field, the British victory was in a sense a Pyrrhic victory. The Boer republics were reduced to colonies under British sovereignty, but to gain the indispensable collaboration of the Boer population the British had to make substantial political concessions. These concessions resulted in the reappearance of the Afrikaners as one of the most powerful interest groups in the political scene. The Union would be possible only if the interests of the Afrikaners were taken into consideration or not at all. It was thus inevitable that the aspirations of the Blacks were to be disappointed.

After the establishment of the Union, the Afrikaner nationalists had two correlated targets: to take political control of the Union, which they could confidently expect because of the growing numerical superiority of the Afrikaner group over the English, and to use this power to eliminate any black influence in South African affairs as a means to assure permanent Afrikaner control over South Africa.

The elimination of any black influence in South African politics was a lengthy process and it was not to be accomplished until after the party representing the extreme Afrikaner nationalists, Malan's National Party, gained an overwhelming majority in Parliament. However, if the process of elimination of black political influence and of total (legal) separation of the races was accomplished only after the Nationalist take-over, this process was well under way long before that time. It is not possible to say that it was the implementation of a pre-planned design, nor that it always went smoothly, but it can be seen as a constant trend in the South African politics of the period, only momentarily halted a few times.

It is particularly worth noting that if the impulse to every move in this direction came from the 'hard core' nationalists, the most important measures taken in this period to curb black aspirations, viz., the Natives' Land Act of 1913 and the Natives' Trust and Land Act of 1936, were passed with the support of practically all the components of the white group. In fact, the Land Act of 1913 was ideated by Hertzog, but was passed after his break with Smuts in a period when the government was supported by a coalition of moderate Afrikaners and the majority of the English-speakers. Likewise, the Trust and Land Act of 1936, which all but abrogated the entrenched rights of the Blacks in the Cape, was passed only after the constitution of the United Party with the indispensable support of the representatives of the English community.

Only in the years immediately before and after the second world war were there signs that the United Party government was thinking of reversing its attitude towards the Blacks, and also in this case, in spite of the fact that the Fagan Commission recommended considering the urban Blacks as a permanent feature of South African society and taking provisions in consequence, the modifications were not intended to be substantial. Indeed, when Malan's National Party came to power in South Africa, it could build its apartheid policy on the firm basis already laid down by its predecessors.

CHAPTER 2

THE NATIONAL PARTY IN POWER AND THE SHAPING OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Attempt to eliminate the Blacks as a factor in South African politics

The access to power of the National Party in 1948 put an end to every trend seeking to change the political situation of the Blacks. In fact, it announced changes in their situation, but in the opposite direction to which they hoped.

The National Party came to power having heavily played on the white fears of the 'swart gevaar'. Their programme was to keep the towns as a 'white man's thing', to obtain through apartheid complete separation between the various racial groups living in South Africa, and to entrench white domination on the country, eliminating any residual influence of the Blacks at the political level. It was clear that in the demographic situation of South Africa, white political domination in the long term could only be assured by a manipulation of the demographic trends. The constantly growing number of Blacks leaving the reserves and settling in the cities or in other 'white' areas was the greatest threat to the aims of the government.

It soon became apparent that in order to ward off this threat, it was not sufficient to set up a comprehensive and stricter control on the movements of the Blacks and on their influx to the urban areas. It was necessary also to revert the trend and to move back to the reserves at least part of the Blacks already settled in the 'white' areas, both urban and rural. The relocation of people was already the logical outcome of apartheid, but the resettlement of the Blacks in the reserves was essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Afrikaner nationalism.

Even the Afrikaner nationalists, however, realised that some form of political power had to be devolved to the Blacks to avoid an explosive

reaction in the long term. This devolution of power was to be relatively limited in substance, confined to the reserves and framed into the traditional tribal system. The decision to utilise the traditional system was due both to the Afrikaner sensitivity to the ethnic problems, which led them to consider the evolution of modern nations from relatively loose association of tribes as a positive and commendable by-product of their policy, and to the more pragmatic considerations that they might find in the tribal hierarchy a willing ally, and that as long as the Blacks were divided along ethnic lines they would find it more difficult to challenge Afrikaner supremacy.

It is possible to say that the access to power of the National Party heralded a new era in race relations in South Africa. The first tasks the government undertook were to separate the various groups and to ensure that every challenge to its activity could be speedily disposed of. In a very short time South Africa was flooded with a never-ending flow of new discriminatory laws involving all aspects of life and a new security legislation which made it almost impossible to challenge this policy.

The tightening of security legislation was considered necessary in the face of a renewed assertiveness of the black political organisations, in particular the A.N.C.. During the forties, the A.N.C. was revitalized and given a modern organisation. Thanks to this, it was able to develop mass support and to regain its primary position in black politics. The main themes of A.N.C. policy became full citizenship and equal opportunity; the ultimate outcome of this policy was recognized to be the emergence of the Blacks as the major political force in South Africa. Their tactics also changed. The means used up to this point by the A.N.C., viz., delegations, resolutions and polite requests, had shown themselves inadequate and useless. Now that the A.N.C. was starting to build up a considerable mass support, it had the possibility of backing up moral claims with effective political pressure. In 1949 it adopted the 'Program of Action' which emphasised the movement's goal of 'one man one vote' and accepted as methods of struggle passive resistance, non-collaboration and strike action. It was clear that the government could never accept modifying South Africa in the sense requested by the A.N.C. and that as soon as the movement started exerting effective pressure it would be checked with growing harshness.

2.1.1 Abolition of the 'Native Franchise'

As far as political rights were concerned, the Blacks in practice were already totally powerless. Their only voices in Parliament were the three white Native Representatives elected by the few thousand Bantu voters in the Cape Province and the four senators elected by the black electoral colleges throughout the country. The Native Representative Council which was only an advisory body and in practice was constantly ignored, had ceased to function as a result of its adjournment *sine die* in 1946 in protest of the government handling of the mineworkers' strike. In reality the uselessness of the Council had already been appraised by its members who considered it "nothing but a toy telephone" because "Africans had been talking into it for a decade without a single word being heard at the other end".(52)

Furthermore, the Nationalist government considered it not only useless but also in contrast with its philosophy of ethnic division of the black population. Indeed the N.R.C. was a partially representative body of all the Blacks of the Union and as such a potentially dangerous precedent.

The government's first move against the political rights of the Blacks at central level was thus the abolition of the N.R.C. by the Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68 of 1951) which in exchange established the 'traditional' tribal authorities system (See point 2.2.1). The end of the N.R.C. was unlamented, and in reality in this period the Blacks had to cope with more pressing and hurtful things to bother much about its fate.

The elimination of the last voice of the Blacks at central level, that of the three Native Representatives, came with the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (No. 46 of 1959). This Act provided for the establishment and political development of ethnic national units (See point 3.1.1), and, among other things, provided for linking all the Blacks living in the 'white' areas with the homeland with which they were ethnically related. This in the eyes of the government made the presence of Native Representatives in Parliament superfluous. The Native Representatives were thus abolished and with them went the last vestiges of the once cherished 'Cape Franchise'.

The abrogation of the last voting rights of the Blacks at central level came at the end of a decade which saw the implementation of

apartheid and the curtailment of the rights of the Blacks in every field. It was a decade in which the A.N.C. tried vainly to protest and to exert pressure on the government to make it change its policy. This decade saw the practical failure of the legal means used by the A.N.C. to change the mind of the government and the spread of security legislation which reduced almost to nil the possibility of legally opposing government policy. The elimination of the 'Cape Franchise' did not arouse a great reaction from the Blacks, certainly nothing comparable with their reaction to the introduction of the separate voters' roll in 1936. Also this form of representation had shown its uselessness. Furthermore, it concerned only a few thousands of relatively wealthy Blacks in the Cape and was discriminatory on the basis of census. The black nationalist movement with its insistence on the 'one man one vote' principle had no more use for such limited and elitist forms of representation.

2.1.2 Apartheid legislation and black reaction

The elimination of the last vestigial remains of black participation to the decision-making process was a step in the government's policy to stifle any possibility of the Blacks in future gaining enough power or influence to pose a threat to 'white' South Africa.

Having made the Blacks powerless did not mean really having created a 'white' South Africa. The presence of Blacks in the 'white' areas was an inescapable fact, and their increasing influx into the urban areas was the most evident threat to the government's aims. In 1951 only 42% of the 8 500 000 Blacks lived in the reserves, 31,2% lived in the 'white' rural areas and 26,8%, corresponding to 2 290 000 people, in the urban areas.(53) (See Tables 6 and 7 for population figures 1951-1960.) The government's answer to this threat was to extend the controls on the movements and on the very life of the Blacks, to limit their ability to settle in the urban areas and to start removing them to the reserves.

This policy was obviously resented by the Blacks who tried to oppose to it with all the limited means at their disposal. Such opposition was led by the A.N.C., which, during the 1940's, had been reorganised and had re-established itself as the most influential black movement. The

TABLE 6: Black population. Years 1951, 1960, 1970, 1980. Black homelands and 'white areas'. Number and percentage distribution.

	1951	%	1960	%	1970	%	1980	%	1980[(1)]	%
Black Homelands	3 316 000	38,8	4 133 000	37,8	6 997 179	46,5	6 802 340	40,2	10 830 770	51,7
White Areas	5 244 000	61,2	6 795 000	62,2	8 060 773	53,5	10 121 420	59,8	10 212 420	48,3
TOTAL	8 560 000	100,0	10 928 000	100,0	15 057 952	100,0	16 923 760	100,0	20 952 190	100,0

SOURCE: BENSO, op.cit. 1976 and BENSO Survey of Black Development 1981.

NOTE (1): Including de facto population of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.

TABLE 7: Black urban population. Years 1951, 1060, 1970, 1980. By provinces and percentage of total urban population.

	1951	%	1960	%	1970	%	1980	%
Cape Province	430 809		623 043		756 688		982 300	
Natal	288 600		420 732		476 391		319 040	
Transvaal	1 399 228		2 016 067		2 647 855		3 501 860	
OFS	209 897		411 400		526 081		521 100	
TOTAL	2 328 534	43,1	3 471 233	46,4	4 407 015	45,5	5 324 300	44,1

SOURCE: Union of South Africa: Population census 1951; Republic of South Africa, Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1960, R.P. No 62/1963; Republic of South Africa, Department of Statistics, Population census 1970, Report No 02-05-10; RSA Central Statistical Services Population Census 1980, Report No 02-80-01.

TABLE 8: Black urban population. Years 1951, 1960, 1970, 1980. By sex, number and percentage.

	1951	%	1960	%	1970	%	1980	%
Male	1 424 336	61,1	2 023 082	58,3	2 533 151	57,5	2 932 020	55,0
Female	904 198	38,9	1 448 151	41,7	1 873 864	42,5	2 392 280	45,0
TOTAL	2 328 534	100,0	3 471 233	100,0	4 407 015	100,0	5 324 300	100,0

SOURCE: As for Table 7.

N.B.: It is likely that in all the censuses the Black population, particularly in the urban areas, has been underestimated.

Congress assumed a more radical attitude also because of the prodding of its Youth League,[54] and its aim now was not only to free the Blacks from all the discriminatory laws but also to obtain their full participation in the political life of South Africa on the basis of 'one man one vote'. Amongst the various nationalist groups there were sharp ideological differences, mainly between communists and non-communists and between orthodox communists and Trotzkyites,[55] and also the Congress itself was divided between moderates and radicals, the latter, members of the Youth League, taking control of the movement in 1949.[56] Notwithstanding these differences, the objective of 'one man one vote' was accepted by all. Nothing could have been furthest from this position than the new government's policy, and it took a short time before the first legislative measures of the Nationalist government[57] elicited a strong reaction from the black movements.

These movements decided to revert to passive resistance, non-collaboration and strike action. Sometimes the protest degenerated into riots causing loss of lives on both sides.[58] The most important protest of this period, however, was completely peaceful. The 'Campaign of Defiance of unjust laws' was launched by the Congress in June 1952. It was decided that volunteers would break the pass laws or other discriminatory regulations and let themselves be arrested. By the end of the campaign, decided as a precautionary measure after the unrelated riots of October-November 1952, more than 8 500 passive resistance volunteers had been arrested. The campaign did not achieve its objective of inducing the government to repeal the discriminatory laws, but was a success for the Congress which saw its membership increase more than tenfold in a few months.[59]

The government's reaction was to apply with more severity the existing laws, to amend them to make them stricter[60] and to introduce a number of new laws aimed explicitly at controlling the Blacks and at reducing their ability to protest against its policy. By the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act of 1952 (No. 67 of 1952), the network of checks on the movements and on the very life of the Blacks was completed, making it even more difficult for them to move into the urban areas and to stay therein when they were not wanted, and by the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 (No. 43 of 1953) strikes by Blacks were definitely prohibited.[61] Also in the economic field the heavy hand of apartheid was felt. The Native Building

Workers Act (No. 27 of 1951) effectively eliminated the presence of black skilled workers from the building industry in the urban areas (excluding the black townships), and a few years later the Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 28 of 1956) introduced the practice of job reservation.(62)

The efficient repression of the protest movement, concentrated on the elimination through banning of the most important and active leaders of the black organisations and of the other extra-Parliamentary opposition, had a demoralising effect and caused a general dwindling of the open membership of these organisations; the A.N.C., for example, was never able to regain the level of membership it had towards the end of the Campaign of Defiance. These years saw a greater collaboration of the A.N.C. with the political movements of the other racial groups, such as the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People's Organisation and the white South African Congress of Democrats. The result of this collaboration was the Congress of the People, held in June 1955, which approved the 'Freedom Charter' as its political programme. This period saw also an increase in the frictions within the A.N.C., again mainly between the old moderate members and the new militant leadership and between communists or pro-communists and non-communists.(63) Another cause of dissension within the A.N.C. was the growing influence and activism of the Africanist group which opposed the A.N.C. multi-racial approach and its collaboration with non-black movements, maintaining that the Blacks should aim at taking control of South Africa and that they did not need the collaboration of any non-black group.(64)

The difficulties in which the A.N.C. and other opposition organisations found themselves were compounded by the arrest of almost all their leaders on charges of high treason, in December 1956. Although they were shortly thereafter let out on bail, the conditions of the bail had the result of prohibiting them almost any political activity. The charges against more than one third of them were withdrawn a year later and those against many others were withdrawn in the following years, the remaining defendants being found not guilty. However, in an important period, the top level leadership of the A.N.C. was put out of action and this caused the internal dissension to come to the surface, further

undermining the effectiveness of its action. Such lack of effectiveness, already shown by the failure of the one-day 'work boycott' called for the 26th June 1957, was enlightened by the utter lack of success of the 'stay at home' demonstrations in April of the following year. At the end of 1958 the internal differences in the ranks of the A.N.C. came to a head and the Africanist group broke away to form the Pan-Africanist Congress (P.A.C.).(65)

The black nationalist movements were encouraged by the events in the rest of Africa and by the approaching independence of the West African states, but they did not find it any easier to act within South Africa. The government did not relent in its repressive action, the freedom of movement of the nationalist leaders was severely curtailed and the ability of the movements to organise mass action was checked by the increased severity of security legislation. The growing competition between A.N.C. and P.A.C. was also a factor of the limited mass response to the initiatives of these movements.

The last attempt of the black nationalist movements to organise peaceful mass protest against government policy, and the pass laws in particular, was in 1960. It was to be a repetition of the Campaign of Defiance, but on a bigger scale. This action, however, was not properly organised because the rivalry with the A.N.C. induced the P.A.C. leaders to anticipate the start of its action to show their militancy. Having launched its campaign after a hasty preparation and in contrast with the A.N.C., the P.A.C. was not able to mobilize a great support.(66) The day could have passed as another half defeat of the blacks movements, leading to further recrimination and disheartenment among the mass of Blacks, but the lack of nerve of the Sharpeville police transformed it into one of the worst days in the history of the Union and into the beginning of a period of unrest which for a time appeared to put in doubt the survival of white rule.

The killing of 69 harmless Blacks in Sharpeville started a series of protests outside and within South Africa which shook the confidence of the Whites and was controlled only after the proclamation of the state of emergency and the full use of the repressive apparatus. The final result was the outlawing of the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. and of every organisation which shared their aims. The reaction of the black nationalists was to go underground and to resort to violent methods to further their aims. The decision to use violence was a complete break

from the previous attitude of the A.N.C. and the P.A.C., but, given the apparent ineffectiveness of non-violent methods, was almost inevitable for all those Blacks who were not prepared to use the instruments put at their disposal by the government policy of separate development. However, both the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. were unprepared to lead an underground struggle, and although both organised their military wing, they met with limited success and were rapidly defeated.

The military wing of the A.N.C., Umkhonto weSizwe, during 1961-62 staged a number of successful bombings, not directed against people, and then started to organise for a guerrilla insurrection, but in July 1963 police raided its secret headquarters and arrested the core of its leadership.(67) The P.A.C. was in an even worse situation, since most of its leaders were already in jail, and only in late 1962 an offshot of the P.A.C., called Poqo, based in the Cape, was able to organise small groups of terrorists. Poqo also had strong links with the rural areas of Transkei. It managed with a minimum of formal leadership and organisation to create widespread fear among the Whites. The repression of Poqo activity was, however, efficient and by the end of 1963 it was to all effects stamped out.(68)

The first open confrontation of the black nationalists with the Nationalist government was thus concluded with the total defeat of the former which caused the disappearance of any organised black opposition to the government for almost a decade.

2.1.3 Reshaping of influx control and resettlement policy

The crushing of the black nationalist movements and the consequent paralysis of any organised opposition to the government policy on the part of the Blacks did not solve the main problem facing the South African government. The Blacks living in the white areas continued to increased in number and as proportion of the total black population. This continuous growth was the nightmare that troubled the government and most of the Whites. In the long term this growth could mean only one thing: that it would be impossible to keep this swelling mass of Blacks indefinitely under control, that sooner or later the Blacks would be able to challenge white rule even in the cities and on the simple force

of numbers, they would be able to win the challenge.

Influx control was the traditional instrument for checking the movements of the Blacks, in particular towards the urban areas, and for limiting their number therein. But although influx control was more strictly enforced, extended to all the black men without exception and slowly extended also to black women,(69) it was clearly insufficient to achieve the aim of reducing the presence of Blacks in the white areas. A different approach was necessary, without neglecting influx control, and this could only involve the removal of people.

Removal of people was, by the mid-fifties, already an established practice in South Africa. The implementation of the Group Areas Act required the zoning of the urban areas into sectors reserved for the various racial groups and the consequent movement of people from one area to the other in order to obtain segregated residential areas. This provision regarded mainly Coloureds and Indians, but also the Blacks were involved, in particular because of the policy of 'slums clearance' and the establishment of new townships in the outskirts of the most important cities and towns. Another occasion for removals of black people was the betterment schemes in the reserves.(70) But in both these cases the movement of people was from one part to another of the same area. After the relocation, the people who lived in the reserves continued to live in the reserves and the people who lived in the white areas continued to live in the white areas.

The idea of mass removals of Blacks from the white areas to the reserves was first entertained in relation to the proclamation of the Eiselen line. The decision to consider the Western Province as the preserve of the coloured people had the effect of making the enforcement of influx control in this region stricter. The flow of Blacks into the Western Province was to be carefully controlled and the arrival of families severely discouraged. The government's policy in this regard was taking shape and at the beginning of 1955 the Secretary for Native Affairs stated that it was government policy eventually to remove all the Blacks from the Western Province since it was the natural home of the Coloureds.(71) This policy was to be implemented gradually and in various phases and initially the removal of people to the reserves co-existed with the concentration of many of the black families removed from the small towns in the westernmost part of the region in the locations of the Cape Town area.

In this period, another category of Blacks was found deserving of being removed. The Tomlinson Commission (See 2.2.2) recommended in its report the consolidation of the reserves into more compact blocks, but found that certain areas occupied by Blacks were so situated as to make impossible their consolidation. The Commission singled out 332 such 'black spots' and suggested their elimination.(72) The government accepted this suggestion and declared that black spots in white rural areas would be gradually 'cleared up', and compensatory land adjoining existing reserves would be given to the people concerned.(73) Also in this case the process of 'cleaning up' was relatively slow and initially involved a relatively limited number of people.(74)

The government was still elaborating its policy and if, on the one hand, it had clear the reasons for wanting to remove the Blacks from the white areas, on the other hand it was less clear what to do with them once they were removed. Only after the whole policy regarding the Blacks was clarified and the decision to establish ethnic homelands as the principal instrument of this policy was taken, was the criterion to be used in the destination of the removed people clear, and with it a more tenable theoretical justification of the relocation of people. Indeed, once the concept of ethnic homelands constituting the foci of a political and national development of the various black ethnic groups and destined to become, sometime in the future, independent as the political home of all the components of their ethnic group is accepted, relocation of the Blacks to their homeland becomes a logical answer to many problematic aspects of the population composition of South Africa. As the Bantu Authorities system was extended and the number of established regional and territorial authorities grew (See 3.1), the pace of removals of Blacks for 'black spots clearance' and from the Western Cape increased.(75) Tighter application of influx control was another source of removals, but it had little effect on the total number of urban Blacks which continued to increase.

The removals started to have an impact on population figures and to involve people on a really grand scale after the decision to abolish the labour tenant system and the presence of squatters in the white rural areas was taken.(76) The elimination of the labour tenant system and the reduction of the number of Blacks living and employed in the white rural areas was noticeably facilitated by the evolution of farming methods

and the modernization and mechanization of agriculture. The white farmers who had always been lobbying for more labour on their farms, found that they did not need so many labourers any more. In fact, the reduction of the number of people employed in agriculture is a characteristic of the development process common to every country. Usually, however, this surplus population tends to move to the urban areas. In South Africa, the government policy made the movement to the urban areas impossible in theory, and very difficult in practice. Nevertheless, this trend played into the hands of the government which could start removing black people from the white rural areas without eliciting serious opposition from the politically powerful farming community.

At the beginning of the 1970's the removals had already affected a great number of Blacks,(77) and this policy started to show its effects, if not on the total number of Blacks living in the white areas, which continued to increase, at least on the proportion of the total black population living in those areas, which decreased from 62,5% in 1960 to 53,5% in 1970. However, this decrease was not due only to resettlements. The addition of newly bought quota land and the policy of industrial decentralization in the 'border areas' helped to bring it about. The policy of removals continued to be implemented, and the proposals for the territorial consolidation of the homelands introduced a new and numerous category of people affected by it.(78)

It is almost impossible to determine the number of people affected by removals since the Nationalist takeover in 1948. G. Marê identifies nine categories of relocations,(79) but does not give figures, except for two of them (about 1 400 000plus for removal of tenant labour and squatters and 250 000plus for clearance of black spots up to the mid-seventies). The group working for the Surplus People Project, elaborating on Marê's categorization, identifies eleven categories of relocation and estimates, for the period 1960 to mid-1982, a round figure of about 3 500 000 people affected.(80) This figure can only be indicative of the magnitude of the phenomenon and the exact number of the people affected in one way or the other by removals will never by known. However, these categorizations are perhaps too omnicomprehensive and indicate the tendency to blame the Nationalist government for everything,

including its positive actions. Nevertheless, the number of people removed, often forcibly, from the place where they were living and resettled or dumped somewhere else is really staggering. Even if only the categories directly related to the implementation of separate development are taken into consideration, viz., removals due to deproclamation of black townships, clearance of black spots and homeland consolidation, the number of people affected exceeds 1 300 000.

Resettlement of people is an inescapable aspect of the policy of separate development, indeed, without it, separate development could not exist. However, it is difficult to say that the policy of resettlement had been overly successful. In fact, the proportion of Blacks living in the white areas decreased steadily from more than 60% in 1960 to less than 50% in 1980. In particular the Blacks living in the white rural areas fell from 31,4% in 1960 to 20,6% in 1980 (See Table 9). Conversely, the proportion of Blacks living in the homelands increased, and in 1980 was more than 50%, the highest since 1921. However, an important, if not determinant, contribution to this demographic change was given by the cession of land to the homelands in terms of the 1936 legislation. From 1971 to 1980 about 1 000 000 ha. of land were transferred to the homelands. It is not possible to know with any degree of exactitude how many people, who in 1970 were living in the white areas, found themselves, in 1980, living in the homelands without having moved, just because of the redrawing of the homelands' boundaries. Nevertheless, their number must be conspicuous.

TABLE 9: Black population in white areas and homelands. 1960, 1970, 1980. %.

	WHITE URBAN AREAS	WHITE RURAL AREAS	HOMELANDS
1960	29,1	31,4	39,5
1970	28,2	24,5	47,3
1980	25,4	20,6	54,0

SOURCE: Surplus People Project, Forced Removals in South Africa, Cape Town, 1983, Vol. 2, p. 6.

In reality, all this apparatus of controls, all the resources spent on the resettlements, all the hardship inflicted on the people have been in vain. The number of Blacks living in the white areas, instead of starting to decrease after 1978 as it was confidently announced by Verwoerd, continued to increase, growing from 6,8 million in 1960 to 10,1 million in 1980. Their proportion in the total population of the white areas has been only slightly affected, decreasing from 57,2% in 1960 to 56% in 1980. The 'whitening' of the white areas is as far as it ever was.

It is of course true that without these removals the white areas would be even less 'white' than they are now, and that without influx control a still greater number of Blacks would have come to the big metropolitan areas. But, notwithstanding this fact, and notwithstanding that the manipulation of demographic trends takes a long time to show results - unless very drastic methods are employed, it appears that the policy of 'whitening' the white areas is doomed to failure.

It is possible that in the light of this evidence the whole policy regarding urban Blacks is undergoing a revision (See 2.1.4 and 8.1), but this does not mean that influx control and the resettlement policy are going to be scrapped. Indeed, in the case of a reappraisal of the political future of the Blacks in the white areas, influx control would probably be tightened and resettlements would continue and perhaps increase. The retention of these policies and their partial success would be a vital pre-condition of any such reappraisal. If a change in the political condition of the urban Blacks and their eventual participation in the policy-making process in the Republic of South Africa could ever by contemplated by this government, the basic condition would be that they would not have the possibility of taking control of the country. This might be achieved in the medium-long term only if the Blacks would not be the majority of the population in the area concerned, and this might only be attained by controlling their movements and removing a still substantial number of them to the homelands.

Thus, the failure of influx control and resettlements to achieve their original aims might become, paradoxically, one of the causes of their retention and of their increased implementation.

2.1.4 Recent trends in black urban local government

At the birth of the Republic, the situation of the Blacks in the white areas of South Africa was one of complete subservience. They did not have any representation, excluding the almost useless Native Advisory Boards in the townships and the faint and generally unwelcome links with the homelands; they could not move from one part of the country to the other without permission; they could not own any land or fixed property; they did not have any security of tenure. They were, in short, at the mercy of the authorities, who could deprive them of any chance of getting a job, and then could deport them. The organisations which articulated their aspirations and aired their grievances had been outlawed and were resorting to futile violent actions. These violent actions were not supported by the majority of the Blacks and were swiftly and ruthlessly dealt with by the government. The only legal way open to politically active Blacks was that of the Bantu Authorities system, i.e., that of the collaboration with the government. For the rest of the 1960's it appeared that the government had won its battle for the preservation of white rule in South Africa: the influx of Blacks in the urban areas was apparently under control, the resettlement of Blacks from the white areas to the homelands was gaining momentum and the Blacks were unable to organise themselves and to act politically outside the framework of separate development.

In the 1960's there was almost no change in urban black local government. In reality some legislative measures were taken in this regard, but their effect was limited. The Urban Bantu Councils Act (No. 79 of 1961) laid down the provisions for the establishment of Urban Bantu Councils. These could be established by an urban local authority for one or more black residential areas or parts thereof under its jurisdiction, or for Blacks in such areas belonging to a national unit in terms of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 (See 3.1.1). The establishment of such councils had to be approved by the native advisory boards of the areas if they existed, or by the local black community. A council was to be formed of elected and appointed members, the latter not to exceed the former. An urban Bantu council had all the powers, functions and duties of an advisory board, and additional powers might be granted to it in respect of residential management and population control.

In practice the urban Bantu councils were simply the old advisory boards with a different name. The most important difference of the councils was the relevance given to the ethnic factor. A council could be established for the members of a national unit living in a residential area, and thus the same residential area might have eight different councils, one for each national unit. Furthermore, if the council was established for the residential area as a whole and not for a national unit, the nominated members were to be representatives of the national units of which a relevant number of members was living in the area concerned. On members of the council might be conferred the same powers and jurisdiction as might be conferred on a chief or a headman.(81) It was, in short, the attempt to introduce the principles of the Bantu Authorities system in the urban areas.

The implementation of this act met with the hostility of the urban Blacks, and the establishment of urban Bantu councils went on slowly.(82) The black opposition or indifference to the councils persisted through the years, and also the provision that all their members would be elected(83) did not improve their popularity.(84) The urban Blacks had been passive for a whole decade, but this did not mean that they were ready to accept a powerless and merely consultative body as the answer to their aspirations.

The first stirring of a black political reawakening came at the end of the 1960's with the formation of the South African Students Association (S.A.S.O.) and with the establishment of the Black Consciousness movement a few years later.(85) But still some years were to pass before the Blacks were able to act in opposition to the government. Indeed, the black nationalist forces were so weak and disorganised that the first remarkable protest after years of passivity, the Durban strikes of 1973, broke out spontaneously and the nationalist movements profitted little from it. This period also saw the growth of Inkatha, the national Zulu cultural movement,(86) which, under the leadership of Chief G. Buthelezi, became the dominant political force amongst the Zulus, a force to be reckoned with also in the urban areas with a strong Zulu presence. The growth of Inkatha was initially received with satisfaction by the government because the movement's insistence on an ethnic Zulu nationalism was considered as the vindication of the policy of separate development. For the first time

a genuinely popular black movement could be seen working within the framework of the government policy, albeit criticizing it. On the whole, by the mid-seventies everything appeared to be under control of the government, the policy of separate development was yielding its first fruits with the coming independence of Transkei, and the Whites were lulling themselves in the conviction that everything was going according to the government's plans.

This confident illusion was shattered in 1976 by the outbreak of the riots in Soweto which in a few days extended to many other important townships in the whole of South Africa. The primer of this explosion was the issue of Afrikaans as a medium of teaching in the schools, but it shortly became a general protest against the government and its policy.(87) The widespread nature of the unrest and its persistence was a symptom of the dissatisfaction of the urban Blacks with their economic and political condition. The government had to admit that its insistence in considering the urban Blacks only as temporary sojourners in the white areas with strong links with their homelands and desirous of returning there to enjoy their traditional life was clearly not based on reality. The reality is that a growing number of Blacks live with their families in the urban areas, are integrated into the urban life, have no link with the homelands and do not in the least dream of returning there.

The recognition and acceptance of these facts were, and are, a traumatic process for the Nationalist party and for its supporters. However, spurred on in this recognition by the widespread riots of 1976-77, the government was compelled to modify at least partially its traditional approach to the question of the urban Blacks, and slowly and cautiously to begin to change some aspects of the discriminatory legislation.(88)

One of the first provisions taken was the Community Councils Act (No. 125 of 1977), by which a slightly higher degree of autonomy was granted to the bodies administering the black urban areas. The urban black councils and the advisory boards were to be substituted by community councils composed of a various number of elected and designated members. These councils could, in respect of their area and "subject to the Minister's directions" exercise powers and perform duties "as may be vested in (them) and with which (they) may be charged

by the Minister, after consultation with the administration board concerned," over a number of matters.[89] Amongst these matters there were: the control of residential questions (approval of sites and plans for buildings, allocation of accommodations and dwellings, prevention of unlawful occupation of land and so on), the administration of sporting and recreational facilities and some other matters of equally little consequence. In the area administered by such a community council there could be established a community guard for policing (in normal times) the area concerned. The sources of revenue for these councils were fees and duties on the services granted, fines and, mostly, amounts granted by the Department of Co-operation and Development.

With this law a little power was given to the black councils in the urban areas, but since those councils did not have the control over their finances and the real administration of the townships was still not in their hands, their meaning for the majority of the Blacks was limited. That the powers and the importance of the community councils were insufficient to attract the interest and the participation of the urban Blacks is testified by the low poll in the elections of the members of such councils in the most important black townships.[90]

In 1978, by the Bantu (Urban Areas) Amendment Act (No. 97 of 1978) provisions were introduced for black home ownership in the urban areas, on a 99 year land leasehold basis. Following the work of the Wiehahn Commission,[91] also in the field of labour relations there was a progressive change, both in regard to job reservation and to the right to belong to, or to form trade unions which could be registered.[92]

It is thus possible to say that a new feature of the government's policy appeared during these years. This was its concern to promote the creation of stable urban black communities. The 1976 riots made the government aware of the possible social and political instability which could be caused by the existing conditions in the black townships. This new concern for the urban Blacks was evidenced by the government acceptance of the main recommendations of the Riekert Commission[93] which were designed to accord a better deal to the urban Blacks. This concern, however, did not extend to the political field, and the government restated that it was its policy that the Blacks should realise their political aspirations through the homelands.[94]

The preoccupation of not letting the political activity of the urban Blacks get out of hand is evidenced by some aspects of the Labour

Relations Amendment Act (No. 57 of 1981). This Act allowed all the Blacks to join a trade union and allowed mixed trade unions. However, clamps on a union involvement in politics were tightened and both registered and unregistered trade unions were prohibited to give financial or other assistance to any party or candidate for election in a legislative body or to influence their members to do so.

Although at the beginning of the 1980's the government has begun to acknowledge that the presence of Blacks in the cities and towns of white South Africa may not be simply dismissed as a temporary phenomenon, it has not accepted them as a permanent and equal component of South African society. The most evident example of this fact is the exclusion of the Blacks from the new constitutional dispensation. However, the situation is compelling the government to give attention to the urban Blacks. Although it is still government policy that at national level the Blacks should be linked politically with their homelands, they are receiving more meaningful powers at local level.

An upgraded form of local government was introduced for the urban Blacks by means of the Black Local Authorities Act (No. 102 of 1982). This Act arose out of the Riekert Commission recommendation on local government. The main aim of this Act is the establishment of local government structures for the Blacks that resemble as closely as possible those for Whites. The main difference being that the black local authorities provided for in this Act do not fall under the jurisdiction of the provincial administrations but under that of the Department of Co-operation and Development.

The Act provides for the establishment of two tiers of local authorities, viz., town councils and village councils, the former with higher status, the main difference being in the degree of responsibility and powers entrusted to them. They can be established by the Minister of Co-operation and Development for one or more townships or parts thereof and will substitute the community councils of these areas. The members of a council are all elected by the Blacks over the age of 18, either South African citizens or citizens of an independent homeland, having Section 10 rights in the area.(95) A local authority is invested with all rights, powers and duties, with regard to all the matters set forth in a Schedule, which have been conferred to an administration board or any other local government body.(96) Furthermore, a local authority may employ people, acquire and sell movable property and,

subject to provisions of any other law, also immovable property, and invest or borrow money.[97] A local authority may make bye-laws, with the approval of the Minister, on any matter within its powers.

The local authorities are certainly a big step forward from the community councils both in responsibility and autonomy. However, they have not been received with immoderate enthusiasm by the urban Blacks. The percentage poll of the elections to the local authorities held in the last months of 1983, on average a little more than 20%,[98] demonstrates that although more interesting than the community councils, the local authorities have not been considered by the urban Blacks a sufficient answer to their aspirations.

2.2 Black Local Government

While, in as far as the rights and conditions of the Blacks in the white areas are concerned, the accession of the National Party to power in 1948 represented mostly a change in the intensity of the application of the policy of curbing their political aspirations, with regard to black local government in the reserves, it represented an important and decisive change of policy. In fact, from the beginning[99] the apartheid policy was two-pronged: on the one hand depriving the Blacks of any chance of influencing the political life in the white areas, on the other hand providing for an autonomous and separate development in the political and social fields. The purpose of separating the political future of Blacks and Whites was to guarantee the 'self-determination' of the white group in its own territory; but it was felt that a political evolution of the Blacks would be inevitable, and it was thought this evolution should be channeled in the form of the development of separate structures of self-government for the other racial groups, granting them, in this way, their right to 'self-determination'.

2.2.1 The Bantu Authorities System

Local government for the Blacks, in the form of the local council system, was more than half a century old, (See 1.3.3) and if on the one

hand it gave some good results, on the other hand the new government felt that it was not attractive enough to have the support of the Blacks. The government position was that the council system was not able to develop the reserves and to motivate the Blacks for the task of moving from a subsistence economy to a framework of modern developing activities. The reasons for this were (in the government view) that the council system was not related to the traditional Bantu hierarchy, and as such, it was unattractive to the Blacks; and that the council system was kept under strict guidance by the white authorities giving the Blacks few incentives to support or participate in an essentially powerless structure. To modify this situation it was felt necessary to give the Blacks a more direct sharing, financially and politically, in a more responsible structure.(100) This new structure was the Bantu Authorities System introduced in 1951 by the Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68 of 1951) at least in the Statute book, because to introduce it in practice took a little longer, as we will see later.

This system was to be based as far as possible on the traditional Bantu tribal organisation,(101) and was to be structured as a three-tiered hierarchical system. At the lower level there would be a tribal authority based on the existing tribes (those groups not forming a recognised tribe, and for which it was not possible to appoint a chief of 'royal' blood, would form a community under a headman acting as a chief); at the middle level there would be a regional authority, in order to co-ordinate, at a higher level, the affairs and the administration of two or more tribal authorities; and at the higher level two or more regional authorities could be unified under a territorial authority with wide administrative powers.(102)

The tribal authority was to consist of the chief or the headman of the tribe or community, and of a number of appointed councillors. It had the power to administer the affairs of the tribe or community for which it had been appointed; to "render assistance and guidance" to its chief or headman in connection with the performance of his functions; "to advise and assist" the government, or any regional or territorial authority having jurisdiction over it "in connection with the matters relating to the material, moral and social well-being" of the members of the tribe. The revenues for the tribal authority were to come from fees, charges and fines payable to the chief or the authority under the

existing laws and customs, and from money assigned to it by the government.(103)

The regional authority could be established in respect of any two or more areas for which tribal authorities had been established. It was to be composed of a number of members elected or selected from amongst the chiefs, headmen and councillors of the dependent tribal authorities. Its powers were "to advise and make representations to the Minister" (meaning the then Department of Native Affairs) in regard to all matters affecting the population of the area under its jurisdiction; to provide, under the direction of the Minister, for the establishment and management of educational institutions, hospitals and clinics, the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and other works of public utility, and for the improvement of farming methods and all the matters relating to agriculture. The regional authority had the power to levy a general tax on every black male in the area of its jurisdiction, and to make bye-laws in regard to any matter falling within its competence, including bye-laws prescribing fees or rates payable in respect of services it made available. Such bye-laws had to be approved by the Governor-General, and any amendment made by him was automatically entered in the text of the bye-law. To the regional authority were payable all the amounts collected in relation to the levies imposed by it, or to the bye-laws it made, or to contraventions to such bye-laws; and any amount which Parliament might appropriate for this purpose.(104)

The territorial authority could be established in respect of any two or more areas for which a regional authority had been established, and its members were to be elected or selected from amongst the members of the dependent regional authorities. It could exercise the same powers as the regional authority (in which case the regional authorities placed under it would lose those powers), and receive parts of the revenues of the regional authorities.(105)

The Bantu Authorities Act, as we have seen, provided also for the abolition of the Native Representative Council.(106)

Notwithstanding that this Act extended the powers of the General Councils and made their substitutes, the regional and territorial authorities, completely black, it was not welcomed by the Blacks, even in the reserves. Since the government decided to apply the Bantu Authorities system only when the population concerned asked for it, it

had to wait for some years before its powers of persuasion convinced the first black group to accept it. The first victory for the Bantu Authorities system was scored in the Bunga, when it dissolved itself, accepting reconstruction as the Transkeian Territorial Authority (24th November 1955).(107)

There could have been many reasons for this decision, but it is beyond any doubt that the system appealed to the traditional chiefs (who formed the majority of the Bunga) for the greatly increased responsibility and financial autonomy it promised, and, above all for the new powers it gave them. In fact the tribal authority, which is the basis of the whole system, had its own basis in the old chiefdoms, which after occupying an equivocal position for about sixty years became the backbone of the administrative system, and this was to have a great influence on the future appreciation of chieftainship by tribesmen.(108)

2.2.2 The Tomlinson Commission

Even before the presentation to Parliament of the Bantu Authorities Bill, the government decided to face the whole question of the black areas in a comprehensive way. In 1950 a new commission, the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa, chaired by Professor F.R. Tomlinson, was established, with the aim of enquiring into all the aspects of actual conditions in the black areas, and in particular into the possibility of, and conditions for the economic and social development of those areas.(109)

The Tomlinson Commission presented its final report in 1954. The Commission considered that the "so-called Native question (was), undoubtedly, the most formidable and urgent of South Africa's problems", and that the Whites faced a fundamental choice, decisive for their own future, "between two ultimate poles, namely that of complete integration and that of separate development of the two main racial groups".(110) Since it was convinced that there was little hope of "evolutionary development" in the integration scenario, the Commission recommended that "the separate development of the European and Bantu communities should be striven for, as the only direction in which racial conflict may possibly be eliminated, and racial harmony possible be

maintained".[111] To accomplish this aim, the most necessary condition was the "sustained development of the Bantu Areas on a large scale". The Commission pointed out that the black population of the Union was divided into various ethnic groups, with different languages and traditions, and recommended the consolidation of the black areas around the traditional "heartlands" of the most important black ethnic groups, which in the course of time would exercise an ever-increasing degree of self-government.[112]

The Commission found that the black areas were appallingly poor, and even their agriculture was hopelessly inadequate because of the backward techniques and soil erosion (in Transkei, one of the most eroded of the black areas, only 26% of the land was free from erosion);[113] and that the real income produced in the reserves "has remained almost unchanged since 1936, ... while the per capita income has even fallen".[114] The Commission proposed a total modification of the economic and social life of the black areas. About one half of the population present there at the time should be removed from the land, leaving there only full-time farmers and their families, who only in this way could have enough space to grow sufficient food for themselves. But even in this case "until agricultural practices and methods have greatly improved, there will be little or no surplus grain available for the use of their non-farming population".[115] The Blacks leaving the land would have to find their livelihood in commerce and industry. The Commission estimated that about 50 000 new jobs per year would have to be created in the black areas in the following twenty-five years,[116] and, since "as far as industries are concerned, the Bantu areas are in fact a desert",[117] and that "owning to lack of a sufficient number of entrepreneurs among the Bantu", "the desired tempo of development will probably not be attained",[118] it proposed that the necessary stimulus to development be provided by white private enterprise, both inside the black areas and through the establishment of industries in "European Areas adjacent to Bantu Areas (Border Areas)".[119]

The government answered to the findings and proposals of the Commission with a White Paper issued in May 1956,[120] in which - after commending the Commission for collecting "precious factual material", and for its stand in favour of the government policy of separate development - it decided to accept only part of the recommendations of

the Commission. In particular, it accepted that the establishment of industries in the black areas had to be undertaken, but, rejecting the recommendation of the majority of the Commission about the establishment of white-owned industries inside those areas, it decided that "private European industrialists should not be permitted into these areas".(121) The government accepted as of the "utmost importance" the development of industries in border areas,(122) but did not "regard it desirable at this stage" to establish a development corporation for the black areas,(123) nor to spend for this corporation the £25 million over a period of five years the Commission considered necessary, because this decision was "presumably based upon the principle, which is not accepted, of the admission of large European privately owned industries into the Bantu Areas".(124) Also with regard to the territorial consolidation of the black areas the government rejected some of the recommendations of the Commission. In fact, it accepted

> the principle that Territorial Authorities, as envisaged in the Bantu Authorities Act, should be founded on an ethnic base and, furthermore, that by the exchange of 'black ownership spots' in the European areas ... for land adjacent to Bantu areas, more geographic consolidation will be effected.(125)

But since the process of acquisition of the released areas under the terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 was far from being complete, it was

> however, unrealistic to indicate at present, vague boundaries on maps which involve further European land, the acquisition of which cannot possibly now be considered. Further Governments may have reason to return to such theories. At the present moment this is not a practical issue.(126)

In the following years the government continued to weigh the report and the decisions to be taken until, five years after the presentation of the report, it made up its mind and presented a new legislation to Parliament.

2.3 Conclusion

After coming to power the Nationalists tried to shape South Africa according to their ideology. To obtain their objectives they implemented a policy of increasingly rigid separation of all the racial groups which form the population of South Africa. Also the two other minority groups, Coloureds and Indians, were strongly hit by this discriminatory policy, notwithstanding the fact that the government considered them as potential subordinate allies in the case of a confrontation with the majority racial group (it took some time, however, to consider the Indians as such, the original Nationalist plan for them being repatriation). Obviously, the most affected group was the black group. A simple look at the population figures explains why. It was clear that in the long run the government's aim of an Afrikaner-dominated South Africa, or, looking at the other side of the coin, of a homeland for the Afrikaners in the land settled by their forefathers, was incompatible with the demographic reality. It was thus necessary to try and modify this demographic reality if the aim of the Afrikaner nationalism was to be safely achieved.

Initially the measures taken were directed at checking the influx of Blacks into the urban areas and at controlling their activities therein. The Blacks were to live preferably in the reserves, or in demarcated locations in the white areas where they would be accepted only in their quality of sellers of labour. They were in the white areas on sufferance and almost no role was comtemplated for them in the political field. They were to obey the government or the 'baas' and eventually go back to the reserves to obey chiefs and headmen who in their turn obeyed the government.

Government policy and actions were strongly opposed by the Blacks. Their opposition lead to a confrontation with the government which ended with the total defeat of the black movements. These movements, particularly the A.N.C., had been able to extend their influence in the black community and at times to mobilize mass support to fight political battles. The A.N.C. was mostly successful in mobilizing the Blacks in the early 1950's when the introduction of apartheid legislation was harshly felt and the security legislation was not as comprehensive as it was to become later. The Campaign of Defiance was the high tide mark of

A.N.C. influence. In this period its official membership touched the record level of more than 100 000, and its influence amongst the urban Blacks, and also in the rural areas, was generalized and without contrast. This great effort of the A.N.C. and the Blacks to induce the government to change its policy was, however, totally unsuccessful.

In the aftermath of the Campaign of Defiance the A.N.C. entered a crisis, caused by various factors. The security legislation was made more stringent and the Congress was temporarily decapitated by the banning of most of its leaders. The new leaders who took their place had neither their experience nor their personal influence amongst the masses. The masses, although still recognizing the Congress as their standard-bearer, had been disheartened by the failure of the Congress to obtain even the minimal concession from the government and deterred from acting in the political field by the combination of tightened security legislation and expanded policy of removals from the urban areas at the smallest infraction. To compound these difficulties, ideological and tactical differences emerged stronger than ever in the leadership of the Congress, paralysing its actions, driving away from it the most moderate of its members and finally causing the split which led to the creation of the Pan Africanist Congress.

Although there were still periods of mass activity, particularly after the old leadership returned on the political scene, the black nationalist movements were again unsuccessful and unable to induce the government to change its policy. To the contrary, their strongest challenge to the government, in 1960, which induced foreign observers to think that the 'wind of change' was blowing also in South Africa, led instead to their outlawing and to the crushing of any organised black opposition. After the outlawing of the A.N.C. and P.A.C., although the majority of urban Blacks still supported them, the black nationalist movements were for many years totally ineffective and constituted no more than a limited nuisance for the government.

The crushing of any organised opposition amongst the Blacks, however, solved only an immediate problem. The Blacks in the white areas continued to increase, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the total black population, and already in 1951 they constituted more than half the population of these areas. The defeat of the black movements and their subsequent banning would assure the break up of effective black opposition for a period of time, which could be

lengthened by the use of an efficient apparatus of control and repression. But the absence or ineffectiveness of black opposition could not be taken for granted to last for long. The demographic reality was self-evident: also in the white areas the majority of the population was constituted by Blacks and their number was growing. It would not be possible to keep them in a subservient condition forever.

For Afrikaner nationalism it was unimaginable to accept the inevitable outcome of such a situation: black majority rule over the whole of South Africa. The only chance to avoid this unpalatable future lay, in government opinion, in the modification of the demographic trend towards the increase of Blacks in the white areas. Since influx control, aimed at controlling the movements of the Blacks from the reserves to the white areas, could only slow down the flow, it was thought necessary to start a movement in the opposite direction.

The resettlement policy was the most immediate answer to the need of moving the Blacks out of the white areas. However, this policy taken alone was self-defeating. If it were implemented to its end the reserves would become an overcrowded and unstable focus of resentment and the white areas would grind to a standstill. Indeed, it was clear to everybody that 'white' South Africa could not survive without the Blacks. Therefore influx control and resettlements could not be the answer to the government's dilemma. The Blacks were needed to make the South African economy work, and they were needed in such a number that they would always constitute a political menace to Afrikaner nationalism.

It was necessary to find a political dispensation in which the Blacks would fit without threatening Afrikaner control of South Africa. This dispensation was found in the political upgrading of the reserves, extending or establishing their powers of local government with a view to a future expansion of these powers. The Blacks would maintain their links with the reserves and their traditional hierarchy and would continue to be considered as temporary sojourners in the white areas.

The Bantu Authorities System, however, was only reluctantly accepted by the Blacks living in the reserves and therefore slowly implemented. Furthermore, it was clear that impoverished reserves endowed with limited powers of local government were an insufficient political dispensation even for their inhabitants, let alone for the urban Blacks. The government accepted that in the long term the status of the reserves

would have to be changed and vastly improved, but it was Verwoerd's inspiration which expanded the still rudimentary policy in regard to the reserves into the vision of a separate development of the black territories leading to their eventual independence.

CHAPTER 3

THE EVOLUTION OF THE HOMELANDS

3.1 The Homelands come into being

3.1.1 Verwoerd's homeland policy

The decisions taken by the government in its limited acceptance of the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission, as spelt out in the White Paper,(127) were put into practice in 1959 by the Bantu Investment Corporation Act (No. 34 of 1959) and by the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (No. 46 of 1959).

By the former act, a corporation (Bantu Investment Corporation of South Africa Limited) was constituted for the promotion of economic development in the black areas, and its operations were to be limited to "Bantu persons and Bantu undertakings in Bantu areas". The B.I.C. was to "promote and encourage the economic development of Bantu persons in the Bantu areas" by providing capital, technical assistance, and specialised advice to encourage the establishment by Blacks of new industrial and other undertakings, and therefore the formation of a self-reliant class of black entrepreneurs.

By the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, on the one hand the process of depriving the Blacks of any political influence still exercised in the 'white area' was completed, by repealing the Representation of Natives Act of 1936, and by the abolition of the last vestiges of the Cape Franchise.(128) On the other hand it augmented slightly the powers of the territorial authorities, and for the first time gave legislative recognition to the different ethnic groups into which the black population of South Africa is divided.

This Act recognised eight national units,(129) each of them destined to have a territorial authority, whose powers were increased in so far as they had legislative powers (not, of course, enabling them to legislate in opposition to Parliament) in the area of their jurisdiction, in connection with matters regarding social welfare and education of the population of the area, the administration of justice, the licensing of trade, and in any matter in respect of which the Governor-General or the

Minister of Bantu Administration and Development might make regulations and which fell within the scope of territorial administration.(130) The powers of the territorial authorities in this field were limited not only in scope and importance, but also because the Governor-General or the Minister could withdraw any of them at any time. Up to this time revenues payable to a territorial authority were those payable to a regional authority and shifted to it by proclamation. From now onwards, the territorial authority received an autonomous source of revenue, being empowered to impose a tax on the Blacks living in the area of its jurisdiction, and a tax on their income,(131) initially only with the Governor-General's approval. The territorial authorities could nominate representatives in the urban areas, acting as 'ambassadors' or 'consuls' of the territorial authority in relation to the population of its national unit living in those areas.(132) The South African government, too, had its representatives to the national units, in the person of a commissioner-general,(133) whose functions were to "furnish guidance and advice" to the national units; to "promote the development of the administration of justice"; to "consult with the Bantu population", in particular with their recognised representatives, "in regard to all matters affecting the interests of the national unit concerned"; to "enlighten the population in regard to government policy and legislation"; and to "advise the Minister in regard to the needs and wishes of the population".

During the debate for the introduction of this bill, there were the first references to a possible future development of the black areas into completely self-governing homelands, or even, in some far distant future, into independent states.(134) It was still a vague prospect, and although Dr. Verwoerd could say that "indeed we regard the territorial authorities as independent bodies in the first stage of development",(135) nobody tried to specify what form those independent bodies would have and when they would attain the further stages of their development. Under the pressure of the Opposition(136) the government could only say that it did not envisage any future threat to the security or economic welfare of South Africa caused by the development of the national units, and it explained its programme by saying that "it is ideal to retain political independence with economic interdependence".(137)

The main reason for taking this way, a way which could bring about, and has indeed brought about, some kind of partition of the territory of

South Africa was that the government felt the growing pressure of a black nationalism. In this way it tried to channel it in the direction of an ethnic nationalism and away from a racial nationalism which could have been (and still can be) more dangerous for 'the mission' the government had (or which it thought it had), i.e., the preservation of the Afrikaner volk through its political domination over at least a part (the largest possible) of South Africa.(138) The channelling of the rising black nationalism in a less dangerous direction would be accomplished by awakening the pride and the sense of 'selfness' of the Blacks using "a system which has developed over the centuries amongst the Bantu ... taken as the starting point for development"(139) in the political field, and organising the structures for power-management for the Blacks on an ethnic base, giving legislative recognition to the national units into which the black population can be divided.

Although it enhanced the 'legislative' powers of the territorial authority, this law did not actually increase them in a meaningful way, nor did it increase the representative quality of the assembly, as the members were still appointed. But notwithstanding this, it was an important law, because, to use the words of the then Leader of the Opposition, Sir de Villiers-Graaff, "although in this Bill no rights of substance have been given to the future black dominions, nevertheless, the very act of establishing these national units as entities ... (was) ... setting them on ... (the) ... road ... (to independence)".(140)

Up to this time the diffusion of the Bantu Authorities system was not particularly fast: the only existing territorial authority was the Transkeian Territorial Authority, established, by Proclamation 180 of 1956, on the 1st September 1956; under the jurisdiction of the T.T.A. there were seven regional authorities and 123 tribal or communal authorities. Outside Transkei there were 195 tribal authorities and nine regional authorities, most of them in Ciskei.(141) The government hoped to implement the provisions of the Bantu Self-Government Act in a few years, but since the Bantu Authorities system was unpopular amongst the Blacks, the implementation took a considerable time: the first territorial authority (besides the T.T.A.) to be established was the Ciskei Territorial Authority on the 24th March 1961, followed on the 21st April by the Tswana Territorial Authority, but both had to wait until 1968 to see the institution of their executive councils. In 1962 three other territorial authorities were established (Lebowa, Machangane

and Thohoyandou), one of them (Thohoyandou) with the executive council. Only in the last years of the decade were other territorial authorities and executive councils established.(142) Particularly interesting, in the light of future developments, was the strong opposition to the Bantu Authorities system amongst the Zulus and in particular by the Buthelezi tribe.(143)

In establishing the national units, the government hoped for a speedy establishment of the homelands, but did not have a clear idea of what to do afterwards, and the statements about future self-government, or even independence, were so vague as to leave the shape of this autonomy and the time of its attainment in the mist of an unspecified future.

In the immediate years that followed the introduction of the homelands, the government, under internal and external pressure, made the choice of really giving the homelands independence in the future. It was not an easy decision, and the eventual partition of South Africa was not enthusiastically endorsed, but it was considered the only acceptable choice between the unpleasant fact of partition and the totally unacceptable alternative of black rule.(144)

Again, a year later, exigencies of international relations made the implementation of separate development leap forward. Wanting to extend that policy to South West Africa and hoping for a positive ruling of the International Court of Justice on its right to keep control of the territory, the South African government thought it was an apt time to show the world that it meant business with its policy of separate development. Again Transkei was the subject of this experiment which transformed it into a "self-governing territory within the Republic of South Africa"!

3.1.2 Transkei becomes a self-governing territory

The spark which ignited this new phase of separate development came however not from the government, but from the T.T.A.. On the 21st April 1961, a motion was moved in the Bunga requesting "that ... this Territorial Authority in session, respectfully requests the Government to declare the Transkei Territories as a whole a self-governing state under the control of the Bantu people".(145) This motion took the white officials

in Umtata by surprise (or, at least, the motion having been tabled two days earlier, they did not realise its implications immediately), and they convinced the T.T.A. to keep the question in cold storage for a while. The government decided to seize the opportunity, and a few days later the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.A.C. van de Wet Nel, let it be known that the government was ready to give the Blacks the possibility of ruling themselves in the homelands, and on the 26th April, the T.T.A. decided to appoint a recess committee to inquire into the implications of self-government. This committee did not meet until the new year, but in the meanwhile some of its members met with Dr. Verwoerd who told them that the government was prepared to co-operate with the T.T.A. in obtaining self-government for Transkei, and that, provided that they did not consider a multi-racial government elected by a multi-racial electorate, they would decide for themselves what kind of constitution they wanted.(146)

The decision to give self-government to Transkei, the limits of this self-government, and the reasons behind this decision were stated by the Prime Minister in Parliament at the beginning of 1962.(147) He said that although he was "not prepared to permit a dramatic development", the decision of giving self-government to Transkei was a very important development which showed that the government was "honest in its policy" and in "earnest". The decision was taken also because "of the demands being made by the Afro-Asian states in respect of S.W.A. in relation to the Republic of South Africa itself", and since those demands were unacceptable, it was necessary to show to the world that the policy of separate development was working, and working well. It was clear that in the end such a policy could produce the partition of South Africa, but the government felt that it was a reasonable price to pay to maintain white rule over the 'white' South Africa.(148) In the light of this, the government could announce that self-government would be in operation in Transkei before the end of 1963.

The drafting of the constitution for the new self-governing territory by the select committee of the T.T.A. took less than three months, and it was based on the suggestion of the chairman of the committee, Chief K.D. Matanzima.(149) It is true that the constitution was drafted by Transkeian Blacks, and then submitted to the T.T.A. and to groups of Transkeians for approval, but the committee had not enough freedom of choice to be defined truly independent. Indeed, in the drafting of it,

Matanzima did not allow any discussion about a multi-racial constitution (which was clearly declared unacceptable by Verwoerd), and at the end of its work the committee expressed its "appreciation of the patient, valuable and friendly assistance" rendered to it by various officials of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.(150) Thus there can be no doubt that the draft constitution was considerably influenced by official direction, as it could be logically expected.

The draft constitution was swiftly approved by the T.T.A. on the 1st May and then the Department of Bantu Administration and Development provided the drafting of the Transkei Constitution on this basis. The proposed Constitution before being introduced into the white Parliament was submitted, on the 12th December 1962, for approval to the T.T.A. which approved it without changes, even if there was some opposition reflecting the cool reception with which it was received by many Transkeians.(151) At the beginning of 1963 the Bill was introduced into Parliament, and the Opposition decided to fight it at every stage.(152) To pass this Bill it was necessary to make a slight amendment to the South Africa Constitution Act in regard to the entrenched clause protecting the two official languages (the amendment provided for the recognition of one or more Bantu languages as alternative official languages for Bantu areas declared self-governing).(153) The Bill was in due course approved and became the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 (No. 48 of 1963) and the Transkei became a "self-governing territory within the Republic of South Africa".

Only the black areas were included in the definition of the territory of Transkei, thus excluding the white enclaves of Umtata, twenty-five other towns, seats of magisterial administration, some white farming areas, and the town of Port St. John's; it was however provided for the 'zoning' of these areas for black occupation and ownership by proclamation of the State President.(154) The citizenship of Transkei was for Blacks only, thus excluding Whites and Coloureds living permanently in the territory. Citizenship included Blacks born in the territory or domiciled there for at least five years, Blacks living outside the Transkei who spoke any dialect of Cape Nguni, even if they were not born in the Transkei, unless they owed allegiance to another Bantu homeland, and other Blacks living outside Transkei who derived from Sotho-speaking tribes living in the territory.(155) The territory was to have an executive council composed of a chief minister and other five ministers(156)

(other ministers, up to a maximum of nine, could be added in future by the State President) elected by the Legislative Assembly amongst its number.[157] The Legislative Assembly was to be composed of the four Paramount Chiefs, sixty chiefs (all members ex-officio) and forty-five members elected by all Transkeian citizens - men and women - over twenty-one years of age or over eighteen if taxpayers.[158] The Assembly had exclusive powers in certain matters (listed in a schedule of 24 paragraphs)[159] to which, with the approval of Parliament, other matters could be added, excepting those expressly excluded from the Assembly's powers by this law[160] (such as military matters, foreign policy, monetary and financial policy). The Legislative Assembly had the power to legislate in the matters under its jurisdiction even in contrast with the central Parliament, and to amend or repeal any law in so far as it related to such matters and applied to Transkei or to Transkeian citizens. The only check on this power was a kind of suspensive veto held by the State President who could refer back for further consideration the laws approved by the Assembly. Sources of revenue for the Assembly were: the taxes payable by any Transkeian citizen in terms of the existing legislation and of any further legislation approved by it; fees, fines, taxes deriving from the administration of those matters subject to its jurisdiction; an annual grant from the Republic approximately equal to the expenditure of the government on behalf of Transkei in the 1962-63 fiscal year, and any additional sum of money which might be appropriated for this purpose by Parliament.[161]

The Transkei Constitution Act placed Transkei in the same constitutional position enjoyed by many British and French colonies a decade earlier, and the cession of powers to the Transkeian Legislative Assembly was more significant than the contemporary situation in Basutoland.[162] It stirred up much protest amongst the Blacks, the opposition parties and abroad, but caused also some interest in quarters not favourable to apartheid.

Besides the fact that the cession of powers was not so extensive as some hoped, two main faults were seen in this constitution. One of these was the decision to limit Transkeian citizenship only to the Blacks, which implied the exclusion of a multi-racial solution. The other was the large number of chiefs, members ex-officio of the Assembly. Since the chiefs were on the payroll of the government, which had the power to

remove them, it was feared, and with good reason, that they might not be independent enough from its pressures. The latter circumstance was not so grave in theory since it was thought of as a transitional phase, and in consideration of the fact that in all the pre-independence African parliaments the number of appointed members was larger than the number of those elected, if there were any elected members at all. But it was another step toward the entrenchment of the power of the chiefs (and this was an autonomous decision taken by the select committee of the T.T.A., because, at the beginning, the South African government wanted more, if not all, members to be elected to the Legislative Assembly),(163) and this entrenchment would cast many doubts on the credibility of the future developments. But the really crucial aspect of the constitution was the citizenship question. It had to be clear to all that the citizenship issue could not be solved in any way but in the one which was chosen: every Black with links, however tenuous, with the Transkei became a citizen of Transkei, and no White or Coloured, even if born there, could take Transkeian citizenship. This was the very core of separate development and any different solution would have meant failure by default for this policy. But of course this solution endangered the credibility of Transkei at this stage, and was going to damage it even more in the future: as we shall see later, it was the death-knell for any hope of international recognition of the independent homelands.

3.1.3 Political stalemate and economic decentralization

In the following years - while Transkei began its life as a self-governing entity amid polemics and political struggles, and Kaizer Matanzima began his march toward almost absolute power in the territory - the policy of separate development lost a great deal of the impetus it had in the period 1958-1963. There was less external pressure against the policy of the National government; the internal opposition was crushed, apparently for good (it would take until 1973 before any important signs of reawakening of organised opposition, and until 1976 before that opposition could again shake the confidence of the ruling group); the question of South West Africa was solved at the International Court of Justice in a way favourable (for the moment at least) to South Africa; and, not least of all, in 1966 Dr. Verwoerd, the 'father' of

separate development was murdered, and with him was lost not only the mastermind of separate development, but also its main propulsory force.

These years saw only the slow implementation of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, with the institution of three territorial authorities and five executive councils.(164) In this period were also laid the basis of the hoped for economic development of the homelands, along the lines indicated by the White Paper of 1956. In this regard the first measure taken (after the establishment of the B.I.C.) was the Bantu Homelands Corporation Act of 1965 (No. 86 of 1965) by which the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development was empowered to establish by proclamation a development corporation in respect of a homeland or a national unit. The objects of such a corporation were "to plan and to promote in all spheres the economic development of the homeland in respect of which it (had) been established, and the general welfare of such Bantu homeland and its population".(165) Such a corporation, whose only shareholder could be the S.A.B.T., was to co-operate with, and then replace the B.I.C. in its operations in the homeland concerned, and to work as the main instrument for the intervention of the state as the main propulsive force of the economic development of the territory. Following this act, the Xhosa Development Corporation was established, to operate in the areas occupied by the Xhosa national unit, i.e., Transkei and Ciskei.

This law was repealed a few years later by the Promotion of the Economic Development of Bantu Homelands Act (No. 46 of 1968) which enlarged the powers of a development corporation and the scope for which such a corporation could be established, it being now possible to establish such a corporation not only in respect of a homeland or a national unit, but also in respect of "any industrial, commercial, financial, mining or other business undertaking in the Bantu homelands", or even in respect of some specified development projects.(166) Moreover this new law put the stress on the necessity of employing black people and of encouraging their training and employment in all "the fields of industry, commerce, ... and any other business" at every level of responsibility.(167) This law provided also for the establishment, after consultations with the local black authority, of an advisory board "consisting of Bantu persons" for each of those development corporations "to advise ... on any matter relating to the affairs of a development corporation referred to it by the board (of directors) ... and ... to exercise ... such powers

of the board as the Trustee, after consultations with the board, may from time to time determine".(168)

The reason for the institution of this board composed of Blacks only was that

> these types of corporation can ultimately pass to homelands governments and by making provision at this stage already for advisory boards consisting of Bantu persons, and for the advisory bodies to exercise the power of the normal boards, it is being ensured that the Bantu are trained in this sphere as well, so they can deal with their own affairs.(169)

Although it stated that the operations of a corporation should be limited "to Bantu persons ... in Bantu homelands", this Act made provision also that the Trustee (the State President) could, "if he considers it necessary for the attainment of the objects of, or the exercise of any power by the body concerned", grant exemption from this rule.(170) Furthermore, among the powers of the investment corporations was the mandate "to act as a broker", and not only "to inaugurate, plan, finance, co-ordinate, promote or carry out ... projects which are intended to benefit and develop the Bantu homelands", but also "to assist in the inauguration" etc., of such projects.(171)

In this way the government announced that it was changing its policy in regard to the intervention of white businessmen in the homelands, which up to this time was the one stated in the White Paper on the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission, i.e., that their presence in the homelands should not be permitted, and that any kind of economic development in these territories should arise from the Blacks themselves or from the activities of the state-owned corporations.(172) Now the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development could explain to Parliament, much to the surprise of the honourable members "for the umpteenth time ... that the old policy ... of using white entrepreneurs, where it is justified, to act as contractors of the Trust" would "be continued".(173) In reality it was a 180 degree turn from the old policy which had been demonstrated to be completely wrong, to the point that in the decade from 1959 to 1968 the economic development of the homelands was conspicuous for its absence.(174) Some kind of economic development of the homelands was one of the bases of the theory of separate development by which the homelands should become developed

enough to attract back some of the Blacks who became urbanised during the years of the industrial development of South Africa (the time for the reversal of the tide was put around 1978). Therefore it was evident that if the government wanted to see at least some of the Blacks staying in the homelands, it had to change its approach to the economic development of these areas. Finally, drawing the conclusions from the realisation that the Blacks did not have the technical expertise and the managerial skill to activate the industrial development of their homelands, nor the capital to invest in this development, the government decided that the establishment of white industries, under certain conditions, could be the only way really to start the process of economic development in the black areas, as had been recommended by the Tomlinson Commission.

The various conditions which would apply to white industrialists willing to move to the homelands were:

1) the white agent or contractor would be granted permission only to occupy land: he would not obtain property or entrenched rights;
2) links with foreign interests would not be allowed;
3) while the agent might benefit financially, he would not operate exclusively for his own financial gain;
4) large concentrations of white workers and their dependants had to be avoided if it was feasible;
5) agreements with the agents would be entered into for fixed periods only;
6) the agents might be assisted in various ways by a corporation;
7) agents had to pay rent, royalties, commissions or a share of profits to a corporation and/or to the Bantu Authority in the area concerned;
8) as far as possible, Blacks had to be employed and they had to be trained to hold increasingly senior posts.(175)

So many conditions were unappealing to the businessmen, and only by elaborating on the possible assistance of the corporations and relaxing some of the conditions was it possible to introduce the so-called agency system, which would become a major component of whatever measure of economic development there has been in the homelands since then.

But for the moment, and for a couple of years still, the development corporations were the only presence in the industrial development of these territories. Following the provisions of the Promotion of Economic

Development of Bantu Homelands Act, the first public corporation to be established was the Bantu Mining Corporation (B.M.C. now M.C.), which took over the mining operations of the B.I.C. and undertook the task of a complete prospecting of the mineral resources of the homelands.

In the meanwhile, by the Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act of 1967 (No. 88 of 1967) the other way to improve the economic conditions of the black people living in the homelands, viz., establishment of industries in border areas following the indications of the White Paper of 1956, was also implemented. This law provided for the proclamation of 'growth points' in which the state would grant facilitations to the industrialists willing to establish their undertakings there; and to stimulate further the industrialists to do so, provided also for the proclamation of 'controlled areas' in which any extension of existing factories, or establishment of new ones, of a particular class or with a white/black employee ratio of more than 1:2,5 depended on the approval of the Minister of Planning. In the following years many growth points and border areas were proclaimed, in the attempt to contrast the great centripetal force exerted in the industrial field by the P.W.V. area, and to bring about economic activities and economic development in areas closer to the homelands.

In 1970 began a new phase of activity in the policy of separate development. Again the pressure from outside (regular condemnations of South Africa at the United Nations for its apartheid policy, the Security Council exercising jurisdiction, however vain it could appear, over South West Africa, re-named Namibia, from 1968) was one of the reasons which decided the Nationalist government to shift its attention again to the political development of the homelands. Furthermore, the implementation of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act was almost completed, and it was time to move another step on the road of separate development.

But now the move was not mainly a defensive one, because the South African government decided to take the political offensive by means of its 'outward policy', aimed primarily at winning friends in the moderate states of Africa. To quote J. Dugard, while it was "the stick of the world opinion" which was "responsible for the initial move towards self-government for black nations, it was the carrot of African support and dialogue which led to an acceleration of that policy".(176)

The first move in this new period of activity was the introduction of the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 (No. 26 of 1970). This Act provided that every "Bantu person in the Republic" who was not "a citizen of any self-governing Bantu territory in the Republic" (i.e., who was not a Transkeian citizen) was to become a citizen of the territorial authority area to which he was linked by birth, domicile or cultural affiliation.(177) The eligibility for homeland citizenship was thus as wide as for the Transkeian one, and it was indeed wide enough to make every black South African a citizen of one or another territorial authority. It was, at least on paper, the first decisive step toward the elimination, in legal terms, of the black South African, and toward the 'whitening', again on paper, of the common area of South Africa.

In the following year another important law was approved by Parliament. It was the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (No. 21 of 1971) which definitely opened the way for self-government in all the black areas of South Africa.

3.2 From Self-Government to Independence

3.2.1 The creation of self-governing territories

At the beginning of the seventies, significant progress along the path of separate development was still conspicuous by its absence. Only Transkei had self-government, while the other black areas were only at the territorial authority level. Moreover, KwaZulu lacked an executive council and the Swazi territory did not have the territorial authority. The economic development of these areas too was almost non-existent. But now the government made up its mind and decided that it was time to show

> the firm and irrevocable intention of the Government to lead each individual (Bantu) nation to self-government and independence ... by making further provision by law for the development of self-government for the said nations in their respective areas.(178)

Indeed, in the preamble of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act there was the first declaration of the commitment to independence for the homelands ever to appear in the statute book.(179) By this Act provision was made for giving the homelands the same status as Transkei, but there were some differences in the procedure by which it could be done.

Firstly, the State President was empowered to establish legislative assemblies or to declare any homeland to be a self-governing territory by proclamation. Parliament passed an act

> in which matters which are common to all areas, such as finances and powers of legislation, (were) provided for in detail, while matters which are peculiar to a particular area, such as the constitution of the legislative body(180)

were left to the discretion of the State President after consultation with the people concerned. In this way Parliament, after having accepted "the principle that every one of the remaining homelands (might) become a self-governing territory in the Republic"(181) and having laid down in detail the limits of the powers of such possible self-governing entities, lost any further control on the implementation of this policy, leaving it to the government.

The other major difference was that the progress toward self-government was to be made in two steps. By Chapter 1 of this Act, provision was made for the institution of a legislative assembly in every homeland which requested it. The composition of those assemblies as well as the period of office of their members, and the ways in which they could be elected or appointed were amongst the matters left to the discretion of the State President. The legislative assembly might make laws, for the area of its jurisdiction, in respect of a series of matters listed in a schedule of 33 articles. The matters included in the schedule were almost the same as specified in the Transkei Constitution Act, with the addition of the control of many health services,(182) the planning, establishment and management of industrial and other business undertakings, and all the matters relating to the traditional subdivision of the tribes and the appointment of chiefs and headmen.(183) In some of the fields in which the legislative assembly had the power to legislate, in particular: establishment of business undertakings, nomination or deposition of chiefs, and education, its enactments were

subject to the veto of the State President or the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development.(184) Again in conformity with the provisions of the Transkei Constitution Act, some matters such as foreign policy, defence and armaments, telecommunications, national roads and railways, monetary and financial policy, were expressly withheld from the legislative powers of the legislative assembly.(185) The capacity of the assembly to legislate, or to amend or repeal acts of Parliament, in so far as they affected the territory under its jurisdiction or its citizens, was limited by a power of veto vested in the State President.

The executive powers were vested in an executive council constituted from amongst the members of the legislative assembly. Such an executive council could establish, with the approval of the State President, a number of departments for implementing the decisions of the legislative assembly in the matters reserved to it; and on it rested the duty to administer the territory within the limits of its capacity. The sources of revenue for the legislative assembly were to be: all the taxes, levies, etc., payable by its citizens, or by any private company with a black majority of interests, under the existing laws or any other law approved by it; all the income deriving from the administration of the matters over which the assembly had legislative powers; an annual grant of an amount approved by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, corresponding to the expenditure of the government on the matters left to homeland control during the financial year preceding the establishment of the legislative assembly; and any additional sum which could be appropriated by Parliament for this reason.(186)

The second chapter of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act dealt with the institution of self-government. Again the State President had the power to declare by proclamation, after receiving the consensus of the legislative assembly involved, that a homeland was a self-governing territory. Such a self-governing territory was to have its own flag and anthem, chosen by the legislative assembly. There were also some improvements in the powers of the legislative assembly of such a territory. The State President had only a suspensive veto on the laws passed by its legislative assembly, and those laws automatically applied to the citizens of the self-governing territory living in other areas of the Republic. (Under chapter 1 rights, the approval of the State President had to be obtained before the extension of the validity of any

law of a legislative assembly to its citizens outside the homeland.) Furthermore, any new law of Parliament affecting the matters reserved to the assembly could not apply to the area or to the citizens of a self-governing territory. The State President might, in regard to a self-governing territory, constitute a High Court replacing any local or provincial division of the Supreme Court of South Africa having jurisdiction over the area, so that a separate body could exercise jurisdictional power in the self-governing territory. At the end of the process a homeland which had become a self-governing territory would be in the same situation as Transkei.

The implementation of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act began at a swift pace: before the end of 1971 six homelands (Tswana, Venda, Ciskei, Lebowa, Machangane and Basotho) had a legislative assembly with chapter 1 rights,(187) and the remaining homeland, KwaZulu, attained this status in the following year. The Swazi territory still did not have a legislative assembly under the 1959 legislation. The passage to chapter 2 rights, i.e., to self-government, took a little longer, but excluding again KwaZulu - with its people solidly loyal toward their traditional leaders, and with a leader of such great personality and political weight as Chief G. Buthelezi, the Zulu homeland has always been a troublesome place in the eyes of the government - was accomplished in a few years.(188)

After the decision was taken to proceed with the constitutional development of the homelands in the direction of an increasing autonomy toward self-government and eventually independence, two major problems presented themselves: the economic development of these areas and, partially linked to this, their territorial consolidation.

3.2.2 The role of economic issues in the political evolution

As regards the former, a major change of policy was made (as we have seen) in 1968, by allowing white industrialists to establish undertakings in the homelands. The conditions which accompanied permission, however, were so stringent that the initial participation of white industrialists was almost non-existent. Therefore some of these conditions were altered and it was recognised that the enterprises would

be operated by the entrepreneurs only on a profit basis. Initially the entrepreneur who had moved into the homelands accepted that while he might receive financial benefits from his undertaking, he would not operate exclusively for his own financial gain: therefore it was understandable that very few, if any, entrepreneurs moved under this condition. For a government so committed, in words, to free enterprise as the South African one, this should have been clear from the beginning. Furthermore, the presence of foreign capital was first allowed and then encouraged; and although the entrepreneur still did not have ownership rights on the land and the buildings, and had to be willing to sell the enterprise to black interests after a fixed period, this period was fixed at twenty-five years or more, guaranteeing him the use of the rented property for enough time to make the investment profitable.

In 1970 the government appointed an inter-departmental committee to evaluate the programme of industrial decentralization. A White Paper on the report of the committee was published in 1971, and in this White Paper the government selected six growth points in the homelands,(189) where a whole range of incentives would apply to the industrialists willing to move in. In 1974 the government decided that the homeland governments would in future determine the conditions under which white businessmen could establish enterprises within a homeland, although Pretoria retained the control over certain conditions of establishment as it was the South African government which was paying for the facilities.(190)

The incentives began to attract some industrialists and by 31st March 1974 seventy-eight industries were established at the various homeland growth points (Babelegi 56, Butterworth 10, Isithebe 9, Umtata 3), and a score more in other places within the homelands. The investment was R28,7 million by white entrepreneurs and R19 million by the development corporations (for buildings, loans, share capital, etc.). This investment provided employment for 11 556 people, 11 194 of them Blacks,(191) at an average cost of R4 130 per job. To this must be added the cost of providing the chosen localities with the whole range of services necessary for starting an industrial settlement, from railway links to sewage and electricity. Of course it was only a drop in the ocean in relation to the enormous requirements of the homelands, but at least it was a beginning.

3.2.3 Territorial consolidation

The other major problem, the territorial consolidation of the homelands, was tackled from 1972 onwards. In this year the consolidation of Ciskei was dealt with, and as a result the fifteen blocks and eleven 'black spots' which constituted this homeland were reduced to four large blocks (two of them, namely the Herschel and Glen Grey districts were transferred to Transkei a few years later). The biggest part of the consolidation issue was tackled in 1973 when the Select Committe on Bantu Affairs presented its report on the land question. It proposed only a partial consolidation, since only two homelands - QwaQwa and Swazi - were to be properly consolidated in one single block. Notwithstanding this, it implied the removal of at least some hundreds of thousands of people from their land. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.C. Botha, said that the government would have liked to consolidate each homeland in a single block, but this was not possible for economic and political reasons.(192) So it had to settle for "a reasonable solution" which transformed the homelands from a patchwork of 112 blocks and 168 'black spots' into a lesser patchwork of little more than 40 pieces. These proposals, excluding those regarding Bophuthatswana which could not be considered for lack of time, were approved by Parliament, and constituted the first official attempt to draw the boundaries of the homelands. The position of some areas was, however, left for further examination. To give the definitive opinion on these areas and to examine the whole situation in the light of the reactions to the 1973 plan, a Select Committee on Bantu Affairs was appointed in early 1975 to consider the matter and to report to Parliament.(193) The major shortcomings of this committee was its decision to accept evidence only from the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, a decision which cast many doubts on the objectivity of the conclusions arrived at in the reports. The committee presented three reports, of which only the first was important, the other two referring to relatively trivial matters.(194) These reports were tabled in Parliament in May 1975 and were adopted by it, becoming the 'final' consolidation programme for the black homelands. By this programme the territory of the black homelands, which before 1973 extended over 15 661 800 ha. divided into 112 blocks and 168 'black spots', was to extend over 17 006 000 ha. divided into 24 blocks (the

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total number of blocks into which the homelands were divided was 35, but the black areas would consist of 24 blocks as some parts of one homeland are situated adjacent to some pieces of another homeland.(195)

These proposals were not welcomed by any black leader,(196) and not surprisingly. Besides the fact that the proposals failed in most cases to consolidate the homelands - although reducing the blocks to almost a fifth of the existing number was certainly an improvement - their main fault lay in the fact that the government was not able to abandon the 1936 legislation as regards the extension of land to be ceded to the black authorities, and that legislation was not supposed to form the basis of independent states, nor even of self-governing territories. Therefore the consolidation programme left completely unsolved the question of territorial consolidation of the homelands. The attitude of the government towards this question in the following years was symptomatic of a lack of clarity regarding the future role of the homelands. On the one hand government officials began talking about co-operation regions, implying that there was no real need for a final and complete consolidation of the homelands, on the other hand some high-ranking government officials (sometimes the same persons) began to say that the Natives' Land Act was "a step in the right direction", implying that the government was thinking of a consolidation programme including cession of land in addition to the quota set apart in the 1936 legislation. (Further developments of the land issue will be examined in Chapter 8.2 .)

The failure to solve the land issue definitely was due mainly to two facts: the economic cost involved in the transfer of a large extent of land, and the political sensitivity of large scale cession of white-owned land to the Blacks. As far as the former was concerned, the decision of the government to purchase every white property in the areas to be transferred to the homelands - although understandable in view of the reluctance of the Whites to live under black rule, and of the political risk of white anger due to an unsatisfactory deal - meant that the consolidation programme would incur very heavy economic costs. Considering that even in this unsatisfactory form the consolidation programme was estimated to cost (at current money values) about R807 million (197) it is understandable that the government was not overly anxious to double the amount of land to be purchased for a proper consolidation of the homelands. But even if the government were ready to spend what was necessary for the total consolidation, the political dangers of a bigger cession of land were too great to be acceptable. Every proposal of cession of

land aroused an outcry from the community involved (of course it aroused outcries also from the Blacks who were compelled to leave their land, and those were more justified outcries at that, but the Blacks could not threaten the standing of the National Party at the elections), and the government had to be very careful in order not to lose their support and the confidence and support of the farming communities at large, particularly in the Transvaal and the Northern Cape.

The consolidation programme could not satisfy any homeland leader and the land issue remained a sore point in the relations between South Africa and the homelands. But this did not reveal itself as such a stumbling block in the path of the separate development policy as one would imagine in the light of many statements on the topic made by almost all the homelands leaders. The first homeland to request independence, Transkei, had already taken this decision before the last consolidation proposals were revealed, and in the following years other homelands requested independence even if their consolidation was far from being satisfactory.

3.2.4 Transkei and Bophuthatswana opt for independence

As we wll see more fully in Chapter 5, the decision of asking for independence was an almost total reversal of his previous attitude for each homeland leader. Although some of those leaders, in particular Chief K. Matanzima of Transkei and Chief L. Mangope of Bophuthatswana, have always been considered supporters of separate development and had accepted in principle the idea of independence for their homelands as the logical conclusion of that policy, they were cautious in hastening this conclusion until their claims and their conditions regarding the economy of the homelands, their territorial consolidation, and the situation of their citizens in 'white South Africa' were met. Indeed, in the early seventies it seemed that all the homeland leaders were becoming disillusioned about the government's implementation of separate development, and were beginning to think of changing their attitude and of trying to modify partially the outcome of that policy.

The maximum level of unity amongst the homeland leaders in partial

opposition to the official policy was attained at the summit conference held in Umtata on the 8th November 1973. This summit was attended by the leaders, or by the representatives of the leaders, of six out of eight homelands.(198) No official statement was issued at the end of the meeting, but it was reported(199) that all the participants were agreed in principle that a future federation of the homelands was vital to the unity of the Blacks in South Africa, and that they would not open separate consultations with Pretoria about independence unless and until there was a revision of the 1936 Land Act.(200) Since it was agreed that the homelands would seek a federal agreement after their independence, the federation issue did not directly concern the next stage of separate development, although this was against one of the basic tenets of this policy. On the other hand, the very essence of the policy was independence for the homelands. There were no impelling preclusions to further and future developments, provided they first became independent. But the decision of not opening independence negotiations until the 1936 Act was revised, could have been a paralysing obstacle to any further implementation of separate development, in view of the repeated statements of Prime Minister B.J. Vorster that he was not prepared to go beyond the 1936 Act. This unity and community of intent, however, were only superficial and were destined to break down within a short time. The idea of federation was not wholeheartedly accepted by all the homeland leaders (QwaQwa and Venda were not represented at the summit, and Mangope was quite hostile towards a federation of black homelands, preferring an eventual federation of Bophuthatswana with Botswana), and the South African government had both carrots and sticks big enough to convince some of them of the attractiveness of independence.

Again the icebreaker was Transkei. Matanzima had always accepted the idea of independence as a final aim, although careful not to hurry until he could see some advantages,(201) but he had always linked it to the acceptance by the South African government of his claims for a better deal. His early hopes were for a Greater Xhosaland extending from the Fish River to the Natal border, but he had soon to drop this scheme, at least as an immediate objective attainable in the given circumstances: his angry reaction to the announcement that Ciskei would become independent makes one think that the dream of a Greater Xhosaland still remains in his mind. Renouncing the Greater Xhosaland idea did not mean renouncing other territorial claims, which now concerned four or five

districts. A year and a half before the summit meeting in Umtata, the T.L.A. approved a motion requesting independence for Transkei and the territories claimed by it.(202)

Matanzima's agreement with the resolution not to ask for independence unless the homelands were given more land was thus not surprising. He maintained his position also at the first summit meeting between the leaders of the homelands and the South African Prime Minister on the 6th March 1974. But six days later, after the annual conference of the Transkei National Independence Party (T.N.I.P.) which was, as it has always been, under his full control, he could declare to the press: "This is an historic day. We have decided to go for independence now".(203) Two weeks later, the T.L.A. approved a motion calling on the South African government to grant independence to Transkei within five years. Two conditions were attached to this, that the land promised to Transkei under the 1936 Land Act be ceded and that independence would not prejudice Transkeian claims to the contested areas. Notwithstanding these two conditions, this decision was a complete about-face from the position held less than a month earlier. The opposition parties asked for the Transkeian population to be consulted by means of a referendum, but Matanzima refused, claiming that the Transkeian people had given him and his party a mandate to negotiate independence both in the 1968 and in the 1973 elections. In May and August 1974 discussions took place between South African and Transkeian leaders, and on the 10th September the Prime Minister, Mr. B.J. Vorster, could declare to Parliament that the South African government was in favour of granting independence to Transkei within five years.(204) Some pieces of land were to be ceded to Transkei within this time, the most important of which was the white enclave of Port St. John's, the others being white-owned farms protruding into, or adjoining, the Transkeian territory. Further details were settled in negotiations held in the following year, and the date of independence was set at the 26th October 1976. In the same year (1975) the Ciskeian government accepted a new consolidation proposal by virtue of which Ciskei returned to South Africa the districts of Glen Grey and Herschel in exchange for land between the two other existing blocks of its territory that were to be consolidated in this way into a single stretch of land. The two districts transferred from Ciskei were ceded by South Africa to Transkei, giving Matanzima something he had not directly asked

for (although the Glen Grey district is inhabited mainly by Emigrant Tembu, whose Paramount Chief is Matanzima) in exchange for the districts he claimed. But this did not preclude the Transkeian claims on the other districts.

South Africa was hopeful that the independence of Transkei would be recognised by a considerable part of the international community in a relatively short time, but as the date of independence approached, these hopes began to fade and it became clear that the chances of international recognition of an independent Transkei, or of any other homeland which became independent, were almost non-existent. The independence of Transkei was not only loudly condemned in every international forum, but it also drew considerable and strong criticism within South Africa, both from the white Opposition and from almost all the black leaders. The failure to gain international respectability for the policy of separate development and the failure of the newly independent state to receive international recognition did not deter South Africa from pushing ahead its policy, nor stop the would-be independent homelands to go along this path. Indeed, already in November 1975, the congress of the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party (B.D.P.), the ruling party in that homeland, gave the Chief Minister, Chief L. Mangope, a mandate to lead Bophuthatswana to independence, even without a satisfactory territorial consolidation of the country. The matter was then submitted to the B.L.A., and on the 19th November the Assembly agreed, by a majority vote (the B.D.P. in favour, the two opposition parties against), to start negotiations for independence. During 1976, it seemed for some time that independence for Bophuthatswana could be not so close after all, because the questions of land allocation and citizenship were again at the centre of stormy declarations by Mangope and other Bophuthatswana officials. The dispute between the South African and Bophuthatswana governments went on for most of 1977, although early that year, the 6th December 1977 was chosen as the day of independence for Bophuthatswana. While some legal and financial questions were settled in the first half of the year, land and citizenship remained points of bitter contention. Only on the 11th October were these issues settled, Bophuthatswana accepting whatever little it could extract.(205)

In 1977 there were other moves in the implementation of separate development. In October, the Swazi homeland entered the first stage of self-government with the establishment of the Kangwane Legislative

Assembly, and in the same month a territorial authority was established for the South Ndebele, who were thus recognised as the ninth national unit in terms of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act 1959.

3.2.5 The Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill A shortlived detour

In the same year new legislation was introduced in Parliament with the Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill. The most important aspect of this bill was the provision of a third stage of self-government which might be attained before independence: should the government of a self-governing territory so request, this territory could be declared an internally autonomous country.

In terms of this bill the legislative assembly of an internally autonomous country would be empowered to determine the manner in which the head of the executive was to be designated and what his powers were,(206) and to make laws in respect of all matters, in addition to those mentioned in Schedule 1 of the original Act (the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971), which might be deemed "necessary for regulating the internal peace, order and good government of its territory".(207) The limits of the competence of the assembly on foreign affairs, defence, telecommunications, etc.,(208) still remained in force. The impact of the State President's veto was partially diminished by the provision that vested in the head of the executive of an internally autonomous country the power to assent to a bill adopted by the legislative assembly. However, every bill passed by the legislative assembly, before being assented to by the head of the executive, had to be submitted to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development who, within twenty-one days, might decide "by reason of its implications for the Republic" to submit it to the State President for consideration and, if necessary, for suggestions by him to the legislative assembly.(209) The head of the executive could not assent to a bill if the State President made 'suggestions' on it "before those suggestions have been given effect to".(210) In this way the State President's power of vetoing the legislation of a legislative assembly was first withdrawn and then given back to him.

The executive council of such a territory was empowered to establish

all the departments it deemed necessary for the performance of its duties. The legislative assembly of an internally autonomous country had the power to amend or repeal almost all the Acts of Parliament, in so far as they affected the territory under its jurisdiction. It could also conclude or ratify conventions or treaties with the Republic of South Africa. This bill envisaged the extension of the powers of the legislative assembly also in some financial matters.(211)

On the eve of its introduction this bill was described as one of the most far-reaching measures to be introduced in Parliament in a long time,(212) and it was predicted that the homelands which accepted a transfer of powers in terms of the bill would be able to enjoy almost all the advantages of full independence, while remaining under South African sovereignty. It was also suggested that this bill could open the way for a confederation of Southern African states,(213) and it was one of the first official allusions to a new development of the official thinking, namely the prospect of a confederal framework within which to solve the South African, and, hopefully, Southern African problems; a line of thought which would evolve in the "constellation of states" concept outlined a few years later by P.W. Botha. The opposition parties in South Africa were opposed to the bill because, although it could provide, in the words of M.C. Botha, the then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, for the highest level of constitutional development for the homelands "this side of external sovereign independence",(214) the South African government still retained the power of vetoing the most important decisions of the legislative assembly of an internally autonomous country. The homeland leaders took different positions on this topic. Professor H. Ntsanwisi of Gazankulu and Dr. C. Phatudi of Lebowa declared that they might be prepared to use the powers granted to an internally autonomous country in order to repeal apartheid legislation, while Chief G. Buthelezi and Mr. K. Mopheli of QwaQwa were totally opposed to the bill, considering it political bait aimed at inducing homeland leaders to take independence by offering them a measure of autonomy.(215)

During the 1977 session of Parliament it was not possible to move this bill beyond the first reading stage, and further developments were postponed to the next (1978) parliamentary session. But although Mr. M.C. Botha, in his statement to the press after the first reading of the bill, declared that "this important further constitutional

development is the logical development of the Government's ethnic policy",[216] the bill was dropped by the government. Explaining the decision to drop the bill, Dr. C.P. Mulder, Minister of Plural Relations (in those days the 'wind of change' swept Pretoria, and the Department of Bantu Administration and Development became the Department of Plural Relations and Development) said that the homelands "must be able to switch from self-governing states directly to full independence without the intermediate step of internal independence".[217] Certainly this bill was dropped because it would have made independence still less attractive to the homeland leaders. After all, a country already internally autonomous could have decided all particulars of its own constitution, enjoyed an almost complete legislative autonomy and searched for foreign loans (with South African guarantees). Almost all the advantages a homeland leader could perceive in the choice of independence were at his disposal in an internally autonomous country, and without the many disadvantages thereof. Most probably the South African government felt that in this situation very few homeland leaders would be tempted by independence, and independence for the homelands was the goal of the South African government. In this light, the fate of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill was doomed from the beginning and the only surprising thing is that it was introduced in Parliament.

3.2.6 The spreading of independence

Independently of the fate of that bill, a third homeland decided to ask for independence. Early in 1977, following rumours regarding the possibility of a request of independence from Venda, the Chief Minister of that homeland, Chief P. Mphephu, said that Venda would not opt for independence until the homeland had been consolidated and a sound economy had been developed. But he said too that the matter would probably be discussed by the V.L.A. the following year.[218] During the same year, discussions were held between Chief Mphephu and Mr. Vorster, centered around the implications of independence for Venda and the granting of extra land to it. During the next session of the V.L.A. in March 1978, a motion calling on the Venda government to ask for

independence was passed, and at the end of April Chief Mphephu made the formal request during a meeting with Mr. Vorster. The date of independence was tentatively set for the latter half of 1979, and negotiations for more land for Venda continued. A month and a half later, the South African government announced that it was its intention to consolidate Venda in a single block[219] although the 1975 consolidation programme had provided for the consolidation of Venda in two blocks. Chief Mphephu was less hard a bargainer than Matanzima and Mangope, or perhaps he had less to ask for, and all proceeded smoothly and on the 13th September 1979 Venda became the third independent homeland.

1978 also saw an unexpected development in the relations between South Africa and Transkei. The land issue was the spark that ignited the crisis. The object of the dispute was Griqualand East. This area, surrounded by Transkei, Lesotho and Natal, had been repeatedly claimed by Matanzima. It was part of the Cape Province, but since October 1976 it was isolated from the rest of it by the independent Transkei. To facilitate the administration of this area, the government decided to incorporate it into Natal. Matanzima renewed his claims and warned that if the South African government went on with the incorporation it would have deleterious consequences on the relations between South Africa and Transkei. The South African government refused to accept the Transkeian claims and proceeded to incorporate Griqualand East into Natal. Matanzima reacted by breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa (10th April 1978). On the face of it, it seemed that the homelands policy had backfired. In reality, the dependence of Transkei on South Africa was so complete as to make Matanzima's action meaningless as a form of pressure on the South African government. Matanzima probably had a twofold objective when he took this action. On the one hand he tried to exert some pressure on the South African government in order to have his claim to Griqualand East accepted. On the other hand he tried to obtain acceptance from the international community by breaking off ties with South Africa and attacking it. His move failed on both accounts and by early 1980 Matanzima had realised that since outside support was not forthcoming, he had better go back on his decision before the South African government lost its patience. South Africa had almost ignored the break and had continued to give Transkei all the financial aid it was entitled by agreement, but had not increased it as it was planned before the break. After the break, Transkei had spent this aid more freely and it was on the brink of bankruptcy. There was no alternative to a rapprochement with South Africa,

and therefore, in March 1980, diplomatic relations between South Africa and Transkei were officially resumed.

During 1978 there were rumours that a fourth homeland might request independence, and all the homeland leaders said that they would not ask for independence: some under no conditions, others until their claims were met. Chief L. Sebe of Ciskei said that he would not ask for independence, nor would he rest until all the land which was rightfully Ciskeian "from Fish River to the Kei and from the Indian Ocean to the Stormberg" had been regained.(220) In August, however, the Ciskeian government appointed a commission (the Quail Commission) to "enquire into and report and make recommendations to the government of the Ciskei on the practical feasibility, considering all political, economic and social aspects, of independence for the Ciskei".(221) The commission worked for the whole of 1979, and in February 1980 presented its report to the Ciskeian government. The commission recommended that the Ciskei should not opt for independence.(222) Only as a fourth alternative was independence taken into consideration, and also in this case only if certain conditions were satisfied, such as the support of the majority of the Ciskeians, the satisfactory solution of the citizenship and land issues, and financial support.(223) The Ciskeian government, having probably already decided to go for independence, accepted the commission's advice only as far as the conditions were concerned, and the usual process of bargaining started again. Chief Sebe spoke about a 'package deal' under negotiation with South Africa, containing many of the conditions recommended by the Quail Commission, and submitted the decision to go for independence to a referendum. The referendum was held on the 4th December 1980 and in a poll of 59,5% of the 503 000 registered voters, 295 891 (98,7%) voted in favour of independence. For almost the whole of 1981 the 'package deal' was at the centre of the discussions between South African and Ciskeian governments (the 'package deal' thus, on the eve of the referendum was not a deal but the Ciskeian opening for the negotiations), but by December (on 4th December Ciskei became independent) Ciskeian hopes of a good deal had disappeared and in the end most of the conditions of independence were similar to those accepted by the three homelands which had preceded Ciskei on this route.

In the following years the South African government put the stress on the concept of a 'constellation of states', or, alternatively, on a vaguely outlined confederation, insisting on the need for co-operation among Southern African states, and in particular among South Africa, the independent homelands, and the non-independent homelands, inducing a

number of observers to think that the independence of the homelands was not a first priority of the government any longer. On the other hand, in April 1979 the government appointed a commission of enquiry into the consolidation of the homelands. The Central Consolidation Commission, chaired by Mr. H. van der Walt, was to report by the 31st March 1980, but its recommendations are for the most part still not for public consumption. Only the proposals for a few homelands have been made public, but they have not yet been submitted to Parliament for approval.

Further developments in late 1981 and early 1982 have demonstrated that those who interpreted the government's attitudes as a re-thinking of its policy were wrong. During 1981 the Kangwane Legislative Assembly asked that Kangwane be declared a self-governing territory enjoying Chapter 2 rights of the Homelands Constitution Act of 1971. The Chief Minister of Kangwane, Mr. E.J. Mabuza, repeatedly stated that it was not Kangwane's intention to move further along the path of separate development and that it would not ask for independence. Furthermore, Mr. Mabuza led his party (Inyandza National Movement) in that federation of black, coloured and Indian parties known as the South African Black Alliance, dominated by G. Buthelezi's Inkatha. The Black Alliance rejects apartheid, separate development and any idea of perpetual division of South Africa on ethnic lines, but it is, on the scale of black nationalism, still in a moderate position. Although the Black Alliance is viewed by many observers of South African politics as the only, and probably the last, black movement that does not put 'one man one vote in a unitary state' as a precondition of any talk with the government, and at the same time still commands allegiance from a very consistent part of the black population, the South African government does not seem to show a great appreciation of this, at least not enough to feel compelled to take into consideration the opinion of its leaders. The government denied the request of the Kangwane Legislative Assembly, and in December 1981 made it known that the unity of the Swazi nation took precedence over the wish of Kangwane to become a self-governing territory. To this end negotiations were held between the South African and Swaziland governments and pending these negotiations, any further constitutional development of Kangwane was kept in cold storage.

The first half of 1982 brought other developments which were unpredicted. In late April the KwaNdebele government announced that, provided that the promised land consolidation of the homeland was completed and the plans for its economic development were implemented, it was ready

to opt for independence. Although KwaNdebele is one of the less credible homelands as an independent state, it is also the only homeland established after repeated requests of its ethnic group for a homeland, and thus it is possible that the choice of independence would have proportionately a higher degree of support here than in other homelands.

In June 1982 there was another development even more startling. Out of the blue the government announced that, after consultation with all the interested parties, an agreement was reached with Swaziland, by virtue of which Swaziland would receive, after the necessary approval of Parliament, the whole of Kangwane and the northernmost district of KwaZulu, the Ingwavuma district. In this way the South African government would get around the stated refusal of Kangwane to opt for independence, uniting it with the internationally recognised Swaziland, and transferring to the latter also the roughly three quarters of a million Swazis living in South Africa. Swaziland, or at least King Sobhuza, would see its dream of an access to the sea and of the recovery of part of the territory lost in the last century become reality, although perhaps at too high a price.

This move stirred up a veritable storm of protests from almost every quarter. Quite understandably the Kangwane leaders and the urban Swazis were totally against this deal. Also Buthelezi, who saw a big district with almost one hundred thousand inhabitants being excised from KwaZulu, was not more in favour of it than they were. Buthelezi's opposition was not softened by the South African offer of other territories in exchange for the Ingwavuma district. However, the fact that amongst these territories there were the Hluhluwe and Umfolozi National Parks raised the strong opposition of the Natal Administration. The government clearly did not expect that such a clever move would raise so many protests. It is also possible, since old vices die hard, that the idea that the deal could be strongly opposed by the black leaders did not even cross the mind of some of its elaborators.

The proclamations which dissolved the Kangwane Legislative Assembly and returned Kangwane and the Ingwavuma district under the control of the South African government were challenged in the courts and quite surprisingly the challenge was successful (surprisingly because it seems impossible that the government had taken such important a step in so amateurish a way to be taken to the courts and defeated). The government had to restore the status quo ante, and immediately established a commission to study all the implications of the deal and to suggest alternative approaches.

At the moment the deal is kept in cold storage: on the one hand, more urgent and important matters, such as the new constitution, are drawing the government's attention; on the other hand, the firmest supporter of the deal on the Swazi side, King Sobhuza, has died and his successor is not obsessed with the idea. This does not mean that the idea is dead. From the South African government's point of view this deal was extremely attractive and sound, and if Swaziland is still interested in it, as it appears to be, it should be concluded even at a higher material price. The problems rise when one contemplates the political price of it. Given the still total dominance of the National Party in white politics, white opposition to the deal can almost be ignored, although the Natal Administration will not let it pass without a fight; also the opposition of the Kangwane leaders might be considered not too important; but if to conclude the deal it is necessary to provide Swaziland with an access to the sea, this would inevitably antagonise Buthelezi. At the moment he is the only black leader with a considerable following amongst the urban Blacks to keep a relatively moderate line and his control of KwaZulu is almost absolute. He is thus a force to be reckoned with, and many in the white group consider him as the only hope of a moderate pro-western and philo-capitalist leader of a future black-ruled South Africa. It thus appears unwise to antagonise him and to stress his basic powerlessness to oppose any government move when the government gives it priority. However, it must be kept in mind that with all his moderation, Buthelezi's aim is totally incompatible with the aims of the South African government. From this point of view there would be little point in not antagonising him, since even his 'moderate' success would mean the utter defeat of Afrikaner nationalism. The South African government would dearly like to see KwaZulu opt for independence, and if Buthelezi cannot be convinced of the advantages of independence, he might be convinced of the disadvantages of not taking it.

PART II

THE RATIONALE BEHIND INDEPENDENCE

CHAPTER 4

SOUTH AFRICA'S INDEPENDENCE TACTICS

As we have seen, independence for the homelands was considered as the final means through which the aim of separate development could be achieved, at least since the late fifties. Truly, the concept of separate development can be retraced back to the early forties,[1] when a scattered Afrikanerdom was regrouping and preparing its ascent, but in this period even the most audacious suggestion fell short of total independence. It was only with the Prime Ministership of Dr. Verwoerd that homeland independence was considered as the necessary step at the end of the road of separate development. Certainly, Dr. Verwoerd's vision was the driving force of this momentous development in South African policy.

4.1 Verwoerd's quest for homeland independence

There is no doubt that Verwoerd's policy constituted a sharp shift from that of his predecessor. Although both were devised with the same aim, i.e., the preservation of white control over South Africa or at least over the greatest part of South Africa as was possible, the difference between the two approaches was noticeable, not only in its formal enunciation but also in its substance. Certainly, Strjidom's enunciation of his policy left few doubts regarding its substance: "Call it paramountcy, baasskap or what you will, it is still domination ... the only way the Whites can maintain domination is by withholding the vote from the Blacks".[2] In this period, therefore, the 'positive' side of apartheid had not yet been discovered by the government, and white domination was considered a perfectly respectable objective which did not need any embellishment to be supported by every decent person.

A few years later, the Tomlinson Commission presented the conclusions of its long work. The Commission proposed the constitution of seven

territories for the Blacks, territorially consolidated and based on ethnic criteria, but although it considered essential the inclusion of the High Commission Territories as the core of three of these consolidated black areas,[3] it did not even once mention independence in its report. Nor was the government entertaining any such ideas, as it is made clear by its decision on the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission. The government did accept "the principle that territorial Authorities ... should be founded on an ethnic basis and, furthermore, that ... more geographic consolidation will be effected,"[4] but it also refused to enter into particulars with regard to this consolidation or even to give consolidation even a minimum degree of priority: "it is, however, unrealistic to indicate at present vague boundaries on maps ... Future governments may have reason to return to such theories. At the present moment this is not a practical issue".[5] It seems quite clear that in the mid-fifties the idea of independence for the black territories in South Africa was completely absent from the minds of South African policy-makers.

It was with Verwoerd that apartheid became separate development. This was the 'positive' aspect of apartheid, introduced in order to cater for the 'national' aspirations of the black groups while, and above all, safeguarding the future of the Whites. Although safeguarding the future of the Whites - and this means maintaining political control, domination in the South African environment - was obviously the main aim, it was felt necessary that a quid pro quo be given to Blacks.[6] This quid was to be the possibility for the Blacks to pursue their economic and political development in their own areas. This was part of the original Nationalist policy, but it was an often overlooked part. It was with the Verwoerd Prime Ministership that the stress was put on this aspect of the National Party's policy.

In this period, the main effort was toward the creation of an institutional framework to accommodate the political aspirations of the Blacks. In 1959 there were the first official statements regarding the possibility of independence for the black territories at some future date. During the no-confidence debate at the beginning of the Parliamentary session of that year, Verwoerd made it clear that "indeed we regard the territorial authorities as independent bodies in the first stage of development"[7] and although the idea of giving independence to the black areas caused a storm of criticisms from the Opposition

(ranging from the doubtful viability of such independent states, to the threats to South African security caused by a possible pro-communist foothold inside the borders of the Union, and to the threats to the South African economy caused by the economic development of those areas), he stated a few months later that "if it is within the power of the Bantu and if the territories in which now lives can develop to full independence, it will develop in this way".(8)

This meant that in order to maintain white supremacy in South Africa, the government was ready to accept a future partition of South Africa itself. (It was a partition on their terms and scheduled for a distant and undetermined future, but nevertheless a partition.)

There were two reasons for this important change. On the one hand, it was implicit in the ideology of apartheid - at least in the interpretation given to it by those who were not only concerned with baassap; furthermore it was necessary, after having accomplished the separation of the races, to put into practice the 'positive' aspects of apartheid, whose existence was, up to this time, more or less an article of faith (for many it still remains so). It was also evident that in order to have the "permanent friendship and co-operation" of the Blacks it was necessary to provide a way in which their aspirations could be satisfied and in the meanwhile channeled towards non-dangerous aims. On the other hand, the international pressures on South Africa were beginning to make themselves felt, South Africa's stand in the international community was rapidly worsening, and the government decided it was time to show the world that South Africa's internal policy was aimed also at developing the black nations living within its borders, respecting the principles of self-determination of peoples.

The implementation of this policy as a reaction to foreign criticisms and as a way to break South Africa's isolation, and the limits beyond which the government was not prepared to go in pleasing international critics, can be seen particularly in the next few years. In this period, the hope of an improvement in the international position of South Africa was amongst the most important factors of the decision to confer self-government on Transkei (or at least of its timing).

The announcement of the government's decision to grant self-government to Transkei(9) came less than a year after South Africa had to withdraw from the Commonwealth - a move that emphasised the level of isolation of this country in the international community - and preceded

by a few months the first ruling of the International Court of Justice on South West Africa. Although the government realised that its policies made the international position of South Africa weak, it was of course not prepared to court the favours of the international public opinion at the cost of the 'suicide' of the Whites.(10) However, the decision to give Transkei self-government was considered by the government not only in line with the ideology of apartheid, but also in line with "the internationally stated principles", and thus as a vindication of South Africa's image in the world. Indeed, this decision was taken in the hope

> ... that after what we are doing to-day, after the proof we are giving to-day in regard to the liberation of nations ... this international action taken against us and the international understanding of our policy will change, as indeed it ought to.(11)

The first elections in Transkei and the constitution of Transkei as a self-governing territory did indeed provoke a considerable interest abroad, but although many observers found the elections relative fair and free, and the experiment of self-government interesting enough,(12) the many drawbacks of Transkei as a self-governing territory - from its almost non-existent economic infrastructure to the limits of the territorial and constitutional competence of the T.L.A. - caused even neutral observers to conclude that: "what has happened to and in the Transkei has made it clear ... that far more has been claimed for separate development than either the process or the accomplishments warrant".(13)

The reaction of the international community to the granting of self-government to Transkei was certainly not the one hoped for by South Africa - particularly because international attention focused on the contemporary enactment of new security legislation - and the South African image was not enhanced by it, but this did not deter the government from the implementation of its policy. The lack of international support, although disappointing, was not considered a sufficient reason to change direction, and had yet been foreseen and taken into consideration by Verwoerd when he said: "The downfall of one's nation, the sacrifice of White government in South Africa is a price which cannot be paid for friends and partners".(14)

Although Verwoerd's commitment to the future independence of the homelands was not in doubt, how far in the future this independence would have been attained was not clear. At the beginning it was seen as a very long and slow process, spanning two or three generations.(15) This was certainly a sign of the reluctance of the National Party to follow words with deeds in the sensitive topic of partition of South Africa, and also of the conviction - widespread amongst the Whites - that, after all, the Blacks were not able to run a country, and that they still needed the white man's expertise for a long time before they could do it alone. A good example of this attitude can be found in the words of the then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.D.C. de Wet Nel: "I believe that for generations they will remain part of the R.S.A., for they realize what is good for them".(16) (The last part of this statement is quite interesting, considering that ten years later the government would be pressing the homeland leaders to accept independence.) A commission on the position of white traders and settlers in Transkei (the Halloway Commission) also arrived at the same conclusions: "The White man must be kept to help the Black man build up the Transkei until he could do without the White man, and that is a 100-years job".(17) Certainly this kind of statement did not improve the credibility of separate development, nor its attractiveness for the Blacks.

In the following years the timetable for independence remained as vague as ever, but the foreseen span of time was reduced and its length made to depend on the wishes of the black leaders.(18) This exposed the government to the charge from the Opposition that it was losing the control of the process and that the likely conclusion of the policy would be the establishment of black dictatorships over parts of South Africa. The government however realised that to maintain some credibility for separate development it was necessary to accept its logical consequences and not to postpone them to the next century. Although probably being uncomfortable with the idea of a near independence for Transkei, Verwoerd reduced drastically his forecast of the time needed by Transkei before being ready for independence, putting the date of this achievement somewhere in the future but within his active political life: "What Matanzima is going to ask is independence for his black territory, and I shall be prepared to grant him that at the right time".(19)

Notwithstanding the vagueness of all the references to the homelands'

independence, this became the main issue of the March 1966 election. The results of this election - the National Party won ten seats from the United Party and all the new ten seats created for this election - were widely interpreted as a mandate to the government to pursue its policy of separate development, and as the proof of the white electorate's acceptance of the future partition of South Africa. In the words of a comment in the Sunday Times:

> The people of South Africa made clear that what they want is separate development; ... they do want the Bantustans. They do want eight independent Black States with eight Prime Ministers.(20)

4.2 Reluctance to grant full independence

A few months after this election, the pace of the implementation of this policy was abruptly slowed by Verwoerd's death. With his disappearance separate development lost its driving force and its most convinced supporter. The new leadership, although believing "in separate development ... as the only practical solution ... to do justice to every population group",(21) was apparently much less enthusiastic at the idea of eight separate states within the borders of South Africa, and remained very vague in its comments on the future independence of the homelands.(22) This attitude did not mean that separate development was now put in cold storage. On the contrary, the government agreed that

> We should develop the homelands ... in all aspects of the economic sphere ... we should see to it that we activate the organized authorities of the Bantu nations ... we should help them ... to create a proper, orderly national economy in their own context ... we should actually convert and develop those territorial authorities into national authorities.(23)

but all this did not have a high priority, and, in particular, the constitutional development of the homelands was not meant to go too far too fast: "All this ... does not imply in one single respect that other systems similar to that of the Transkei have to be established immediately".(24) This was because "the Bantu authorities as we have

at present should be first given more work to do ... as they become better activated with new duties they will be able to progress to higher levels of self-government".(25) Certainly the ultimate target of this policy was still independence. Indeed, the new Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.C. Botha, wanted "to give shape to every Bantu nation", and

> this shaping ... should be carried out ... on the basis of these separate national identities ... towards the fulfilment of their own separate destinies ... in the arduous process of attaining true ... independent nationhood.(26)

However, he was less precise about the exact steps to be taken to accomplish his policy:

> Independence to a lesser extent, to a greater extent, to an ultimate extent ... Independence (is) not something with a purely political meaning ... It includes the economic ... the education ... all those manifestations ... of the activities of a nation.(27)

but he had clear in his mind that this process was to be quite a long one because "One should bear in mind that no nation has ever achieved full maturity in one century".(28)

The change of attitude towards the perspectives of independence for the homelands was not only due to the death of Verwoerd. In the mid-sixties, the pressures towards change - whose existence, both outside and within South Africa, was one of the principal reasons of the Verwoerdian 'revolution' - were relenting, or at least were no more felt as a menace. The internal militant opposition had been crushed and its leaders were in jail or in exile; and international attention was diverted towards new, and perhaps easier, targets, such as rebellious Rhodesia. The African states, which in the first years of their independence had assumed a militant posture, had to switch their attention to their pressing internal troubles. And although their yearly condemnation of South Africa and its policy at the General Assembly of the U.N.O. and at the O.A.U. summits was becoming customary, the economic power of South Africa was stronger than ideological differences, and unofficial trade relations between black African countries and the bastion of white supremacy flowered. In the absence of strong pressures the need of change lost its character

of urgency and, furthermore, also amongst its supporters old and deeply rooted prejudices were not easy to overcome. The attitude and the statements of M.C. Botha are a good example of the ambivalence of this period: on the one hand it was accepted that the final result of separate development should be independence for the black territories, but there was great reluctance in putting these principles into practice, reluctance due partially to fear and partially to distrust in the capacities of the Blacks.(29)

The rationalisation for the decision to slow down the pace of separate development was a clear one. And it was difficult not to agree with this argument: political independence alone, without social and economic development which could give independence a concrete meaning, would be a sham. Economic viability became the password of the day, and future development beyond the Transkeian level or even beyond the territorial authority level, was linked to a visible development in the socio-economic field. The stress on the economic factors caused a welcome change in the government's policy: after having been fiercely opposed to direct intervention of white private capital in the homelands, on the ground of its exploitatory character,(30) they had to realise that without the enterprise and the flexibility of the private sector economic development of the homelands was unattainable. The government thus agreed "that white capital and white know-how must be utilized and harnessed in order to develop the Bantu homelands".(31) But even with the help of private capital (and it was not sure that this help was forthcoming) the economic development of the homelands was not to be attained in a short time (if it could ever be attained) and this meant that the pace of political development was to be slower than it was thought by Verwoerd and other enthusiastic supporters of his policy. Of course, this new assessment of the tempo of the implementation of separate development was made taking into consideration the 'interests' of the black peoples. Vorster himself made this clear when he kept the subject of homeland independence safely clouded in the mists of a still distant future, although reducing the time foreseen for the accomplishment of the necessary development from more or less a century, as it was heavily hinted by his Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, to a more reasonable span.(32)

Thus, towards the end of the sixties the independence of the homelands was again seen, as it was ten years earlier, as the distant final

target of separate development, something to strive for, but safely far in the future. This attitude is well illustrated by the answer given by M.C. Botha to the request of speeding the process towards independence for Transkei. During the 1968 session of the T.L.A., a motion was passed asking the South African government to do everything in its power to prepare Transkei for independence in the shortest time possible. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development gave a reply in the House of Assembly, which was directed to all the black peoples of South Africa. He said that the road to independence was "a long and difficult one" and that "the process of becoming independent ... is not a process which can be accomplished overhastily and overnight at as a rapid pace as possible".(33) Before any people could aspire to it, certain prerequisities had to be fulfilled:

(a) considerable administrative experience in the management and control of government departments;
(b) deep-rooted reliability in all actions, particularly in the control of finance and budgeting;
(c) integrity of purpose in public affairs from the highest to the lowest official;
(d) a democratic way of life and a sense of complete responsibility;
(e) the control and management of all fields of administration by its own citizens and not on a large scale by citizens of another country (South Africa) because there were not enough local men qualified to do the work;
(f) economic development and the provision of jobs for its own people by its own government; and
(g) a firm desire for peaceful co-existence: a nation that wished to govern itself independently must show by word and deed that it is prepared to live in peace with its own people and with other nations, especially its neighbours.(34)

This last prerequisite indicates that the government's concern for South African external security has always been foremost, even to the point of exaggeration. It can be said without any doubt that in the conditions existing in 1968, the idea of a possible hostile or even belligerent behaviour from the leaders of an independent homeland could constitute a worry only to people really oversensitive to the question

of national security.

Such prerequisites were not easy to be fulfilled, and certainly to fulfil them would take, in the Minister's opinion, a very long time:

> I cannot predict whether (it will take) three years or ten years, and whether this or that will happen. There is a very large human factor involved, namely that of the Bantu peoples themselves ... What their capacity is their Creator alone knows ... I shall perhaps be no longer alive when it will be possible to say when that day will be.(35)

In this period then, the government was quite content with the situation as it was, and did not feel compelled to move at a quicker pace towards this almost mythical independence for the homelands. It was again for requirements of international policy that the government decided to speed up the process. We have already seen that this time it was not a reaction to pressure from outside, but the decision to take the diplomatic 'offensive' with the 'outward policy' that ignited the new phase of separate development. The discovery that independent Lesotho and Botswana did not become a springboard for attacks against South Africa, and that, on the contrary, they kept close economic ties with it, helped to relieve South African fears (excessive fears certainly) about security. The government realised that there was room for manoeuvre, and that relatively good relations with the African states were in the realm of possibilities. But manoeuvring for this objective meant to do something about race relations within South Africa. Although South African conditions for dialogue very clearly included non-interference in South African internal affairs,(36) it was as much clear that only some development in the internal situation in South Africa could be a sufficient incentive for African leaders to negotiate and to open friendly relations with South Africa. The only field in which the government was prepared to do something in this regard was the implementation of separate development. Independence, however, was still not regarded as imminent, since in the government's view considerable development was necessary, both in the economic and in the institutional fields, before it could become a realistic prospect. Although up to this time, the bulk of the criticisms levelled at South Africa in this regard concerned the fact that black territories did not enjoy a sufficient degree of autonomy, and that South Africa should

really give Transkei independence to prove the earnestness of its policy, the government decided that many steps were needed before it was possible to take independence into consideration. As it was explained by P. Koornhof, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, the government's policy

> of having a maximum number of Bantu in the Bantu homelands and a minimum number of Bantu in our white areas very clearly implies vigorous economic development around and within these homelands, and also in particular greater self-government for the Black peoples in their own territories. It means more and more self-determination for each Bantu people in each one of the homelands. ... Under our policy the road for each Bantu people to develop to full self-determination is clear. This does not exclude independence ... All possibilities are open to the Bantu peoples in their own homeland, and when the time arrives, full independence for them can be considered. This time may be soon or not.(37)

He even made a discount on the time foreseen by Vorster a year earlier, since he thought that it was "quite possible that that time would arrive long before the year 2000". The most revealing part of this speech, however, was when he said that "It (the date of independence) will depend on the Bantu themselves and on other circumstances which may come into play". (My emphasis)(38) There can be no better demonstration of the essentially pragmatic approach of the South African government to the implementation of their policy of separate development than this statement, although this pragmatic approach did not prevent some ideological rigidity which caused waste of time and money.

In this period, new provisions were taken to speed up the tempo of the implementation of separate development, including the Economic Development of Bantu Homelands Act (No. 46 of 1968), and in the following years the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (No. 26 of 1970) and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (No. 21 of 1971).(39) Those provisions, however, were related to independence only because they were considered as the necessary premise to it, and even the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act in reality provided simply for a Transkei-type of self-government to be granted to the homelands in a two step move and in due course.

4.3 Foreign policy and the revitalization of the independence goal

Independence for the homelands was still probably not wholeheartedly accepted by all the National Party members, and it is possible to see also in this subject the growing differences that in a short time would create the division between verligte and verkrampte and would eventually lead to the split in the National Party. While the Deputy Ministers of Bantu Administration and Development (first P. Koornhof and then A.J. Raubenheimer) were preparing the ground for the big decision (of really giving independence to the homelands) which they saw approaching because 'other circumstances' were coming into play, the Minister, Mr. M.C. Botha, sometimes could not resist the temptation of dragging his heels. He clearly accepted the aims of separate development, but his scepticism about the capability of the Blacks kept surfacing in almost all his statements.(40)

But the requirements of foreign policy were pressing for a clear acceptance of the next steps of separate development. Since the first overtures to African states had an acceptable success, the independence of the homelands was again foreseen as a short term possibility. In September 1970, Vorster declared that "any Black state is free to come to this Parliament and say that its time has arrived and that it wants to follow its own course ...". It was still not the green light, however, since in the same breath he also said:

> (then we) will deliberate with that state. As there are dozens of matters to which consideration will have to be given ... those talks will probably have to be held over very long periods.(41)

Having accepted that some of the homelands could become independent in the short term, another problem presented itself to the government: it was clearly impossible to fulfil some (or many) of the prerequisites to independence which had been laid down as late as 1968, if the homelands were to receive independence in a relatively short time. In particular, the economic condition of the homelands was quite dismal,(42) and economic viability was an ever receding target. In this regard, the government took the short way out and decided that: "Economic viability is not a prerequisite for future political development".(43)

In 1971, the declarations of readiness for giving homelands independence multiplied, and Vorster was at pains to make it plain that there were no tricks in South Africa's stance:

> The policy of this government is to lead these black states to independence. When I use the word 'independence' I use it in the ordinary, every-day sense of the word.(44)

In this period, at last, also a time limit was indicated: "We declare that we shall do it (leading the homelands to independence), and we are doing it in this dynamic decade".(45)

In the meanwhile the results of the diplomatic offensive were good, and trade and political contacts with a number of African states were in expansion. A measure of the dimension of this successful attempt to break South African isolation is given by the fact that in this period a number of mostly French-speaking African states, led by Ivory Coast's President Houphuët-Boigny, was pressing for an open dialogue with Pretoria. In fact, the number of the states supporting this position was limited, and at the summit of the O.A.U., held in Addis Ababa in June 1971, a resolution instructing member states to make no attempt to collaborate with South Africa was passed with a large majority. But the simple fact that it was necessary to debate this matter was a proof of the success of South Africa's diplomatic offensive. Moreover the approval of this motion was not unanimous: twenty-eight states voted for it, but six (Ivory Coast, Gabon, Lesotho, the Malagasy Republic, Malawi, and Mauritius) were against it, and five others(Dahomey, Niger, Swaziland, Togo, Upper Volta) abstained. At this point thus, a quarter of the African states were inclined to dialogue with South Africa. The issue of opening relations with South Africa caused considerable friction amongst O.A.U. members which almost divided in two bitterly contending sides: Lesotho suggested, in September, a summit conference of the pro-dialogue states, to be held in the Malagasy Republic, while the following month, a summit of fourteen East and Central African states, held in Mogadishu, adopted a resolution reaffirming the policy of armed struggle against South Africa.

On the wave of this success, the South African government confirmed the decision of granting independence to some of the homelands in a very short time:

> If there is a Bantu people that believes the time has arrived for it to become independent, it can come and discuss the matter with me, and then my door stands open to it ... when I speak of independence I mean independence in the normal sense of the word, the independence which Botswana or any other country has.(46)

There were, however, two weak points in Vorster's 'outward policy'. Over one of them the South African government did not have any influence - this was the fact that the trend towards dialogue with South Africa depended on the leaders of the various African states themselves, and the chronic instability of these states was the reason of a great degree of uncertainty in the long term relations with each one of them.(47) The other weak point was the direct responsibility of the South African government: the slow pace of progress inside South Africa, indeed the total absence of it, excluding the institution of some new self-governing territories, disappointed and discouraged many of the 'pro-dialogue' African leaders. 1971 was the high tide mark of the South African diplomatic offensive, and the following years saw a slow but steady worsening of South African relations with many African states.

It being impossible for South African leaders to accept changes to the system, the only hope they had (or they thought to have) to give a new impulse to their African 'detente' was an acceleration of those changes which were possible within the system. Transkeian independence was, from this point of view, a very appropriate way to show the seriousness of South Africa's intentions.

For a while a new, and unexpected, obstacle appeared on the road to independence. This was caused by the attitude of the homeland leaders, who took the resolution of not asking for independence until and unless their claims for more land were met. Since their requests were flatly turned down by the government(48) the situation seemed deadlocked, but South African leverage was powerful enough to convince some of them to change their attitude. However, Pretoria could not impose independence against the will of the homeland leaders, and it could not be sure that the pressure it exerted on them would bring positive results. Even if Matanzima had always been a staunch supporter of separate development, his attitude on the land issue hardened, and even at the beginning of 1974 M.C. Botha was not completely sure of his position:

> The Transkei area ... may and can become an independent area. In terms of our policy it ought to do so. We will not force the area to become independent if they do not want to.(49)

Matanzima's attitude became clear, probably to Pretoria's relief, when, during March 1974, the T.L.A. passed a motion - moved by Matanzima himself - asking the Republican government to grant full independence to Transkei within five years. The South African answer was positive, and Mr. Vorster announced in the House, on the 10th September, that

> in the constitutional field an important development took place in the Republic ... the Government was requested to grant independence to Transkei ... the Government has considered the request and is in favour of granting independence to the Transkei.(50)

This was a real breakthrough which heralded the implementation of the last phase of separate development. This was not however the almost unmitigated success for the National Party policy which it could have been only a few years earlier. As a matter of fact, the international situation was rapidly changing, putting out of balance Pretoria's leaders. The military putsch in Lisbon, on the 25th April 1974, was an ominous sign for Pretoria, and the collapse of the Portuguese empire which followed, was a plain disaster. Although the South African government put on a brave face, and tried to weather the changing situation as graciously as possible, the new balance of power emerging in Southern Africa was clearly to the detriment of South Africa. How much all this worried the South African government is demonstrated by the fact that Vorster felt it necessary to make an important policy statement in the Senate, in which, amongst other things, he said:

> I believe that Southern Africa has come to the crossroads. I think that Southern Africa has to make a choice. I think that that choice lies between peace on one hand or an escalation of strife on the other ... The toll of major confrontation will be high. I would go as far as to say that it will be too high for Southern Africa to pay.(51)

This statement, which implied a South African readiness to collaborate with African countries towards the solution of the numerous problems of the sub-continent, was well received in the African capitals, and was even hailed by Kaunda as "the voice of reason for which Africa and the rest of the world have been waiting".(52)

During this period there was a revival of high level contacts between South Africa and African states, with visits by Vorster to Ivory Coast (22nd to 24th September 1974) and Liberia (11th and 12th February 1975). This development revived Vorster's enthusiasm for his policy of 'outward movement', and his hopes of being able to convince the African countries of the merits of separate development:

> I will go out of my way ... to normalise relations in Africa ... attempts have been made. ... to a lesser extent these met with success ... to a greater extent perhaps these met with failure, but did not cause (us) to flag in (our) zeal to normalise those relations. ... It is true that the outward movement ... did fail at times ... (But) ... there is today a greater understanding of South Africa and its problems than there has been in many decades.(53)

Notwithstanding that at an extraordinary conference of the Foreign Ministers of the O.A.U. states, held in Dar es Salaam in April 1975, it was again decided to have nothing to do with the homeland leaders,(54) Vorster hoped that the homeland leaders would in the end be accepted as legitimate heads of state in the international community, and perhaps was convinced that it would happen:

> I hold talks on the basis of the policy of separate development; ... I hold talks on the basis that the Black homelands will become independent; and I hold talks in the hope of clearing the way for those homeland leaders ... to take their full and equal place in world organisations.(55)

This was not an impossible thing because the attitude of the African states has never been so unanimous as one could think looking at the O.A.U. resolutions. And, after all, Chief G. Buthelezi had already attended an O.A.U. summit in Addis Ababa in 1974, although not in his capacity as Chief Minister of KwaZulu; and as early as 1971, Kenya's Foreign Minister, Dr. N. Mungai, suggested that the leaders of the South African homelands should be invited to attend O.A.U. meetings.(56) This was very little, but on the whole, amongst the African countries there was a great difference of attitude towards South Africa and even towards separate development, the condemnatory resolutions customarily passed at every meeting notwithstanding, and it was not foolish on South Africa's part to hope for international respectability for separate development.

4.4 Acceleration of independence moves after 1975

In 1975, while a joint committee (three South Africans and three Transkeians) worked on the various problems which had to be solved before giving independence to Transkei, a second homeland, Bophuthatswana, decided to opt for independence. For a while it seemed that the South African government was going to score an incredible victory in its struggle to guarantee white supremacy in South Africa.

But again external factors and internal problems worked to disappoint the government's hopes. Certainly the main misunderstanding in the South African detente offensive, i.e., the fact that while for Pretoria detente was a means of selling to the African states separate development, for the African states it was a means of bringing about changes in the race relations in South Africa, again played an important part. While Vorster was claiming that

> more and more leaders throughout the world (were) asking themselves whether separate development ... (was) not the solution to the problems of a country such as South Africa,(57)

even the moderate African leaders who were favourably disposed towards South Africa insisted that an improvement was necessary in race relations within South Africa: "We feel that what is crucial is that there be an interior dialogue within South Africa among the members of the various communities".(58)

But it was the failure of South African intervention in Angola(59) which caused the definitive cooling of African enthusiasm towards Pretoria. Then Pretoria's decisions - the decision to press Ian Smith's government to accept in principle majority rule in Rhodesia and start negotiating a settlement, and the decision to give South West Africa/ Namibia independence - on one hand helped to improve for a while South Africa's stance in the eyes of the African countries, but on the other hand gave the black South Africans the impression that the 'wind of change' was finally blowing also around Pretoria. Thus, while Pretoria was still trying to promote international recognition of an independent Transkei, inside South Africa an upheaval was maturing which was to sound the deathknell of the international respectability of separate development.

Even before the June uprising in Soweto, the most Pretoria could hope for in terms of international recognition of Transkei was the support of the 'pariah' group (Taiwan, Israel et similia) and of some western countries, and even this was an ever fainter hope.(60) At the end of June, when the black townships on the Rand were in turmoil, the O.A.U. decided that member states should not recognise Transkei. The same decision was taken in September by the E.E.C. countries, and although in the U.S.A. the issue was well contested, hopes of western support definitely faded. The day after the Transkeian independence, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring the independence of Transkei to be null and void, and calling on all governments not to establish diplomatic or economic contacts with Transkei "or any other Bantustan". (By 134 votes to nil.) Although - spes ultima dea - some quarters still believed that diplomatic recognition of Transkei was possible,(61) it was clear that in the existing circumstances Transkei had no chance of having its independence recognised.

In theory this failure should have been the end of separate development, but in practice it did not deter South Africa in pressing ahead with this policy, nor did it deter other homeland leaders from following the trail blazed by Matanzima: in 1977 Bophuthatswana became independent, and in the same year there were the first signs that Venda could become the third homeland to make this choice.

In view of the failure of Transkei to gain international recognition, it would have been logical for the South African government to wait and reassess the validity of separate development. Certainly, a debate on the validity of the existing policies for the solution of South Africa's problems was undertaken - and this brought about the National Party constitutional proposals which led to the establishment of the President's Council. This revision, however, fell short of changing the envisioned role of the homelands. On the contrary, separate development was the reaffirmed policy, and independence for the black territories the reaffirmed aim of the government. Indeed, not only the official policy was confirmed, but a sense of urgency was instilled in its implementation. This urgency was particularly due to the changing and worsening strategic situation in South Africa. The end of the Portuguese empire and the foreshadowed end of white rule in Rhodesia and South West Africa meant that the outer ring of defence was disappearing and that in a short time South Africa would find itself surrounded by potentially hostile neighbours. In such a situation the existence of a horseshoe of independent

and presumably sympathetic black states around the most senstive borders of the Republic would be of great advantage for South Africa, constituting a useful buffer and a first line of defence.

One of the first results of the urgency in seeing more homelands become independent was the unlamented departure of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill of 1977. Since the 'internally autonomous country' envisaged in this bill would have had a higher degree of autonomy than the existing 'self-governing territory' and it was, at least in theory,(62) within its powers to modify the racial legislation, this status would have given the homelands many of the advantages of independence without having its negative aspects. The decision of withdrawing this bill shows that the government considered unnecessary (and perhaps detrimental) another constitutional step on the road to independence, and that it preferred to see the homelands opting for independence rather than giving them the possibility of remaining part of South Africa with a higher degree of autonomy. In fact, the implementation of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill would have been a self-defeating move on the part of the government, considering that its aim is to lead the homelands towards independence as a means of reducing, and possibly removing totally, the number of people who can legally claim to be black South Africans. An 'internally autonomous country' would have felt in a lesser measure the disadvantages of being part of South Africa and this would have taken the pressure off it. Indeed, the leaders of the two homelands that at the time had already opted for independence had made clear that they took that decision not because they were enthralled by the idea of independence but mainly because they wanted to get rid of a system they loathed (See Chapter 6). An 'internally autonomous country' had the possibility of getting rid within its territory of most of the apartheid measures without becoming independent. This would have blocked any further step towards independence more effectively than any sanction or threat by the U.N.O., the O.A.U. or the A.N.C., and the whole purpose of separate development (cancelling the Blacks as part of the population of South Africa) would have been defeated. Thus it is not surprising that after a careful consideration the government dropped the bill and continued exerting pressure on the homelands to convince them to accept independence.

Therefore, the process of partial partition of South Africa progressed, and in 1979 a third homeland, Venda, became independent.

During this year a new elaboration of the policy of separate development was advanced, namely the constellation of states. Although this concept was alluded to before[63] - since the times of Verwoerd, the E.E.C. and/or the British Commonwealth have been used from time to time as examples of the way in which South Africa and the (future) independent homelands could collaborate in matters of common interest - only now it received close attention from the government. The decision of underlining the endorsement of the confederal scenario was not a change of policy. It was certainly due to the progressive implementation of separate development: until no homeland was independent there was no point in worrying about a future eventual confederal relationship with not yet existing subjects; besides that, it could have called in question the most important part of the process. (After all, if you want to create a confederation between South Africa and the homelands, what is the point of stirring up a hornets' nest with a controversial independence?) Once the first group of homelands became independent, it was necessary to set up a framework of relations which could enable the various sides to manage the affairs of mutual interest. Given the weakness of these black states, their scattered form and their dependence on the South African infrastructure, the matters of common interest are quite numerous. And although in the late sixties/early seventies the government insisted that the homelands would become economically viable and have an independent economy, it has always been clear to everybody that, since the homelands were not isolated in the middle of an ocean, their economic viability could not and will not be attained in isolation from the wider South African, or Southern African economic framework. The idea of a constellation of states - which could be extended to other Southern African countries, although in the present situation this is politically impossible[64] - and of the evolution of this constellation in an institutional confederation is thus a logical and perhaps inevitable[65] evolution of the government's policy.

4.5 Conclusion

Why then pretend that the homelands become independent before setting up a confederal framework which will inevitably limit this independence? Because while confederation will be a concession to geographic and economic realities, ideology - and the perception of an increasingly threatening situation - make necessary independent black states as the way to divert black people's claims to a share (which necessarily would be a majority share) in the government of 'white' South Africa.

This was already spelt out more than twenty years ago by Verwoerd:

> That is not what we would have liked to see ... there is however no doubt that eventually this will have to be done, thereby buying for the white man the right to retain his domination in what is his country.(66)

He wanted, and his successors want, to make sure that in future the Whites will have a place, a dominant place, in South Africa, and since it is a widespread opinion that majority rule, i.e., black rule, would pose an unacceptable threat to the future of the Whites,(67) he had to find a different solution.

When Verwoerd started to talk in terms of a possible future independence of the black territories, the statement that "the White man will never be under any form of Bantu control"(68) was not only agreed upon, but also considered as a plain enunciation of facts, with relevance not only to South Africa, but also to many other regions of Africa. Verwoerd realised that the rising tide of African nationalism was inarrestable and that it was vitally necessary to channel this tide in a direction which would not threaten white interests, or, at least, white survival. He also realised that any form of qualified franchise would have been swept away, and would have taken with it also every chance the Whites had to maintain their control over their country. Furthermore, in view of the enormous importance that ethnicity has for the Afrikaners, there are no doubts that in giving the Blacks the chance to develop their ethnic feelings and to form their own ethnic states, Verwoerd and his fellow Afrikaners sincerely felt, as many of them still feel, that not only were they solving their own problems, but that they were also having a fundamental role in the liberation of the black nations.

It is still open to discussion if the homelands can be the right solution to the South African problem, but, at least in view of the stated aim of maintaining white control over South Africa or a part thereof, it was a better answer than those offered by others. The present government wants to give the homelands independence for exactly the same reason: to eliminate (albeit with a legal fiction) the existence of black South Africans and to maintain white (i.e. Afrikaner) control over a white homeland which should comprise as large a part of South Africa as possible. Again it is open to discussion if it is the best way of obtaining this. However, at the moment the government and the majority of Whites feel that no other solution exists which will not involve unacceptable losses.

This is certainly the main reason for South Africa to give independence to the homelands. Other reasons do exist, but they are ancillary to the main purpose. It is possible to discern these subordinate motivations particularly in the tempo of the implementation of separate development. Although the implementation of this policy has its own course, and some intermediate objectives had to be attained before moving another step, the timing of every new step and the explanations given for it show that each step of this policy had, in addition to the main strategic aim, also tactical objectives not directly related to separate development itself. The attempts to influence South Africa's foreign relations are the most remarkable of these tactical objectives.

Verwoerd's decision to consider the future independence of the homelands as the aim of his policy can certainly be considered as an attempt to find international respectability after the shock of Sharpeville. In the same way, the decision to confer the 'self-governing territory' status to Transkei in 1963 was directly related to the Odendaal plan of extending the ethnic policy to South West Africa, and to the fact that a ruling of the International Court of Justice was expected on the right of South Africa to administer that territory.

As the periods of activity in the institutional progress of separate development were related to international policy factors, also the periods of standstill in this progress had this relationship. In the second half of the sixties, South Africa was not in the spotlight of international interest. The pressures, external and internal, on Pretoria were almost non-existent, and this can be enough of an explanation for

which insulated South Africa from the direct influence of black nationalism, underlined the urgency of carrying out successfully the government's policy. In this framework, Transkei's independence was seen as a preemptive strike against the easily foreseeable wave of external pressures and possible internal unrest which would follow this victory of black liberation movements. In Pretoria's wishes, an independent Transkei would demonstrate the validity of separate development, gain lasting respectability for this policy and for Pretoria in the eyes of public opinion, and appeal to the Blacksin South Africa (those of Transkeian origin at least) as the fulfilment of their expectations. 1976 was thus quite a frustrating year for Pretoria, and worse was to come.

After the international failure of Transkeian independence, separate development ceased to be considered by the government as the 'quid' in exchange of which the right of the Whites to live in and rule the largest part of South Africa could be internationally accepted. However, this unquestionable failure did not stop Pretoria in conceding independence to other homelands. Incidentally, this should be the best evidence against the theory that separate development is simply an expendient device envisaged under international pressure and changing in its forms and objectives according to circumstances. In these latest years, tactical reasons for giving independence to the various homelands are becoming insignificant, while there is an increased urgency to see accomplished the main objective of this policy, and perhaps doubts are growing regarding the viability of this solution. There are however complementary motives for wanting to see an increasing number of homelands become independent. One of the most important is the creation of a fait accompli. Already the homelands as territorial and administrative entities - after having been ridiculed by many - are recognised and taken into consideration by the majority of South African political forces and by almost all the scholars examining South African problems. Excluding the solution of 'one man one vote' in a unitary state, all the other ways taken into consideration to solve the South African political problems take into account the homelands in one form or another. From those who argue for a federal solution to those who think that partition is the only solution, passing through the federal-confederal hypothesis, the confederation and the constellation of states, everybody, to a greater or a lesser

degree, consider the homelands as part of the solution (federal-confederal hypothesis, confederation and constellation of states) or as lesser components of the final picture (federation). Even those partitionists who want to divide South Africa into a black dominated part and a white or non-black part, although not considering the homelands in their present form relevant to their solution, save as administrative units of the black state, accept the basis principle which lies at the basis of separate development, i.e., the establishment of black-ruled areas so that in the remaining part of South Africa the Blacks will constitute only a minority of the population.

The existence of independent homelands, with their police and their army, could not be ignored in the case of negotiations on the future order of South Africa and this would certainly strengthen the hand of the present government even if it were to use them only as bargaining cards to be discarded as 'concession' during the negotiations (but this is at the moment really a 'worse case' scenario). To this can be added the fact that after ten or more years of even 'sham' independence, there would be in existence the machinery of a state, with the Civil Service and other members of the establishment having a vested interest in the perpetuation of this state. And if the programme of economic development is even partially successful, there would be in the homelands a black middle class whose main interest would be stability, that could be convinced, in exchange for their prosperity, to limit their political aspirations to their independent state. All this would change the balance of the forces and would create a group of Blacks interested in safeguarding the system. (Certainly those Blacks would be called 'quislings'; but it always depends on the numbers and on the distribution of power: if there were enough 'quislings' and they were strong enough, they could become 'kadars'. Perhaps all South Africa's problems would boil down to how many 'quislings' there would be on the day of reckoning.) Another useful consequence of the independence of the black states is the creation of a belt of black-ruled countries as a buffer at the north-eastern borders, the militarily most sensitive borders of South Africa. This buffer cannot substitute the disappeared Angola-Rhodesia-Mozambique belt, but would at any rate be a valuable complement to the white laager.

Separate development has been envisaged as the way to avoid an open

struggle for power in South Africa and to secure for the Whites the control of a 'white homeland' almost as big as the whole South Africa. It has been implemented for this purpose, while the tempo of its implementation was often decided by tactical reasons. And it is still being implemented for this motive, albeit among growing doubts that it alone could be the way for attaining the aims for which it was envisaged.

CHAPTER 5

HOMELAND INDEPENDENCE TACTICS

5.1 Decision-makers in the homelands and their attitude towards independence

The political environment in the homelands is relatively rudimentary. There are very few independent centres where different interest groups may coagulate and decide how to influence the res publica. The interest groups themselves, particularly those which might oppose the decisions of the ruling élite, are almost non-existent. Since the land is mainly communal property, there are almost no farmers or 'kulaks' who might form a strong pressure group. Because of the limited extent of the secondary sector and the inexistence of trade unions, the working class is politically inexistent. The business community is formed mainly by expatriates who are not at all interested in local politics. Professional men are so limited in number to be hardly worth political consideration. In the commercial sector there is the basis of an influential interest group, but it is possible to say that up to this moment this group has drawn advantage from political decisions taken by somebody else, and this from a subordinate position. Rather than a pressure group they can be considered as a group of 'clientes' which, although having interests to protect and to further and being able to exert some degree of pressure to this end, are not likely to hinder those to whom they owe their position. The civil servants and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the teachers, too, are in the same condition: they form groups with definite interests and a moderate capacity to influence the decision-making process in their favour, but their prosperity is so dependent on the existence of the homelands and on the goodwill of their leaders to make them uninfluential when the most important decisions are taken. Or at least their influence is directly proportional to the degree in which they agree with the intentions of the leadership. Only the political parties and the traditional élite are left, and in reality, they have been the same thing for a long time and still are the same thing to a certain extent.

Indeed, a common pattern is discernible in the birth of almost every important political party in the homelands. These parties were not founded by members who shared a common political or ideological position and dedicated themselves to the furtherance of this stance. Nor were their leaders elected as the best men for implementing a political line agreed upon in some party congress. On the contrary, the homeland parties crystallized from original loose groups of supporters of prominent personages, usually traditional leaders.(71) In a number of cases personality differences were at the root of the political struggle which caused the formation of two competing parties, and party members, more than supporting some political party line, were supporters of the person who founded the party. Thus, in the homelands' policy, instead of speaking of party leaders, it would be more appropriate to speak of leaders' parties.(72) In such a condition the attitude of the party towards major issues is strongly conditioned by the personal attitude of the leader.

Also on the independence issue therefore, the position of the leader of the homeland is determinant. If, or until, the leader does not want to request it, independence is not an issue at all; When he decides to start negotiating with Pretoria on this subject, his decision is endorsed with little or no opposition by his party and by the legislative assembly.

Of course, the Matanzimas and the Mangopes - and the Buthelezis too - do not hold their position simply by the force of their personality. They are the most visible exponents of that traditional élite which had seen separate development as the manner to preserve and increase its dominant role in the black society.(73) Chiefs and headmen have gained much, in status as well as materially, from the political transformation of the 'Native reserves' into homelands. At the inception of separate development they came into power endowed with a degree of traditional legitimacy, and they - although perhaps not gaining a wider and unquestioned legitimacy - have managed to consolidate their power effectively. As a group, they never questioned separate development and they, in general, enthusiastically endorsed this policy, including, and in particular, its final aim of establishing independent black states,(74) the main exception being for the moment the Zulu chiefs who almost unanimously support Buthelezi's refusal of independence.

The most influential group within the homelands was therefore in favour, in line of principle, of independence.

Since many of the parties in the four homelands which opted for independence based their initial support and their recruiting efforts on the traditional élite,[75] it is not very strange that, also, those parties were generally favourable towards independence. Indeed, in these four homelands, only one party was clearly and consistently opposed to independence, and to the very concept of separate development, and it was Transkei's Democratic Party (D.P.), that pledged itself to the "continued retention of Transkei as part of the Republic of South Africa"[76] and reaffirmed its belief that "the Transkei's future is full of promise so long as it continues to remain an integral part of the Republic of South Africa".[77] The other parties in the four homelands in the beginning either openly supported separate development and clearly stated as their goal the independence of their homeland, or left the question of independence in the background, stressing, however, the importance of their homeland and the need to build on this basis. Only later on, some of these parties changed their position and decided to oppose independence. The party most in favour of separate development was certainly the Transkei National Independence Party (T.N.I.P.) - Chief K. Matanzima's party - which in the manifesto for the general election of 1968 stated: "We believe in the policy of separate development, since it has proved that it is the only policy that can successfully be applied in South Africa" and "We strive for the entire independence of Transkei".[78] Also both the Ciskeian parties, Mr. (now Chief) L. Sebe's Ciskei National Independence Party (C.N.I.P.) and Chief J. Mabandla's Ciskei National Party (C.N.P.), stated repeatedly their support for independence.[79]

In Bophuthatswana, of the two main parties existing on the eve of the 1972 general election, Chief L. Mangope's Bophuthatswana National Party (B.N.P.) and Chief T. Pilane's Seoposengwe Party (S.P.), the most clearly in favour of independence was the latter, which accepted

> the policy of separate development only for the implied promise of handing back to us our homeland (forefather's land) and particularly for the promise of granting Bophuthatswana its ultimate sovereign independence.[80]

Mangope's party did not, in the beginning, talk of independence in its

programme, but in its statements there is implicit support for it. The fact that "the Bophuthatswana National Party firmly reaffirms its acceptance of the positive aspects of the policy of separate development" and that "the party aims to build a strong and secure Bophuthatswana Nationalism"[81] left little doubt as to where the party stood on the independence issue. Bophuthatswana politics in the five years between the first general election and independence were quite lively. Mangope came to a clash with members of his cabinet and tried to expel them from the party. Failing to do this (because the Supreme Court annulled his decision), he himself resigned from the party and established the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party (B.D.P.) which became the majority party in the legislative assembly. The B.N.P., now led by Chief H. Maseolane and in the opposition, united with the S.P. forming the National Seoposengwe Party (N.S.P.), but then some members of the S.P. defected to the B.D.P.. The N.S.P. changed its position on the independence issue, and in 1977 fought, and lost, a bitter battle against it. The party asked for at least a referendum to test the wishes of the Bophuthatswana people on this issue, but Mangope answered that if they were against independence, they could make it clear by voting for the N.S.P. at the election.

Also in Venda the two contending parties implicitly accepted independence from the beginning. Venda Independence People's Party (V.I.P.) was for "One Venda nation - one Venda Country"[82] and Chief P. Mphephu supporters pledged to spare no effort "to fulfil the ideals of freedom, self-reliance and independence".[83]

In general, then, in the early seventies almost all the parties in the four homelands were more or less openly in favour of independence. Some of these parties, when the moment came to really opt for it, changed their position, but sometimes this change reflected not only a deeply felt hostility to the type of independence on offer, but also the need to differentiate their position from that of the ruling parties. In general, however, and taking into consideration, too, the relative insignificance of the opposition parties - the only opposition party that had a remarkable support, V.I.P., was also the one which less opposed the decision to opt for independence - it is possible to say that the political establishment in these four homelands was solidly in favour of independence.

5.2 Attitudes and election results

How great was the support for this choice amongst the population, however, is not easy to estimate because, excluding the case of Ciskei, there was no possibility for it to express its opinion clearly on this issue. Furthermore, the fact must be emphasised that in the homelands, public opinion, as it is understood in western democratic countries or in 'white' South Africa, does not exist. There is nothing strange in this: it is the situation which predominates in third world countries. In these countries, the main interests of the majority of the population are food and shelter, and the quest for these two basic needs leaves very little time and energy to pursue more abstract interests; this pursuit is hindered further by the generally low level of education and the limited diffusion of the press, which is normally strictly controlled by the government. Most people are not interested or have not the possibility or capacity to be involved politically except on local topics, those which most directly affect their lives. In this situation, the growth of public opinion as an autonomous force is practically impossible.

In Transkei, as well as in Bophuthatswana and Venda, there was an election on the eve of independence, and the leaders of those homelands decided that the people had enough of a choice voting for those who were negotiating independence. This deprived independence of any credibility as a popular choice, perhaps even more than the real opposition to it could justify. The homeland leaders's argument that the population, voting for them after they made known that they were leading their territory to independence, gave them a popular mandate to do so, can be accepted, at least in so far as this can provide a rough gauge of the extent of some kind of support.

It is difficult to determine how much in favour of independence were those who participated in the elections. The elections were held in circumstances which did not guarantee the free expression of all the opinions. In particular, in all four homelands in the years before independence, emergency regulations were in force. Furthermore, in the light of the almost total control on the very lives of the tribesmen which is held by chiefs and headmen, the high turnout in the polls and the resounding success of the government parties in many rural areas

appear suspicious. However, an important example against this interpretation is the case of Venda, which is not the homeland most renowned for its respect of democratic principles. In this homeland, in both the elections held before independence, the opposition party won a big majority of the elective seats, only to be beaten in the legislative assembly by the compact stance of the chiefs in favour of one of them. It seems logical to say that if the chiefs and headmen have the possibility of influencing in a determinant way the results of the elections, such victories of the opposition should not happen; and conversely, that if the opposition wins, the power of the chiefs in determining the outcome of an election is not as great as commonly believed.

This is not to say that they do not influence the attitude of the electorate. They most certainly influence it. But rather as 'notables' than as mini-dictators. Their influence is the influence of the rich and/or politically powerful, who can dispense favours in a society where much depends on the benevolence and the favour of the powerful. In addition, most of the people do not have strongly held opinions on subjects different to those which affect their basic needs. In these communities, the 'notables' assume the function of opinion leaders in almost all the political issues, thanks both to the generic influence they can exert as 'important' people, and, more important, to the possibility of patronage they have. In such a situation it is not necessary to threaten the electors or to frighten them into voting in a particular way: the electors themselves will willingly vote in such a way to please the 'notable'. This is not democracy at its best, nonetheless it is a common occurrence also in countries with better democratic credentials than the homelands.

The main factor which detracts credibility from the claim that the results of the elections indicate popular support for independence is the very low turn-out in those elections. In particular, the turn-out amongst the urban electorate in the white areas was always negligible. It is difficult to ascertain the causes of abstention, but certainly the disinterest in the homeland framework and the rejection of independence had a great influence in determining the low turn-out. In reality, it is not possible to draft every abstention in the army of the opposers of homeland independence. Nevertheless, even when one takes this into consideration, the only numbers one can quote are those of the voters,

and these numbers do not hint at a great popular enthusiasm for independence.

5.2.1 Transkei

In the case of Transkei the elections were held on the 29th September 1976, less than a month before the date of independence.(84) There is no doubt that, although the decision had been already taken, the main issue of this election was independence, or at least, an endorsement by the electorate of the decision taken by Matanzima. Proclamation R400 - an effective means of curbing dissent - was in vigour, and shortly before the election, the leader of the radicalized D.P., H. Ncokasi, and almost all its directive staff were arrested. Although it is unsustainable that the outcome of the election would have been different if these detentions had not occurred, they have been quite a heavy blow to the credibility of the whole independence process, and to the prestige of the new state. The outcome of the election was never really in doubt, because Matanzima's T.N.I.P., after coming out a bad second in 1963, managed to overturn this early defeat in the elections of 1968 and 1973 which it won with an increasingly wide margin against the opposition.(85) Moreover, in 1976, the opposition was in disarray, following the ousting of K. Guzana as leader of the D.P. and his substitution by the more radical H. Ncokasi. The radicalization of the party under the new leadership caused its disintegration, and prominent members of the party in the legislative assembly left that party becoming independent or even crossing the floor joining the T.N.I.P.. After a while, K. Guzana formed the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.), and rallied some of the independents around his old policy. But, with such an example of disorganisation and infightings few months before the general election, the opposition effectively put itself out of the electoral race.

For many reasons, including the effects of the application of Proclamation R 400, the opposition parties were able to enter candidates in only ten of the twenty-eight constituencies, contesting only twenty-six seats out of seventy-five.(86) In six constituencies, electing sixteen members, the T.N.I.P. candidates were unopposed; and in another twelve, electing thirty-three members, the contest was between two lists of

T.N.I.P. supporters. Even taking into consideration all this, the performance of the opposition was dismal, being able to gain only less than a sixth of the contested seats. Two seats went to the N.D.P. - but its leader, K. Guzana, lost the seat he had held since the first election in 1963 -,one to the D.P. and one to an independent. The defeat of the opposition was of such a dimension to make irrelevant any influence of Proclamation R 400. The T.N.I.P. won seventy-one of the seventy-five elective seats in the assembly, and its control of Transkeian politics is undeniable. More questionable is if the support of the Transkeian people for independence was as overwhelming as the results of the election could suggest. The interest of the Transkeians in the elections has been fading since 1963, when 68,3% of the registered voters cast their vote. Although in 1976 there was a slight improvement in comparison with the 1973 election, the percentage poll was only 43,5%. (See Table 10) The declining participation in the polls after 1963 has been widely interpreted as a sign of a progressive alienation of the Transkeian electorate from the homelands policy, and this interpretation must be accepted, although I think it is worth noting that while percentage and absolute number of votes cast declined, the number of registered voters steadily increased from 880 425 in 1963 to 1 053 175 in 1976. This shrinking of the number of actual voters removes a great deal of meaning from the increase in the T.N.I.P.'s share of the total vote, from 44% in 1968 to 55,2% in 1973 and to an unknown but very high (probably in the order of 75-80%) figure in 1976. Nor can this apparently overwhelming support for independence be confirmed by the result of a referendum sui generis held early that year by the Transkeian government which induced Matanzima to claim that "it is perfectly clear that the Transkei people overwhelming want independence".(87) In reality, it was not a referendum in the accepted sense of the word, but a series of votings held during meetings of tribes, public bodies and various associations. Besides the fact that these meetings involved less than 170 000 people - less than 20% of the number of registered voters for the 1976 general election - the modality of the votings and the particulars of the result(88) make the whole exercise totally useless for an objective evaluation of the opinion of the Transkeians.

From all these considerations it should ensue the conclusion that the majority of the Transkeians did not actively support independence.

TABLE 10: Election results in selected homelands.

TRANSKEI	1963	1968	1973	1976
Registered voters	880 425	907 778	952 369	1 083 175
Voters inside Transkei	478 358	363 678	283 584	297 161
Voters outside Transkei	127 964	86 647	39 418	62 924
Total voters	606 322	450 325	323 002	360 085
Percentage Poll (adjusted)	68,3%	52,6%	42,3%	43,5%
Candidates	180	146	96	161
Unopposed candidates	-	3	5	16
T.N.I.P. seats	15	28	27	71
D.P. seats	29	14	10	3*
Independents	1	3	8	1

BOPHUTHATSWANA	1973	1977
Voters inside Bophuthatswana	268 407	156 586
Voters outside Bophuthatswana	126 106	37 041
Total voters	424 993	163 141
Unopposed candidates	8	1
Seats for government party	20	43
Seats for the opposition	4	5

VENDA	1973	1978
Voters inside Venda	N/A	107 116
Voters outside Venda	N/A	15 861
Total voters	68 301	122 977
Seats for government party	5	11
Seats for the opposition	13	31

* One seat went to Ncokasi's D.P. and two to Guzana's N.D.P.

SOURCES: BENSO, Statistical Survey of Black Development, 1980, and S.A.I.R.R., Surveys of the appropriate years.

It is however exaggerated to conclude from this, as it is done by the authors of "Transkei In Dependence" that "Matanzima (accepted) 'independence' for Transkei with the support of less than 15% of the people".(89)

But as clear as the lack of a majority support for independence is the fact that the Transkeian electorate did not give their leaders a mandate not to ask for independence. Furthermore, if we take into consideration the different attitudes of the Transkeians living outside Transkei and separate the results of the elections within Transkei from those in the 'white areas' - inside Transkei there were 297 161 voters while in the 'white areas' the votes cast were 62 924 - we will find that within Transkei the percentage poll was at least around 55%. It is thus possible to affirm that while the majority of the Transkeians living outside Transkei were indifferent or hostile to independence, a little more than half the Transkeians living in Transkei showed positive signs of interest in this regard, and a big majority of these people accepted or supported Matanzima's decision,(90) although, for many, independence was not their preferred option but only an expedient to free themselves from a condition they liked even less.

5.2.2 Bophuthatswana

In the case of Bophuthatswana, too, it is possible to make more or less the same considerations. The opposition party, the N.S.P., was opposed to independence, but its importance has always been limited and Mangope's group had always had a comfortable majority. In this case, too, the opposition party asked for a referendum and again it was denied, elections being held in its stead. The voting took place between the 22nd and 24th August 1977, three and a half months before independence. Although it was claimed that some chiefs, supporters of Mangope, were refusing N.S.P. permission to hold meetings in their villages,(91) the fairness of this election is generally accepted.

About 350 000 Tswanas registered as voters, and 163 141 of them, about 47,7%,actually cast their vote, giving an overwhelming majority to Mangope's B.D.P.. The number of elective seats in the Bophuthatswana legislative assembly was forty-eight. Of these,

forty-three were contested and the B.D.P. won thirty-nine of them. The uncontested seats were five, four of them held by B.D.P. members. Again, the interest within the homeland was far higher than outside it: only 37 041 Tswanas living outside Bophuthatswana voted, while within it the votes cast were 126 100.(92) But the interest this election aroused in the Tswanas was even lower than the interest the Transkeians had in theirs; how disinterested the Tswanas were in their second general election is demonstrated by the fact that in this election on the eve of independence the number of voters was about one third of those who voted during the 1972 election (163 141 against 424 993). In particular, the number of votes cast outside Bophuthatswana was so low (37 041) that it is clear that for the Tswanas living in the 'white areas', the existence of an independent Bophuthatswana was completely irrelevant.

In the case of these two states, it is possible to say that independence did not arouse a great interest among their citizens, and amongst those citizens who did not live within the homeland, the interest was almost completely non-existent. There was not however an active refusal of independence, and the overwhelming majority of those who voted, did vote in favour of parties openly committed to it. If it is not possible to say that independence was actively supported by the majority of the population, it is also impossible to say that the majority was totally hostile to it. Since a percentage poll of 99% or more is a phenomenon peculiar to the people's democracies which has never been repeated in countries where registration and voting are voluntary, the low participation of these elections cannot be construed as a downright rejection of independence. The majority was simply not interested, and it is bad enough that in occasion of what should have been a momentous event - perhaps the most important in the collective life of a people - only a relatively small percentage of the population felt involved enough to express their opinion. The only point which can be considered positive is the relatively high turn-out within the homelands themselves. This suggests that at least the people living within the territory feel involved to some degree in the life of their state and are willing to give it a chance to show its possible worthiness. It will then be up to the ruling groups to spread whatever benefits independence could bring widely enough to transform the indifference with which independence was greeted into vested interest in the existence of their independent state and active support for it.

5.2.3 Venda

The case of Venda is a particular one. At the end of April 1978 the Chief Minister, Chief P. Mphephu, made formal application for independence. At the beginning of July a general election was held in which the number of votes cast was, for homeland standards, surprisingly high: an estimated 52% of the eligible voters turned out, and this percentage was certainly in the range of 60-70% within Venda. It is also worth noting that, strangely enough in the light of the high handed attitude of Mphephu's government towards the opposition, which in 1973 won thirteen out of eighteen seats, the number of voters in 1978 was almost double that of 1973, making Venda the only homeland in which the number of voters actually increased after the first election. Furthermore, all the seats were contested and it is thus possible to say that a relevant number of Vendas expressed their opinion in this election. The result of the election was an unequivocal rebuff for Mphephu's government: his V.N.P. won only eleven of the forty-two seats contested. This could allow us to draw as much unequivocal a conclusion if it were not for the fact that the V.I.P. which had formerly been opposed to independence, decided, shortly prior to the decision of the legislative assembly to ask for it, to maintain a neutral stand on this issue. It is thus impossible to evaluate the degree of support for independence from the results of this election, although it is legitimate to guess that this support was higher than in the case of Transkei and Bophuthatswana. It can be noted that only a third of the Vendas lives outside Venda. Since usually the higher percentage of supporters of independent homelands is to be found in the rural areas within the homelands, it is consistent to assume that the degree of support for independence could be and was higher amongst the Venda people.

5.2.4 Ciskei

In the eyes of a western observer however, the results of this kind of election is not sufficient to be accepted as an unmistakeable show in favour of independence. To consider something as an expression of

support for independence, it is necessary to have a clear cut question posed to the voters, to which the majority answers positively. Such a thing could be a referendum, and the Ciskeian government, the fourth homeland government to opt for independence, decided to test the opinion of their fellow Ciskeians in this way.

A little more than 503 000 Ciskeians registered for this referendum. Since the de jure population of Ciskei is not exactly known, it is difficult to say how high a proportion of the total number of adult Ciskeians these 503 000 registered voters represent. The Ciskei Commission estimated a total of 2 099 000 Ciskeians, while the preliminary results of the 1980 census give the number of Ciskeians as 1 071 515. This almost incredible difference is due to a different estimate of the number of Ciskeians living in the 'white' areas of South Africa. (See Table 11 below.)

TABLE 11: Number and place of residence of Ciskeians in 1980.

	Estimates of the Ciskei Commission	Preliminary results of 1980 census
Ciskei	666 000	630 353(1)
Other homelands	1 433 000	21 975
'White' South Africa		421 119
TOTAL	2 099 000	1 073 447

(1) including 1 936 non-Xhosa.

SOURCES: Ciskei Commission Report, para. 20, and BENSO, Statistical Survey of Black Development(1980), Table 8.

This discrepancy can be partially explained by the fact that the census considers more than three quarters of the Xhosa living in 'white' South Africa as Transkeians, while the Commission presupposed that a higher proportion of Xhosa is of Ciskeian origin or gives their allegiance to Ciskei. Another explanation can be the number of illegal residents in the 'white' areas who would certainly be reluctant to show up for an official census. From the way in which the Commission arrives at its estimates,(93) it seems however that the highest discrepancy is in the number of minors, while the number of adults is reasonably close in both estimates.

If we take as good the preliminary results of the census, the number of registered voters for the referendum represents almost the totality of the eligible voters. If we choose the Commission estimates and suppose that 60% of the total is below voting age, the registered voters would be 60% of those eligible. The Commission, however, seems to consider the proportion of adults as one third or less of the total and in this case the registered voters would be between 72,5% and 80% of the adult Ciskeians.

On the 4th December 1980, 299 731 Ciskeians actually cast their vote in the referendum. The actual voters were thus 59,5% of the registered voters and between 43 and 47,5% of the adult Ciskeians. It is again a relatively high proportion for homeland standards, and such a proportion could be accepted as normal in many countries of long democratic tradition. However, in such an important occasion, one could expect a higher turn-out. Of the votes cast, 2 198 were spoilt papers, 1642 were 'noes' and 295 891 were 'ayes'. The proportion of votes in favour of independence was thus of 98,7%. The explanation for such high a proportion of positive votes can be that a number of voters feared retaliation in case they cast a negative vote. Also, and more significant, all the organisations which opposed independence called for a boycott of the referendum, and apparently the near totality of those who opposed independence stayed at home. In this case, however, it is clear that those who voted in favour of independence were almost all genuine supporters of independence. The number of votes in favour of independence represents 58,2% of the registered voters and between 42,7 and 46,9% of the adult Ciskeians. It is not enough to say that the Ciskeians enthusiastically welcomed the opportunity of independence, but one can certainly say that a sizeable part of them,

even perhaps a slight majority, did really support this choice. This would be a comfortable discovery were it not for the fact that few months before the referendum, Chief Sebe announced that a 'package deal' was being negotiated with the South African government which would ensure that Ciskei's independence would be very different from that negotiated by Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. In reality, at the time of independence, the 'package deal' looked very different and far poorer than what Sebe had asked for and had announced he would receive.(94) It is then possible to argue that the majority of the Ciskeians voted for a 'package deal-type' of independence and not for what, in the end, they got. Certainly, a part of them fell into the misunderstanding, but to presume that this could have significantly influenced the outcome of the referendum is unverifiable and presumes also an exceedingly high degree of political naivety of the average Ciskeian voter. Furthermore, the result of the referendum is reasonably consistent with the findings of the survey of the attitude of Ciskeians done for the Quail Commission. Having to rate various things they really wanted or needed on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (want most), 53,7% of the respondents rated Ciskei becoming independent at 6 or more (37% rated is 10), while 33,7% rated it at 4 or less. Independence was less valued by the Ciskeians living the P.W.V. area and in the Western Cape (29% rating it 6 or more; 55% rating it 4 or less), while the strongest support for it came from the rural areas of Ciskei (60% against 25%) and the Port Elizabeth/Eastern Cape area (59,6% against 27,5%).(95)

This does not mean, however, that more than half the Ciskeians enthusiastically support the independence of Ciskei. Indeed, the first choice of the greatest part of them would be to participate in the political life of a unitary South Africa. Having to rate 'being able to vote with Whites for South African Parliament', 61,6% of the respondents rated it at 10, and 76,5% at 6 or more (against 14,4% rating it 4 or less).(96) Furthermore, 90,4% of them declared themselves in favour of 'all people, White and Black, voting together for anyone they like for one single multi-racial government'.(97) The results of this survey confirm that 'one man one vote' is the political solution most wanted by the Ciskeians - and we can safety assume that in this field they are representative of all the black ethnic groups. (The attitude survey conducted for the Buthelezi Commission gives 78% of the Zulu "happy" or "willing to accept if nothing better is attainable" "one South African Parliament where the largest group, the Blacks, have power to make

decisions for everybody".)[98]

This preference, however, does not exclude a pragmatic attitude: given the existing situation, the chance of obtaining their preferred solution is considered quite small, and in this case, a sizeable number is willing to take into consideration the homelands as a second best solution, particularly if some improvements are suggested. Amongst the things most wanted, "more land given to the Ciskei" was rated at 10 by 68,9% of the respondents, and 83,9% of them rated it at 6 or more. Asked if they would be willing "to accept as worthwhile, the way matters seem at the moment" Blacks having "rights and a future in homelands like the Ciskei as they are now, but governing themselves completely", 70,1% of the respondents answered positively; and 87,3% answered positively in the case of Ciskei having "more land, towns and factories", (this is the choice which received the second highest score of all, the highest being received by 'one man one vote').[99] And although this is not their first choice, a good proportion of them think that in an independent Ciskei in ten years' time, things could go better than now. Asked how they feel about the existing political situation in South Africa, 39% said they were 'angry and impatient' and 23,3% that they were unhappy - 62,3% were thus dissatisfied with the situation, and only 34,6% declared themselves happy or neutral (only 6,7% said they were very happy, 8% were happy and 19,9% neutral). However, asked how they will most probably feel in an independent Ciskei ten years from now, only 36,7% of them thought they would feel 'angry' (22%) or 'unhappy', 18,7% thought they would be 'not happy or unhappy', and 39,7% optimistically thought they would be 'happy' (13%) or 'very happy' (26,7%).[100]

In reality, it is difficult to understand clearly the attitude of the respondents, since many answers are contradictory, but one thing can be affirmed, i.e., that they consider their conditions bad enough that they are willing to try almost everything else, even an independent homeland. It thus seems possible to say that in the situation in which they found themselves, the Ciskeians decided, without great enthusiasm, to go ahead with independence, with the sceptical hope that it could help improve their situation. This seems also to be the conclusion one can draw from the results of the various elections held in the other homelands before their independence: the people were not enthusiastic

at the move - although on average about one third of them actively supported independence - but also they were not exceedingly hostile to it, excluding those living in the great urban areas (but not so in the Eastern Cape for Ciskei). The majority accepted this more with indifference, rather than with enthusiasm or hostility.

5.3 Public opinion and leadership in the non-independent homelands

The centres of power are the same in all the homelands. This means that also in the homelands that have not up to now opted for independence, the decision to follow this line is mainly due to the local Chief Minister who acts like a plenipotentiary representative of an élite mainly limited to the traditional power-holders, the chiefs. There is no doubt that in refusing independence those homeland leaders express the wishes of a large part of their people. However, the fact that this choice is generally supported by a majority of the local population, does not mean that such a choice is the direct result of the 'will of the people'. In every society there is a reciprocal relationship between the rulers and the ruled, therefore also in these homelands the leaders have to take into consideration the opinion of the population. But notwithstanding the fact that the decisions of these leaders appear to be more in line with the opinion of the majority of their population than those of the leaders who opted for independence, the reality is that the decisions are taken by the leader who at most has to obtain the consensus of the political élite. Such consensus is generally not difficult to obtain if one considers the almost total inexistence of organised political opposition in the homelands and the dependence of chiefs and headmen on the homeland governments.

Once the leader's decision is approved by this small group, the previous opinions of the majority of the population have a limited importance. The majority can be convinced of the justness of the leader's decision, or some form of consensus can be engineered, and, at any rate, in the existing situation the sweeping powers of the homeland governments in the field of the maintenance of 'law and order' make

organised opposition impossible or ineffective. All this is to say that if at the moment a number of homelands refuse to accept independence and thus appear to interprete the wishes of their population, this does not mean that they will not become independent until the majority of their population presses for independence. It is sufficient that the leader becomes convinced of the advantages (for himself, for the élite of which he is part or for his people) of independence, and independence will become the definite choice of that homeland.

The history of the summit meetings of the homeland leaders demonstrates this reality. At every meeting the participants (excluding Mangope or his representatives) reaffirmed the common decision to

> have no intention whatever of opting for so-called independence, as we do not want to abdicate our birthright as South Africans, as well as forfeiting our share of the economy and wealth which we have jointly built.(101)

And almost every time, at the following occasion they were one less, because in the meantime one of the signatories of such high sounding declarations had changed his mind and opted for independence. The leader had reassessed the cost and profit balance of independence and made his decision. On this, the opinion of his people had only a scant influence.

All the homeland leaders accepted to be involved in the policy of separate development, and indeed to become the most visible instruments of it, because they thought that this policy would give them the means of influencing the attitude of the South African government to the advantage of their people. (Of course, the material advantages for the leaders themselves inherent in this collaboration played a role in their calculation, but it would be simplistic to overemphasise this role.) Even Buthelezi, whose opposition to the government's aims is of long standing and whose good faith in the effort to improve the lot of his people is hardly questionable, reckoned that in the conditions existing in the early 1970's, the homelands could play a positive role. He was convinced "that the homelands concept could easily be the formula for the basis of a future South Africa, provided certain conditions are met".(102) His conditions were numerous and some of them unacceptable to the government,(103) nevertheless he felt that the homelands as they were would at least give him and other black leaders a useful power basis

from which they could negotiate with the South African government.

Buthelezi's position on the independence question was that first of all it should be the object of negotiations and dialogue between the South African government and the governments of the homelands concerned. And "dialogue implies that South Africa as we all know it should not be broken up into a series of independent states by unilateral decisions of the White group only".(104) Furthermore, he would not take independence into consideration if it meant the exclusion of the Blacks from a share of the wealth of South Africa:

> Let us ... get clear the point that independence or autonomy of those new states should not be conditional on the breaking up of the integrated economy which is the life blood of all the peoples of South Africa.(105)

In this he did not differ from his colleagues. Also the leader of Gazankulu, H. Ntsanwisi, held the same position. He was prepared to talk about independence, but he made it clear that any form of independence would have to be granted within the framework of a broader South Africa, and, most important, should not deprive Gazankulu inhabitants of their "inherent birthright which is reflected in their South African citizenship".(106) The economic considerations, the poverty of the homelands and their unviability as self-contained units, was - and is - amongst the most important reasons for the scepticism of these leaders. All of them consider South Africa as "one economic unit" with their homelands as "an unviable portion"(107) of it.

The concern about the unviability of the economy of the homelands was compounded by the worry that once a homeland became independent, its people would lose South African citizenship and with it the right to claim a share of South African wealth and to participate in a possible future political evolution of South Africa. This worry was confirmed by the reality of the independence of Transkei and Bophuthatswana. In the estimation of leaders such as Buthelezi, the kind of independence received by Transkei and Bophuthatswana was nothing better than a robbery on grand scale of the rights of the Blacks who became their citizens:

> The ultimate erosion of civil rights - or should I rather say - the final destruction of human rights, is to be robbed of your citizenship. To be made aliens in the land of your birth is an act of political treachery ... And that is precisely what the South African government set out to do as it began implementing its homelands policy.(108)

His opposition to this type of independence has always been outspoken. He was convinced that the policy of separate development, although having some positive aspects,(109) was doomed to ultimate failure because it had been envisaged and was being implemented to preserve white interests:

> My stance was that apartheid would fail. My stance now is that apartheid has failed. My stance was that homeland development would suffer from lack of white sincerity. My stance is now that it has suffered irreparably from white insincerity ... The change I want for millions of blacks in the country is the scrapping of apartheid and the so-called homeland policy.(110)

Since he wanted the scrapping of the homelands policy, he certainly could not entertain any idea of independence. Indeed, he had always insisted on the fundamental unity of South Africa and all its peoples, particularly the Blacks:

> I want to make it very clear that blacks in this country have one homeland which they all share together: South Africa. The myth that we blacks have no rights in so-called white areas can no longer be sustained. South Africa will never be divided into a number of black mini-states dominated by a sprawling white monster-state.(111)

In reality, the virulence of his opposition to independence was subject to changes of intensity according to the occasions. When talking to Blacks or to foreigners, when he needed to stress his independence from Pretoria to avoid being considered a 'puppet', he was quite liberal with his 'nevers'. When he was speaking to Afrikaners, when he had to put the stress on his reasonableness, he was careful to qualify his refusal (which, however, remained clear):

> We are categoric that the independence of KwaZulu, as presently conceived, is unacceptable to us. We also cannot see that it could be in the interest of our people as a whole to seek a complete amputation of KwaZulu, which would amount to a complete forfeiture of our birth rights.(112)

This was an attitude common to all the homeland leaders who refused independence (including, at the time, Sebe): independence in the South African context was almost meaningless and, furthermore, would amount to selling 'one's own birth rights for a dish of soup'; and at any rate, it could not be accepted at the existing conditions, when only limited and scattered pieces of land, without urban centres and significant infrastructures, were set apart as black areas; and, finally, it would not be acceptable even at improved conditions, because the real solution to South Africa's problems could be found only in equality of rights between Blacks and Whites.(113)

For many of the homeland leaders, in the late 1970's, the opposition to independence was still mainly a tactical stance. The most evident example of this is Sebe, who, after repeatedly saying that there was no point in sitting at the 'empty table' of independence, led Ciskei to this goal. Although Sebe was the only leader of the 'steadfastness front' actually to lead his homeland to independence, others too, made clear that their refusal was not their last word on the subject. H. Ntsanwisi, for example, stated in March 1978 that he would not opt for independence as this could offer his people nothing until such time as Gazankulu was economically independent. He did, however, say that he would keep his option open on this matter.(114)

It is difficult to say which consideration influenced most this position. If in showing unwillingness to opt for independence, these leaders hoped to extract better conditions from the South African government before accepting it, or if in showing unwillingness to opt for independence at the existing conditions but keeping their option open in case of improvements, they not only tried to obtain better conditions, but, above all, to gain time to build a stable power base from which to challenge the South African government. Probably it was a mixture of the two trends, each becoming from time to time more important than the other according to the developments of the situation. In the end, the first aspect was the most important for Sebe, while the second appears to be the most important for Buthelezi.

Buthelezi has been able to use the freedom and the means inherent in his position as leader of a homeland to build a political movement which enjoys a wide support, particularly amongst the Zulus, but also outside KwaZulu and amongst other Blacks. He is the most popular and arguably the most powerful of the Black leaders operating within the South African system. He is aware of this and he is trying to use the

power base given by the support Inkatha has gained amongst the Blacks to become an important, or if possible, a privileged interlocutor of the South African government: "We have created a power base which commands the kind of respect that makes any attempt to work politically without it, simply a waste of time and energy."(115)

In his attempt to become the recognised internal leader of the Blacks, he used his position as Chief Minister of KwaZulu and his refusal to accept independence as instruments both for expanding his support amongst the Blacks and for compelling the government to take him into consideration as the representative of the Blacks, including the urban Blacks. By refusing independence he tries to force the government to modify its policy towards the Blacks:

> I am convinced that our continued non compliance in the further evolution of homeland policies will force the whites-only government to find ways and means of dealing with us and including us in the political process which lies behind power control.(116)

Buthelezi is convinced that

> The government has been encouraged by the leaders of these so-called independent homeland regions who have opted for so-called independence, to pursue their apartheid policy ... the problem that bedevils the situation is the lack of black unity which has guaranteed the continuation of apartheid ...(117)

Thus, he reckons that the decision of the TBVC leaders to opt for independence has encouraged the South African government to pursue its policy and has weakened the leverage the black leaders have for inducing it to change this policy, in particular towards the urban Blacks. However, he is also convinced that the government can pursue its policy disregarding the political aspirations of the Blacks only if it can induce all the homelands to opt for independence, or at least if the homelands which are induced to do so will include the most numerous black ethnic groups. In his reckoning, if enough homelands refuse independence to maintain black numerical superiority amongst South African citizens, the government will have to change its policy and to negotiate with the Blacks their place in the political set-up of the South Africa of the future. Since the Zulus already outnumber the Whites, his refusal to opt for independence would - in his reckoning -

wreck separate development and compel the South African government to negotiate with him the future political set-up of South Africa.(118)

Buthelezi is probably the firmest of the homeland leaders in his refusal of independence. The simple fact that he is considered as the most representative of the homeland leaders, if not the only one enjoying true and wide popular support, might become a weakening factor in the other's resolve. Buthelezi is already claiming the merit for a possible change in government policy:

> ... The defeat of the ultimate ends of the homeland policy is now a political trophy on Inkatha's wall. We do not rest here, however. We are going on to offer a helping hand to those who have already been made aliens.(119)

Even if other leaders could match Buthelezi's popularity with their popularity amongst their own group, the numerical strength of the Zulus would give their chief the leading role amongst the internal leaders. Considering that strong personality and a strong streak of personal ambition are characteristic common to all the homeland leaders, it is doubtful that they will be prepared to take a secondary and less rewarding role. It is thus possible that having to choose between accepting to fade slowly into oblivion and becoming the president of an independent state, they will choose independence, even if it is not completely satisfying.

The possibility of being bribed or cajoled or bullied into accepting independence is present also for Buthelezi himself. The government does not seem to consider important the fact that he is arguably the only black leader to accept that one-man-one-vote in a unitary state is not the solution to South Africa's problems and to maintain, at the same time, a substantial support amongst Blacks, including urban Blacks. Often it seems more interested in 'keeping Buthelezi in his place' rather than in exploring the perspectives that his unique condition may offer. Certainly, the government's actions in the latest years, from the proposed Swaziland land deal to the new constitutional dispensation within South Africa, show that it does not even taken into consideration Buthelezi's opinion when it makes its decisions.

Perhaps as a way to pre-empt the government in going too far in its use of the carrot and the stick, Buthelezi has often warned that (being a Zulu prince of royal blood) he is not a pushover and that there are things that cannot be accepted: "Homelands politics are a pipe dream.

The whole idea that we blacks can be declared foreigners in any part of our land ... causes such revulsion that its enforcement can only mean ultimate war."[120] He often insists on this argument lately. He knows that although "Inkatha has mobilized an effective veto on independence for KwaZulu" and that "We in KwaZulu will never voluntarily opt for independence", the South African government might feel able to overcome this opposition and tempted to do so. He thus made clear that his quest for a peaceful solution to the South African problems might be stopped if the South African government tried to impose its will on the subject of independence: "We have gone much further and stated that to force us to go for independence will define the battle lines outside our non-violent strategy."[121]

It is possible that Buthelezi personifies the general attitude of the majority of the Blacks better than the other leaders, both internal and external. It is, however, difficult to define what the attitude of the majority of the Blacks might be. In South Africa until recently, the opinion of the Blacks has received scant attention. Also in recent years the only way to have an indication of what the attitude of the Blacks might be has been to interprete few nation-wide surveys.[122] One of the drawbacks of this situation is that while one can reasonably identify the main points which arouse black passions and in which general direction they would like to see the situation evolve, one cannot infer from this what their actual behaviour might be in determined circumstances. In the words of the report of the Buthelezi Commission:

> While one may be able to make broad assumptions about what the different groups want and aspire to, it is more difficult to make correct assumptions about what they may be prepared to accept as compromises.[123]

However, on the subject of homeland independence, which is a relatively clear cut topic, these surveys shed much light on the general attitudes of the Blacks. Indeed, in the one case when it was possible to compare the results of a survey with the real thing, i.e., in the case of the referendum on the Ciskeian independence, the findings of the survey have come remarkably close to the actual response of the electorate.[124] It is then possible to accept the surveys on this topic as reasonably indicative of the real attitude of the Blacks.

It is noteworthy that on the topic of homeland government and homeland independence, the survey made for the Buthelezi Commission showed results remarkably similar to those of that made for the Quail Commission. Only on one point the results markedly differed, and this was on the perception people have of the benefits derived from the establishment of the homelands. For the Buthelezi Commission, the question "What benefits for Black people came when the KwaZulu Goverment took over the government for people in the Black areas?" was asked only in Natal/KwaZulu, where 33% of the respondents said that they found that the establishment of the KwaZulu government gave no benefits whatsoever to the Blacks (44% of the respondents in the metropolitan areas thought so and 26% in rural KwaZulu). The report, after pointing out the relatively high number of people finding no benefits in the existence of the homeland, adds: "However, among all groups, either 50% of people or more tend to see benefits in the degree of self-government which has been granted and the way it has been handled by the KwaZulu leadership".(125) These results are strikingly different from the findings of the Quail Commission, which found that only 4,4% of the respondents had something positive to say in answer to the question: "The Ciskei is now a homeland with its own government making decisions about many but not all of its internal affairs. What has this meant for you personally in your life?". Partly this difference can be attributed to the different way the question was formulated. Indeed, also the negative answers were minimal (4,9%), while the great majority (90,7%) felt that the existence of the Ciskeian homeland was meaningless for them.(126) Whatever the reason for the difference in the answers to the two surveys, it seems safe to say that the Zulus feel much more than the Ciskei Xhosa that the introduction of self-government for their homeland has given them some benefits.

The general attitude toward ethnicity and the desirability of an ethnic homeland can be inferred, as far as the Zulus are concerned, from the fact that 26% of the respondents in Natal/KwaZulu felt themselves to be Zulu before anything else (but only 5% of the Soweto Zulus and 21% of the Zulu migrants in Transvaal felt in this way),(127) and that 42% of them answered KwaZulu or Zululand to the question: "Which place or places is the country of the Zulus?" (23% of the Soweto Zulus and 33% of the Zulu migrants answered in the same way).(128) Thus, the

support for ethnic exclusivity, as opposed to the identification with a wider South Africa, is not very great among the Zulus. Indeed, the report has concluded that although a "group of avowed separatists and fierce Zulu nationalists who find aspects of separate development considerably of their liking" exists, it constitutes only about 10% of the Zulus in KwaZulu.(129)

In reality, the basic concept of separate development, i.e., the preservation of a 'white homeland', has even less support than that. To the question "Are there places in South Africa that Whites should be able to keep for themselves only?", 5% answered positively in Natal/KwaZulu (6% among the Soweto Zulus and 9% among the Zulu migrants).(130) It is thus evident that the basis of the government policy towards the Blacks is in principle rejected by almost the totality of the Blacks themselves.

The abysmally low popularity of the basic concept of separate development does not extend in the same measure to the homelands, however. To the question "What would you say about the homelands?", in Transvaal 72% of the answers were negative or critical, 24% positive and 10% ambivalent or evasive; in Natal the results were: 57% negative, 45% positive, 10% ambivalent. (These percentages add up to more than 100%. This is due to the fact that some respondents answered mentioning both positive and negative aspects.) The comment of the report is that

> a very clear majority of people in the Transvaal responded negatively to the idea of their 'national state', whereas in KwaZulu/Natal, although more people respond negatively than positively, the sentiments are much more evenly balanced.(131)

It appears that there is a sizeable minority of black people, which in Natal/KwaZulu assumes substantial proportions, that accepts the homelands as positive. Among the people giving positive answers, a substantial part, not much less than half of them, mentioned as the positive factor the idea of autonomy, self-rule or freedom (about 10% of the total in Transvaal and 21% in Natal/KwaZulu).(132) However, the remainder of those who gave a positive answer, more than half of them, considered instrumental factors, such as being able to keep livestock as the reason to take a positive view of the homelands. These practical reasons do not mean support for the homelands <u>per se</u>. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that

> no more than one-tenth of people on the Witwatersrand and roughly one-fifth ... in KwaZulu/Natal are prepared to endorse the idea of national states from the point of view of it being a positive political development in an intrinsic sense.(133)

Although endorsement of the idea of national states does not necessarily mean support for independence, particularly at the existing conditions, it should be possible to consider this 10% of the Blacks in urban Transvaal and 20% in KwaZulu/Natal as the basis from which a homeland leader, intending to opt for independence, could start to build up a sufficient degree of support for this move. A verification of this can be found in other findings of the survey. In assessing the popularity of alternative political dispensations, the alternative with the best rating was "KwaZulu, etc., should not exist. It should become part of Natal and South Africa", which was considered a good or acceptable solution by 73% of the Soweto Zulus, 65% of the Zulu migrants, 72% of people in rural KwaZulu and 82% of people in metropolitan Natal.(134) Similar results had the enquiry in political and constitutional alternatives ("Plans for African people in the future"). The most popular of these alternatives was "one South African Parliament where the largest group in the government, the blacks have power to make decisions for everyone". 74% of the Soweto Zulus were happy with this solution or willing to accept it, as were 73% of the Zulu migrants, 77% of those living in rural KwaZulu and 84% of those living in metropolitan Natal.(135) Therefore, little more than 20% of the Zulus found the solution of 'one man one vote' not of their liking. It can be reasonably to identify this 20% with the 20% of people prepared to endorse the idea of national states.

It is clear that as in the case of all the other black groups, the great majority of the Zulus too, does not consider the homelands as an acceptable way to fulfil their political aspirations. To the contrary, between three quarters and four fifths of them see as the ideal solution the one-man-one-vote in a united, if not unitary South Africa. However, it seems that, realising the difficulty and the probably high cost of attaining this goal, they are prepared to compromise and to accept solutions that can be acceptable also to the white group. Of the various alternatives proposed in the survey, I will take into consideration only those that include the independence of KwaZulu, with

different conditions attached to it but always moderate enough to be in the realm of possibility without postulating a major change in government policy. (See Table 12)

The less popular of these alternative solutions is that of independence in the existing conditions. A Transkei-type of independence is considered as 'good' by 18% of the Soweto Zulus, and 'not good but acceptable' by 7%. The attitude of other groups living in Soweto is remarkably similar: 25% is prepared to accept independence (13% 'good, 12% 'not good but acceptable'). Thus, around a quarter of the people of Soweto might be prepared to accept independent homelands as a solution even with things as they are now. The appeal of this solution does not change much in Natal/KwaZulu, where 26% in the rural areas and 30% in the big cities consider it acceptable. Only amongst the Zulu migrants this solution is accepted by a considerable proportion of the respondents (39%).(136)

If some improvements to the present conditions are suggested, the number of people prepared to accept independence increases noticeably. 46% of the respondents in Soweto are prepared to accept independence if some more land (but not much more) is given to KwaZulu, together with more towns and industries. This number increases to 47% in rural KwaZulu, to 51% in metropolitan Natal and to 65% among the migrants. More popular, particularly within KwaZulu, is independence if a considerable amount of land is added to the homeland. In Soweto, 47% of the Zulus accept this (32% considering it 'good'), 51% have the same view in metropolitan Natal (only 25% 'good'), 62% in rural KwaZulu (44% 'good') and 68% in the small towns of KwaZulu/Natal (48% 'good').

It must be said that when various items are added to basic independence, there is the danger that the respondent will forget about the context of homeland independence and think only of the advantages of the added item. The report warns: "One dare not, therefore, see the positive endorsement of these items as in any way positively endorsing a mere variant of separate development".(137) However, this point must not be overstressed: otherwise one should have to conclude that the level of stupidity of the respondents is far higher than that of the population in general.

In conclusion, in the non-independent homelands, the majority of the population does not consider independence at the existing conditions as an acceptable solution. The leaders of these homelands are of the same

TABLE 12: Reactions to various alternative political futures for the homelands among major groups of black South Africans associated with KwaZulu/Natal. (Selected items.)

ALTERNATIVE DISPENSATIONS	SOWETO		WITWATERSRAND		KWAZULU/NATAL			
	ZULU %	OTHER %	ZULU %	OTHER %	ZULU MIGRANT %	METRO %	SMALL TOWN %	RURAL %
KwaZulu, etc., independent like Bophuthatswana or Transkei. Good	18	13	11	7	23	12	16	13
Not good but accept	7	12	8	9	16	18	10	13
TOTAL	25	25	19	16	39	30	26	26
Independent but with a little more land, towns and industries.								
Accept	22	17	23	20	38	23	39	32
Accept if nothing else	24	16	16	19	27	28	14	15
TOTAL	46	33	39	39	65	51	53	47
Independent but with more farming land. Good	31	18	29	28	44	25	48	44
Not good but accept	16	20	15	14	21	26	20	18
TOTAL	47	38	44	42	65	51	68	62
Independent but with some towns and factories added. Good	31	21	27	29	36	26	50	46
Not good but accept	21	22	17	19	30	26	19	25
TOTAL	52	43	44	48	66	52	69	71
Independent but with big towns like Richards Bay, Eshowe, etc., added.								
Good	34	(1	27	(1	51	31	54	59
Not good but accept	20		18		16	32	18	19
TOTAL	54		45		67	63	72	78
KwaZulu, etc., should not exist - it should become part of Natal and S.A.								
Good	61	(1	71	(1	50	62	54	47
Not good but accept	12		9		15	20	15	25
TOTAL	73		80		65	82	69	72

(1 Not processed.

SOURCE: The Buthelezi Commission; The requirements for stability and development in KwaZulu and Natal, Durban 1982.

opinion. However, the influence of the 'will of the people' in the leaders' decisions is limited. These leaders' refusal to opt for independence is not definitive. Only Buthelezi enjoys a supoort widespread enough to maintain his position of important black leader even in spite of government's hostility. All the others owe their position and their influence to the South African government and have not been able to become popular enough to survive politically without its support or at least its neutrality. Therefore, they might be induced to change their position in regard to independence, particularly since the South African government has demonstrated a noticeable skill in using the stick and the carrot. In this case, popular opinion will have scant importance. Also because the proportion of people prepared to accept independence, if better conditions were offered, is big enough to allow these leaders to engineer some form of consensus, albeit manipulated, for their decision.

5.4 Key elements in the choice of independence and in its timetable

In the context of homeland politics the most important, and indeed the only determinant factor is the leader himself. Therefore every important political decision is taken by the leader, according to his perception of the situation and to his evaluation of the relative advantages each move involves for his people, for the élite of which he is part and expression and, last but not least, for himself personally. This personal factor is discernible also in the choice of time in the process towards independence.

Since Transkei was the senior homeland, it was logical that the first signs that independence was becoming a real issue came from there. Also came the evidence that Chief Matanzima - as well as the other homeland leaders - did not feel inclined to jump to independence for independence's sake.

At the end of 1965 (22nd December), the Maluti branch of the T.N.I.P. adopted a resolution, calling on the South African government to grant complete independence to Transkei by May 1967. The mover of this motion

was S.M. Sinaba, first vice-chairman of the T.N.I.P. and its chief whip in the assembly. Having been rebuffed by Matanzima, Sinaba resigned from the T.N.I.P. calling for a referendum on the independence issue. Matanzima made it clear that he considered this to be a rash move, and declared that "The road to freedom is a long one which has to be negotiated carefully step by step".(138) Sinaba established the Transkei People's Freedom Party (T.P.F.P.) a short time thereafter, and in the assembly moved a motion calling for independence. His motion was defeated(139) and in its stead a government motion stating that the territory was not yet ripe for independence was approved. Matanzima explained his rejection of immediate independence saying that "political independence without economic independence will get us nowhere".(140) This was to remain his position also in the following years, although he never forgot that independence was his ultimate aim. Explaining his reluctance to hurry towards independence he always underlined the backwardness of Transkei and the need to solve more immediate problems before starting to think of independence:

> At this stage of our development there are far more important tasks that claim our undivided attention, tasks such as the education and upliftment of our people, the agricultural economic and industrial development of our country and the laying of solid foundations for our administration. Only after substantial success is attained by us in these important spheres will independence enter into the realm of practical politics for the Transkei.(141)

This was clearly not a refusal in principle to consider independence. Indeed, independence was listed as an objective in the T.N.I.P. manifesto for the general election of 1968, which pledged the party to "strive for the entire independence of the Transkei along the lines of steady constitutional development".(142)

In the meanwhile Matanzima was trying to obtain better conditions for Transkei, and in particular, was making territorial claims and asking for a Greater Xhosaland including Transkei, Ciskei and the 'white corridor' with East London. The land issue and the problem of the resettlement of Blacks from the white areas were, however, two points in which he made little headway, and again in 1972 he declared his unwillingness to consider independence in the existing conditions:

> We do not see our way to ever requesting a declaration of independence if part of our land still remains in the Republic and we shall oppose any endorsement of our people from the cities if sufficient land, as claimed, is not provided for them. To us, this is fundamental to our acceptance of the policy of separate development as against a multi-racial society in South Africa.(143)

Matanzima was not alone in taking this attitude. All the other leaders maintained that the policy of separate development could be accomplished only if the conditions of the homelands were improved and if more land were given to them. They also maintained that even after independence, South Africa would have some responsibility for the welfare of the Blacks living in the homelands. Mangope warned the Whites not to think that simply a few lines on the map could solve all the problems:

> I cannot think of a more disastrous self-delusion than the idea still ghosting around in the minds of some White South Africans namely: Create the Homelands, give them independence, yes, even fully-fledged sovereign independence, and then push them out of your thoughts, forget about them, let them work out their own salvation.(144)

In this period the black leaders fully realised how weak was their bargaining position against the South African government, and they started to work together in order to be able to exert greater pressure on Pretoria. This necessity and the realisation that after independence each homeland would still be totally dependent on South Africa, helped to bring to the surface the federalist approach.

To counter the divide et impera aspect of separate development, some of those leaders floated the idea of an eventual federation of the black states after independence. The clear advantage of this solution would be that it would give a single, and arguably stronger, voice to the Blacks of South Africa and a stronger hand to their leaders on the negotiation table. Matanzima - perhaps thinking he was entitled to the leading role in such a federation because of his seniority as Chief Minister - was one of the strongest supporters of this idea, and the T.N.I.P. even included the federation of the black states in its programmatic manifesto for the 1973 general election.(145)

The first result of this policy was the summit conference in Umtata on the 8th November 1973, attended by the leaders, or their representatives, of six out of eight homelands. At the end of the conference, no official

statement was issued, but it was reported that all the participants were agreed in principle that a future federation of the homelands was vital to the unity of the Blacks in South Africa.(146) This could have been a very important moment in the political life of South Africa: for the first time recognised leaders of the greater part of the Blacks - and leaders wielding effective albeit limited powers - met together and hammered out a common strategy to follow in their relations with the white government. In reality, however, this unity and community of intent were only superficial, and were destined to be shattered within a short time.

Two of the homelands (QwaQwa and Venda) were not represented at the summit, and although their relative importance was not great, they were the sign that not everybody was happy with the idea of federation, or even of a common policy. In addition, not all the leaders who participated in the summit were wholeheartedly in support of that idea. In particular, Mangope and Sebe were sceptical. Although the latter had not yet spelt out his very strong Ciskeian nationalism, he could certainly not forget Matanzima's ambitions for a Greater Xhosaland. Mangope, on his part, has always been a Tswana nationalist and his idea of federation was not Matanzima's. In reality, he preferred to think of the unity of the Tswana people:

> You know that my colleagues, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Chief Kaizer (sic) have been speaking of a federation of the homelands. I am not very keen about it ... I feel that we must have some sort of referendum if we were to have it. But I think, personally, that we would prefer to incorporate with Botswana, since we share a common border and we are the same people in almost all respects.(147)

The homeland leaders were able to put up a common front again at the first summit meeting with the South African Prime Minister, Mr. J. Vorster, held on the 6th March 1974. On this occasion, they reiterated their request for more land, and refused to take into consideration independence if their claims were not acceded to.

A week later, however, Matanzima, after having received a mandate to negotiate independence from the annual T.N.I.P. conference, introduced in the T.L.A. a motion calling on the South African government to grant independence to Transkei within five years. The only conditions were that the land promised to Transkei under the 1936 Land Act be granted, and that this move would not prejudice Transkei's claim to

other disputed areas. By the end of March the debate was over, the motion approved and a committee started drafting the constitution for the independent Transkei.

Since all the previous Transkeian land claims had been rejected, this decision can be considered as an about-face from the position held in the past. (But shortly afterwards, the 1975 consolidation proposals approved by Parliament gave Transkei the district of Port St. John's, and in a three-cornered deal, Ciskei ceded the districts of Herschel and Glen Grey to it.) It was perhaps an inevitable about-face, in the light of Matanzima's convictions and of his previous acceptance of separate development. Matanzima could see three alternatives in the existing situation, and he had no doubts about which one was the best suited to the interest of Transkei, and even of all the Blacks in South Africa. He reviewed his choice in a speech at a symposium organised by the Foreign Affairs Association in Umtata, in April 1976:

> I shall tell you what they (the alternatives) are:
> (a) We can accept that South Africa is immutable; or
> (b) We can engage in a bloody revolution in an attempt to bring about the collapse of what is to the Black man an unjust society, upon the rubble of which a new, just, multi-racial society ... will arise; or
> (c) We can try to achieve the same end without violence and bloodshed by working within the system.
>
> Acceptance of the status quo as permanent we ... rejected out of hand. Revolution along classical Marxist lines, the next alternative, is a concept relatively easy to 'sell' to those who have nothing to lose ... We in Transkei know poverty. But we are also not in the position of having nothing to lose. ... My Government ... can see no virtue in mobilising ... peaceful people into a revolutionary army bent on military confrontation with the Republic. Firstly, it would be militarily suicidal; secondly, it is quite unacceptable to us morally ... lastly, it is quite unnecessary - we are closing the wage gap, and generally getting all we want without a shot being fired! ...
>
> This brings me to the third alternative. In South Africa ... the only evolution possible is within the framework of the policy of separate development ... We opted for this alternative for ...
> Firstly: To remove from Whites the fear that a better deal for Blacks in any field, particularly in politics and economics, threatens the existence of the Whites as a group ...
> Secondly: To create identifiable areas ... where Blacks have political rights and can exercise them without running into White opposition ...
> Thirdly: To develop these areas economically to stop the drift of young Blacks to those areas designated for White egemony ... hopefully ... (to make) ... possible the relaxation or scrapping of influx control.

> Fourthly: To create an atmosphere in which it is possible for Whites to accept the leaders of these new Black political entities as equals ...
> Lastly: ... to restore personal dignity to Black ... South Africans and gradually to condition Whites to the equality ... of Black and Brown people who meet the requisite norms. In this way the social intercourse between the various population groups will, in time, assume a profile acceptable to all population groups ...(148)

The decision to ask for independence flows from this without a ripple: having accepted separate development, having accepted in principle independence as a target of this policy, having ascertained that imposing pre-conditions did not bring any concession, independence was the only practicable choice for Matanzima. However, it would be wrong to consider the reluctance of the previous years merely as a tactical move. The problems and shortcomings of the homelands were there for all to see, and everybody worth his salt would have tried to obtain better conditions. But in the first half of the seventies, white South Africa was not in the mood for making concessions and the situation reached a stalemate. It can be argued that time is working for the Blacks, and that the Whites are those who should feel interested in making concessions to get out of a stalemate. But even if it is so now, this was far less clear at the beginning of 1974 when the Portuguese were still in control of their empire and the guerrilla movements in the areas closer to South Africa little more than a nuisance. Furthermore, even if time was on the side of the Blacks in general, this did not mean that it was also on Matanzima's side. In reality, in the years from 1972 onwards, Matanzima's leading role amongst the recognised black leaders was increasingly challenged by newcomers of good quality, such as L. Mangope, H. Ntsanwisi, C. Phatudi and G. Buthelezi. The latter in particular, being the leader of the most numerous and compact black ethnic group and having wider support among urban Blacks for his outspoken criticism of the South African government, was rapidly stealing the stage from Matanzima. In this situation, a common policy of the black leaders, aimed at extracting concessions from Pretoria by refusing independence and at a federation of the homelands, rapidly lost its appeal for Matanzima: the South African government stubbornly continued to refuse any meaningful concession to the claims of the black leaders, whether they were performed in choir or a solo, and a common policy was increasingly meaning to work with, and under the lead of Buthelezi.

Another factor which can have influenced the decision to opt for independence was that, accepting it, it was possible to obtain some of those concessions which Pretoria refused to make previously. Indeed, after Transkei asked to be granted independence, it received part of the land it claimed and a greater economic and financial support.(See Chapter 7.2)

At the end of 1975 another homeland, Bophuthatswana, made the same choice. The annual conference of the ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party (B.D.P.) gave Chief Mangope a mandate to lead Bophuthatswana to independence, even if the South African government refused first to consolidate the country in a satisfactory way, and this mandate was endorsed by the B.L.A. shortly thereafter. Again the realisation that persisting in laying down pre-conditions for opting for independence was leading nowhere was a very important factor. The 1975 consolidation proposals 'consolidated' Bophuthatswana in six pieces and there was no chance of further concessions. The frustrating effects of the South African attitude and their influence on his choice were confirmed by Mangope at the beginning of 1976:

> Indeed the question arises: in the profound dilemma which is South Africa, what else can we really do except to embrace independence? What other options are open by which we can restore our self-respect, our sense of dignity, or give expression to our own identity? Truly, if we remain at our present constitutional status, what other harvest can we gather except a bitter harvest of frustration?(149)

With Mangope breaking the ranks too, the common policy of the black leaders was losing meaning, and Buthelezi accused him of betraying the interest of his people and of all the Blacks by breaking their unity. Mangope's answer to this charge shows that although separate development is a <u>divide et impera</u> policy, it is also based on an ethnic consciousness which in many cases is strongly felt:

> Ek as leier van een van die klein swarte volke in Suid-Afrika sal my nie by 'n beweging aansluit waarin ek altyd in die minderheid sal wees nie. Bowendien is ek nie aan Kaptein Buthelezi veraantwoordig vir my optrede nie. Ek ken my volk beter as hy.(150)

Since Mangope is above all a Tswana nationalist, it was inevitable that he would start asking himself which role the Tswana (and himself) could play in a united black front. The simple fact that the Tswana are about two million out of twenty million Blacks was enough to make him unhappy

with a unitary front.

Although among many of the politically conscious Blacks ethnicity has become a swear word, it is not possible to ignore the role that the ethnic factor has played, as bona fide motivation, in the decision to opt for independence. This ethnic, or, in my opinion more correctly, nationalistic factor did play an important role not only in the case of Bophuthatswana, but also in the decision of Venda to ask for independence in 1979. However, the arguably most striking example of the influence and importance of the ethnic factor is perhaps the case of KwaNdebele. Due to their limited number and to the great dispersion of their areas of settlement, the Ndebele were not recognised as a 'national unit' in terms of the 1959 legislation, and only after repeated requests and a long insistence a homeland was created for them. The pressure on the government to grant the Ndebeles the status of 'national unit' and thus a homeland of their own came mostly from a number of chiefs, who were, however, generally supported by their tribesmen. This may introduce some suspicion on the real weight of the ethnic nationalism factor in the moves which led to the establishment of KwaNdebele. It cannot be denied that the prospect of becoming a minister in a homeland government, with all that it means in terms of personal wealth and possibility of patronage, played an important role in awakening the nationalistic spirit of some of these chiefs. However, it is not possible to reduce the raison d'être of KwaNdebele to the personal ambition of a few individuals who saw their chance to gain a position of power. The attachment of the Ndebeles to their ethnic identity also played a significant role. Although not all the Ndebele tribes have supported the creation of KwaNdebele, the number of those that have done so is substantial. In many cases, those chiefs who agitated for the creation of KwaNdebele and wanted to secede from the homeland in which they were, had the support of the great majority of their tribe. A number of tribes voluntarily decided to leave the area in which they lived to resettle in KwaNdebele.(151)

Certainly, a contributing factor to the awakening of ethnic identification among the Ndebeles was the harassment some Ndebele tribes and individuals suffered at the hands of the authorities of other homelands, in particular Bophuthatswana.(152) This point, however, only increases the importance of ethnic feeling in the establishment of KwaNdebele: being discriminated against on ethnic grounds or having one's

own ethnic identity threatened cannot but enhance one's perception of one's own ethnic identification.

In regard to the spontaneousness of the desire for a Ndebele homeland among the Ndebele, the authors of the Surplus People Project Report, who certainly do not hide their conviction about the artfulness of the 'bantustans', after saying:

> It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which various Ndebele groups identified with a common Ndebele bantustan and as a result attempted to secede from either Lebowa or Bophuthatswana. Other factors playing an important part in this process have been the harassment and discrimination experienced in the bantustans and the possible alleviation of that in the Ndebele bantustan,

went on to give some example of pressures for the establishment of a Ndebele homeland stemming from Ndebele nationalism and conclude: "This identification has facilitated the formation of KwaNdebele and has led to the movement of many thousands of Ndebele people".(153)

The part played by ethnic nationalism in the formation of KwaNdebele can be thus considered significant, if not substantial. Indeed, it is arguable that in the case of KwaNdebele the establishment of an ethnic homeland had the active support of many of the people concerned and certainly a higher level of popular support than any other homeland. Being the smallest group and having already suffered from ethnic discrimination at the hands of their fellow Blacks, a considerable number of Ndebeles felt that only as an autonomous entity could they properly protect their interests.

Therefore, although Mangope was the first to spell out the relevance of the ethnic factor in the decision to opt for independence, he was by no means the only one to give greater importance to ethnicity than to racial affiliation.

The fact that Mangope received the mandate to lead Bophuthatswana to independence even if South Africa did not consolidate satisfactorily the territory did not mean that he was ready to accept everything: "Although I emphatically believe that our destiny lies in early independent nationhood, we are equally emphatic that we still do not want independence at all costs".(154) However, he was wise to phrase his conditions in a relatively vague way and thus to leave himself a wide margin of manoeuvre, because there were few chances that he could gain anything meaningful from negotiations. Of this he was fully aware,

and in one occasion he remarked that "We are negotiating, at this moment, from a position of such powerlessness that they can do as they please".(155)

Indeed the negotiations were quite stormy and on more than one occasion they arrived at breaking point. Pretoria seemed determined not to budge an inch from its position on the land and citizenship issues, and Mangope expressed his frustration and despair at the way in which negotiations were developing:

> We ... have recently experienced the full blast of ... painful humiliation and disillusionment. ... it is the question-mark about the motives of the ... Government which is trying to trick us into an independence which smells of fraud ... an independence which will only cater for certain White people's dreams of continued 'baasskap' ... while shattering for ever my people's dreams of a place in the sun for all.(156)

For a while it seemed that the negotiations were deadlocked and that Bophuthatswana would not accept independence after all. In the second half of 1977, agreement was slowly reached on the contentious points, with some concessions to Bophuthatswana on the land and citizenship issues. On the latter point, the modification Mangope obtained (it was provided that a Bophuthatswana citizen might renounce his Bophuthatswana citizenship and regain the South African one on conditions agreed upon between the two governments), although small, was just about everything that could be obtained on that matter in the existing situation. Furthermore, it had effects on the other homelands and on Transkei, because, as a result of the agreement with Bophuthatswana, the South African Parliament enacted the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Amendment Act (No. 13 of 1978) which provided for a person who is a citizen of an independent black state and who was a South African citizen, to regain South African citizenship by being granted citizenship of a non-independent homeland.

The advantages gained by Mangope in his independence negotiations were, in reality, of little significance and fell short of his objectives, but in the end the possibility of being at last able to get rid of the South African control and of the apartheid legislation had a paramount importance in the decision to become independent. As Mangope put it in the independence speech:

> ... why we opted for independence? ... If we stand together to make the most of the new challenge, then our greater independence will put us on the road towards all those things which generations of our people have been crying and yearning and praying for. What it means is our liberation from the indignity of colonial bondage, so that at long last ... we can carry our heads high.
> What it means is that at last we are no longer helplessly at the mercy of the arbitrary arrogance of those who ... trampled our human dignity into dust. At last we can demand that our human dignity be respected ...
> With pride we can now turn into reality the yearning towards taking our destiny into our own hands...(157)

Furthermore, it was Mangope's opinion that an independent Bophuthatswana could be an example of good inter-racial relations which could modify the attitude of the Whites in this regard:

> We believe that the road taken by Bophuthatswana is acting as a potent catalyst. We have committed ourselves to building here a model of a non-discriminatory society which, we believe, will prove to be extremely infectious and will inevitably help to give direction to the social, economic and political evolution of this subcontinent.(158)

The year 1978 saw two other homelands taking independence into consideration. The Venda government, which in the eyes of Pretoria had been one of the least troublesome of all, decided to opt for independence, which it attained after uneventful negotiations that gained for Venda some little territorial concession. The Ciskeian government, on its part, appointed a commission "to enquire into and report and make recommendations to the government of the Ciskei on the practical feasibility considering all political, economic and social aspects of independence for the Ciskei."(159)

In the early 1970's Sebe, too, was opposed to independence on the grounds of excessive poverty of Ciskei and insufficient allocation of land to it. When, on the eve of the Transkeian independence, the possibility was aired of Ciskei joining Transkei and forming one independent state, his reaction was:

> I have often said that our people cannot eat flags or constitutions ... of what benefit would it be to the Ciskei to become part of an independent Transkei which ... has completely inadequate resources ...? Is any benefit to be found in one destitute family joining another to sit down at an empty table?(160)

In the following years, being confronted with the frustrating inability to stop the resettlement policy of the South African government, and finding always more difficulty in extending the scope of his autonomy, he slowly changed position.

Needing to secure the support of the Ciskeian population, he decided to awake the Ciskeian nationalism and to present his C.N.I.P. not simply as a political party but as the movement representing the national spirit of Ciskei and heralding its national rebirth.

The use of national feelings - sometimes even artificially whipped up - as a means to rally and mobilize a people in order to muster its energies and use them for developing a country is an old device which has often proved successful. Indeed, in a developing country, where one of the biggest obstacles to development is the apathy of the people and where the first priority must be to involve them in the development process, the revival of the nationalist spirit (or its creation if there are no historical precedents) is often the only means to mobilize and involve the people. The need to resort to these means did not escape any of the homeland leaders' notice, and it played a role in their decision to opt for independence. As Mangope had occasion to remark:

> The ... prospect ... to mobilize our people's will to economic self-help by means of own decision making ... was in fact a major consideration in adopting our present status. Under the old dispensation the hopes of pulling ourselves by our own bootstraps out of the apathy of an artificially maintained economic ghetto appeared to be unbearably remote.(161)

In Sebe's case, it was not possible to exploit ethnic nationalism, since there are two foci for the Xhosa ethnic feelings. Thus he resorted to the history of the western Xhosa and found in the long history of struggles against the Whites(162) and in the old warrior chiefs the uniting force of Ciskeian nationalism. (After all, over-crowded graveyards have often been good breeding grounds of nationalism):

> For myself, I find my strength, ... my total commitment to our national goal in the stirring examples of our warrior leaders of the past ... For over a hundred years these mighty chiefs fought with great courage ... to defend our sovereign right of survival as a free and independent people.(163)

However, although wanting nationalism to play an important part in Ciskei and wanting to satisfy this nationalism with independence, Sebe did not forget "the existence of a total South African culture and an intimate relationship between all of the South African peoples".(164) He wanted to preserve the "differences in culture and history which give all the groups an individuality", but he recognised also that "the Ciskeians ... do not want to lose that which identifies them not only as Ciskeians but in the broader context as South Africans".(165) Thus he identified Ciskei's objectives as follows:

> Today the Ciskei Nation has but a single objective: the restoration and regathering of the nation to the land of its forefathers and the establishment of its economic and political autonomy - all within the community or commonwealth of nations of Southern Africa.(166)

This hope of a future close collaboration, possibly in the form of a federation or confederation, with all the states and territories of South - or Southern - Africa, and in particular with 'white' South Africa, has been evinced also by other leaders who accepted independence. In Mangope's opinion "our survival is rooted in our interdependence" because "the fact is that Blacks and Whites in South Africa are crowded together in one little boat".(167) For this reason, he talked of 'greater independence' for Bophuthatswana and not of 'sovereign independence', and remarked that:

> By adopting greater independence we have by no means opted out of the Pan-South African destiny. On the contrary, we have now ... established an indisputable and meaningful power base which gives us the freedom and privilege to create viable and convincing models for the direction and quality of changes which are required ... if every man and woman in the region is to be entitled to his rightful place in the sun.(168)

and he hoped that "this process will eventually lead to the emergence of a strong, peaceful and prosperous Southern African Community".(169) Also Sebe has the same hope, and he sees

> the future political framework of Southern Africa taking the form of a confederacy of self-governed autonomous states, comprising the individual national units of all the black races together with the white South African unit in a strong, harmonious and peaceful United States of Southern Africa.(170)

Since it is evident that the aim of these leaders is the creation of some kind of confederal structure in South Africa, possibly as a forerunner of a federation, which inevitably would limit the scope and the meaning of their independence, one can ask oneself why they felt necessary to go through the option of independence. Probably there are two main reasons. One is that only after independence they would have been free of the controls and pressures of the South African government, at least within their homeland. Another is that the personal ambition which moves every politician made itself felt. The prospective of becoming presidents or prime ministers of their country and acquiring the same formal rank as their former rulers must have been a powerful incentive to opt for independence. Furthermore, the South African government has many ways of exerting direct and indirect pressure on the homeland leaders, and certainly its willingness to increase the amount of financial aid to those homelands which choose independence can be a powerful incentive for exercising this option.

CHAPTER 6

ASSESSING REASONS, TACTICS AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

The decision taken by some homeland leaders to opt for independence has been criticised from many quarters and for many reasons. In particular, this choice has been condemned as treason against the Blacks, both those who became citizens of the new states and those who were left under white rule. The homeland leaders who decided to lead their territories to independence were thus accused of being 'sell outs' and 'puppets' of the white government who, for lust of power and for the sake of personal gain, sold the rights of their peoples and crippled the chances of a fairer division of the wealth of South Africa.

Although in some cases there is more than some substance in the charge that homeland leaders have considerably enlarged their personal and family fortunes (the most well-known case is that of the Matanzima brothers),[171] the decision to opt for independence cannot be reduced to this. Deeper and sounder reasons have been advanced by these leaders to justify their move, and they are worth taking into consideration.

In accepting to work within the framework of the policy of separate development, many homeland leaders accepted, explicitly or implicitly, also its final consequence: independence. Even more, the promise of future independence was the sweet coating which made some traditional leaders and some political groups within the homelands swallow the pill of separate development.[172]

This acceptance of separate development and the readiness to work within its framework did not mean that these Blacks were wholeheartedly supporting its aims and the apartheid system. The position of middle-high ranking Blacks, such as petty chiefs and civil servants, has been well explained by Chief J. Mabandla (Ciskei's former Chief Minister):

> those blacks who were in a position to make the policy a working ... proposition ... were very much aware of the conduct or utterances which might result in the banning of opposition to the government. The black personnel responsible for the running of the policy of separate development can be classified as:

> (a) those who accept the policy, while indifferent to its aim and finality; they enjoy the minor benefits within their immediate surrounding, such as an M.P.'s salary at the end of the month ...;
> (b) those who accept the policy only as a medium for free expression, in order to voice what would be difficult outside the enclosure of expressed government policy; and finally,
> (c) those who accept the policy as a 'while we wait' device.(173)

Also the leaders, the very people who accepted separate development and started implementing it, did not give their unflinching support to this policy. Some of them expressed approval of separate development, as Mangope did: "I believe that this principle, if it is implemented with integrity, can provide a lasting solution to the unique historical and cultural situation which we South Africans of today have inherited."(174) Matanzima even found that "this apartheid policy of the Nationalists was most attractive to me as an individual", but this was not because aims and means of apartheid were in his dreams, but "because it came at a time when black people wanted to control their own affairs. It coincided with my desire to see my people free".(175)

Their approval was not for apartheid, but for the possibility inherent in the homelands' policy of putting the black people's case to the government and of taking into black hands the administration of black territories. Indeed, their acceptance of the government policy was motivated mainly by the hope of bringing about a change in the political and economic situation of the Blacks in South Africa. The homeland leaders themselves have repeatedly spelt this out:

> ... I doubt whether there is a single homeland leader in South Africa who has taken the step to self-government because of his commitment to this policy. In the majority if not all cases co-operation within the policy is seen as a means, indeed the only legal and peaceful means, of using the institutions provided to bring about change ...(176)

The homeland leaders did realise that separate development was a white invention, implemented by the Whites for safeguarding white interests. But they also realised that this was a unique chance to assert the black claims and peacefully to fight for an improvement of the conditions of the Blacks. This was aptly expressed by Matanzima in one of his speeches:

> ... this policy of separate development is a White man's policy. Its primary goal is unashamedly the preservation of a White identity and control by the Whites over their own destiny. ...
>
> If separate development is the only way in which the vast majority of Whites in South Africa can be persuaded to allow their Black countrymen a better way of life, then my Government will do everything in its power to assist the Republican Government ... to make the policy work in so far as the Homelands are concerned. We must not precipitate a White backlash by immediate demands and extremist posturing.(177)

The same reason was given by Buthelezi, when, after a long opposition, he accepted to work within the framework of separate development:

> Those who believe in change through non-violent methods should explore other possibilities of averting such a danger. Dialogue, and meaningful dialogue, can begin on the basis of homelands policy ... By participating in the implementation of separate development we are by implication committed to a meaningful negotiation even on its basis ... This policy could easily be the basis of a future South Africa if the government were prepared to negotiate with us seriously.(178)

Their attitude was thus not one of 'yes-men', but that of leaders of a discriminated community, and arguably responsible leaders, who were trying to improve the condition of their people without running foul of the main white interests, which would mean confrontation and the end of any chance of peaceful change.

Indeed, in the political situation of the 1960's, few alternatives were left to a Black who wanted to act in the political field. The A.N.C. and the P.A.C., which were the traditional and most active and popular black political organisations, had been outlawed, their members persecuted and their attempts to overthrow white rule with violent methods ruthlessly and effectively crushed. Internal opposition having been silenced, the alternatives were either to resign oneself to the situation, losing interest in political activity and accepting the immutability of the system, or to leave the country to live in exile trying to form a better organised guerrilla movement to overthrow the white government manu militari.

The first alternative was unacceptable, and no politically active Black could ever have subscribed to it. The second was of doubtful outcome and morally distasteful to people politically brought up in the school of non-violent action which had been one of the basic tenets of the A.N.C. until 1960.

A realistic appreciation of the balance of power within South Africa and in Southern Africa in the mid-1960's would have left few hopes that an external liberation movement could effectively influence South African policies. Indeed, if one excludes those already compromised and wanted by the police, very few Blacks made this choice before the change in the internal and international situation in the mid-1970's. Furthermore, the resort to violent action was totally alien to the philosophy of the great majority of black nationalists.

The traumatic events of 1960-61 forced the black nationalists to take violent action into consideration as a means of furthering their objectives, but violent action was not necessarily the only course of action left open to them. It is possible to say that black nationalism, in this crucial period of its history, split into two divergent streams.

The traditional A.N.C. policy was to work within the system, or at any rate with legal means, to bring about a gradual but irreversible change in the political and economic condition of the Blacks. The security legislation gradually introduced during the 1950's made it more and more difficult for the A.N.C. to pursue its aims within the legal framework, and the repressive measures of the early 1960's made it impossible. Every politically active Black had to contemplate a break from the traditional and deeply ingrained attitude of black nationalism. This break could take two different forms. One was to put the stress on the final aim of black nationalism: a South Africa where political rights and economic opportunities would not depend on the colour of one's skin. And since white repression made it impossible to fight for this with legal and peaceful means, the only alternative left was to fight to obtain this aim through a revolutionary action. The other form was to put the stress on the necessity to avoid violence, both for moral and tactical reasons, and to work with the limited legal means left to try to improve, step by tiny step, the position of the Blacks, in this way slowly creating the conditions for overcoming racial prejudices. This choice implied renouncing, for the time being, to fight for 'one man one vote' and accepting to work within the framework of the ethnic policy imposed by the government.

One group, personified by the leadership of the A.N.C. and P.A.C., opted for violent action. This choice was not taken lightheartedly, and

it was resorted to only when repression of black political activity made violence appear the only way Blacks could make their voice heard. Although sympathy for the A.N.C. remained widespread amongst the Blacks, only a limited number of them was prepared to follow this course.

Another group preferred the other alternative. The most important reason for this choice was the moral repulsion that the use of violence roused in many of them. Almost all the educated Blacks, who constituted the backbone of the nationalist movements, had been educated in the missionary schools, and many of them were deeply committed Christians. As such, violence was repugnant to them, whoever used it for whatever reason. Other reasons compounded, to a different degree in different people, this basic refusal to use violence. Tactical reasons were important: the rapid suppression of the first actions of Poqo and Umkhonto weSizwe and the elimination of the embryonic clandestine network of these organisations showed that a revolutionary overthrow of white rule was outside the realm of possibility. However desirable the aims of the A.N.C. could be for a Black, the chances appeared that it would take decades before a revolutionary movement could defeat the government. In the meanwhile the external liberation movements could do nothing to improve the daily condition of living of the Blacks. Certainly, to work within the limits imposed by the Nationalist government would leave little room to manoeuvre, but it offered more occasions to do something practical to improve the conditions of the Blacks than leaving the country to train for guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, and this also had an influence on those who took this decision, to work within the legality and in collaboration with the government was certainly less dangerous than trying to launch guerrilla attacks from Dar es Salaam, and opened up perspectives for a more immediate and tangible reward.

From the second of these streams in which black nationalism had divided in the early 1960's came at least some of the homeland leaders, in particular those, such as Matanzima and Buthelezi, who in their position do not put the stress mainly on ethnicity. Matanzima's links with the A.N.C. are often dismissed as 'youth's mistakes', but his frequent insistence on black consciousness and his, admittedly weak, attempts to free himself of the strait-jacket of government policies permit one to consider him as a moderate black nationalist (as opposed to an ethnic nationalist such as Mangope). Buthelezi is the homeland leader who most frequently had made the point that his aims are those

of a black nationalist of the old A.N.C. school and that his actions are in the mould of the traditional political action of the black nationalists:

> I have openly identified with the A.N.C.'s traditions .... There is nothing whatsoever in that which the A.N.C. have ever stood for, which says that liberation will come by violence alone.(179)

These leaders accepted to collaborate with government policies because it was the only way they had to influence, however weakly, the attitude and the policy of the government.(180)

While working within the framework of separate development, all the homeland leaders insisted on the separate-but-equal doctrine,(181) and they all agreed with Mangope when he said that he would like "more emphasis to be placed on development rather than on separation".(182) Furthermore, although having to operate within a policy of racial separation, almost all the leaders stressed that their aim was a multi-racial society which could set an example of armonious relations between Blacks and Whites, to allay Whites' fear of black rule. Only Matanzima accepted and supported racial exclusiveness in his homeland for a number of years, on the principle that since the Whites were discriminating against the Blacks in the 'white' areas, the Blacks could as well discriminate against the Whites in the 'black' areas. However, he had to discard this aspect of his policy after realising that without white expertise and capital the development of Transkei would never take off.

The support given to separate development by the homeland leaders was not unqualified, and Whites too were requested to show goodwill and to make concessions. In Mangope's view, the success of this policy would

> ... depend on progress in four fields: the reconsideration of the land issue so that the Africans could obtain more land; the need for Whites to make meaningful sacrifices for their policy by spending more on African education, social services, homeland development and wages; Black dignity and the rejection of discrimination; and the assumption of responsabilities by the Africans.(183)

The same concepts have been expressed, perhaps in a somewhat cruder way, by Buthelezi:

> ... (I want to share) ... some of the fat of South Africa. South Africa is a wealthy country, and we should get our pound of flesh. If they are giving us our own nation, that is okay, we are not against being given nationhood. But it must be a true nation.(184)

The decision to collaborate with the government in making the homelands policy work undoubtedly yielded some fruits. In the decade from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's there have been important, albeit not conspicuous, changes in the position of the Blacks. On practical matters, the establishment of the homeland governments put sizeable resources at the disposal of the Blacks for the first time in South African history, and put them under their direct control. These resources were limited and constituted a small portion, in some people's opinion a ludicrously small portion, of South Africa's resources. Furthermore, the amount given each year to the homeland governments were decided by the South African government and approved by the South African Parliament, without even the slightest participation of the homeland leaders in the decision. The homeland leaders could plea for more money but they did not have any part in actually deciding how much money they would receive. Direct taxation of its citizens was the only source of revenue which a homeland government could count on without having to wait and hope for South African largesse. For the rest, the South African government budgeted an amount to be spent by or on behalf of the homelands, more or less arbitrarily increasing or decreasing it (usually increasing it), and that was all. Despite these restrictions, however, the homeland governments had the power to decide how to spend these resources; and with the increase in the number of departments left under their responsibility, an ever increasing amount of resources was put under their direct control.

If one of the attributes of power is to have resources and the capacity to allocate them according to one's own interests and decisions, the decade up to the mid-1970's saw a perceptible shift of power in favour of the Blacks. Admittedly, since on average only about 20% of the budget of the homelands was covered by 'own resources',(185) it was a limited power. The origin of the homelands' resources was mainly under South African control, as it was logical since the homelands, albeit as 'self-governing territories', are an integral part of South Africa. Thus, great part of the power wielded by the homeland governments was wielded with the leave of the South African government. Nevertheless, it was real power.

It might sound excessive to say that the power of the Blacks increased in that decade. The reality of poverty, pass-laws and political repression remained unchanged for most of them. Furthermore, part of the resources at the disposal of the homeland governments was used to further personal or clan interests of the small political élite. The average black man-in-the-street benefitted very little, if at all, from this limited shift of power in favour of the Blacks. Nevertheless, in this decade the foundations were laid down for an increase in the influence of the Blacks in South African life. For the first time, black actors appeared on the South African political stage to play a part. For the first time, they were not considered mere walkers-on on that stage, but had a recognised role to play.

With their decision to collaborate with the government the homeland leaders created for themselves a small space of political freedom. In a society where political opposition from the Blacks had been silenced and where any form of criticism from them was subject to immediate repression, the homeland leaders, by virtue of their office, had an undreamt of freedom of speech. They made use of it, prudently at the beginning, more outspokenly with the passing of the years, to voice black grievances. Sensitive topics were discussed in public by these leaders and their critical statements, even on topics which had been almost taboo for the Blacks, were widely publicised in the press. Some of these statements would have earned their authors the immediate attention of the police had they been proferred by any other Black. Instead they were discussed by the white establishment and sometimes even answered to by the government. The small space of freedom the homeland leaders procured for themselves slowly enlarged, and extended also to other Blacks. The homeland leaders made statements which the government found unpleasant and which, although expressing the opinion of almost all the Blacks, only they could make. However, slowly other Blacks outside the group of 'collaborationists' started to voice the same opinion, and the government had to tolerate them instead of banning them as it would have liked to do.

It is possible to say that, up to the early 1970's, one of the most important results of the decision of some Blacks to collaborate with the government in the homelands policy was that this collaboration allowed black opinions to be expressed and black interests to be pointed out to the government, and sometimes protected, in a period when

government attitude was to silence every form of black dissension to its policy. Black opposition was indeed silenced, but some of its arguments were then taken up by the homeland leaders, and this brought about, with time, a wider scope for black criticism than the government expected.

In conclusion: the black leaders accepted to work within the framework of separate development because they saw that there were

> only two choices for a black person who seeks to ... influence future events. He can seek the way of bloody confrontation ... and enter into an internal and external war which will rip the very guts of the country ... or he can seek the way of peaceful co-operation and negotiation ...(186)

and they chose the latter course

> not because it ... (the Ciskei in this case) ... endorses the policy of apartheid, not because it seeks eternal white domination, ... but because it is the only acceptable way of achieving progress towards the attainment of a just society in South Africa.(187)

It was the choice of the lesser evil, in the hope that this initial development, however slow and limited it was, could bring about a meaningful change:

> As the ultimate ideal I can never depart ... from the principle of 'one man one vote'. But it would be utterly futile at this stage to disregard the historical realities and their practical implications. The fear on the part of .... Whites of the power falling ... into the hands of sixteen million Blacks is a natural and not unreasonable reaction ...
> At the same time it is not unreasonable to postulate that in the long run developments may bring about a situation where this fear loses all substance ... A society will then emerge in which ... all will have an equal stake in peace and progress ...(188)

In the black leaders' opinion, their choice did really cause a modification in Pretoria's attitude. Matanzima expressed his conviction that "our quiet progress has done much to allay white fears",(189) and Sebe thought that "such change as has been effected in the thinking of white politicians has been achieved through pressure brought via the medium of these institutions (the homelands)".(190) Also Buthelezi, perhaps from a different point of view, emphasised the important role the homelands had in improving the situation of the Blacks, also in the

political field:

> Among the so-called homeland leaders there are some like myself who believe in Black consciousness, and who believe they have done more in promoting the concept of Black consciousness than those who arrogantly dismiss them as 'irrelevant'.(191)

Although all the homeland leaders accepted to work within the framework of separate development in order to create a platform from which they could further black interests, the degree of their acceptance of that policy varied considerably from one to the other. Some, such as Buthelezi, accepted it only when its forced imposition was threatened and only as a means to build an unassailable power basis from which to oppose some aspects of the policy which they considered unacceptable. These leaders did not want independence for their homelands, they wanted for all the Blacks a larger share of power and wealth within South Africa. Others, such as Matanzima, willingly accepted separate development because they reckoned that it was the only way the Blacks had to take the control of their future, at least in some territories since it appeared impossible to modify their political situation within the whole of South Africa. Thus, they accepted independence as a substitute for an unattainable participation of the Blacks in the political process within South Africa. Others still, such as Mangope, saw in separate development not only a surrogate for black presence in South African politics, but also a way to protect and promote the interests of their ethnic group. These nationalist (in an ethnic sense) leaders considered independence as a positive and fundamental aspect of separate development and one of the reasons for which they accepted to support it.

This nationalistic factor undoubtedly played a significant part in Mangope's decision to opt for independence and also in that of the Venda and KwaNdebele leadership. These three territories are the homelands assigned to small black ethnic groups (Venda and Ndebele are the smallest recognised 'national units') and their leaders do not ignore that in a multi-ethnic country the ethnic factor often plays a determinant role, particularly when the moment of the allocation of scarce resources comes. In the South African situation, in particular after Matanzima led Transkei on its independent way, the most numerous

group is the Zulu group. It is also the best organised and its leader can count on the compact support of his people. The Zulu are at the moment the potentially strongest black group, and, in whichever way the South African situation will evolve, the chances are that the Zulus will have a hegemonic position amongst the black groups, be it in a united black front negotiating with the white government or in the government of a black Azania. Mangope did not want to participate in a movement in which he would always be in the minority(192) and where the protection of the 'vital interests' of his people would be entrusted to the fair play of other groups whose 'vital interests' could clash with those of his own group. This argument was certainly taken into consideration by Mphephu, while KwaNdebele's leaders did not have to guess what the situation of a minority group might theoretically be since some Ndebele tribes had already had a taste of ethnic discrimination at the hands of bigger black groups. This nationalistic factor has also played a part in Sebe's decision, although probably not as big as in the previous cases. At any rate, the Xhosas were the main potential challenger to the possible Zulu hegemony in black politics. However, after the independence of Transkei their relative importance amongst the black groups decreased considerably, and the Xhosas in Ciskei might well have thought that their interests would be better protected by an independent Ciskeian government rather than by a black united front where for each one of them there would be nine of the others, and five of them Zulus.

However important this nationalistic factor has been, it was not the only factor which influenced the decision to opt for independence nor was it the most important. Another reason for making this choice was that the homelands had a limited scope for exerting really autonomous decisions. Time and again homeland initiatives and requests met with government refusal. Those homeland leaders felt the need to shake off the control of the white government and the sovereignty of the white Parliament, in order to be able to refuse to bend to South Africa's wishes every time there was dissension with it. The leaders of these homelands reckoned that they had exploited all the room of manoeuvre they had in the existing circumstances. The self-governing homelands were becoming a dead end in which the occasions for misunderstandings and for increase of tension with the South African government were becoming more numerous. The necessity to wait always for the placet of the South African government was frustrating and

sometimes was felt like a strait-jacket which prevented them from taking their own decisions.

Furthermore, South African sovereignty did not only mean limited decisional autonomy for the homeland leaders, it also meant that all the laws and regulations of South Africa applied to these territories. The possibility of getting rid at last of the discriminatory legislation has certainly been a powerful incentive to choose independence. Indeed, this is the one advantage which everybody admits independence brought to the homelands and their people: the abolition of apartheid legislation. The possibility of getting rid of discriminatory legislation and of the sometimes suffocating control of the white government was certainly alluring for all the homeland leaders, and strongly influenced the decision whether to opt for independence or not. Refusing independence meant continuing to act in an increasingly frustrating environment, with no hope of being able to change the basic characteristics of the South African society, at least in the short term. Only leaders with extremely long term plans, determined to outlast white government can find this line of action worth following.

In addition to this, one must not forget the influence the personal factor had in the decision to opt for independence. This is not to say that the perspective of personal gain had an overwhelming importance. Certainly, the personal interest in becoming leader of an independent state (and the lack of international recognition does not detract from their salary and other fringe benefits) had its importance, although not much more importance than this factor has in the desire of every politician to get to the top.

Almost all the homeland leaders aim at changing South Africa's society. This is a long term objective which might be attained following different strategies: total opposition to the white government and open war; total opposition within legality; political collaboration with the government accepting separate development up to a point; and almost total collaboration with it, accepting separate development to the point of opting for independence. The homeland leaders refused to follow one of the first two strategies, when in the early 1960's, they accepted to work within the framework of separate development. The choice between the two other strategies depended on the assessment each leader made of the costs and benefits of each

alternative. In this analysis of cost and benefits, the personal factor plays its role. To continue to work in an increasingly frustrating condition, a homeland leader had to be convinced not only that his strategy is the one which will reap the better fruits, but also that he will be there to reap these fruits himself. A leader such as Buthelezi can reckon that however high both for himself and his people are the costs of remaining under white control, the possible benefits of success will be higher still. A leader such as Mphephu, whose popularity is almost non-existent, found refusing independence in the hope of a change in the political condition of the Blacks in South Africa pointless: such a change would mean his disappearance from the political scene. A leader such as Mangope, whose popularity is arguably high among the Tswana, might have considered that no matter how popular he is with his people, the small size of his group would prevent him from being among the principal actors of black politics. From this point of view, the benefits of independence exceed its costs, particularly in the case of Bophuthatswana whose resources put it in its own class among the homelands. Perhaps the case in which the relevance of this calculation of the personal perspectives in different developments of the political situation is most apparent is the case of Matanzima. As long as he was the most important of the homeland leaders, he found merit in the idea of a united black front as a means of changing the condition of the Blacks in South Africa. When other homeland leaders became more sure of their position and started to challenge his prominence, his enthusiasm for it cooled considerably and it disappeared altogether when it became clear that Buthelezi was going to become the most prominent of all. A last element which reinforced the influence of the personal factor in the choice to opt for independence was the desire to see the fruits of one's efforts. Refusing independence may mean to defeat the white government's policy as Buthelezi maintains[193] and may or may not be the way to bring about a decisive change in the condition of the Blacks in South Africa. However, even if this were the case, and the homeland leaders who opted for independence did not think so, this would be a long process which might well take another generation to be accomplished. Many black leaders found, and others may still find, that between a possible great or decisive improvement in the conditions of the Blacks to be attained by the next generation and a smaller and less important improvement to be attained now with themselves as principal author of this improvement,

the decision is heavily weighed in favour of the latter.

Even those leaders who accepted separate development because of the prospective of independence[194] have been reluctant to go ahead too fast, despite the fact that at the beginning one of their misgivings was that they were afraid that the South African government was not really committed to it. They realised that the conditions of their territories were so wretched that these threatened to make independence meaningless. They had doubts over the fairness of the deal offered to them and wanted to obtain better conditions before opting for independence.

The list of the drawbacks of the homelands was almost inexhaustible and while the South African government was prepared to offer its help to relieve some of them, in other cases it was not. It was prepared to make a financial effort to improve the economic conditions of these territories and to help them build the necessary infrastructures, but on such topics as land and citizenship it was not prepared to concede anything. The homeland leaders tried to convince the South African government to make concessions, but their capacity to exert pressure on it was limited.

They first tried a common approach, which, however, did not bring any result. The South African government discouraged the establishment of a united front of the homeland leaders, continuing to deal with each of them individually. It was logical that the South African government, after having devised separate development as a way of accommodating the ethnic differences of the Blacks and of exploiting these differences to maintain its control over South Africa, would not consider with favour the possibility of a concerted action of all the homelands. However, this common approach was doomed to failure by intrinsic factors. Different strategies or even different aims pursued by the various leaders made a common action impossible. To these political differences must be added personal rivalries which put out of the question the possibility that the ambitions of each of them could be subordinated to the attainment of a common objective.

Therefore, the homeland leaders had to confront the South African government individually and this enhanced their basic weakness. All those who opted for independence adopted the same tactics and all of them obtained meagre results, at least on the most controversial issues. This persistence on the same tactics even when they appeared to be ineffective may seem dull, but in reality, once they had decided to go

for independence, these leaders had little choice.

They started by saying that they would not opt for independence unless the South African government met their conditions. These conditions were generally the same: more money, more land, no automatic loss of South African citizenship for those homeland citizens living in the white areas (only Mphephu did not insist on the citizenship issue). The South African government was prepared to give money, although the homeland leaders had to fight for it, but on the land issue it was less obliging, making only small concessions far short of the homelands' claims, and on the citizenship issue it was absolutely uncompromising. Concessions on this last topic were, of course, out of the question: the main reason for giving independence to the homelands was to deprive of South African citizenship as great a number of Blacks as it was possible, and no amount of pressure from the homeland leaders could change the government's attitude. Also on the land issue the attitude of the South African government was negative, but it made some concessions which, although far from what the homelands had asked for, were in some cases rather important. Most of them were made in the crucial period when the negotiating weight of the homeland leaders was maximised.

The maximum degree of leverage is attained by the homeland leaders in the period when they have made it known that they are prepared to accept independence but when they are not yet firmly commited to it. This is the only moment in which the homeland leaders, too, have a carrot to dangle in front of the government's eyes. This is the moment when the government, finding itself close to the attainment of its objective, can be induced to commit itself to concessions which it would not make in other circumstances. How much can be extracted from the government in this period depends on the ability of each homeland leader and on how hard a bargainer he is.

This is, however, only a short period which ends the moment a homeland leader commits himself to independence. Once he has decided that he wants independence, that he wants to become the president of an independent country, he loses most of the leverage he has towards the South African government. This is what happened to all of them. They decided they were interested in independence and started negotiating with the South African government, obtained some concessions which induced them to commit themselves to accept independence, a date was fixed for independence day and they went on negotiating on the many

points still unresolved. From this moment onwards, the South African government concentrated on the technical aspects of the independence process and made almost no concession on the most important issues. The homeland leaders tried to pressure the government for more concessions but found that, no matter how much they recalcitrated, they were unable to prevail over it. Some of them threatened to go back on their decision and refuse independence, but this was an empty threat. Once a homeland leader has taken the decision to opt for independence, and it is a difficult decision, he is committed to it and often finds that he is forced by himself to go along with this decision. A factor which helps them to accept this situation is the close interdependence of the homelands with South Africa. Also after they have become independent, their economy is so entwined with that of South Africa that close contact and collaboration between them are a vital necessity, particularly for the homelands. In this situation, their leaders are able to put again and again their case to the South African government hoping to obtain improved conditions, and sometimes they succeed in it.

This interdependence is welcomed by the homeland leaders not only because it guarantees a constant flow of South African money and offers the chance of obtaining the odd concession from the South African government, but also because it gives them the chance of influencing the situation of the Blacks within South Africa. Indeed, this is one of their long term objectives: to induce the South African government to change its attitude and its policy towards the Blacks. None of the leaders who accepted independence considered it as the final step in the institutional development of South Africa, and each one of them, in various degrees, hopes that in a not too distant future there will be a confederal or federal agreement which would bring about a fairer sharing of the wealth of South Africa. And they are convinced that their decision will positively influence the political evolution of South Africa towards this target.(195)

Mangope expressed well the main reasons which led him to opt for independence, the hope he has that this move would be a step towards a greater aim and his fear that lacking a further evolution the political situation in Southern Africa would undergo an involution towards disaster:

> ... we deliberately chose independence for Bophuthatswana in the faith that the example we have committed ourselves to, namely of non racialism and tolerance and of democratic freedoms enshrined in a Bill of Rights, would help to soften the political rigidities and serve as a catalyst for accelerated, creative change in the whole subcontinent.
>
> By chosing independence we did not opt out of the South African situation. We emphatically opted in, hoping that through our experience and our example we could help to create a new and greater whole ... in Southern Africa, with justice to all. Such a settlement, to be truly a settlement, would have to be negotiated - and for true negotiations Black and White both need visible bases of power and proven experience and ability in statecraft to allay the fears of minorities.
>
> ... Those with a limited view of history regard territorial independence as the final stage of the independence process. They have forgotten the lesson that Europe has taught us twice in this century ... (when it) ... was a boiling-pot of countries stridently independent against each other, with frontiers not reflecting the ethnic or economic realities and with minorities complaining bitterly that they were being treated badly. This led directly to the most destructive war ...(196)

But whatever rationalization the homeland leaders gave for their choice, the reality is that theirs was a reaction to the South African system. Many were the motivations that influenced the choice of those who opted for independence, but perhaps the most important reason for this choice has been poignantly pointed out by Mangope himself:

> Let this hour go down in history as marking the beginning of the end of racial discrimination in South Africa! Let it be known that our main reason for choosing independence is that we utterly abhor racial discrimination.(197)

PART III

THE CONSEQUENCES OF INDEPENDENCE

CHAPTER 7

INTERDEPENDENCE AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE INDEPENDENT STATES

7.1 Inter-state agreements

In preparation for independence, a number of subjects was discussed by the South African government and the government of the homelands concerned, with the aim of guaranteeing a smooth transition to the new status, and of helping the fledgling countries to face and solve the problems inherent in their independent existence. To this end, a number of agreements was entered into between South Africa and each future independent state, the agreements usually having validity from the day of independence.

The number of agreements entered into - some of them in the form of an exchange of notes - is relatively large (from 54 in the case of Transkei to about 80 in the case of Ciskei). Most of them have mainly technical and/or administrative importance, particularly in helping the black states maintain services of an adequate standard after independence. Of course, these agreements make sure that the independent states conform to South African rules in all the matters taken into consideration. Some of them make South African collaboration necessary in potentially sensitive matters, such as broadcasting, thereby giving South Africa a form of control on the activity of the independent states in these matters. Of particular political significance are the agreements on financial and security matters.

7.1.1 General observations

Although the number of agreements entered into between South Africa and the different black states varies, and increases from the first homeland to become independent to the latest,[1] it is difficult to find any noticeable difference in the treatment of the various black states.

Particularly in the case of the first three homelands to gain independence, the differences were almost non-existent. Indeed, if one excludes the lack of the sentence "Whereas the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of ... recognize the friendly relations existing between the two Governments and their peoples" at the beginning of the preamble of the agreements with Transkei - a lack certainly due to an oversight rather than to ill-will, the agreements entered into between South Africa and Venda are almost a verbatim repetition of those signed by South Africa with Bophuthatswana and with Transkei.(2) The few exceptions are mainly due to small adaptations, or to the peculiarity of the topic of the agreement. Sometimes an agreement entered into with one black state is divided into more than one when the following homeland to become independent signs its own agreements, or vice versa. For example, the South African Ministry of Industries entered into three agreements with Venda, but the text of these three agreements corresponds almost word for word with the text of a single agreement signed by the South African Ministry of Economic Affairs and Bophuthatswana. In short, excluding the case where the differences are due to the 'environment' - there is, of course, no agreement with Venda regarding common measures to be taken to prevent and combat sea pollution - the few cases in which different topics have been the subject of an agreement with one homeland and not with another, or not with all the others, are apparently due to almost an afterthought: some topics of scarce relevance which were ignored in one case were considered worthy of an agreement in the following and vice versa.

The agreements signed with the independent black states touch almost every field, from agriculture to water affairs. They include among others a non-aggression pact, provisions for the continued secondment of personnel, from judges to teachers, to the independent black states from the South African government, and agreements with regard to economic relations and development. Other agreements concern co-operation in the most various fields, from mining and civil aviation to fuel conservation measures and health services, from telecommunications and international bridges to veterinary services and forest technology. The main aim of these agreements is to assure the conformity of the future legislation of the independent black states to the existing legislation in South Africa, and to provide that any future modification thereof would be agreed upon beforehand. Furthermore, in many cases these are framework

agreements, with the two sides agreeing in principle and in general terms on some subject, leaving operational particulars to be spelled out in future negotiations to be held at departmental level.

If one excludes the agreements related to economic and financial co-operation, few of these agreements have great political relevance. Among them there is the non-aggression pact, which commits the signatory parties not only not to "resort to the use of armed force against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of each other",(3) but also not to allow their territory "to be used as a base, thoroughfare or in any other way by any state, government, organization or person for military, subversive or any other hostile actions or activities against the other Party".(4) Since the meaning of 'hostile actions' is open to a wide range of interpretations, particularly in the South African context, the result of this pact is that the independent black states, pledging themselves not to allow any organisation hostile to the South African government to operate from, or to be present in their territories, would have not only to prevent the nationalist movements opening representative offices in their territories, but also to refuse to harbour eventual refugees from South Africa. Of course, in the present circumstances, the independent black states would do so even without a pact with South Africa, since the black nationalists consider the leaders of the black states as puppets of the white government, do not recognise the independence of these black states (even their existence as administrative units is refused), and their programme is the destruction of both the white government in South Africa and of its 'puppets' in the national states. But it often happens in politics that the enemy of one day becomes a more or less trusted friend another day, and not signing a non-aggression pact with South Africa, or signing one on different terms, might have left the independent black states more room to manoeuvre in case of unexpected events. With this pact however, the independent black states clearly side with South Africa, and in practice pledge themselves to fight on behalf of South Africa in case of a future worsening of the situation. However, it was not possible for them to promise otherwise, since this is precisely one of the aims of the South African government, i.e., to have a belt of black states to act as a buffer for white South Africa and to fight on its side against the A.N.C. and other black nationalist forces.

As regards land and citizenship, the treaties did not touch politically sensitive issues because those issues were solved, from the South African point of view, with the 'status' acts, which delimited the areas over which South African sovereignty was to be relinquished and removed ope legis the South African citizenship from all those people who were deemed to be citizens of the independent states. Both these subjects will be examined later (Chapter 8), and suffice it to say here that, by force of some of the treaties, the citizens of the independent black states must have a special endorsement if they wish to remain in South Africa for more than fourteen days (the same applies to South African citizens in the black states), and that if they wish to take up employment there, they can enter the Republic for this purpose only if they have written contracts or 'call-in' cards. The South African government also pledged itself to give the independent black states all the land which in the 1975 consolidation proposals was assigned to them and which had not yet been transferred to them.

Other treaties of relevance are those referring to economic aid and financial assistance. Also in this case, there is no real difference in what the various black states have obtained. Although different agreements were signed at the moment of independence of different black states (Transkei having fewer agreements of narrower scope and Ciskei more of wider scope), the financial support given by South Africa does not change, in relative terms, from one country to the other, because other instruments exist (e.g. the 'Financial Arrangements' acts) to assure an equivalent treatment to all the independent black states. Those treaties are mostly pro forma since they transform the financial support given by South Africa to the homelands from a handout of the South African government to a dependent territory into international aid, or even into a share of a pooled amount (as in the case of the Rand Monetary Area and the Customs Union) which therefore becomes part of the own resources of the independent black state. The participation of the independent black states in the Rand Monetary Area and in the Customs Union might appear strange when one considers that the other countries which are parties to the Monetary Agreement (Lesotho and Swaziland) and to the Customs Union Agreement (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) do not recognise the independence of the TBVC countries, and that they refused to accept any 'ex-homeland' as a new member of the club. The problem was solved by

bilateral agreements between South Africa and the independent black states by which South Africa considers the two agreements as referring also to the TBVC countries, and transfers to them part of its share of the resources pooled with the BLS countries. In this way, the BLS countries share the resources with South Africa as they did since the signature of the Monetary and Customs Union agreements without ever naming any of the TBVC countries, and the latter receive their share from South Africa as if they were full parties of those agreements.

7.1.2 Differences in the agreements signed with the various independent black states

When agreements cover important matters there is in general a complete equality in their wording no matter which is the country concerned. This assures that each black state is dealt with in the same way. In three cases only, agreements covering matters of consequence have not been entered into with all the independent states.

The first case was the absence of an extradition agreement between South Africa and Transkei. This absence was odd, and since it is difficult to believe that such an agreement was not signed because the parties concerned could not agree on its terms, it is possible that it was not signed with all the other agreements in time for independence just because nobody thought of signing an extradition agreement until it was Bophuthatswana's turn to become independent. Indeed the extradition agreement with Transkei was eventually signed at the beginning of November 1977,(5) solving this little anomaly.

The other two cases of important agreements not signed with all the independent black states involve Ciskei. One is in regard to an agreement concerning "Development Co-operation", whose effect is, among others, to put into the form of an international agreement the clauses of Section 2 of the Financial Arrangements with Ciskei Act (Act No. 118 of 1981).(6) With this, the source of the bulk of direct financial aid from South Africa to Ciskei became an international agreement instead of being an act of the South African Parliament. This agreement with its annexure provides also for further financial aid to be made available to Ciskei on a project basis,(7) and for consultation between the parties after three years "with a view to determining what adjustments, if any,

should be effected in order to take account of changed circumstances".[8] The agreement manages to increase both the South African control on the funds transferred to Ciskei, and Ciskeian participation in the assignment and utilization of these funds. Tighter South African control of the funds is achieved by finalising the concession of money to specified projects, which are then monitored in their implementation by South Africa. This provision is given more force by Article 4 of the agreement which allows South Africa to earmark part of the sums transferred to Ciskei in terms of Article 1(b) for specific services or programmes, and binds Ciskei to "utilise such amount exclusively for the purpose so earmarked and on conditions mutually agreed upon". Clearly, the cavalier way in which Transkei used South African financial aid in past years has made South African authorities more cautious about the allotment of South African money.

The increased Ciskeian participation is guaranteed in the annexure[9] which pledges close co-operation between South African and Ciskeian governments "in implementing projects financed by the former"; co-operation to be achieved "through active participation by the Government of Ciskei in each of the various stages of a project". Furthermore, "the preparation of the projects and programmes in respect of which aid is required shall be the responsibility of the Government of Ciskei or other approved beneficiaries". In this way a remedy was found for one of the most criticized aspects of the South African financial aid, viz., the propensity of the South African government to decide not only how much money to give the independent black states - a legitimate desire after all - but also how and when to spend such money. Of course, it was only a partial remedy, since the dossiers concerning these projects or programmes, when ready, "are to be submitted to the Government of the Republic of South Africa by the Government of Ciskei".

The contradiction between South Africa's desire to tighten its control on the financial aid it gives to the independent black states and the accusation to South Africa of imposing the utilisation of its money on projects which were more in South African interests than in the interest of the black state receiving this help is solved if one considers that the great majority of South African aid was given to the black states with only a generic specification on how to spend it, and once the receiving government budgeted this money for the generic use

it was earmarked for, the control of its spending was in the hands of the black states. On the other hand, the few projects initially financed specifically with South African money, or also the more general fields in which South African money was to be used, were often decided in Pretoria with a limited participation, if any, of the representatives of the black state concerned. In some occasions, the results of this state of affairs were that the South African authorities dictated to the black states the priorities in their investments and thus their economic policy, and the black states' authorities had the greatest freedom of spending money in useless or prestige projects, provided that the heading of the relevant expenditure was within South African specifications.

This agreement can therefore be considered as an indication of a change of attitude of the South African government towards the supply of financial aid to the independent black states. This change of attitude implies both a stricter South African control on how the money is spent, and a higher degree of participation of the black states' governments in deciding what this money is spent for. This change should be welcome, since it could help to eliminate a few obstacles on the path to an effective development policy in the independent black states.

The second important agreement signed only with Ciskei is the one "(...) concerning consultations, co-operation, and reciprocal assistance in matters which concern the common security (...)". With this agreement, "the Government of the Republic of South Africa agrees through its Department of Police (...)" and at the request of the Ciskeian government

> (...) to make available to the Law Enforcement Branch of the Ciskei Department of State Security professional and technical advice (...); (...) to place at the disposal of the Law Enforcement Branch of the Ciskei Department of State Security in the event of riots in Ciskei or in the event of any emergency (...) such trained personnel and other means as may be necessary to meet any such situation; and (...)
> (...) to second to the Law Enforcement Branch of the Ciskei Department of State Security qualified personnel to assist in the prevention of terrorist infiltration into Ciskei, terrorist activities within Ciskei, and any other common security matters.(10)

Ciskeian obligations are: to confer to members of the South African Police serving in Ciskei the same powers as the members of the Ciskeian

Law Enforcement Branch; to allow members of the South African Police to serve under South African command and control; to pay for the services it requires under the agreement; and "to consider to render, at the request of the South African Police, (...) assistance (...) with a view to suppress any riot occurring in the Republic of South Africa or any emergency arising therefrom or from other causes".(11)

The effect of this agreement is to formalize, in the case of Ciskei, that collaboration on security matters between South Africa and the independent black states which was already well established, and to give legal basis to intervention of South African security units in Ciskei in the case of danger to the political establishment. Although collaboration between the South African Police and the police forces of the independent black states was already a common practice, and although some black leaders had expressed on some occasions their desire to see their armed forces fight together with the South African Defence Forces against the 'common enemy', this is the first case in which an independent black state formally commits itself actively to support South African efforts in curbing 'subversive' activities and to allow South African forces, albeit on request, to enter its territory to suppress riots or any other menace to the established authority. It is also worth noticing that under the terms of the agreement, the South African forces, once called in by the Ciskeian authorities, will be under exclusive South African command and control, and thus able to ignore any local exception to their actions unless such exception is passed through by Pretoria. Even the non-aggression pacts, which already indicated that the independent black states had chosen, if one can speak of choice, to side with South Africa, were not so explicit and did not give South Africa such a wide possibility of action in case of political emergencies.

What were the reasons for which such an agreement was considered necessary when Ciskei became independent, while it was not so when the other black states did? This agreement suggests that although its control of the guerrilla ambitions of the black nationalist movements is almost total, and that the militant mass defiance of the system which flared up in 1976-77 has been effectively quenched and does not appear to be able to flare up again in the short term, the South African government perceives a general worsening of the security situation, and feels that a closer co-operation in this field with the independent black

states is necessary. It could also mean that the South African government wants to see, at least in this field, the first fruits of its policy: black forces under black operational and, most importantly, political command fighting to defend the established order. It can also be that South Africa considers Ciskei as the weakest of the independent black states - particularly for the high proportion of urban dwellers, commuting to work in areas where the black trade unions are quite active, and for the high number of resettlement camps which can easily become a focus of dissatisfaction and unrest - and thus the most probable area to receive the attentions of the black nationalists.

Examination of the Government Gazette shows that apparently in two other cases important agreements were signed with only three of the four independent black states. One is the non-aggression pact, and the other is the agreement on the monetary relations (which regulates the black state's participation in the Rand Monetary Area): there is no sign in the Government Gazette of a non-aggression pact between South Africa and Venda, nor is there any sign of an agreement on the monetary relations between South Africa and Transkei. This is bizarre, in particular because, since independence, Transkei has regularly received the compensatory payments which should be its due by the terms of such an agreement. The even odder explanation of this oddity is that this agreement, as well as the non-aggression pact with Venda, had simply been forgotten out of the list of the agreements which was published in the Government Gazette.(12)

It has already been remarked here that, excluding the above mentioned cases, there is little difference in the way the independent black states have been treated by South Africa. Only Ciskei could obtain something more from it than the others. The two most significant differences have already been seen. (Also the agreement on security co-operation can be considered, from the point of view of the Ciskeian leadership, better than what the others obtained.) There is also another area where Ciskei extracted from South Africa something which others could not. This is in respect of South African expenditure on specific works (buildings, roads, clinics and so on) to be completed after independence at South African expense as a bonus for the newly independent country. While the other black states had to be content with the construction, at South African expense, of residences for the ministers, barracks for

the army and/or police, a few new government offices and a new prison (more or less), Ciskei was able to convince the South African government to pay for a number of projects - from the installation of sprinkler irrigation systems on certain farms, to the building of a number of dams, schools and clinics, in particular for the areas of heavy resettlement, (and the residence for the Head of State) - which are specified in an agreement that occupies four pages of the Government Gazette.(13)

In conclusion, if one excludes the few cases mentioned, the agreements entered into between South Africa and the independent black states, numerous and covering a wide range of subjects as they are, are not of prominent importance. Indeed, it is possible to say that only those agreements concerning economic relations and aid have a real impact on the life of the black states, because a considerable proportion of the economic resources of these countries are received, in one way or another, from South Africa.

7.2 Economic Relations

7.2.1 The provision of 'aid' by South Africa: the instruments

There is not doubt that the most important aspect of the collaboration between South Africa and the independent black states lies in the field of economic and financial relations, and, in particular, in the financial and development aid given by the former to the latter. The provision of this aid is based partly on agreements between South Africa and the black states, and partly on laws passed by the South African Parliament. In some cases the content of some of these laws is also embodied in agreements between South Africa and the black state concerned.

Several ways have been envisaged to permit the transfer of financial and development aid from South Africa to the independent black states. They are:

1. The participation of the independent black states in a share of the revenues pooled in the Customs Union, and the compensation due to them for their quota of Rand circulation in the Rand Monetary Area;

2. a direct subsidy to the budget of the independent black states by means of a statutory grant in terms of the Financial Arrangements acts;
3. the transfer of taxes levied by the South African government from TBVC citizens who live and work in the 'white areas' of the Republic of South Africa;
4. the provision of loan capital to the independent black states at a very low interest (2% - 3%);
5. the provision of technical aid or advice at a subsided cost;
6. the secondment of South African personnel to the civil service of the independent black states;
7. perhaps as 'independence bonus', the agreement to build or complete a number of buildings and other works, always at South African expenses, in a short time after independence.

Points 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are covered by bilateral agreements, while points 2 and 3 are covered by the Financial Arrangements acts (As we have seen, in the case of Ciskei, points 2 and 3 are covered both by the Financial Arrangements act and by a bilateral agreement.). Another and more recent way to channel resources from South Africa to the independent black states is through multilateral undertakings, some of them aimed at harnessing white private enterprise for the economic development of the black states. These undertakings are multilateral in the sense that both South Africa and the independent black states are represented on their boards, and that while South Africa puts in public and private money, all the independent black states are entitled to use this money without 'political' preferences. Examples of this kind of undertakings are the Development Bank for Southern Africa and the Small Business Development Corporation.

The agreements that regulated the participation of the independent black states to a share of the resources pooled in the Customs Union and to the Rand circulation in the Rand Monetary Area have already been examined under point (1) of this chapter. Suffice it to say here that a simple way was found to avoid the problems caused by the refusal of the other signatories of the Customs Union agreement (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland) to allow independent homelands to be official parties to those agreements. In terms of the agreements with the BLS countries, South Africa receives its share as it did before 1976, and then in terms of the 'interim' agreements with the TBVC countries, it divides its share with them. The terms of the agreements with the TBVC countries are the

same as those with the BLS countries. In this regard then, the independent black states are in the same condition and receive the same treatment as the BLS countries do, even if it was necessary to make separate arrangements with them.

The provision of loans at low interest is mainly covered by agreements relating to the economic development of the independent black states. These agreements do not introduce anything new, but are simply made to regulate the activity of the National Development Corporation (NDC) of the independent black states after those states acquired a new status with independence. Such agreements provide for the National Development Corporation concerned the possibility "to request the Corporation for Economic Development Limited (CED) or any other development or other corporation established in the Republic of South Africa to afford it such assistance as it may deem necessary".(14) The government of the independent black state undertakes to guarantee the repayment of loans granted to the NDC by the CED,(15) as every self-respecting state does, but, given the noticeable amount granted by South Africa to the independent black states as budgetary aid, in practice it is almost a case of the South African government guaranteeing through a third party a South African state-owned corporation. Another article of these agreements provides for the NDC concerned to negotiate joint participations in "companies operated and controlled in ... (the independent black states) ... for the promotion of economic development"(16) with the CED or other corporations. In substance, these agreements allow the NDC's of the independent black states to maintain the working collaboration with the CED and other South African state corporations which existed before independence. Another way to make loans from South Africa to the independent black states is through the Economic Co-operation Promotion Fund, established by Act No. 68 of 1968 with the purpose of utilising its money "for the promotion of economic co-operation between the Republic and other countries by the granting of loans or the rendering of other financial assistance in respect of development projects in such countries".(17) This Fund is now the main source of funds for soft loans.(18)

The provision of technical aid or advice is regulated by a number of agreements. Almost every South African government department which was involved in negotiations and agreements with the homelands that chose independence undertook to provide services, aid and advice in the field

of its competence. It would be tedious to examine the particulars of these agreements; it is enough to say that they are imprinted with an open readiness on South Africa's part to give all the aid that is requested, and that this aid is sometimes given gratis and sometimes paid for at a favourable rate. To finance technical assistance to the independent black states a Technical Assistance Fund is used. To give an idea of the dimensions of this aid, it may be noted that in the financial year 1981/82 the budget of the Fund was R6,5 million.(19)

The secondment of South African personnel to the civil service of the independent black states may be considered as another form of technical aid. Again this field is covered by a number of agreements signed with each independent black state. In each case, there is a main agreement on the "provision of technical and administrative personnel" and then some other agreements which involve the secondment of specific South African personnel, such as the agreement on the secondment of judges. However, it is difficult to understand the reason for the existence of particular agreements for certain kinds of seconded officials because the conditions for the secondment are exactly the same. In the terms of the agreements relating to the basic conditions governing the provision of technical and administrative personnel, South Africa undertakes "to second officials to serve in the Government Service" of the black state concerned and "to assist in recruiting other suitable personnel on behalf of the Government" of the black state.(20) The South African government undertakes to "be responsible for the payment of (seconded officials') emoluments; ... to pay subsistence allowances for official absences ...; ... to pay the cost of forward and return passages between the Republic of South Africa and (the independent black states) ... for them and their dependants ...".(21) The government of the black state undertakes, amongst other things, to provide the seconded officials "free housing of a standard appropriate to their ranks", to "facilitate the repatriation of them and their families in the event of civil commotion and other crisis" and to "grant them immunity ... and indemnity ... in respect of ... all acts performed by them in the course of their duties".(22) However, the black state maintains the right to refuse entry into its territory or to expel therefrom any persona non grata amongst the seconded officials. In the case of personnel coming from the private sector, the South African government has no obligation, since

the relation is between the black state and the individual, but the latter is guaranteed the same immunity and indemnity as a seconded official.

It is difficult to evaluate the exact number of seconded officials and of white expatriates working in the independent black states, but it is possible to say that, although the process of 'indigenization' of the civil service is in full swing and the percentage of Whites in it is continuously shrinking, many key places in the civil service of those states are still occupied by them. From some quarters, doubts about the quality of seconded officials have been raised. To make an assessment in this regard is practically impossible, but it is still feasible to make a few comments about it. It is quite possible that the best brains and the best organisers in the South African civil service are kept in South Africa where they are necessary, although their short term secondment to a homeland to solve some difficult problem cannot be ruled out. The bulk of the seconded officials is probably a cross-section of the human material at the disposal of the South African civil service: some good and competent, many average, some not too good and uninterested and a few outright bad. Nevertheless, it is possible that in some cases they do not perform at the best of their ability: this may happen when the interests of the black state to which they are seconded contrast with the interests of South Africa. In this instance it is difficult for a South African civil servant, although seconded to another country, not to side, perhaps unconsciously, with South Africa.

The last form of aid is the pledge of South Africa to complete a number of buildings or other works in the black states in the period following independence at South African expense. Those works range from military bases to hospitals, from prisons to bridges, but usually are not in great number.(23) Nevertheless, in the case of Ciskei, there is a considerable number of these projects and some of them are fairly important.

The bulk of South African financial aid to the independent black states, however, is not regulated by bilateral agreements but by laws of the South African Parliament. These laws are the Financial Arrangements acts, which, passed in relation to each homeland in the period immediately preceding independence, allow the South African government to transfer considerable amounts of money to the independent black states in the year of independence and in the following years.(24) The amounts which can be

transferred fall into three categories:

a) transfer of taxes levied from citizens of the independent black states within South Africa in accordance with the Black Taxation Act (Act No. 92 of 1969),[25]
b) the so-called annual statutory grant or budgetary aid,[26] and,
c) further additional amounts at the discretion of the government[27] (Of course these additional amounts must then be approved by Parliament).

The amounts transferred under point (a) are, of course, the results of estimates, since it is impossible to establish with precision how much has been paid in form of taxes by citizens of the independent black states living and working in South Africa. This leaves the South African government with a great discretion in this regard, since it might increase or decrease this amount without much control: not only do the black states not have ways of claiming that the estimate is wrong, but also the South African Parliament has no power of control in this regard. Indeed, Section 2(2) of the acts provides that the amounts transferred to the black states as taxes levied in South Africa from the black states' citizens will not be regarded as revenue for the purpose of the Exchequer and Audit Act (Act No. 66 of 1975). Consequently, these amounts are regarded as income from own sources of the black states and not as financial aid from South Africa to these states, and the Parliament is powerless to object.

The most important part of the financial aid is the budgetary aid which is authorised by Section 2(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the acts. This section authorises the transfer to the black state concerned of an amount determined by the Minister of Finance, but not exceeding the sum of the amounts appropriated for the black state in the financial year of its independence by an act of Parliament and the amounts provided to the same black state by the Provincial Administrations (if any) in the same year,[28] plus an amount determined by the Minister of Finance to be necessary for the government of the black state concerned to carry out the services for which it is responsible.[29] From this sum will be deducted an "amount equal to the total additional revenue accruing to ... (the independent black state) in the financial year after independence which prior to the introduction of the act accrued to the State Revenue Fund, the Post Office Fund or any other fund or account established by law".[30] This statutory grant or budgetary aid constitutes the main

source of financial aid to the independent black states, in particular in the cases of Transkei and Venda.

There are other agreements relating to South African money being spent in the independent black states, but since they cover the establishment and completion at South African expenses of resettlement projects, this can hardly be considered a form of aid. By these agreements, South Africa undertook to "continue to develop and complete planned development and settlement projects" and to finance all these projects from its own funds. South Africa also reserves for itself the right to undertake "further settlement projects as may be deemed necessary for purposes to be determined"[31] in consultations between South Africa and the black state concerned. Although all the decisions regarding future resettlement projects are to be endorsed first by a mixed Settlement Board and then by a Control Committee,[32] the composition of these bodies and the rules by which they work make it almost impossible for the government of a black state successfully to oppose for more than one year any resettlement project. This would be going by the letter of the agreement; of course, it is possible that South Africa may not be willing to pay the political price of promoting an unwanted resettlement project, however limited this price may be. At any rate, it is certain that the governments of the independent black states would willingly do without this kind of aid. In fact, this 'aid' results from an agreement that puts on South Africa the financial cost (and only the initial financial cost at that) of actions, viz., the resettlement of citizens of the black state concerned from South Africa to the black state, which is in the exclusive interest of South Africa[33] and which is bitterly opposed by the government of the black states that will have to bear the economic and social costs of such resettlements.

Another and more recent way to transfer resources from South Africa to the independent black states is through multilateral undertakings aimed at involving white private enterprise in their development. The South African government has always been wary of the participation of private enterprise in the efforts for developing the homelands. Nevertheless, under the force of circumstances its position changed from the original pledge to keep the 'capitalist vultures' out of the homelands to a grudging acceptance of their presence under well defined conditions (See Chapter 2). Because in the late sixties and early seventies the homelands were not a place where an industrialist would invest his money, a set of

concessions and rebates was launched to attract investments in these territories. Although this policy and the 'agency system' had some limited success in starting industrial activities in the homelands, the rate of economic development and of creation of employment therein was still far inferior to the needs. Towards the end of the seventies it became apparent that a more direct involvement of the private sector was necessary.

In March 1979 there was a meeting of the Minister of Co-operation and Development, homeland leaders, directors of the National Development Corporations and industrialists from 46 of South Africa's leading companies to discuss ways to assure the future economic growth of the homelands.(34) Later in that year at the Carlton Conference with selected industrialists, the Prime Minister emphasised the importance of developing the homelands and insisted on the need of a deeper participation of the private sector in this effort. The hoped-for increase of private sector involvement in the economic development of the homelands was not seen as an isolated effort of independent entrepreneurs, but as a co-ordinated endeavour of the state, the private sector and the homelands themselves towards the economic development of these areas as a part of a more general effort for a decentralised economic development in South Africa. As part of this strategy, the South African Prime Minister and the leaders of the independent black states agreed on the establishment of regional co-operation in the fields of economic development, social affairs and so on.(35) Among the instruments for implementing regional co-operation in the field of economic development, the establishment of a Development Bank for Southern Africa was considered. Initially the bank was to be open to all the countries of Southern Africa ready to participate in the constellation of states. Since the political ambitions regarding the constellation of states had to be reduced because of the cold reception this proposal received from the other states of the region, the participation in this multilateral Development Bank for Southern Africa was limited to South Africa, the independent black states and the homelands. The gestation of this bank, however, took longer than foreseen because it was necessary to iron out differences of opinion about methods of operation of such an international organisation(36) and also because of some pressure from right-wingers within the National Party who feared that the establishment of the bank would blunt the ideological sharpness of separate development.(37)

The bank started its operations at last in 1983, representing one of the prongs of the new offensive of the government aimed at the economic development of the homelands. Another prong of this offensive is the decentralisation plan, which is based on the Industrial Development Proposals released by the South African Prime Minister at the Good Hope Conference on the 12th November 1981. The aims of this plan are to obtain a more balanced distribution of economic activity in South Africa stimulating the economic growth of new industrial poles outside the main industrial areas of the country, and to promote economic development in and around the homelands identifying a number of growth points nearby or within them.(38) This plan stresses the need for an organic regional development in which the homelands are involved not as autonomous entities but as part of wider development regions.(39) In this strategy the part reserved for the private sector is quite important and both the South African government and the governments of the independent states repeatedly emphasised their desire for a greater involvement of private capital in the development of the homelands. A good example of this desire is given by the "Declaration to promote private investment" agreed to at the summit meeting on the 23rd July 1980 in Pretoria, and subscribed by South Africa, Bophuthatswana, Transkei and Venda (subsequently also Ciskei subscribed).(40) The signatory countries, believing that the "private ... sector can and must play a vital role in ... (their) ... economic development", resolved to encourage private investment by promoting the necessary stability and by providing the most attractive conditions to private investment that the circumstances make possible. The answer, however, has not been up to now overly enthusiastic and the private sector is still playing a limited role in the economic development of the black states.

7.2.2 Nature and extent of the economic support from South Africa

The financial aid from South Africa is the most important source of revenue for the budget of the homelands,(41) and also after independence this situation has not greatly changed. The main difference is that after independence a considerable part of the resources at the disposal of the black states' governments is formed by amounts coming from the

Customs Union or other agreements. These amounts accrue rightfully to the black states and are not a grant from South Africa, nevertheless they are transferred to them by South Africa. The transfer of money to the governments of the homelands is not, however, the only way South African money is spent in those territories: there are also direct interventions and expenses of various South African government departments or corporations.

As is shown in Table 13, the bulk of the direct South African expenditure in the homelands consists of the statutory grants and the additional amounts in terms of Sections 6(2)(c) and 6(2)(d) of Act 21 of 1971,[42] and the corresponding sections of Act 48 of 1963.[43] After a homeland attains independence, the bulk of this expenditure is still in the form of a statutory grant (for the first three years) or budgetary aid, in terms of Section 2(1)(b) of the Financial Arrangements acts. The proportion of these grants varies from about two thirds to about three quarters of the total expenditure, and rises sharply after independence. This is natural, since the expenditure of the various South African departments, after a noticeable increase in the years around independence, tends to disappear; obviously all their functions are taken over by the new state's departments. Also the expenditure of the S.A.D.T. tends to diminish after independent, although not sharply and not to the point of extinction. This is because the expenditure of the S.A.D.T., which is concentrated on three fields, viz., buying land to be transferred to the homelands, buying white businesses in the homelands for a subsequent transfer to black control and establishing and maintaining resettlement projects, are not necessarily finished when the homeland becomes independent. To the contrary, up to now it has always been impossible to buy out before independence all the white businessmen who did not want to stay under black rule. Likewise not one of the homelands which became independent received within the day of independence all the land it was promised under the consolidation proposals. Furthermore, occasionally more land was given to the homelands than that promised in the 1975 proposals. And to conclude, the South African government is always anxious to start new resettlement projects or to expand old ones. It is thus clear that the S.A.D.T. still has numerous engagements to fulfil in the independent black states. Thus although S.A.D.T. expenditure becomes a small part of the total after independence - in 1981/82 both for Transkei

TABLE 13: SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPENDITURE ON GRANTS TO AND SERVICES RENDERED IN SELECTED INDEPENDENT BLACK STATES AND HOMELANDS, BY MAIN SELECTED BODIES

	1975/76				1976/77			
	Bantu Adm[1] & Development	SABT[2]	Other Departments	TOTAL	Bantu Adm & Development	SABT	Other Departments	TOTAL
BOPHUTHATSWANA	41 473 766	12 091 914	2 848 930	56 414 610	45 825 462	14 502 614	3 816 638	64 144 714
CISKEI	28 300 596	14 850 095	2 245 489	45 396 180	40 445 153	10 630 711	2 220 430	53 296 294
GAZANKULU	10 129 436	4 784 382	561 391	15 475 209	11 990 124	4 571 883	695 506	17 257 513
KWAZULU	75 653 972	42 964 605	8 859 650	127 478 227	85 041 082	47 135 859	9 888 435	142 065 376
LEBOWA	27 626 374	15 765 501	1 569 390	44 961 265	47 797 476	4 401 192	1 856 806	54 064 474
TRANSKEI	74 154 572	10 015 115	12 182 170	96 351 857	107 743 187	15 113 994	11 149 810	134 006 991
VENDA	12 333 002	2 553 710	466 816	15 353 528	14 317 836	2 981 057	552 780	17 851 673

	1977/78				1978/79			
	Cooperation[3] & Development	SADT	Other Departments	TOTAL	Cooperation[3] & Development	SADT	Other Departments	TOTAL
BOPHUTHATSWANA	57 103 169	23 595 158	3 468 864	84 167 191	29 647 723	7 821 034	55 200	37 523 957
CISKEI	42 896 404	6 942 662	2 471 209	52 310 275	51 197 108	9 266 849	1 174 187	61 638 144
GAZANKULU	17 282 646	972 743	758 794	19 014 183	21 187 146	1 416 274	225 138	22 828 558
KWAZULU	89 139 216	51 317 119	10 395 841	150 852 176	149 253 046	27 035 531	11 150 674	187 439 251
LEBOWA	52 003 982	3 845 547	2 158 151	58 007 680	63 160 196	6 768 880	1 688 606	71 618 682
TRANSKEI	119 859 654	10 470 573	5 806	130 336 033	119 027 661	7 245 112	2 589	126 275 362
VENDA	19 109 903	320 942	676 162	20 107 007	30 456 390	3 436 731	1 614 844	35 507 965

TABLE 13 (continued)

1979/80

	Cooperation & Development (3)	SADT	Other Departments	TOTAL
BOPHUTHATSWANA	31 200 530	10 956 225	14 255	42 171 010
CISKEI	64 237 411	9 826 214	535 509	74 598 134
GAZANKULU	32 974 633	7 587 359	447 264	41 009 286
KWAZULU	168 649 570	29 822 746	14 574 790	213 047 106
LEBOWA	78 651 956	6 778 233	1 810 993	87 241 082
TRANSKEI	121 265 132	3 957 175	616	125 222 923
VENDA	38 355 651	5 105 228	1 914 649	45 375 528

1980/81

	Cooperation & Development (3)	SADT	Other Departments	TOTAL
BOPHUTHATSWANA	37 541 348	9 885 031	705	47 427 084
CISKEI	97 345 939	11 618 544	575 746	109 540 229
GAZANKULU	44 679 098	2 312 767	597 309	47 589 174
KWAZULU	218 529 553	31 535 713	18 364 851	268 430 117
LEBOWA	104 404 353	9 131 075	1 818 840	115 354 268
TRANSKEI	115 402 036	3 031 315	4 064	118 487 415
VENDA	49 730 117	1 805 918	13 239	51 549 274

1981/82

	Cooperation & Development (3)	SADT	Other Departments	TOTAL
BOPHUTHATSWANA	40 694 154	8 218 162	1 177	48 913 493
CISKEI	147 442 593	28 102 271	3 084 387	178 629 231
GAZANKULU	65 050 975	8 352 735	784 021	74 187 731
KWAZULU	289 398 719	38 033 081	21 238 132	348 669 932
LEBOWA	131 911 869	10 720 921	2 346 110	144 978 900
TRANSKEI	156 088 901	4 628 868	1 660	160 719 429
VENDA	62 535 789	1 265 583	1 420	63 802 792

Notes: (1) More than 90% of the money spent under the vote of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (later Cooperation and Development) consisted of grants in terms of Sections 6(2)(c) and 6(2)(d) of Act 21 of 1971 and corresponding sections of Act 48 of 1963 (Statutory grant and additional amount).
(2) South African Bantu Trust, later South African Development Trust.
(3) After a homeland gained independence the amounts given to it as Statutory Grant and Additional Amount were paid in terms of the relevant sections of the Financial Arrangements Act under the vote of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Source: Republic of South Africa: Report of the Auditor-General (Part I) for the years 1975/76 to 1981/82.

and Venda, it was 2% of the total South African expenditure[44] - the Trust still spends millions of Rands in each of these states every year.

Table 14 shows that the total expenditure of the South African government in the homelands has constantly increased from 1975/76 to 1981/82, by far outpacing both the rate of inflation (excluding 1977/78) and the rate of growth of the South African G.D.P.. This indicates that in those years the South African government has given a higher degree of priority to the reinforcement of the structures of the homelands and to the improvement of the capability of the homeland governments. The rate of increase in South African expenditure varies for each homeland from year to year for contingent reasons without any apparent rule. Besides these variations from year to year, it is possible to notice a trend common to all those homelands that have chosen independence. In these cases there is a sharp increase in South African expenditure in the year of independence (Transkei about 40%; Bophuthatswana almost 58%; Venda 76%; Ciskei 63%), and also the proportion of expenditure assigned to those homelands increases noticeably in such a year (from 23,7% to 27,4% for Transkei; from 13,1% to 16,1% for Bophuthatswana; from 3,8% to 6,2% for Venda; from 13,2% to 15,8%, after a similar increase the previous year when its choice was already known, for Ciskei). These are not, however, the only homelands to show sudden increases in the total South African expenditure or in the percentage of this expenditure received: Gazankulu and QwaQwa also show such an increase. It is in the 1979/80 financial year when the expenditure in Gazankulu increases by 79,6% and that in QwaQwa increases even by 125% from the previous year, and their share of the total expenditure increases from 3,9 to 6,1% and from 1,3 to 2,6% respectively. The only possible explanation is that in 1978 Kangwane obtained the legislative assembly with 'Chapter I' rights and the expenditure of the South African government in this homeland in the year 1978/79 was quite high and practically at the same level as that in Gazankulu. It is then possible that the following year the statutory grants and additional amounts of Gazankulu and QwaQwa had been increased to keep fair the distribution of the South African expenditure in these homelands. This might have two explanations. Either the South African government is really trying to be equitable, as far as it is possible, in its dealings with the homelands, or the South African government is not at the moment interested in pushing Gazankulu and QwaQwa towards independence, or at least it is not interested enough to offer more powerful incentives.

TABLE 14: THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON GRANTS TO AND SERVICES RENDERED IN INDEPENDENT BLACK STATES AND HOMELANDS, AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

	1975/76		1976/77		1977/78		1978/79		1979/80		1980/81		1981/82	
	R	%	R	%	R	%	R	%	R	%	R	%	R	%
BOPHUTHATSWANA	56 414 610	13,89	64 144 714	13,12	84 167 191	16,15	37 523 957	6,55	42 171 010	6,28	47 427 084	5,73	48 913 493	4,33
CISKEI	45 396 180	11,17	53 296 294	10.90	52 310 275	10,44	61 638 144	10,76	74 598 134	11,12	109 540 229	13,24	178 629 231	15,84
GAZANKULU	15 475 209	3,81	17 257 513	3,53	19 014 183	3,65	22 828 558	3,98	41 009 286	6,11	47 589 174	5,75	74 181 731	6,58
KANGWANE	-	-	-	-	79 020	0,01	22 088 468	3,85	24 737 193	3,68	27 888 667	3,37	43 517 556	3,86
KWANDEBELE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40 638	-	21 027 083	2,54	31 758 318	2,81
KWAZULU	127 478 227	31,39	142 065 376	29,06	150 852 176	28,95	187 439 251	32,73	213 047 106	31,75	268 430 117	32,45	348 669 932	30,92
LEBOWA	44 961 265	11,07	54 064 474	11,06	58 007 680	11,13	71 618 682	12,50	87 241 082	13,00	115 354 268	13,94	144 978 900	12,85
QWAQWA	4 687 298	1,15	6 035 466	1,23	6 065 632	1,16	7 745 189	1,35	17 445 666	2,60	19 883 736	2,40	32 369 627	2,87
TRANSKEI	96 351 857	23,72	134 006 991	27,42	130 336 033	25,02	126 275 362	22,05	125 222 923	18,66	118 487 415	14,32	160 719 429	14,25
VENDA	15 353 528	3,78	17 851 673	3,65	20 107 007	3,86	35 507 965	6,20	45 375 528	6,76	51 549 247	6,23	63 802 792	5,65
TOTAL	406 118 175	100,00	488 722 485	100,00	520 933 197	100,00	572 665 576	100,00	670 888 416	100,00	827 177 038	100,00	1127 547 009	100,00

SOURCE: Republic of South Africa; Report of the Auditor General (Part I) for the years 1975/76 to 1981/82.

Another trend which is possible to discern from Table 14 is that after independence the direct expenditure of the South African government in the new states tends to decrease both as percentage distribution and (less clearly) as absolute amount. Since the Table is limited to the 1981/82 financial year it is not possible to take Ciskei into consideration. The three independent black states remaining are perhaps too few to make a rule. Indeed not one of them follows clearly a common pattern.

In Transkei, after the South African expenditure increased in the 1976/77 financial year, it decreased slowly but continuously in the following years, both as a percentage share of the total and as an absolute amount. In 1981/82, the decrease in percentage distribution was almost halted and that in absolute amount reversed with an increase of more than R40 million (more than 35% increase from the previous year). The case of Bophuthatswana is partially different. In fact, after the sharp increase in the year of independence, the expenditure dropped dramatically the following year, being more than halved (increase -55,4%). From then onwards, it increased slightly in total amount (little more than 12% per year in 1979/80 and in 1980/81, and only about 3% in 1981/82), but at a rate inferior to the rate of inflation, while the percentage share of the total expenditure continued to drop (from a maximum of 16,15% in 1977/78 to 4,33% in 1981/82). The case of Venda is again different. The large increase in expenditure in this homeland happened in 1978/79, i.e., in the financial year before independence. This may be explained as the incentive used by the South African government to convince the Venda leaders of the attractiveness of independence. The following year, during which Venda became independent, the expenditure increased again, although not as much as in the year before (27% vs 76%), and also as percentage of the total expenditure in the homelands it slightly increased (from 6,2% to 6,7%, but in 1977/78 it was 3,8%). In the following years the expenditure in Venda followed only partially the pattern of the two homelands which preceded it in chosing independence. The share given to Venda decreased in percentage but not dramatically (in 1981/82 it was still as high as 5,6%), while the absolute amount continued to increase and at a faster pace than inflation.

The series of figures is still too limited to draw from it a general rule, and also the comments on the single cases must be taken as tentative. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that after independence the direct South African expenditure on grants to and services rendered

in the independent black states tends to decrease. This decrease is due to the disappearance of the direct expenditure of the South African government departments and to the reduced activity of the S.A.D.T.. This decrease in the activity of South African institutions in the territory of the independent black states is logical and common to all the three black states considered. Where they differ is in the amount of the statutory grant or budgetary aid granted them. In the case of Transkei it remained almost unchanged for the first three years after independence at a slightly higher level than in the year 1976/77, to increase sharply in 1981/82. In the case of Bophuthatswana it was almost halved the year after independence and afterwards it increased slightly, neither keeping pace with inflation nor rising to the level of 1977/78. The case of Venda is different because the statutory grant to it continued to increase every year after independence, outpacing inflation and thus assuring an increase also in real terms.

This different treatment of the various independent black states is probably due to contingent reasons. As we will see when examining Table 15, Venda is not able to earn an appreciable amount from the Customs Union or the Rand Monetary Area agreements. Its position far away from the main centres of South Africa is not conducive to economic activities and thus its budget needs to be buttressed with direct grants from South Africa. Exactly contrary is the case of Bophuthatswana. Already from Table 14 it is possible to surmise that Bophuthatswana is the success story in the homeland policy. Indeed, in 1981/82 the amount of South African money given to it was only slightly larger than the amount given to Kangwane and in the same year that amount was still less than the amount given in 1975/76. Evidently the South African government felt that Bophuthatswana could manage on its own with only a little help in the form of grants. In the case of Transkei the figures suggest that the needs of this country were urgent enough to convince the South African government to maintain a relatively high amount of grants to it. Particularly worth noting is that also during the years in which the diplomatic relations between Transkei and South Africa were broken, the amount of money granted by the latter to the former did not decrease considerably (the difference between the amount of 1977/78 and that of 1980/81 is -9%). This in a way underlines the total dependence of the independent black states on South Africa and the South African quiet certainty that in matters of importance the independent black states will

always have to toe the line. After Transkei broke diplomatic relations, South Africa did not feel the need to resort to sanctions against it or to assume a hostile attitude. It felt confident enough in its dominant position towards Transkei to continue to finance its budget to the tune of more than one hundred million Rand, considering remote the possibility that all that money might have been used by a hostile country for hostile purposes against South Africa itself. Of course, in this period South Africa did not feel the urge to increase the amount given to Transkei either. But after the resumption of diplomatic relations this amount was notably increased, to remind Transkei and to prove to it which side of its 'half loaf' was buttered.

At this point, one might ask oneself what was the point of choosing independence if after it the amount of South African money, which is the economic lifeline of the new states, decreased. The answer is, of course, that while the direct South African expenditure in these states declined, they gained by their independence a number of sources of money from which they were formerly excluded. These are, as we have already seen (See 7.2.1), their participation in a share of the revenues pooled in the Customs Union, the compensation due to them for their quota of Rand circulation and the transfer of taxes levied by South Africa from their citizens living and working in the Republic.

Table 15 shows how much money these sources provided for them.(45) It appears immediately that the bulk of this money comes from the share of the Customs Union, the quota of currency circulation representing less than 5% of the total (and often as little as 2%), and the General Tax constituting less than 10%. These figures reinforce the interpretation given above of the different pattern of the grants given by South Africa to the independent black states. The share in the Customs Union indicates the strength and the vivacity of the economy of the black state concerned. From this it appears that Venda's economy, even after its smaller population in comparison with the two other states is taken into consideration, has not the inherent strength to act as the motor power for the country, thus the need for South African help remains high, simply to make the structure work. In the case of Transkei, it is possible to see that although the economy is not much livelier or stronger, the size of the Transkeian market is large enough to contribute to a significant extent to the resources of the country. Nevertheless, the amount directly spent in or granted to Transkei by South Africa is

TABLE 15: SOURCES OF FINANCE OF THE INDEPENDENT BLACK STATES RECEIVED THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA (thousands of Rands)

	1976/77			1977/78			1978/79		
	General Tax	Customs Union	R.M.A.	General Tax	Customs Union	R.M.A.	General Tax	Customs Union	R.M.A.
BOPHUTHATSWANA	-	-	-	6 162	-	-	8 542	71 137	1 415
TRANSKEI	10 907	-	-	8 327	40 000	3 074	9 900	62 377	1 887
VENDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	1979/80			1980/81			1981/82		
	General Tax	Customs Union	R.M.A.	General Tax	Customs Union	R.M.A.	General Tax	Customs Union	R.M.A.
BOPHUTHATSWANA	9 446	85 281	981	10 390	114 944	2 043	6 000	128 337	1 700
TRANSKEI	6 503	88 497	2 047	7 000	119 704	1 000	6 000	91 947	3 500
VENDA	-	-	-	180	10 186	300	1 000	11 300	500

SOURCES: Years 1976/77 to 1980/81: Benso, Statistical Survey of Black Development, 1980.
Year 1981/82: S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1982, p.365.

still the largest contribution to Transkeian resources. The figures referring to Bophuthatswana show that its economy is working much better than the economy of the other two independent states considered, and that its share of the Customs Union is a remarkable amount in absolute terms, particularly if one considers that its population is only half that of Transkei. This indicates the relative prosperity (one might say: a less desperate poverty) of Bophuthatswana in comparison with the other homelands, and the capability of this country to provide for its basic needs with only limited help from South Africa. Indeed, in the 1981/82 financial year the revenues of the government of Bophuthatswana were covered only for 14,7% of the total by South African money (opening balance excluded).(46)

It may seem arbitrary to put together in the same set of figures the amount spent by South Africa in the homelands with the amount spent in the independent states plus the revenues accured to these states in terms of the Customs Union and other agreements. These last mentioned revenues are not strictly speaking South African money and thus do not fall within the category of South African aid. Nevertheless, it is useful to include these amounts to give an idea of the result independence had on the financial resources of the TBVC states. After all, these amounts accrue to them only because they are now independent, and conversely the transfer of certain amounts of South African money was stopped because after independence the source of certain revenues passed under their control.

Table 16 shows such a total flow of financial resources to the homelands and the independent states for each year from 1975/76 to 1981/82. The figures for the non-independent homelands are of course the same as in Table 14. Also the figures for Ciskei are the same because in the last year taken into consideration there were no transfers to it in terms of the Customs Union or other agreements, this being the year of independence (at least BENSO 1980 gives no figures in this regard). For the other three independent states it is possible to see again the sharp increase in the year of independence. This increase is illustrated in Diagram 1. The increase remained noticeable also in the following year, the cut in direct South African expenditure being more than offset by the resources made available by the Customs Union agreement and to a minor extent by the Rand Monetary Area agreement and the transfer of General Tax. For Transkei the increase from the financial year before independence, 1975/76, to the year after it, 1977/78, was 88,6%; for

TABLE 16: TOTAL EXPENDITURE (INCLUDING TRANSFERS) BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE INDEPENDENT BLACK STATES AND HOMELANDS, AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

	1975/76		1976/77		1977/78		1978/79		1979/80		1980/81		1981/82	
	R	%	R	%	R	%	R	%	R	%	R	%	R	%
BOPHUTHATSWANA	56 414 610	13,89	64 144 714	12,83	90 329 191	15,61	118 617 957	16,29	137 879 010	15,96	174 804 084	15,99	184 950 493	13,42
CISKEI	45 396 180	11,17	53 296 294	10,66	52 310 275	9,04	61 638 144	8,46	74 598 134	8,63	109 540 229	10,02	178 629 231	12,96
GAZANKULU	15 475 209	3,82	17 257 513	3,45	19 014 183	3,28	22 828 558	3,13	41 009 286	4,74	47 589 174	4,35	74 187 731	5,38
KANGWANE	-	-	-	-	79 020	0,01	22 088 468	3,03	24 737 193	2,86	27 888 667	2,55	43 517 556	3,15
KWANDEBELE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40 638	-	21 027 083	1,92	31 758 318	2,30
KWAZULU	127 478 227	31,39	142 065 376	28,43	150 852 176	26,07	187 439 251	25,75	213 047 106	24,66	268 430 117	24,56	348 669 932	25,30
LEBOWA	44 961 265	11,07	54 064 474	10,82	58 007 680	10,02	71 618 682	9,84	87 240 932	10,10	115 354 268	10,55	144 978 900	10,52
QWAQWA	4 687 239	1,15	6 035 466	1,20	6 065 632	1,04	7 745 189	1,06	17 445 666	2,01	19 883 736	1,81	32 369 627	2,35
TRANSKEI	96 351 857	23,72	144 913 911	29,00	181 767 033	31,42	200 439 362	27,53	222 269 926	25,73	246 191 415	22,52	262 166 429	19,02
VENDA	15 353 528	3,78	17 851 673	3,57	20 107 007	3,47	35 507 965	4,88	45 375 528	5,25	62 215 247	5,68	76 602 792	5,55
TOTAL	406 118 175	100,00	499 629 485	100,00	578 496 197	100,00	727 923 576	100,00	863 643 416	100,00	1 092 924 038	100,00	1 377 831 009	100,00

SOURCE: Own elaboration from Tables B and C.

Bophuthatswana, the increase from 1976/77 to 1978/79 was 85%; for Venda, from 1977/78 to 1979/80 - it will be remembered that for Venda the big increase in South African expenditure came the year before independence - the growth was 125,6%. From the second year after independence, the total amount continued to grow, but at a steadily slower pace, until in the fourth financial year after independence, the rate of increase for the independent states became slower than the rate of increase of the sum of South African direct expenditure in and transfers to all the independent states and homelands.

Such a course is well shown by Diagram 2 in which the increase of financial resources for each independent state and homeland as given in Diagram 1 is plotted against the increase in the total, again as in Diagram 1 but kept as a constant value 100.(47) From this diagram it is easy to see the sharp rise in the years around independence, the subsequent levelling off and the trend to a limited increase - inferior to the rate of increase of the total - after the fourth year. This reduced rate of growth can be explained by the fact that, after all, the resources are limited and as soon as another homeland requires independence, the South African government exerts its efforts in considerably augmenting the resource at the disposal of this homeland and automatically reduces its efforts in favour of the others. Certainly, sources like the Customs Union share or the Rand circulation quota are dependent on international treaties and on the economic situation, thus the amounts accruing to the independent states under this heading should not be dependent on South African activity in other homelands. Nevertheless, Diagram 2 shows clearly the existence of such a relation, with the levelling off and the dropping of the curves relating to each independent state corresponding to the surge of the curve relating to another. For example, Transkei's goes down when Venda's rises, Bophuthatswana's levels off when Gazankulu's rises and drops when Ciskei's goes up, and Venda's levels off in the same time.(48) These are too many similar facts to consider as a mere coincidence. This induces one to surmise that many more things are at the discretion of South Africa than appears at first sight.

From these figures it appears that the increase of financial resources of comparable homelands and independent states (e.g., KwaZulu and Transkei, Lebowa and Bophuthatswana, Gazankulu and Venda) was from the 1975/76 to the 1981/82 financial year roughly comparable, and in two cases out of three the independent state came on top. (From 1975/76 to 1981/82 the amount of KwaZulu grew by 173,5% and that of Transkei by 172,1%. The

DIAGRAM 1: Increase of amount spent by the South African government in, or transferred to the independent black states and selected homelands.
(1975 = 100)



DIAGRAM 2: Relation between the increase of amount spent by the S.A. government in each independent black state and selected homeland and the increase of the total amount spent by the S.A. government in all the independent black states and homelands. (Curve for Total in Diagram 1 put as = 100.)



figures for Lebowa and Bophuthatswana are 222,5% and 227,8% respectively, those for Gazankulu and Venda 379,4% and 399% respectively.) This does not mean, of course, that in the seven years considered the total amount received by them was equally comparable.

Table 17 gives the total amount of each homeland and independent state and shows already some differences, particularly in the case of Bophuthatswana which has received in these seven years 43,5% more than the amount received by Lebowa. The situation of KwaZulu and Transkei appears not only not to follow this trend, but to reverse it. The amount received by KwaZulu is, in fact, superior to that received by Transkei, although only by 6,2%. The reason for this is that in the years before independence KwaZulu received a considerably higher amount than Transkei (in 1975/76, the last year before Transkeian independence, the amount given to the former was 32,3% superior to that given to the latter).

TABLE 17: TOTAL EXPENDITURE (INCLUDING TRANSFERS) BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE INDEPENDENT BLACK STATES AND SELECTED HOMELANDS. SUM OF THE AMOUNTS FROM THE 1975/76 TO THE 1981/82 FINANCIAL YEARS.

	RAND		RAND
Bophuthatswana	828 139 291	Gazankulu	237 361 264
Ciskei	575 408 487	KwaZulu	1 437 982 185
Transkei	1 354 099 933	Lebowa	576 226 201
Venda	273 013 740		

SOURCE: As for Table 16.

This anomaly is explained if one looks at how much the amount received by homelands and independent states has increased from the 1975/76 financial year, which was the last one before the first homeland became independent. Diagram 3 shows that, in general, the homelands which chose independence fared better than those which did not, and certainly much better than their direct counterpart. Ciskei is the only independent state which does not follow this trend, but this is explained by the fact that the last year to be taken into consideration is the

1981/82 financial year, that is the year of Ciskeian independence. Thus up to this year Ciskei cannot be considered as an independent state.

DIAGRAM 3: PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXPENDITURE IN, OR TRANSFERS TO THE INDEPENDENT BLACK STATES AND SELECTED HOMELANDS 1975/76-1981/82 (THE LATTER YEAR AS PERCENTAGE OF THE FORMER).



SOURCE: Elaboration from Table 16.

The pattern indicated by Diagram 3 is confirmed by the examination of the pro capite* share of the amounts received by each of these territories. This is shown in Diagram 4. This diagram may perhaps be considered a little arbitrary since the figures for the population used are those of the mid-year estimates reported by BENSO. These figures may be at best considered as educated guesses,(49) because of the difficulty of determining

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* NOTE: Since in the English-speaking world the expression per capita is used, I will use it too. However, I would like to point out that these are Latin words used with the meaning of 'for each head (person)'. To say this in Latin, there are different ways. One is by using pro plus the ablative singular: pro capite (as is the Italian custom). Another is by using per plus the accusative singular: per caput (this construction has been adopted in English for various expressions, e.g., per annum). Even the adverb capitim could be used, although it would be less correct. It baffles me that having available three different expressions with the required meaning, a fourth one had been chosen which does not mean what it is supposed to mean.

DIAGRAM 4: South African expenditure in and transfers to independent black states and selected homelands. Per capita. 1975/76 to 1080/81.



the exact number of deaths and births in the homelands and also because the estimates do not always take into consideration resettlements of population and/or changes of borders. Furthermore, I could not find estimates for the year 1975 and thus the figure I used for arriving at the per capita figure for the 1975/76 financial year is that of the 1970 census.(50) This explains the drop in the per capita figures for every homeland between the years 1975/76 and 1976/77. Only the figure for Transkei does not drop, and this indicates that in the year of its independence, the amount of South African money spent per capita in Transkei in reality increased more sharply than the diagram shows.(51) From this diagram it is again possible to notice the sharp increase in the money given to the independent states in the year of their independence (for Venda it must again be remembered that the main increase came in the financial year before independence), while the levelling off in the following years is less noticeable, or does not appear at all. This diagram shows that those homelands which chose independence, received from the years of independence a greater amount per capita of South African money than they did before and than other homelands which remained within South Africa did. However, Gazankulu is again shown not to be following this trend to the point that in 1980/81 its per capita figure was higher than Transkei's. The curve of Ciskei too is anomalous. This anomaly may be explained by a considerable under-enumeration of its population in the 1970 census and the failure of the population estimates of the following years to take this, and also the great number of resettlement projects affecting Ciskei, into consideration.

From the data shown above it is possible to draw a few reasonable inferences. The first is that the choice of independence has yielded a few economic benefits: all the independent states received more South African money, in absolute terms and in per capita amount, than the homelands directly comparable with them. Furthermore, with the exception of Gazankulu from 1980/81, all the homelands have received a lower amount of South African aid per capita than the independent states. Also the rate of South African aid has been lower in the case of the homelands than in the case of the independent states. However, it is necessary to qualify carefully these conclusions. First of all, the data cover only a short period after independence. Therefore, it is not possible to extrapolate from them a definite trend. Furthermore, the amount of money spent by South Africa in the independent states or given to them

increased noticeably in the two or three years around independence, but the rate of such increase became slower in the following years and in the fourth year after independence it actually became less than the rate of increase in total South African expenditure in, or aid to the independent states and homelands together. This indicates that the bulk of South African expenditure in the newly independent states was tied to particular projects directly related to the independence process, and not to activities having a long term effect on their economy. Only in per capita terms is it possible to see a clear and persistent (remembering the short period after independence covered by the data) advantage for the independent states. And also in this case comparing the per capita figures of similar (in size and population) homelands it appears that the advantage of the independent states, although considerable, is not excessive. Only in the case of Bophuthatswana and Lebowa is the per capita figure of the independent state double that of the homeland. Therefore, it seems possible to say that those homelands which opted for independence had some financial incentives to do so, and were advantaged over the other homelands in the allocation of South African money. However, this advantage was not as great nor as lasting as to make a significant difference for their economy.

Another fact which deserves to be pointed out is the high rate of increase of South African expenditure in and transfers to Venda and Gazankulu. One of the reasons for this is certainly the low amount received by these two homelands up to 1975/76: it is easier to treble a R15 million grant than to double a R90 million one. The case of QwaQwa, whose amount increased almost eightfold from 1975/76 to 1981/82, confirms that the lower the amount received by a homeland in 1975/76, the higher the rate of increase of this amount in the years considered. But this is not enough of an explanation. The relatively low absolute amount of South African expenditure can explain the higher rate of increase for these two homelands, but cannot explain the fact that from 1978/79 Venda has the highest figure per capita of all the independent states and Gazankulu the highest figure per capita of all the homelands (and from 1980/81 the per capita figure of Gazankulu is higher even than that of Transkei). There can be two reasons for the particular attention given to these two territories. One is that Venda and Gazankulu are the homelands situated furthest from the most economically advanced areas of South Africa. They have thus only a limited possibility of autonomous economic growth, and to overcome this limitation a higher input of South

African money is necessary. However, also Lebowa and Transkei are badly situated in regard to access to markets and infrastructures, and their per capita figure is very low. There must then be another reason, and this second reason can be found in the strategic field. Venda and Gazankulu are situated in a part of the Eastern Transvaal where white presence is very scarce; there are no obstacles and no populated areas between them and the borders of a potentially hostile country; the terrain in this area is amongst the most conducive to guerrilla warfare that one can find at the borders of South Africa. It is then quite possible that the reason for the largest amount of South African money spent in these two homelands is a preventive effort to win 'the hearts and minds' of the local population, to make it less responsive to the appeals of a guerrilla force which might appear in the area in the event of a deterioration in the relations with the frontline states.

7.3 Development progress in the Independent Black States

The financial efforts made by the South African government in favour of the homelands had a definite aim. They aimed at stimulating some form of economic development in these territories in order to facilitate the achievement of one of the main aims of separate development: the stopping first and the reversal afterwards of the influx of people from the black reserves to the white areas. The mythical objective of the economic growth of the homelands attracting back thereto black people from the white urban areas has long ago been abandoned. However, the performance of the economy of the independent states is of fundamental importance for a political evaluation of the role these territories can have in the solution of the South African problems. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the independent states in the eyes of their population depends, in the long term, on their ability to improve the standard of living of at least a significant proportion of the resident population. If the economic conditions in the independent states have improved since independence, and particularly if their economy has fared better than that of the homelands which have refused independence, then the case of those leaders who opted for independence will be strengthened.

The proper evaluation of the economic development of a country would require at least a treatise on its own, let alone what would be required for the examination of the economic development of four different countries. Moreover, economics is not the writer's chief focus of interest. Thus only an outline of the economic development in the independent states will be given here.

Furthermore, only the cases of Transkei and Bophuthatswana will be discussed in some detail, although the figures for Ciskei and Venda will also be given in some of the tables. The reasons for the exclusion of these two countries are that they are dimensionally less important and that their economic development is in absolute terms less noticeable than that of the two others. Transkei and Bophuthatswana have been chosen for their importance, for the fact that they have been independent for a longer time and because they typify two different conditions in which the economy of a black state can find itself in the struggle for development.

Bophuthatswana is relatively well endowed with natural resources, is in part situated close to the industrial core of South Africa and thus enjoys a number of advantages in terms of accessibility to markets and advanced infrastructures. These relatively good basic conditions have helped to make Bophuthatswana the economically most successful homeland. Transkei instead, is totally devoid of natural resources, if its potential for agriculture is excluded. In theory, in Transkei there is some of the best agricultural land of South Africa, but the sorry state of its agriculture reduces the practical contribution of the primary sector to the economy of the country to a minimal part of its potential, as happens in all the homelands. Transkei is situated far from the principal industrial areas of South Africa and thus its economy feels only in a limited way the pulling effect of the South African economy. In such circumstances the economic development of Transkei has been limited, and this country has been even less capable than Bophuthatswana of absorbing the waves of newcomers on the job market. Venda and Ciskei are, for different reasons, in an even worse situation than Transkei, although in both of them there has been lately some progress. Thus all the negative consideration made on the Transkeian economy will be applicable to these two countries, only more so.

The first indicators which may be taken into consideration in examining the conditions of the economy of a country are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the Gross National Product (GNP) when it is

significantly different from the GDP, and their per capita values. Usually the GNP should suffice for a first evaluation, but it is well-known that the homelands and the independent states are dependent for a considerable part of their GNP on income generated outside their borders. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the GDP, i.e., the product generated within their borders only, to know the real state of the economic development of these territories.

The figures I quote are from various BENSO publications and it is necessary to point out again that these figures must be taken cum grano salis. The figures of the GDP include both the product generated by the market economy and that generated by the subsistence sector. The figures of this 'non-market' sector are necessarily estimates only, and therefore are only indicative of the size of this sector. The figures of the GNP are obtained subtracting from the GDP the 'foreign factor payments', which are computable with exactitude, and adding to it the 'foreign factor receipts', i.e., the income of the commuters and part of the income of the migrant workers. Apparently it is not possible to know the exact figures in this regard, and BENSO publishes estimates which are revised year by year. Consequently, also these figures must be considered only as indicative of the size of these factors and not as actual figures. Furthermore, the method used by BENSO to obtain the GNP figures is controversial. In fact, many think that these figures overestimate the real contribution of commuters and migrant workers to the economy of the homelands because a considerable part of their income is spent in the Republic of South Africa. The figures of the GDP and the GNP per capita are even less reliable, because to the uncertainties of the GDP and GNP figures they add the unreliability of the population figures which are only estimates, and sometimes rough estimates at that. However, the figures, all considered, may be taken as reasonably accurate, and since they are the only figures available one has to make do with them.(52)

7.3.1 Outline of the economic conditions of Transkei and Bophuthatswana

A first idea of how the economy of Transkei and Bophuthatswana has fared since independence is given by Table 18 which gives the GDP of both

TABLE 18: GDP OF TRANSKEI AND BOPHUTHATSWANA

TRANSKEI

	1977		1978		1979		1980	
	R'000	%	R'000	%	R'000	%	R'000	%
Market	155 745	54,1	202 787	58,8	272 918	64,0	379 599	69,3
Non-market	131 960	45,9	142 105	41,2	153 850	36,0	167 740	30,7
TOTAL	287 705	100,0	344 892	100,0	426 768	100,0	547 339	100,0

BOPHUTHATSWANA

	1977		1978		1979		1980	
	R'000	%	R'000	%	R'000	%	R'000	%
Market	222 491	87,8	273 020	89,3	393 426	91,4	546 668	93,4
Non-market	30 833	12,2	32 616	10,7	36 426	8,6	37 632	6,6
TOTAL	253 324	100,0	305 636	100,0	430 194	100,0	584 300	100,0

SOURCE: BENSO, Statistic Survey of Black Development, 1981, Part II.

countries, divided in market and 'non-market' sectors. From 1977 to 1980 the GDP of both countries has noticeably increased, almost doubling in the case of Transkei and more than doubling in the case of Bophuthatswana (the GDP of Transkei was in 1980 190% of the GDP in 1977 and that of Bophuthatswana 230%). The average annual rate of growth of the GDP in the period 1975-1980 was 20,5% for Transkei and 22,4% for Bophuthatswana. Although a sizeable part of this growth in monetary terms was due to inflation, also at constant 1970 prices the increase is remarkable, averaging 7,6% and 9,3% per year respectively. This is without any doubt a positive aspect of the economy of both countries, and suggests that some kind of economic development is really taking place.

Another positive aspect is the decreasing incidence that the subsistence sector has in the formation of the GDP. This is an indication that these countries, and in particular Bophuthatswana where the market economy contributed the 93,4% of the GDP in 1980, are giving themselves a more modern economic structure, which is one of the first steps necessary for development. As it is logical, agriculture has the biggest share in the subsistence sector. However, it is unfortunate that

subsistence agriculture has maintained its dominant share in the total agricultural output (in the years taken into consideration it was in the range of 86-91%, in 1980 it was 90,7% in Transkei and 90,9% in Bophuthatswana). This means that the bulk of the agricultural production is for self-consumption and that distribution and marketing of agricultural products are still in an embryonic state. The lack of channels for selling the products of the land reduces the incentives for increasing production and this perpetuates the predominance of self-consumption, thus ensuring that the great majority of the people living on the land will not advance beyond subsistence level.

From Table 19 it is possible to see that the incidence of agriculture in the formation of the GDP has steadily decreased both in Transkei and in Bophuthatswana. This can be considered a positive step because it means that the subsistence sector is occupying a constantly minor part in the economy of these countries. The negative aspect of this is that the production has remained almost constant at a very low level. Up to 1980 neither of the two countries had been able to meet its food requirements and it appears difficult that they will do so in the near future, although Bophuthatswana is coming quite close to it.

In Transkei, agriculture is almost the only component of the primary sector and in 1980 contributed 27,2% of the GDP (down from 44,9% in 1977), while in Bophuthatswana it is a minor component of this sector, contributing only 5,6% of the GDP in 1980 (down from 10,5% in 1977). While the role of agriculture in Bophuthatswana is rather small, the primary sector contributes more than half of the GDP. The importance of mining in the economy of this country is clearly pointed out by the fact that in 1980 it alone contributed 52,9% of the GDP (up from 41,8% in 1977), almost trebling its value (from R105 million to R309 million). Mining is certainly the most important part of the Bophuthatswana economy and this puts the country in a better condition than the other independent black states. Although the possible oscillation in the price of minerals may be a cause of concern, the presence of a strong mining sector guarantees a considerable source of income to the government and to the communities to which royalties are paid. The fact that, although platinum is the most important mineral mined, other minerals contribute noticeably to the mining activity makes an eventual collapse in the price of one commodity less dangerous than it is for other countries which are dependent on one single major source of income. Also in the mining sector, however, not everything that glitters is gold. One of the problems

TABLE 19: GDP of Transkei and Bophuthatswana according to main economic activity

	TRANSKEI								BOPHUTHATSWANA							
	1977		1978		1979		1980		1977		1978		1979		1980	
	R'000	%	R'000	%	R'000	%	R'000	%	R'000	%	R'000	%	R'000	%	R'000	%
Agriculture	129 380	44,9	135 068	39,1	141 446	33,1	148 563	27,1	26 758	10,5	29 553	9,7	31 972	7,4	33 000	5,6
Mining	170	0,1	183	0,1	197	0,1	212	0,1	105 737	41,8	137 289	44,9	222 595	51,7	309 252	52,9
TOTAL PRIMARY SECTOR	129 550	45,0	135 251	39,2	141 643	33,2	148 775	27,2	132 495	52,3	166 842	54,6	254 567	59,1	342 252	58,5
Manufacturing, electricity and water	24 900	8,6	29 414	8,5	35 617	8,4	44 046	8,1	26 192	10,3	34 854	11,4	43 465	10,3	58 007	10,1
Construction	10 860	3,8	13 203	3,9	16 350	3,8	20 648	3,7	14 382	5,7	11 459	4,1	17 374	4,0	33 700	5,7
TOTAL SECONDARY SECTOR	35 760	12,4	42 617	12,4	51 967	12,2	64 694	11,8	40 574	16,0	46 313	15,5	60 839	14,3	91 707	15,8
Trade, financing, catering and business services	38 475	13,4	60 687	17,6	98 101	23,0	161 850	29,5	22 600	8,9	25 945	8,5	34 432	8,0	40 991	7,0
Public Administration, Health and Education	68 700	23,9	88 806	25,7	114 826	26,9	148 629	27,1	42 421	16,8	49 207	16,1	61 600	14,3	77 500	13,2
Transport and other services	15 220	5,3	17 531	5,1	20 231	4,7	23 391	4,4	15 234	6,0	16 429	5,3	18 756	4,3	31 850	5,5
TOTAL TERTIARY SECTOR	122 395	42,7	167 024	48,4	233 158	54,6	333 870	61,0	80 255	31,7	91 481	29,9	114 788	26,6	150 341	25,7
TOTAL	287 705	100,0	344 892	100,0	426 768	100,0	547 339	100,0	253 234	100,0	305 639	100,0	430 194	100,0	584 300	100,0

SOURCE: BENSO, op.cit., 1981, Part II.

is that the Bophuthatswana government thinks that royalties and taxes paid by the mining industry are too low, but it is clearly reluctant to act in this regard lest its relations with the South African private sector and the South African government become bad. Another negative aspect, although this is possibly considered as negative only by the Bophuthatswana government, is that only a limited number of Tswanas is employed in the mines,(53) and a considerably part of the miners are not only migrant workers, but even 'foreign migrants', i.e., from the BLS and other countries. This is negative in the sense that it means that some tens of thousands of jobs within Bophuthatswana are not occupied by the local population, which certainly needs all the jobs that can be created in the country.

The secondary sector is clearly still in its infancy, and both in Transkei and in Bophuthatswana it has maintained its contribution to the GNP at a fairly constant level (around 12% in Transkei and around 15-16% in Bophuthatswana). In general, two thirds of this contribution are due to the manufacturing sector and one third to construction. Although the expansion of the secondary sector is undeniable, particularly in the case of Bophuthatswana, it remains far below what is necessary. The Tomlinson Commission had already regarded the development of the secondary sector as one of the pre-requisites for the success of the policy of separate development. In its report the Commission noted that the pressure on the land was too high and recommended the creation of employment in other sectors in order to move approximately half of the rural population to the towns so that the remaining half might start building a viable agriculture. Great part of this new employment had to be per force created in the secondary sector. To this requirement had to be added the need to find employment for the natural growth of the labour force. When one looks at the results, one has to conclude that they have been up to now rather short of the minimum requirements. In Transkei, there were 12 393 Transkeians employed in manufacturing enterprises in 1978, and in 1980 there were about 20 000 (the figure reported is 23 308, but the author says that this is doubtful and probably too high).(54) This constituted less than 13% of the total local paid employment (excluding the informal sector) which in its turn constitutes 19,6% of the labour force. In Bophuthatswana there were 9 870 paid employees in the manufacturing sector in 1978,(55) and in 1980 at least 12 100 (12 108 were employed in the enterprises established with the aid of concessions)(56) and possibly as many as 20 000 (this figure probably includes also the

informal sector). Also in the case of Bophuthatswana the employment in manufacturing constituted less than 13% of the total local paid employment which, however, constituted more than 36% of the labour force. (Again it must be pointed out that these figures must be taken cum grano salis.)

The secondary sector is therefore still weak in both these two countries and its prospects of growth are mainly dependent on the concessions given to the businessmen to attract them to the growth points within the country. Another drawback is that many of these newly established industries will not operate for the local market which remains depressed. However, the growth points, in particular those in Bophuthatswana, are attracting a steady flow of industrial concerns, many of them from overseas, and this will certainly have some positive effects.

Another noticeable difference between Transkei and Bophuthatswana is the different incidence of the tertiary sector in their economy. The tertiary sector has increased its contribution to the GDP of Transkei from 42,7% in 1977 to 61% in 1980. Both commerce and public administration (including education and health) have increased their share, the latter doubling the absolute amount and growing from 23,9% to 27,1% of the GDP, the former quadrupling the absolute amount and growing from 13,4% to 29,5% of the GDP. Thus almost half of the Transkeian GDP in 1980 was produced by commerce and government. Such oversized incidence of the tertiary sector in the formation of the GDP of Transkei cannot be considered positive. In particular, if on the one hand the fact that the public administration contributes more than a quarter of the GDP suggests a commendable attention on the part of the government to the need for social services (and indeed Transkei has, e.g., a relatively high per capita expenditure on education), on the other hand it underlines the fact that a considerable proportion of the very scarce resources at the disposal of this country are utilised in sectors which do not directly produce wealth. It is possible to devote such a high proportion of the resources to social services only because of the South African aid. But the fact that a considerable part of this aid is not used to enlarge and strengthen the productive basis of the country will make it more difficult for Transkei to start a process of self-sustaining economic development. Furthermore, public administration includes also a bureaucratic civil service whose utility may be questionable. A second component of the tertiary sector which has grown noticeably in these years is commerce. The quadrupling of the sector's product in four years and

the increase of its contribution to the GDP from 13% to 29% strikingly indicates that the traders are those who most benefitted from independence.

To the contrary of Transkei, the incidence of the tertiary sector in the GDP of Bophuthatswana is rather small and, although the absolute amount almost doubled from 1977 to 1980, its share in the GDP fell from 31,7% to 25,7%. Of this 25,7%, 7% was due to commerce and 13,2% to public administration, education and health. Thus it is possible to say that in Bophuthatswana the tertiary sector is of a reasonable size (perhaps even too small), and to note that its growth has been moderate.

Another indication of how Transkei and Bophuthatswana have fared since independence is given by Table 20 which reports the sources of finance of the two governments. In both countries there has been a steady growth of the resources at the disposal of the government. Particularly significant is the increase in 'own sources' and in this respect the two countries differ markedly. In Transkei this increase has been from R74 million in 1977/78 to R172 million in 1981/82, while in Bophuthatswana it has been from R108 million in 1978/79 to R285 million in 1981/82 (the figure for 1977/78 is not comparable because it was the year of independence and the control of financial resources was still mainly in the hands of the South African government). In these figures the transfers under the Customs Union agreement are included which in 1981/82 amounted to R91 million for Transkei and R128 million for Bophuthatswana. Notwithstanding the remarkable growth in the money raised with their own means, both countries receive a sizeable amount of money in the form of development aid from South Africa. In 1981/82 this aid constituted 50% of the resources at the disposal of the Transkeian government (excluding opening balance) and little more than 14% of those at the disposal of the Bophuthatswana government. (See Table 21.) This is a most striking indication of the different achievements of these countries in their struggle for development. Despite its undeniable progress, Transkei is still heavily dependent on South African aid simply to continue working, while Bophuthatswana is reducing its dependence almost year by year and is approaching the moment it will be able to stand on its own feet.

There is, however, another aspect which, in my opinion, must be used as the main yardstick in evaluating the degree of development in these countries and judging how successful they have been up to now. It is the ability of these countries to absorb the newcomers on the job market. Table 22 gives a rough estimate of the increase in local

TABLE 20: Sources of finance of the governments of Transkei and Bophuthatswana - 1977/78-1981/82 (R'000)

	YEAR	OPENING BALANCE	OWN SOURCES (1)	RSA DEVELOPMENT AID (2)	OTHER SOURCES (3)	TOTAL
TRANSKEI	1977/78	1 903	74 034	121 152	27 586	224 675
	1978/79	(1 429)	111 310	123 422	39 802	273 105
	1979/80	10 010	150 722	134 148	55 466	350 346
	1980/81	10 177	190 400	130 148	51 818	383 060
	1981/82	48 453	172 347	210 156	37 000	467 956
BOPHUTHATSWANA	1977/78	8 351	20 910	59 993	8 000	97 254
	1978/79	14 314	108 800	30 605	6 125	159 844
	1979/80	39 463	192 348	47 012	981	279 804
	1980/81	92 968	270 844	45 700	4 600	414 112
	1981/82	103 812	285 258	53 400	31 700	474 170

NOTES: (1) Includes self-generation and Customs Union.

(2) Includes statutory grand or budgetary assistance, General Tax and project aid.

(3) Includes Rand Monetary Union and loans.

SOURCE: BENSO 1981, T.66.

TABLE 21: Own source and RSA aid as proportion of source of finance. Transkei and Bophuthatswana. 1977/78-1981/82 (%).

	INCLUDING OPENING BALANCE		EXCLUDING OPENING BALANCE	
	OWN SOURCES	RSA AID	OWN SOURCES	RSA AID
Transkei				
1977/78	32,9	53,9	33,2	54,4
1978/79	40,7	45,2	40,5	44,9
1979/80	43,0	38,3	44,3	39,4
1980/81	49,7	34,1	51,0	35,0
1981/82	36,8	44,9	41,0	50,0
Bophuthatswana				
1977/78	21,5	61,7	23,5	67,5
1978/79	68,0	19,1	74,4	21,0
1979/80	68,7	16,8	80,0	19,5
1980/81	65,4	11,0	84,3	14,2
1981/82	60,1	11,2	77,0	14,4

SOURCE: Elaboration from previous table.

employment from 1970 to 1980 and the estimate of the increase of the economically active population in these two countries in the same period. The difference between the two figures is the estimated number of newcomers on the job market who did not find any job locally and thus went to increase the number of unemployed or migrants. This table is only indicative, because many of its figures are open to contestation and only contestable may be the way the table was put together. Nevertheless, it allows one to draw a few rough conclusions which have a general validity.

It is evident that neither of the two countries has been able to give employment to all the newcomers on the job market in the period taken into consideration. This should be the very minimum requirement these countries have to meet. And even if this occurred, it would certainly not be sufficient to consider them a success. Indeed, if all the newcomers were absorbed, there would still remain all those who were unemployed at the beginning, those who had been resettled, the migrant workers and part of the 'permanently absent' to be accommodated before these countries could be considered a success in terms of the original policy of separate development.

TABLE 22: Increase in the demand and supply of labour. Transkei and Bophuthatswana. 1970-1980.

	TRANSKEI	BOPHUTHATSWANA
Local Employment 1970(1)	403 000	215 000
Local Employment 1980(1)	530 000	316 000
Increase in local employment 1970-1980	+127 000	+101 000
Estimated increase in Economically Active Population 1970-1980(2)	267 000	129 000
DIFFERENCE	-160 000	- 28 000

NOTES (1) From BENSO figures relating to Economically Active Population. These figures include estimated self-employment in agriculture and the informal sector and are considered inflated by many scholars. According to Thomas, W.H., Socio-Economic Development in Transkei, UCT 1983, Transkeian local employment amounted to about 380 000 in 1980, to which can be added an estimated open unemployment of about 145 000.

(2) Estimates by BENSO based on geographical distribution of female population in 1970 to reduce the effect of migrant labour on population distribution figures. Resettlement since was not taken into account.

SOURCES: BENSO Black Development in South Africa, 1967.
BENSO Statistical Survey of Black Development 1980 and 1981, part II.

Transkei in these ten years has not been able to give employment to more than half its people entering the job market. This means that notwithstanding the development which took place in these ten years, Transkei is now more dependent on South African than ever, and Transkeians will continue to flock, legally or illegally, to the Republic to find that work which they cannot find at home. The case of Bophuthatswana is different, because, there, in these same years job opportunities were created locally to absorb the equivalent of almost four fifths of the newcomers on the job market. It is thus clear that Bophuthatswana fared better than Transkei. Indeed, if the contemporary increase of commuters to the border areas is taken into consideration, it is possible to surmise that it has been able to absorb even a part of those who were previously unemployed. Bophuthatswana, then, might almost be considered a success. Almost, because the ability of absorbing all the newcomers on the job market is only the first step along the road to economic viability (which, however, does not mean economic independence), and unless this road is covered, any exultance about the economic prospects of these countries would be out of place.

In conclusion, it can be said that although Transkei and Bophuthatswana have achieved some positive results, these results cannot by any means be considered sufficient to attain the aims which the South African government and the governments of the independent black states have, for different reasons, given to the strategy of separate development. Indeed, not only has none of these countries been able to attract back some of their people living in the Republic of South Africa, as was the dream of the South African government, but they have been unable to cope with the natural growth of their population. Furthermore, great part of the development that has been achieved is due to 'external' causes, namely, the decentralisation of industries, South African development aid, border areas development. Also in the case of Bophuthatswana, which has been the most successful of the independent black states, there are only limited forces which can stimulate an 'internal' growth. Unless these countries are able to absorb at least the natural increase of their economically active population, they have to be considered as a failure even in the terms of the government philosophy which is at the basis of separate development.

7.3.2 Independent black states and other homelands: A comparison of main economic indicators

After having briefly examined the economic conditions of Transkei and Bophuthatswana, and having concluded that despite their undeniable progress they are still far from being satisfactory, it is interesting to compare summarily the main economic indicators of the independent states with those of the non-independent homelands. This might indicate whether the economy of the former has fared better than that of the latter and, therefore, whether the decision to ask for independence bore any fruits in this field.

Although using the figures for the GDP and GNP, total and per capita, does not give a reliable picture of the economy of a country and sometimes may be misleading, it is nevertheless sufficient to give a general idea of the situation and to make some rough comparison. Therefore, only these indicators will be used, also to avoid an extension of the subject beyond the scope of this work.

Tables 23, 24 and 27 give the GDP and the GNP of the independent states at factor costs, the GDP and GNP per capita and their average annual rate of growth in the years 1970-1980 and 1975-1980. In these tables the figures for Lebowa and KwaZulu are given as a control to see the differences between independent states and homelands. All these figures show a remarkable increase. However, also the prices have increased during the period taken into consideration, and, therefore, these figures are largely inflated. Tables 25, 26 and 28 give the same information as the previous ones, but at constant 1970 prices. This enables us to see how much of the increase registered in the previous tables is real and how much of it is only nominal, due only to inflation. It is now possible to see that a great part of this increase has been nominal, and this cuts down to size the impression of remarkable development given by the first three tables. For example, the nominal per capita GDP of Transkei increased more than fourfold from 1972 to 1980 and that of Bophuthatswana more than fivefold. When the deflator is applied, this astonishing progress reveals itself to be mostly illusory, since the per capita GDP of Transkei at 1970 prices increased in this period from R 55 to R 85, and that of Bophuthatswana from R 78 to R 159. Despite this cutting down to size, however, the figures show that there has been a real, albeit generally limited, improvement in the economy of the independent states;

TABLE 23: GDP and GNP of the independent Black states and selected homelands at factor costs (R'000)

	TRANSKEI	BOPHUTHATSWANA	VENDA	CISKEI	LEBOWA	KWAZULU
GDP						
1972	114 218	83 263	9 770	31 516	55 128	99 190
1975	210 356	200 960	23 152	54 791	106 032	181 335
1977	287 705	253 324	32 189	71 225	118 532	278 021
1978	344 892	305 639	39 799	91 180	128 755	295 026
1979	426 768	430 194	48 013	106 282	182 907	354 413
1980	547 339	584 300	60 791	131 919	221 685	425 674
GNP						
1972	278 871	148 835	42 677	67 098	165 360	352 004
1975	543 106	490 064	54 998	149 812	298 572	734 525
1977	736 455	678 531	78 421	197 011	389 651	1 073 131
1978	853 504	794 212	94 464	235 526	452 525	1 318 510
1979	1 012 324	1 008 001	118 893	272 941	566 309	1 598 310
1980	1 271 456	1 326 885	149 974	340 665	730 239	2 001 039

SOURCES: BENSO Statistical Survey of Black Development 1980 and 1981, parts I and II.

N.B.: As already pointed out in the text (p. 209), these data must be taken cum grano salis. Their reliability has been questioned, and indeed, considering too the criteria used in their elaboration, their margin of error is quite wide. Therefore they can be considered only as indicative.

TABLE 24: GDP and GNP of the independent Black states and selected homelands. Per capita. Rands.

	TRANSKEI		BOPHUTHATSWANA		VENDA		CISKEI		LEBOWA		KWAZULU	
	Total	Blacks	Total	Blacks	Total	Blacks	Total	Blacks	Total	Blacks	Total	Blacks
GDP Per capita												
1972	62	51	88	50	35	30	57	46	47	37	44	37
1975	109	95	183	117	79	72	78	65	76	58	67	58
1977	130	114	214	150	106	97	128	107	78	62	93	82
1978	153	137	248	178	130	119	153	129	81	65	95	83
1979	186	169	337	245	154	143	167	141	110	88	108	96
1980	234	216	440	326	192	179	195	165	127	103	124	111
GNP Per capita												
1972	132	126	148	138	127	124	114	111	124	122	140	139
1975	244	237	388	359	172	168	199	196	193	190	248	247
1977	292	284	499	477	237	232	322	318	232	229	333	331
1978	334	325	564	540	281	276	363	357	258	257	392	391
1979	390	380	689	649	345	340	396	391	309	305	455	454
1980	481	471	870	820	427	424	464	458	380	375	543	542

NOTE: Although it may seem inopportune to give per capita figures divided into Total and Blacks, particularly so in the case of the independent Black states where racial classification of the population was aborgated, I decided to give them in this way because, in judging what value these countries may have for their population, it is more interesting to know the general conditions of the Blacks rather than that of the expatriates.

SOURCES: As for Table 23.

TABLE 25: Real GDP and real GNP of the independent Black states and selected homelands at 1970 prices (R'000)

	TRANSKEI	BOPHUTHATSWANA	VENDA	CISKEI	LEBOWA	KWAZULU
Real GDP						
1972	101 078	73 684	8 646	27 890	48 784	87 779
1975	134 241	128 245	14 775	34 998	67 666	115 721
1977	148 454	130 714	16 609	36 752	61 162	143 458
1978	160 415	142 156	18 511	42 409	59 886	137 221
1979	175 336	176 744	19 726	43 666	75 147	145 609
1980	197 667	211 015	21 954	47 641	80 060	153 728
Real GNP						
1972	246 789	131 712	37 767(1)	59 379	146 336	311 508
1975	346 590	312 740	35 098	95 604	190 537	468 746
1977	380 001	350 119	40 465	101 657	201 058	553 731
1978	396 979	369 401	43 937	109 547	210 477	613 260
1979	415 910	414 134	48 400(2)	112 137	232 665	656 660
1980	459 175	479 193	54 162	123 028	263 719	722 658

NOTES: (1) Figure doubtful, incompatible with correlated figures in other series.
(2) My own estimate. BENSO's figure (77 060) is clearly wrong.

TABLE 26 : Real GDP and real GNP per capita of the independent Black states and selected homelands at 1970 prices (R).

	TRANSKEI	BOPHUTHATSWANA	VENDA	CISKEI	LEBOWA	KWAZULU
Real GDP per capita						
1972	55	78	31	50	42	39
1975	70	117	50	55	49	43
1977	67	110	55	66	40	48
1978	71	115	60	71	38	44
1979	76	138	63	69	45	44
1980	85	159	69	70	46	45
Real GNP per capita						
1972	117	131	N/A	101	110	124
1975	156	248	110	127	123	158
1977	151	257	122	166	120	172
1978	155	262	131	169	120	182
1979	160	283	142	163	127	187
1980	174	314	154	168	137	196

also the economy of the non-independent homelands improved, but at a slower pace. This improvement, however, is of little meaning for a sustained economic development of these areas. Indeed, if the underdeveloped countries can be divided according to the performance of their economy into those whose economy is taking off, those whose economy is awaiting to take off and those whose economy is still taxiing on the service runway, the homelands in 1972 had to be included in the unfortunate category of those countries whose economy had not yet started the engines. Since then there has been some progress, but most of the homelands and the independent states still remain in the same category. Also Bophuthatswana, which has shown better results, remains in the group of the very poor.

With such a small GDP, the population of these territories would have difficulty in simply surviving, were it not for the income earned in 'white' South Africa. The figures of the GNP show the importance of the contribution of commuters and migrant workers to the income of the local population. Two observationscan be made on this. One is that the GNP per capita is remarkably higher than the GDP per capita, and this moves these countries from the group of the hopeless failures to the group of extremely poor but with some chance of improving their condition. Furthermore, while the GDP per capita hides profound differences in real income, the income produced by commuters and migrant workers is more evenly distributed, therefore it gives a more accurate picture of the general conditions of the population. This means that the people living in the homelands are not in such a bad condition as might be inferred from taking into consideration the GDP only. The second consideration is that despite the contribution of commuters and migrant workers, the real disposable income of these people is dramatically low, and therefore the little improvement there has been in the economic conditions of these areas is inadequate and still far from making them a viable or attractive alternative to the Republic of South Africa in the eyes of their own population.

Tables 27 and 28 give the average annual growth rate of the GDP and GNP at factor costs and at constant 1970 prices. They show that in the decade 1970-1980 there has been an undeniable increase. Although it might be said that it is not overly difficult to have a considerable growth rate when the starting point is so low, nevertheless the increase is there. However, it must also be pointed out that in many cases the growth rate in the years 1970-75 has been higher than that of the years 1975-80. This is certainly due also to the fact that in 1970 almost the

TABLE 27: Average annual growth of the GDP and GNP of the independent Black states and selected homelands. Total and per capita. (%)

	1970-1980				1975-1980			
	GDP		GNP		GDP		GNP	
	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita
TRANSKEI	19,9	16,2	20,5	16,6	20,5	16,6	17,8	14,5
BOPHUTHATSWANA	25,9	21,1	22,4	17,8	22,4	17,8	21,1	16,7
VENDA	25,0	23,2	21,7	19,8	21,7	19,8	22,3	20,0
CISKEI	19,7	18,6	19,5	17,9	19,5	17,9	17,6	16,0
LEBOWA	18,5	13,6	20,3	15,3	15,3	10,2	18,8	13,8
KWAZULU	18,9	13,5	23,7	18,5	17,4	12,0	21,8	16,6
GAZANKULU	20,4	13,0	20,8	13,9	23,8	16,1	21,2	14,0

SOURCES: As for Table 23.

TABLE 28: Average annual growth rates of the real GDP and real GNP of the independent Black states and selected homelands. Total and per capita. (%)

	1970-1980				1975-1980			
	GDP		GNP		GDP		GNP	
	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita
TRANSKEI	8,0	5,7	7,8	5,4	7,6	4,2	5,2	2,2
BOPHUTHATSWANA	13,4	9,1	12,4	8,4	9,3	5,1	8,2	4,2
VENDA	12,6	11,0	13,6	9,8	8,7	6,9	13,6	7,1
CISKEI	7,9	6,8	6,6	5,6	6,7	5,1	5,1	3,7
LEBOWA	6,8	2,3	8,4	3,9	3,1	-1,4	6,1	1,6
KWAZULU	7,1	2,2	11,5	6,8	4,8	-0,2	8,8	4,1
GAZANKULU	8,5	1,9	8,8	2,6	11,3	4,0	8,2	2,0

SOURCE: As for Table 23.

only economic activity in these countries was subsistence agriculture and thus in the early years of the decade every small development had a noticeable impact on the growth rate. The most hopeful aspect revealed by these tables is that both the GDP and GNP per capita in real terms show an increase, particularly in the case of the independent states. This suggests that notwithstanding the high increase of population registered in these countries between 1970 and 1980 (due both to a high natural rate of increase and to the extensive resettlements) their economy grew at a faster pace, therefore the economic conditions of the average inhabitant of the independent states should be slightly better now than they were in 1970. Another positive aspect pointed out by the tables is the fact that in the independent states (excluding Ciskei) the rate of increase of the GDP has been higher than that of the GNP. This may be taken as an indication that the economy of the independent states is growing stronger.

This indication is confirmed by Table 29 which gives the proportion of the GNP produced within the borders of the countries taken into consideration. Certainly, the fact that the GDP of Transkei in 1980 constituted only 43% of its GNP (up from 38,7% in 1976) and that of Bophuthatswana was 44% of its GNP (up from 37,3% in 1976) clearly confirms that these countries are unable to sustain their own population even in its present state of poverty. It is, however, possible to make a positive annotation: in three out of four independent states there appears to be a trend towards a higher incidence of the GDP in the formation of the GNP. This suggests that something is moving in their economies, and that if this trend continues it might be possible to take the eventuality of a real economic development of these countries more seriously.

Perhaps one of the most important facts revealed by these tables is the generally better performance of the economies of the independent states in comparison with that of the homelands. The average annual rate of increase of the GDP of the former has been generally higher than that of the latter: Transkei and Ciskei had the lowest growth rate of the real GDP amongst the independent states with 8% and 7,9% respectively; KwaZulu's growth rate was 7,1% and Lebowa's 6,8%. Amongst the homelands only Gazankulu, with 8,5%, fared better than Transkei, while Bophuthatswana and Venda are in a class of their own with 13,4% and 12,6% respectively. The anomalous situation of Gazankulu, which has been already pointed out in Chapter 5.2, is confirmed here.

If the growth rate of the real GDP per capita is taken into consideration,

TABLE 29: The GDP of the independent Black states and selected homelands as percentage of their GNP.

	TRANSKEI	BOPHUTHATSWANA	VENDA	CISKEI	LEBOWA	KWAZULU
1972	40,9	55,9	22,9	47,0	33,3	28,2
1975	38,7	41,0	42,0	36,6	35,5	24,7
1977	39,0	37,3	41,0	36,1	30,4	25,9
1978	40,4	38,5	42,1	38,7	28,4	22,4
1979	42,1	42,7	40,4	38,9	32,3	22,2
1980	43,0	44,0	40,5	38,7	30,3	21,3

SOURCE: Elaboration from previous tables.

the different and better performance of the independent states is more striking (and the Gazankulu anomaly disappears): the lowest growth rate amongst the independent states is that of Transkei which is 5,7%, the highest one amongst the homelands is that of Lebowa which is 2,3%. However, before drawing any conclusion from the foregoing data, it must again be pointed out that the figures are not totally reliable, and that the margin of error is wide enough to make differences of a few percentage points almost meaningless. However, if each figure is unreliable and only indicative of the magnitude of the activity taken into consideration, all the figures have been elaborated with the same criteria. Therefore, they are consistent. It is possible that the figures of the GNP have a margin of error of 10% or even 20%. As such, they have only partial significance if one wants to know the real dimensions of the economy of a particular territory. However, it can be assumed that if the figures of the GNP of, e.g., Transkei for the year 1977 are overestimated by 12% roughly, the same applies to the figures of the GNP of the other homelands. And in this case the figures for the year 1978 might be overestimated by 10% or 15%, but it would be improbable that they were underestimated by 10%. Therefore, it can be considered acceptable to found on them an evaluation of the general performance of the economy of the independent states and the homelands.

After having made that premise, it is possible to say that is appears that the independent states have fared better than the homelands. This is even more visible when one takes into consideration the average growth rate for the years 1975-1980. In this period the rate of growth of the GDP of the homelands was much lower than that of the independent states (excluding again Gazankulu). When one takes into consideration the rate of growth of the GDP per capita, the situation of the homelands in comparison with the independent states becomes worse. Gazankulu is the only one which has a positive performance, while for Lebowa and KwaZulu the average rate of growth is even negative. Only because the remittances of the migrants grew with the increase of the wages in the Republic of South Africa, the population of these two homelands avoided in general being worse off in 1980 than in 1975. In these circumstances the contribution of the GDP to the GNP remained low and decreased: Table 29 shows that in 1980 it was lower than in 1972. This is another indication of the fact that the economy of these two homelands has been much less able to cope with the needs and the growth of their population than was the economy of the independent states.

TABLE 30: Capital investment and employment in all enterprises established with the aid of concessions

	INDUSTRIALISTS' INVESTMENTS (ESTIMATES) R'000		BLACK EMPLOYMENT			
	1977	1981	1976	1979	1981	Latest
Bophuthatswana	40 081	74 240	8 373	10 886	14 677	17 731(2)
Venda	909	1 594	759	1 098	2 595	-
Ciskei	2 659	10 783	919	1 839	3 076	5 221(2)
Transkei	31 245	30 932(1)	5 600	7 165(1)	-	-
KwaZulu	8 715	49 306	2 197	4 945	7 323	9 578(3)
Lebowa	5 673	11 847	1 866	2 206	3 272	4 267(3)
Gazankulu	601	2 510	670	688	944	1 316(3)

(1) The latest available data for Transkei are for 1978.

(2) 1982.

(3) 1983.

NOTE: To the investments of the industrialists must be added the investments of the Development Corporations for industrial buildings, loans and share capital amounting on average to 15% more than those of the industrialists.

SOURCES: BENSO Statistical Surveys 1978, 1981 parts I and II; S.A.I.R.R. Survey 1983.

A further indication of this fact is given by the data on employment creation in these territories. The estimated number of salaried workers in the homelands in 1972 was 190 443, 88 125 of whom in Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, and 102 318 in the other homelands. In 1980 the estimated number of salaried workers in the homelands was 176 000, an increase of 73 682 units, equivalent to 72%. In the three independent states in 1980 it was 216 000, an increase of 127 875, equivalent to 145%.(57) The enlargement of the civil service after independence accounts for a sizeable proportion of this bigger increase, but it is worth pointing out that also the increase of job opportunities created by the investments of the private sector has been larger in the independent states than in the homelands. (See Table 30)

It is of course impossible to conclude that the better performance of the independent states has been the result of independence, but certainly one of its main causes was the increase in the amount of money transferred from South Africa to the independent states which followed the decision to opt for independence.

Too short a timespan is covered by the data on the economy of the TBVC countries since their independence to allow politically significant conclusions. Independence has certainly not meant that the TBVC countries have significantly lessened their economic dependence on South Africa, but since the whole sub-continent is one economic unit with South Africa as its pivotal element, these countries are not alone in their dependence. With the economy of all the states of the sub-continent interlocked with that of South Africa, it is almost pointless to speak of self-sufficiency. However, it seems that the independent states have managed to increase the proportion of their population in local employment. Also in this regard, Bophuthatswana is far ahead of the rest, and this is obviously due to its closeness to the industrial core of South Africa rather than to any effect of independence.

Nevertheless, from the available data it appears that the independent states have fared better than the homelands. This is shown also by the fact that the GDP per capita of the homelands in comparison with that of the independent states was generally lower in 1980 than it was in 1972. For example, the GDP per capita of KwaZulu in 1972 was 71% of that of Transkei, 50% of that of Bophuthatswana, 125% of Venda's and 78% of Ciskei's. In 1980, it was 53% of Transkei's,28,3% of that of Bophuthatswana, 65% of that of Venda and 64% of Ciskei's. The same

TABLE 31: Relation of the GDP of the homelands with that of the independent states

	As % of GDP of:			
1972	TRANSKEI	BOPHUTHATSWANA	VENDA	CISKEI
GDP of				
KwaZulu	71	50	125	78
Lebowa	76	54	135	84
Gazankulu	60	42	106	66
1980				
GDP of				
KwaZulu	53	28	62	64
Lebowa	54	29	66	65
Gazankulu	52	27	64	63

SOURCE: Elaboration from Table 26.

applies also to the other homelands. (See Table 31)

Despite the limited data available and their unreliability, it seems justified to conclude that the independent states had from their choice a relative advantage in comparison with the homelands. This conclusion is provisional, because revised and more accurate data covering a longer timespan might change the picture. Nevertheless, until it is disproved by these new data that the economists are promising us, it must be taken into consideration when one tries to give a political evaluation of the effects of independence.

CHAPTER 8

UNRESOLVED ISSUES BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE INDEPENDENT STATES

Independence certainly did not solve the problems of the homelands which asked for it, nor those of their people. Indeed, some awkward issues have been left unresolved. They are those questions where the objectives of the South African government and the aspirations of the black governments or of the black population are most in contrast, viz., land and citizenship.

The possession of land is everywhere an important and sensitive subject. It is particularly so in South Africa, where the territorial separation of the Blacks has long been and still is one of the corner-stones of separate development. And indeed, for a country acceding to independence, land is one of the most important aspects of the deal. The request for more land has therefore been a constant in the attitude of the black leaders.

The delimitation of land reserved to the Blacks was the first important measure of Native policy of the Union (See 1.3.1), and the 1936 legislation in this regard (See 1.3.2) has been one of the most important guidelines of the government policy ever since. When the government started implementing separate development and establishing self-governing territories, it soon became evident that the haphazard way in which the obligations contained in the 1936 legislation were met was not equal to the necessity. It was also evident that the scattered form of the homelands made the administration of these territories complicated and the pretence of their being nations in the making ludicrous. In the early 1970s, the questions of land consolidation was again approached in a comprehensive way with the aim of solving it once and for all. The results of this activity were the 1975 'final' consolidation proposals (See 3.2.3) which were approved by Parliament. These proposals did not really obtain a real consolidation of the homelands but only reduced their scattered aspect. These proposals were not considered satisfactory by any of the black leaders, and territorial

claims remained one of the constant points of disagreement with the South African government. Also the South African government realised the unsatisfactory nature of the situation, and in 1979 a commission was appointed to examine the whole question again, for the first time having the possibility of going beyond the 1936 legislation in its recommendations. This commission is still working on its very sensitive task and it does not appear that the land question will be solved in a short time.

The other area where the government's policy is mostly in contrast with the aspirations of the black leaders and those of their people is that of citizenship. The fact that a citizen of a homeland loses South African citizenship ope legis at the moment of independence, irrespective of where he lives or what his desire in this regard is, has aroused the hostility of all the black leaders, who during independence negotiations, tried unsuccessfully to change it.

This question is of course linked with the problem of the urban Blacks and thus is at the heart of the whole policy of separate development. The South African government has always been resolute in maintaining that once a homeland becomes independent all the Blacks linked with that homeland cease to be South African citizens. It is difficult to see how the government could change its position, since this would mean the failure to achieve the final aim of the government policy.

However, it appears that the government is searching for a solution which could permit on the one hand to safeguard the principle that independence means the loss of the citizenship of the Republic of South Africa, therefore assuring the achievement of the aim of separate development (i.e., no Black will be citizen of the white homeland),* and on the other hand, at the same time to accommodate the Blacks' claims of participation in the political and economic life of a greater South Africa. (See 2.1.4)

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*NOTE: In this chapter I use the expression 'white homeland' to indicate the area where the Whites hold the power. The aim of the present government is to establish the conditions whereby the Whites can maintain an undisputed ruling position over as great a part of the original Republic of South Africa as possible. Coloureds, Asians and many Blacks will live in this area, but if the control of the most important decisions remains in the hands of the Whites, this area will still be the 'white homeland'.

8.1 Citizenship

As it has been repeatedly pointed out, the citizenship issue is one of the main points of contention between the South African government and the leaders of the homelands. Moreover, the fact that the Blacks lose their South African citizenship at the moment their homeland (or the homeland to which they are assigned ope legis) becomes independent is the cause of a great deal of hostility against the idea of independence on their part.

The Blacks living in the homelands may accept independence, and sections of the de facto population of the homelands find advantages in it, but the Blacks living in the white areas, in particular the urban Blacks, are in their great majority totally opposed to it. They feel that independence means that they will be cut off from prosperous South Africa to be linked with impoverished territories, losing in this way the chance of finally taking a share of the South African wealth proportional to their contribution to the prosperity of the country and to their number.

Although it is not the intention of the South African government to deny the Blacks a share of the wealth of South Africa, it is not prepared to give them a share of the South African cake even only vaguely proportional to their number. To accept this would mean the end of white rule over the whole of South Africa, while the aim of the government is to make white rule over a great part of South Africa undisputed.

The main obstacle to the achievement of this aim is, of course, the presence of millions of Blacks in those areas of South Africa which the government has decided should form part of the white homeland. The solution to this problem had been seen for a long time in the forcible limitation of the influx of the Blacks to the white areas and in their resettlement in the homelands. This anxiety about the growing number of Blacks in the white area and the government's commitment to the reduction of this number was repeatedly emphasised:

> ... (the) figures prove once more the untenable imbalance of numbers within and without the homelands ... 48,9% of the Blacks live inside their homeland and more than half - i.e., 51,5% - live outside ... If we project these figures to the year ... 2020 ... between approximately 27 million and 30 million Bantu will have to be provided with accommodation outside the Bantu homelands ... The Government realizes that this Black preponderance of numbers as against the Whites

> cannot be accepted on a permanent basis ... The Blacks have to be re-channelled to the homelands and as far as the future is concerned, the number of Blacks in the Black (sic) homeland must be drastically reduced.(58)

However, three big obstructions are in the way of a drastic reduction of the number of the Blacks in the white homeland.

One is the sheer size of the task: at present there are a little more than 10 million Blacks in the white areas. To reduce drastically their number would mean to remove many millions more to the homelands. The human and economic costs of such removals would be very large, and if the past shows that the government is prepared to face the former, it might baulk at the latter.

A second problem is the effect such an influx of people can have on the weak structures and economy of the homelands. Despite the considerable economic support the South African government gives to the homelands, these are impoverished and underdeveloped territories and an influx of that dimension could easily break the weak fabric of their society. From the point of view of the South African government it is still acceptable to have the homelands as small dictatorial states where order is maintained by black rulers with a mixture of manipulation of consensus and repression. It would, however, be too dangerous to dump there other millions of people who would find it difficult to eke out a living: this could well cause a sizeable part of the local population to cross the line between a resentful adaptation to the existing circumstances and open defiance. A state of continuous rural unrest and the inevitable opening this would give to internal guerrilla action is probably the only type of threat that South Africa would not be able to overcome.

But even if these two obstacles could be surmounted, there will remain the fact that the presence of Blacks in the white ares is vital for the South African economy. Without the Blacks, white South Africa would grind to a standstill and its prosperity would disappear. Despite the extensive use of migrant labour and despite the existence of considerable unemployment amongst the Blacks in the white area, a 'drastic reduction' of their number would be detrimental to the good functioning of the economy and to the prosperity of all its population groups.

Furthermore, to achieve the aim of a reduction of the number of Blacks in the white area, the removals would have to be concentrated in time. In Chapter 2.1.3 we have seen that from 1960 to 1982 about

3 million Blacks have been removed, about two thirds of them from the white area to the homelands. These removals, however, did not achieve any reduction of the number of Blacks living in the white area. To the contrary, in those twenty years their number there doubled. It is thus evident that the solution to the government's dilemma cannot be given by a 'drastic reduction of the number of the Blacks in the white homeland' because this is, in the present circumstances, impossible to achieve.

After the government realised that it was materially impossible to reduce the number of Blacks living in the white area, the importance of formal independence of the homelands increased. If it was impossible to reduce materially their number, it would be possible to reduce the number of black South African citizens by force of law.

When Transkei opted for independence, Matanzima tried to negotiate on this subject too, but the South African government did not change its stance. It is difficult to think that Matanzima really believed he would succeed in this. Although he had his own objectives, which were not those of the South African government, when he accepted to work within the framework of separate development and then to ask for independence (See Chapter 6), he was certainly aware that the citizenship issue was possibly the only one on which the South African government could not make any concession. Probably he regarded this only as a card to be played on the negotiating table to obtain some concession in other fields, while letting time work for a different solution of the citizenship issue.

The Status of Transkei Act (No. 100 of 1976) granted independence to Transkei and its Section 6 took care of the question of citizenship as the South African government wanted. The schedule of this Act defining the categories of persons who "shall be ... citizen of the Transkei and shall cease to be South African citizen" has seven headings, and starting from "every person who (is) citizen of the Transkei in terms of any law" goes on reducing the mesh of the net until it includes every person who, not being citizen of another territory within the Republic of South Africa, is related to any member of the Transkeian population or "has identified himself with any part of such population or is culturally or otherwise associated with any member or part of such population".(59)

Despite the fact that Section 6(3) assures that "no citizen of the Transkei resident in the Republic ... shall, except as regards citizenship,

forfeit any existing rights, privileges or benefits by reason only of this Act", the clause on citizenship was seen by the urban Blacks as extremely threatening. On the face of it not rights were lost by the Blacks living in the white area, but in reality the loss of citizenship was profoundly unsettling for them. Even if their present rights were not affected (but often over-zealous officials make them feel the difference), they lose in two ways. They are cut off from possible future changes affecting the black group at constitutional level, and their children born after independence will not be automatically entitled to those rights, such as Section 10 rights, which are most important for the urban Blacks.

During the negotiations for the independence of Bophuthatswana, the citizenship issue was again one of the points of contention, and again the South African government did not concede anything of substance. However, Mangope was able to extract a small concession. Section 6 of the Status of Bophuthatswana Act (No. 86 of 1977) is slightly different from Section 6 of the Status of Transkei Act: subsection 6(3) says that "a citizen of Bophuthatswana may renounce his Bophuthatswana citizenship after independence on conditions agreed upon between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Goverment of Bophuthatswana, and in a manner prescribed by the Government of Bophuthatswana". Apparently, with this provision the South African government abandoned its position of principle that once a homeland becomes independent its citizens become foreigners and have nothing more to do with South Africa as far as citizenship (and all that goes with it) is concerned. It recognised that some of the Blacks who 'by order' lose their South African citizenship to become citizens of an independent homeland might take exception to this and desire to maintain their South African citizenship. The obvious catch in that provision is that the conditions for regaining South African citizenship must be agreed upon by the South African government.(60) It was evident that the South African government would be very careful not to open the door too much.

Mangope negotiated this small concession for Bophuthatswana, but his achievement was of benefit to all the other independent states. In 1978 the National States Citizenship Amendment Act (No. 13 of 1978) was passed. Section 3(3) of this Act makes provision for a citizen of an independent state to regain, subject to some conditions, South African citizenship. However, the only way he can do so is by acquiring the citizenship of

one of the non-independent homelands. With this, one is back to square one: the re-acquisition of South African citizenship is provisional, depending on the homeland not opting for independence.

Indeed, the government policy did not change. This small concession is in practice meaningless, and only a limited number of people has been able to take advantage of it.(61) Having obtained the concession embodied in the Citizenship Amendment Act might have been gratifying for Mangope, but it does not change the reality. And the reality is that in growing numbers the Blacks have lost, are losing and are going to lose their South African citizenship.

8.1.1 Urban Blacks

The loss of South African citizenship affects different categories of Blacks in different ways. For the urban Blacks it has greater and more negative effects than for any other section of the black population. They are the section of the black population that presents the most visible obstacle to the maintenance of undisputed white rule over the white area and therefore the most likely to suffer as a consequence of a policy aimed at preserving that rule.

In Chapters 1.2 and 2.1 the attitude of the previous South African governments in regard to the presence of Blacks in the white area has already been discussed. It is sufficient to repeat here that all the South African governments considered the Blacks residing in the white area only as temporary sojourners, devoid of, and not entitled to any political rights therein. This position was often reaffirmed, and as late as 1977 prominent cabinet members stated that "the Black man who is in the white area is here at the moment to sell his labour and to improve his standard of living".(62)

The independence of Transkei did not change this attitude. However, the fact that the Transkeians were now foreigners with no legal ground for claiming a participation in the political life of South Africa removed them from the 'potential threat' category from the government perspective. This induced a more relaxed attitude towards those 'de-South Africanized' Blacks. The government decided that it did not have

> great objections of principle against the presence of Bantu persons here in White South Africa, especially if they identify themselves with their own specific Black nation. In fact, such Bantu persons

> who identify themselves with their own nations are much more welcome here in the White area than those who deny or hide their relationship with a Black nation of their own ... To those who acknowledge their own specific national context, we must grant more and more privileges here in the White area. Preference must be given to them in regard to available jobs ... They must be provided with housing ...(63)

This position implied the decision of favouring the Blacks who became citizens of an independent homeland in terms of improved quality of life as a reward of their renunciation to South African citizenship and as an incentive to the others to follow suit. The preference to be accorded to the citizens of the independent states was, however, to be limited to those aspects of life in which they were legally in the same conditions of all the other Blacks. The preferential treatment did not extend to a lightening of the measures of influx control or to more relaxed conditions for the attainment of residential rights in the urban areas.

In theory, the government wanted to give a definite, albeit small, advantage to the Blacks who became citizens of an independent state. In reality, however, excluding the members of diplomatic missions, no black citizen of the TBVC countries ever felt this supposedly preferential treatment. Indeed, often they met with petty harassment instead, and the tentative policy of giving them better conditions in exchange for the loss of citizenship foundered before getting under way. It is apparently strange that the government did not implement such a policy, because it would be logical for it to reward those Blacks who cease to be a 'potential threat' to white rule as a way to engineer some degree of acceptance of independence also amongst the urban Blacks.

There have been two main reasons for the government not adopting this logical course of action. One is that, excluding the migrants, in practice there are few urban Blacks who are to all effects citizens of the TBVC countries. This is another example of the difference between the legal appearance and the reality in South Africa. When a homeland becomes independent, all the Blacks legally linked to it cease to be South African citizens and take its citizenship. This is the theory. The reality is that because of the great number of Blacks involved it was not possible to provide them with all the necessary documents in time for the date of independence of their homeland. A period of grace of two years, extendable upon agreement, was then agreed upon, during

which time those Blacks could present themselves to the competent authority to exchange their South African documents for those of their independent state,[64] becoming in this way true citizens of their independent state.

The naive expectation of the South African government that the Blacks would flock to the competent authorities to formalize the change of citizenship was rapidly frustrated. The Blacks kept well away and refused to take the documents of their independent state. The provision for the extension of the period of grace for technical reasons was used more and more, as a screen behind which to hide their passive resistance to the government's citizenship policy, by the TBVC authorities, who are not overly keen to register as citizens more recalcitrant people than they have to. In these circumstances, that provision has become an opportune safety valve which allows an indefinite postponement of the deadline for the actual registration of the urban Blacks as citizens of the independent states without causing a dangerous increase of the tension both between South Africa and the independent states and amongst the urban Blacks. This leaves the things as they were, with the Blacks officially losing South African citizenship, but in practice refusing to ask for the citizenship of their independent state and continuing to use South African documents. As a result of this, the South African government gave up its hope of formally freeing itself of that category of Blacks that in the 1970 census was classified as 'de jure' population of the TBVC homelands in a short time after independence, but it did not renounce its aim of making them citizens of these countries.

The lack of recipients for the policy of preferential treatment of the citizens of the TBVC countries in the white area helped to shelve it before it started to be implemented. In its stead was adopted a waiting policy: sooner or later those Blacks would need a new document, and then they would have to ask for that of their independent state. The final result would be the same, even if it could take many years to be obtained. For the moment, until they do not have contact with the South African authorities, the life of these Blacks goes on just as it did before. Their security of residence and work, however, is limited. They can be more subject to harassment than other Blacks, and the possibility that a change of policy would lead to a crackdown against them hangs always over their heads. Evidently, however, they prefer this situation to the alternative of taking the citizenship of the independent states, and this says a lot more about the popularity of

independence amongst the urban Blacks than a whole treatise.

The second reason for which the policy of preferential treatment for the urban Blacks who are citizens of the TBVC countries did not materialize is that the policy towards the urban Blacks has slowly changed after 1976. The riots of 1976-77 has been a turning point in many aspects of South African policy. Amongst many other effects, they compelled the government to face the reality of a growing, increasingly stable and increasingly demanding black urban community. This led to a re-elaboration of the policy towards the urban Blacks and to a reappraisal of their role in the South African society.

The first area in which this change of policy was felt was that of the material conditions of life in the black townships. Upgrading the conditions of the townships did not require any important shift from the ideological basis of separate development; to the contrary, it could be presented as part of the same policy. However, the resources that could have been used for the preferential treatment policy were thus used for a general improvement of the conditions of life in the townships. Furthermore, in the light of the potential reactions from the other urban Blacks, it was evidently considered not advisable to concentrate the effort on the citizens of the TBVC countries.

The 'Soweto effect' went, of course, deeper than that. While the position on the theoretical level remained unchanged,(65) the government's attitude towards the urban Blacks began slowly to change. One of the most important signs of this change was the decision to grant 99-year leasehold rights in the townships. Leasehold is not freehold, of course, but 99 years is a far longer timespan than anybody could reasonably expect for enjoying any property right, and therefore this leasehold could be considered as a lifelong title of property.

This was the first sign that the government was reassessing the place of the urban Blacks in the South African future, and was definitely abandoning its hope of disposing of the South African Blacks. This was not an easy process and the opposition from the 'verkrampte' in the National Party was strong. When, in February 1979, the then Minister of Health said publicly that he could not "envisage that the day will ever come when we have no black South Africans", he had to go back to the press the following day to say that it was only his "personal opinion of the way I think things are moving".(66)

But despite the rearguard action of the right wing of the National

Party, the government was slowly catching up with the reality of a permanent black presence in the white urban areas. The early 1980s saw the government's acceptance of this permanent presence and its first attempts at finding a political place for the urban Blacks within the framework of its policy and without endangering its main objective of a white (Afrikaner) controlled homeland.

8.1.2 Signs of re-integration of urban Blacks in the decision-making at central level

The prime ministership of P.W. Botha opened a period in which the government hastened slowly to reassess its policy towards the urban Blacks. The first measures were taken in the social and economic field, with the increase in spending on behalf of the black townships, the introduction of the 99-year leasehold, and the significant changes in the field of labour relations. (See 2.1.5) The political aspect of this reassessment was a more thorny issue and was handled cautiously. Two facets of this issue were taken into consideration: the question of citizenship for the people of the TBVC and othereventual independent states, and the problem of the participation of non-homeland Blacks to the decision-making process at least on the issues that more immediately affect their lives.

There was still a noticeable reluctance to de-couple the urban Blacks from the homelands, but at least the fact that a number of urban Blacks might not be satisfied with their links with the homelands was recognised(67) and some thought was given to the possibility that that number might be great enough to require alternative solutions. At the beginning of 1980, the Prime Minister admitted that such an alternative solution might be necessary. He said that he believed:

> that most Black people in our urban areas have homeland ties, and consequently I believe that they would prefer to participate in such a constellation through their national States. However, if there are still those, who for some practical reason or other, cannot be accommodated in this way ... one can allow them to participate in such a constellation of States.(68)

The way in which such a participation might take place was not yet decided. It was, however, tentatively identified in a slow institutional

growth from the basis of the improved local powers envisaged in one of the 'Koornhof bills' (the one which would result in the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982) and in the representation of the urban Blacks in the constellation of states:

> We shall ... grant them a higher status than municipal status, but not overnight ... That higher degree of local government ... can receive a say in some co-ordinated form or other in this council of States where the constellation of States deliberate with one another on matters of common interest.(69)

The reluctance of the government to accept the participation of the urban Blacks at higher levels of the decision-making process is revealed by its insistence on the need of developing close contacts between the homelands and the urban Blacks. It was becoming evident that it was necessary to find a political accommodation for these Blacks, but still this accommodation was identified in some kind of link with the homelands. The need to avoid a serious confrontation with the 'verkrampte' in the National Party was an important factor in the government's cautiousness in this field. Even if Botha had accepted that his policy would lead to a split in the party and, worse, in the Afrikanerdom, to force it on the issue of the participation of urban Blacks in the decision-making process, even if only within the framework of the constellation of states, would have been a tactical blunder which could have caused the detachment of the majority of the Afrikaners from the National Party. Thus, after the 1981 elections, P. Koornhof stressed again that the urban Blacks should maintain and tighten their links with the homelands:

> As a result of the economic interdependence of nations, we find ourselves in a situation in which approximately 10 million Blacks are resident outside the national States in White South Africa, and the presence of some of these is accepted as permanent today. Those people must be accommodated politically ... it is essential for these Blacks to remain bound to their national States as far as possible, both politically and otherwise ... it is our duty to develop that bond to the full.(70)

However, the most important part of this statement was the almost incidental clause referring to the acceptance of some of the urban Blacks as permanent residents in the white area. This was one of the first occasions in which the taboo of the temporary presence of the Blacks in

the white area was officially broken by senior cabinet ministers. Indeed, such a break with the traditional policy required a revolution in the ideological thinking of the National Party. Accepting some of the Blacks as permanent residents of the white area was exactly the contrary of the National Party policy since its establishment. It was the recognition that one of the cornerstones of the government policy had been laid down on sand and was giving way.

When the National Party made a public self-criticism, it recognised that the assumption that the Blacks were only temporary residents in the white area was wrong and that provisions had to be taken to change the foundations on which the policy towards the urban Blacks rested:

> The National Party Government has made mistakes with the entire urban Black problem. For a long time we said that the group of people in the urban areas were merely temporary, and we thought that they could return to whence they came. However, that was a mistake ... the Government is now saying ... that it admits the permanence of the problem, and on this basis we are now coming forward with practical steps.(71)

However, it is difficult to say that the bulk of the National Party thought in terms of sweeping changes of policy. Probably, the majority of the National Party was still too busy digesting the notion of a permanent presence of Blacks in the white area to think about the political changes such a recognition implied. Indeed, while the party was slowly accepting the idea of a new constitutional dispensation for the Coloureds and the Indians, there was no chance that it could be innovative in this field as well. The rank and file M.P.s could not go further than using an improved type of local government institution to accommodate the political aspirations of the urban Blacks:

> It has become necessary for a truly effective local self-government with real power and responsibility to be granted to the Black urban communities on an ethnic basis as far as possible. And this was the way the Community Councils were established. The Community Councils therefore aim at accommodating the needs and aspirations characteristic of the urban Black man within the Republic in the new constitutional dispensation that we are entering.(72)

In the meanwhile, with the approaching of the independence of Ciskei, the question of citizenship came again to the fore. Also the Ciskeian government tried to obtain concessions on this issue, but again without

and was prepared to retake some responsibility for their citizens in a wider international context, but it was not prepared to compromise on the question of political rights for the Blacks within South Africa. Again this solution had one major drawback. It took into consideration some of the problems faced by the citizens of the independent states, and it may well be acceptable for those Blacks who live there, but it did not take into consideration the urban Blacks and thus failed to address their problems. Indeed, as far as the urban Blacks were concerned this was a non-solution.

However, the government had definitely accepted that the urban Blacks could not be ignored any longer. The split in the National Party and the departure of the most 'verkrampte' of its members allowed the government a larger room of manoeuvre for facing in a more constructive way the problem of their place in the constitutional arrangement of South Africa. The first step was to recognise that since the pressure of the Blacks in the urban areas had been accepted,(76) now the government had to face the consequences of this and had to

> accept the reality of the Black people in our urban areas ... the constitutional problem of the urban Black people will have to be solved ... we are not prepared to tell the Black people in the urban complexes that they have no rights.(77)

Having admitted that "some of the N.P.'s political ideas, too, in an absolute form, as we foresaw they would apply in the future, have fallen flat ... in the face of realities in South Africa",(78) did not mean that the National Party had renounced to its aim of safeguarding the white homeland. It recognised that:

> the problems surrounding the urban Blacks ... are ... the most important issue that bears on the future of all of us in South Africa ...

but the moving force behind this recognition was logically the preservation of white control over South Africa:

> we are considering the realities and how to deal with those realities in the interest of the Whites.(79)

At the opening of the 1983 session of Parliament, the Minister of Co-operation and Development, P. Koornhof, gave a lengthy explanation of the government's position and intentions in this regard. Although

it was more a statement of intentions rather than a precise programme, and was devoid of practical proposals or timetables, it can rightly be considered as the government's manifesto on the future of the Blacks:

> Black constitutional development is one of the Government's highest priorities ... Black people constitute part of any reform which is undertaken ... the Government ... is therefore working on the rightful Black claims to participation in the processes which affect their interests. The policy of including Black people too, in the decision making processes ... has already gathered an irreversible momentum ... The Government remains convinced ... that the optimum form of self-determination for the Black people is the gaining of independence in their own territory ... Against this background of clear objectives ... I wish to state clearly that the Government accepts the fact that large numbers of the Black peoples will be present in the Republic of South Africa on a permanent basis. This fact, too, must be taken into account in the responsible planning of constitutional development ... we are working towards accommodating the position of this section of the Black population in one way or another. Provision for the exercising of powers at the local authority level by Black people in the Republic of South Africa reflects an ongoing movement in the direction of management bodies which are elected by the residents themselves and which are being invested with constantly increasing powers ... Last year, with the acceptance of the Black Local Authorities Act, the stage of fully-fledged Black local authorities was achieved. This process is still under way ... such local authorities form structures which offer the potential for the co-ordination of common local interests ... Now in this set-up there are ... problem areas, such as the possible establishment of regional institutions ... to serve rural communities ... It is accepted that Black people in the Republic of South Africa also have expectations beyond local authorities level ... The meaningful satisfaction of those expectations is undoubtedly one of the most important constitutional challenges we face at present.(80)

The dilemma facing the government in its quest for a workable solution to the problems presented by the permanent presence of great numbers of Blacks in the white area is that, on the one hand, it recognises that it has to take the initiative and find solutions acceptable to the Blacks, and on the other hand, it considers it its duty to preserve white control over South Africa. In his speech, Koornhof pointed out the direction in which the government intends moving for finding this solution.

The first point is that the government has irreversibly decided that in some form or another the Blacks living in the white area will be part of any further constitutional development in South Africa so that they will have a say in the decision-making process, at least in those aspects of South African policy which affect them. Here we have both one of the greatest changes in government policy and the first safety net for its

tightrope exercises. In fact, one could safely argue that there are no aspects of South African policy that do not affect the Blacks. However, the government's view is bound to be different and the scope of the eventual black participation in the decision-making process will be hard fought over. It is safe to assume that this participation will be quite restricted to begin with, and that it might be slowly expanded as the progress in other fields of the government's policy (such as further homelands opting for independence and successful developments in the co-option of Coloureds and Indians) allow or as the circumstances require.

The second point is that independence for all the homelands, and thus the loss of South African citizenship for the Blacks and the consequent elimination of their claim to direct voting rights for the South African Parliament, is still the main aim of the government. Therefore, it will be difficult that the envisaged participation of the Blacks in the decision-making process could be on the basis of a more or less equal participation in the political life of the Republic of South Africa. The Blacks living in the white area will probably end with having a say in political decision-making; however, not in that they are regarded as fellow countrymen in the Republic, but in that they happen to live therein, irrespective of their citizenship. This means that their participation may become reality only through a separate place in the eventual constellation of states and not as an integral component of the Republic of South Africa. Although such a solution would not be easily accepted by many Blacks, it seems to me that it can be considered as a last line of defence on which the government will hold unguibus et rostris. This solution would allow the government to accommodate at least some of the Blacks' claims while at the same time preserving an almost absolute control on the Republic. A change from this position would mean relinquishing white control over the country and might be contemplated by the government only under extreme duress, and, in this case, it would probably be rejected in favour of a drastically partitionist line.

A third interesting point is the refernce to the inclusion of 'rural communities' in a structure at regional level co-ordinating black local authorities. The Blacks living in the white areas have been almost completely ignored in political terms not only by the government, which considered them perfectly assimilable in the homelands' political structure, but also by white opposition parties, which tended to accept

the government's point of view or to concentrate on the urban Blacks, and by the black opposition, which also found the urban areas a more promising ground for political activity.

The decision to take those Blacks into political consideration appears a logical consequence of the government's main decision: after all, after having accepted that the urban Blacks have a rightful claim to participation in decision-making processes, it would be difficult to explain why the Blacks living in the white rural areas should not be entitled to a similar treatment. But South African politics are not always logical, particularly if the logical consequence clashes with the overriding requirement of preservation of white control.

Considering that the rural Blacks in the white area are almost as numerous as the urban Blacks, the decision to involve those rural Blacks means a doubling of the number of people for whom a political accommodation must be found. While Whites, Coloureds and Indians are more numerous than the urban Blacks and might remain so for some time, they are hopelessly outnumbered by the Blacks living in the white area, urban and rural. This constatation strengthens the case for supposing that the participation of the Blacks in the decision-making process would take place within a framework separate from that of Whites, Coloureds and Indians.

Koornhof's speech did not spell out any particular of the proposed structure which would accommodate black political aspirations. This is probably because at the time these particulars were not known even to the government itself: the whole affair was at the stage in which vague ideas are circulated within the circle of top level decision makers in the hope that these would coalesce into a workable proposition.

It is thus too early to make any prediction on the outcome of this effort. The only firm points which have emerged up to now are two. The first is that the government accepts that "Black people in the Republic of South Africa also have expectations beyond local authorities level" and that "the meaningful satisfaction of those expectations" is one of the long term objectives of the government's present policy. The second point is that "the granting of a say in decision-making processes may not endanger the overall security and stability".(81)

The government intention is to move slowly and cautiously towards the creation of a structure able to accommodate the political aspirations of the Blacks living in the Republic of South Africa. Cautiousness is

dictated by the desire to preserve stability in South Africa and to contrive black participation in such a way that the final control of the most important political decision-making would remain in the hands of the National Party (i.e., in the hands of the Afrikaners). Slowness is dictated by the necessity of assuring the constant support of the majority of the Afrikaners for the government's policy. At the moment the right-wing backlash to the government's reforms has been successfully parried. However, for the first time since disgruntled extremist Afrikaners started rebelling to the 'progressive' moves of the National Party government, a relatively strong party has been able to establish itself on the right of the National Party, to act as a magnet for the right-wing protest. Afrikanerdom, on whose unity so many successes of the National Party rested, is definitely split. This will make it easier for people dissatisfied with the government's policy to leave the National Party. Until the government is as successful as it is now in the first half of 1984, the right-wing threat can be ignored, but if the government loses its momentum, or the general situation worsens, or if some of Botha's fireworks misfire, such a threat will grow again. And few aspects of the government's policy are more conducive to a possible right-wing backlash than its plan to allow the Blacks living in the white area to have a say in the decision-making process.

However, this fear to move too fast lest frightened Afrikaners flock to the Conservative Party is balanced by other factors, internal and external, which push the government towards a more daring approach to the question. One of these factors is the bad experience of the late 1970s. After Soweto, the government has been for a long time on the strategic defensive. Time and again it had to bend to internal or external pressures, to react, sometimes anxiously, to events outside its control or over which it was unable to exert enough control. There were moments in which it appeared that the government was unable to do much beyond holding on and trying to weather the storm. It was a dangerous and uncomfortable situation from which P.W. Botha has been able to get out also because changes in factors outside his control (such as the election of Reagan as President of the United States) created a general situation more favourable to South African than it was at the end of the 1970s. The experience was, however, quite disagreeable, and the government appears decided not to find itself in such a situation again. P. Koornhof expressed this attitude when he said:

> (we are) seeking anxiously to develop constitutional structures to accommodate Black aspirations also at national level ... (this) work ... must be pursued with a view to achieving results as soon as possible ... the improved quality of life that derives from economic and social development inevitably leads to greater political awareness, and in order to accommodate the political demands that will arise from that it will be necessary to continue unceasingly to create constitutional structures, where it is politically feasible to do so. A situation in which it is necessary to take action on a reactive basis under pressure as far as constitutional affairs are concerned, ought to be avoided as far as possible.(82)

The government feels that it has been pushed around in the late 1970s, or at least that it was in the condition of being pushed around. It found this uncomfortable and dangerous. Now that it has retaken the strategic initiative, a feat of which few would have credited it of being able to accomplish so thoroughly, it cannot slow down lest it lose the initiative again. It is necessary for it to keep its many internal and external adversaries out of balance and divided. The only possibility it has to achieve this is by making reforms that must be attractive to at least a significant part of the group to which they are addressed. It is not possible to foresee which shape these reforms will have. Most certainly they will fall short of anything which would remove the final control of the most important decisions from the hands of the Whites, but it is equally certain that the South Africa which will emerge from that will be very different from Malan's or even Vorster's South Africa.

8.2 Territorial consolidation

The land issue is certainly one of the most contentious issues in the relations between South Africa and the homelands. Also on this topic the attitude of the South African government has been, and is, pragmatic (always within the limits of its ideology). The determination with which a solution to this problam is pursued is directly correlated with the general situation, with the advantages the South African government expects from each move and with the reactions it fears each move may elicit from affected white interests. This explains the frequent changes that the priority of territorial consolidation underwent in the

course of the years. On the background of this continuously changing assessment of the relative importance of territorial consolidation for the South African government (of which more will be said later) some generally constant attitudes can be noticed.

Every homeland since it was granted self-government has insisted on proper consolidation, to be achieved by transfer of South African territory. These requests fell on deaf ears. For a very long period the position of the South African government was that the amount of land destined for black occupation had been decided in 1936. The government had the 'moral duty' to fulfil 'the White man's promise to the Bantu' in regard to the land set apart by the Natives' Trust and Land Act of 1936, but once this had been given to the Blacks the government would not feel it had any obligation as far as the land issue was concerned.

After the decision was taken to consider the black areas as embryonic states that would become independent sometime in the future, it became clear that a remedy had to be found for the fact that the reserves were scattered across half of South Africa and that in such a state they would make very sorry independent states indeed. The need of a territorial consolidation of the black areas was evident, and also evident was that "an enormous task ... awaits us in giving final geographic shape to the separate Bantu homelands" and that in this regard "a great deal remains to be done".(83)

According to the government, this final and consolidated geographic shape was to be attained within the limits of the 1936 legislation. The most outlying of the reserves, which obviously could not be consolidated even using to the full the limited amount of land earmarked for black occupation, would be classified as 'black spots' or as 'badly situated black areas' and exchanged with equivalent land adjacent to bigger chunks of black land. Even within these limits the process of 'shaping' the homelands was to be a lengthy one. The main reason for the slowness of the implementation of the government's policy even within the limits of the 1936 legislation was the financial aspect: the residual 'quota land' and the 'compensatory land' to be acquired would require a sizeable financial effort, and this effort would increase with the passing of the years because of the gradual appreciation of land values. The financial problem was compounded by the reluctance of the government and Parliament to earmark considerable amounts of money for this task. This reluctance was - and is - clearly due to the absence of any political

constituency which could exert pressure in favour of a speedy transfer of land to the Blacks. The interests represented in the government or able to influence its decisions are many, but for all of them the cession of land to the Blacks was at the bottom of their interests, unless they were actively opposed to it. Therefore, whenever it was necessary to save money out of government spending or to use government resources for a new activity, the funds for acquisition of land by the SABT were the first to go. The only people who were really interested in the implementation of the 1936 Land Act were the Blacks living in the homelands, and they were unable to exert any kind of pressure on the government. Other problems were caused by the attitude of the white farmers living in the areas set aside for black occupation. Often those farmers were unwilling to leave their land and had to be prudently convinced to sell, without causing a backlash in the farming community which was one of the strongpoints of the National Party. Also the Blacks living in the 'black spots' had to be convinced to leave their land, and this too was time- and money-consuming, although requiring less caution.(84)

When the government first began to talk about territorial consolidation, it was in order to implement Verwoerd's policy aimed at giving independence to the homelands. However, it soon appeared evident that the degree of territorial consolidation practically obtainable would fall short of a total consolidation of each homeland in a single block. Therefore, at the end of the 1960s - beginning of the 1970s, when the pressure on the government was at its lowest, the amount of land acquired in terms of the 1936 legislation was limited and the importance of territorial consolidation itself for the successful outcome of the policy of separate development was downgraded:

> Consolidation cannot be absolute. Therefore it is not an absolute condition either ... there are many states which do not have consolidated land ... It is, however, our aim to have the largest possible measure of consolidation.(85)

The difficulty of the task of arriving at some degree of territorial consolidation of the homelands was enhanced by the government decision of not going beyond the 1936 legislation.(86) Since the 1936 Land Act was enacted when to all practical effects nobody thought that the Native reserves might become independent, the allocation of land provided for

in it was not geared to create the territorial basis of independent states. Sticking to that act in the process of giving land to perspective independent states clearly made any meaningful territorial consolidation impossible. This was, however, the position of Vorster's government, and even when his foreign policy offensive required that a new impulse should be given to separate development (See 4.3) and more attention to the homelands, the 1936 Land Act was the impassable limit in any discussion about land transfers: "I have told them (the homeland leaders) that we shall give them the land which the 1936 Act states they should have. Beyond the 1936 Act I am not prepared to go".(87) However, the foreign policy offensive required that progress had to be made in the homelands policy, and the land question was already one of the major issues of contention between the South African government and the homeland leaders. Territorial consolidation became again a major topic of government interest and the 1973-1975 consolidation proposals were the result of this attention (See 3.2.3). No homeland leader was satisfied with these proposals, but the government was, or at least, although considering them not completely satisfactory, it regarded them as the best which could be accomplished within the impassable limits of the 1936 legislation. Of course, the fact that the 1936 Act was considered immutable was a convenient excuse for avoiding the real problem of consolidation: the fact that the land earmarked by that Act was insufficient for the establishment of viable independent states and that nobody in the government was prepared to consider an extension of that land. After all, the 1936 Act, which had established the extent of land to be given to the Blacks province by province, was simply an act of Parliament not an act of God. The Parliament could amend or repeal it whenever there was the political will to do that. Therefore, to use the 1936 Land Act as the reason for which the government was unable to obtain a proper consolidation of the homelands was rather disingenuous.

The government's determination to stick to these limits and the opposite determination of the homeland leaders not to take independence into consideration unless more land was granted to them, apparently posed a stumbling block on the path of future developments in the homelands policy. On the contrary, an important development took place the same year with Matanzima's decision to opt for independence. As far as the land issue is concerned, this decision again underlined the limited leverage of the homeland leaders towards the South African

government. But the negotiations following this decision also pointed out that, thanks to the fact that the 1975 proposals could not yet have been implemented and to the fact that in these proposals a certain amount of quota land was kept as reserve land for eventual rounding off, the government had left itself enough room of manoeuvre to make limited concessions to those homeland leaders who were prepared to opt for independence, while at the same time respecting the self-imposed 1936 limits.

8.2.1 Territorial gains in the independence negotiations

Despite the limited capability of the homeland leaders to influence the decisions of the South African government, and the decision of the South African government not to go beyond the 1936 Land Act, the first homelands to become independent were able to extract some concession on the land issue. One of the reasons for which the government could make these concessions was that a limited amount of land (61 100 ha.)[88] had been kept as a reserve in the 1975 proposals to be used in such cases. But this was really a limited extension of land and was not sufficient for making substantial concessions.

Although the 1975 proposals were considered final, the howls of protest they elicited from the homeland leaders convinced the government that they could be improved. The decision to respect the limits of the quota land provided for black occupation in 1936, however, left the government with only one alternative to the straightforward implementation of the 1975 final consolidation proposals. This alternative was the exchange of land. If the homeland governments were not happy with the way the consolidation proposals left their homelands unconsolidated, they might come forward with proposals of their own for exchanging some outlying pieces of their territory with white land adjacent to the bulk of their territory: "There can be further negotiation between Government and Government to exchange land ... at any time."[89] The borders of each homeland were still open to negotiation (and thus the 'finality' of the 1975 proposals was discarded already at the beginning of 1976), what was unchangeable was the quota of land provided by the 1936 legislation. This was not acceptable to the homeland leaders who would have become responsible for the decision of uprooting and

resettling thousands of their people. Therefore exchange of land was never seriously taken into consideration by them as a means of obtaining greater consolidation of their homeland.

Apparently therefore, any greater consolidation than that provided for in the 1975 proposals was impossible. Indeed, in the following years when Transkei and Bophuthatswana became independent, the 1975 proposals were the basis of the allottment of land to them. However, the land given to them when they became independent was not quite that earmarked in the 1975 consolidation proposals. Both Matanzima and Mangope realised that the time when they enjoyed maximum leverage toward the South African government was the period before independence, when they had accepted independence in principle, thus giving the South African government the incentive to show generosity, but when all the problems were still being thrashed out at the negotiating table and the threat to go back on the decision of accepting independence could still have credibility. Even in this condition they obtained little, and indeed, as far as consolidation per se is concerned, they ended up in a worse situation. However, this worse situation was due to the fact that they managed to keep under their control some pieces of land already earmarked for excision from the homeland or to take under their control some other piece of land originally intended for other homelands. In the end, they did obtain more land, and this must be scored as a success for them, even if the extra land thus obtained was not immediately transferred to the independent state and, indeed, much of it had still to be transferred at mid 1984.

a) Transkei

Matanzima's land claims can be divided into two categories: those referring to a Greater Xhosaland and those referring to a territorial enlargement of Transkei proper. Obviously, the land claimed for the former included all the land claimed for the latter. A Greater Xhosaland has been for a long time one of the dreams of Matanzima. This Greater Xhosaland should result from the unification of the two Xhosa-speaking homelands and the white area lying between them. Such a country would extend from the Mzimkulu River in the north to the Great Fish River in the south and from the Stormberg and Drakensberg mountains in the west to the Indian Ocean in the east.

Although Matanzima had on various occasions expressed his hope that a Greater Xhosaland might one day come into existence, it was obvious also to him that the South African government would consider his request of the whole territory comprising the Greater Xhosaland little more than a joke. Indeed, the official land claims of the Transkeian government were always limited to a number of districts adjoining the main body of the Transkeian territories. However, informal soundings were made at least in regard to a possible unification of the two Xhosa-speaking homelands (under Transkeian leadership). The South African government's answer was that this was a matter to be solved by negotiations between the two homeland governments and that it was prepared to accept the outcome of these negotiations whatever it would be. The South African government would maintain a neutral stance and would neither press the Ciskeian government to accept the merger nor oppose it if the Ciskeian government accepted it. This neutral stance of the South African government was tantamount to a refusal since it was obvious that Sebe would not accept to stand aside and let Matanzima have his Greater Xhosaland. However, two facts tend to indicate that both leaders felt that the permanence of two Xhosa-speaking homelands was not a foregone conclusion. The first is, on Sebe's part, his sudden discovery of Ciskeian nationalism in the mid-1970s, and the great care he dedicated to the building and fostering of a purely Ciskeian nationalism among the Ciskeians and his insistence on all the historical factors which could help to differentiate the Ciskeian population from the Transkeian one. Evidently he felt that this was necessary to counteract the possible attractiveness of a united Xhosa homeland in order to have the support of the Ciskeians in his opposition to Matanzima's 'anschluss' moves. The other fact is the angry reaction of Matanzima to the announcement that the South African government would grant independence to Ciskei, and his almost sulking attitude in the following months when he threatened not to sit at any table where independent Ciskei was represented. Although Matanzima is inclined, sometimes, to act with seeming rashness, he is shrewd enough a politician to know what is possible and what is not. His reaction induces one to think that in 1980 he was convinced that a Greater Xhosaland was still a possibility. However, even if he was convinced of the feasibility of Greater Xhosaland, this was considered, and perhaps still is, as a long term perspective. The territorial claims of Transkei were made with the

more immediate objective of increasing the extension of Transkei to the limits that the Transkeian government considered as its just borders.

The Transkeian government started to claim more land practically since the day of its establishment, as all the other homeland governments did. After a period of general claims for more land, made with the aim of creating the basis for a Greater Xhosaland, the Transkeian government's appetite focused on a number of districts adjacent to Transkei. These were the districts of Elliot, Maclear, Matatiele and Port St. John's, to which were added, on different occasions and in different composition, the district of Mt. Currie and those parts of Natal and KwaZulu situated south of the Mzimkulu River.(90) The usual answer of the South African government to these requests was that "the representation cannot be favourably considered". The main point raised by it to explain its refusal was that it was not possible to go beyond the 1936 Land Act. However, since not all the land earmarked for black occupation in terms of that legislation had already been assigned to a particular homeland, there was scope for some cession of land to Transkei.

In the early 1970s the Select Committee on Bantu Affairs worked on the issue of territorial consolidation of the homelands, and the results of this work were a number of reports, discussed in Parliament in 1973 and 1975, which gave the 'final' word of the government in regard to territorial consolidation.(91) In terms of these proposals, Transkei would receive the district of Port St. John's and various pieces of farming land in the districts of Elliot, Maclear, Matatiele and Mt. Currie.(92) Although the extension of the land which was to be thus ceded to Transkei was more than 100 000 ha., this fell short of the Transkeian requests.

During the negotiations preceding independence the Transkeian government again asked for more land, in particular the districts of Elliot, Maclear and the two districts forming East Griqualand (Matatiele and Mt. Currie). Again these requests were refused, but the South African government became convinced that an enlargement of Transkei was necessary for paving the way to its independence.

The solution the South African government found to its problem of giving more land to Transkei without exceeding the 1936 quota when almost all this quota had already been assigned was simply to transfer to Transkei two districts belonging to Ciskei. The two districts in question were the districts of Herschel and Glen Grey, two separate and relatively big pieces of black land to the north east of the main body

of Ciskei. The Herschel district, situated at the border with Lesotho and with the Orange Free State, is inhabitated mainly by Sotho tribes, while the Glen Grey district, now constituting the westernmost district of the main block of Transkei, is inhabitated mainly by Emigrant Thembu, whose Paramount Chief is Matanzima.

It appears that neither of these two districts had ever been officially claimed by Transkei (which is strange, at least in the case of Glen Grey, considering the tribal affiliation of its people), but clearly some soundings in this regard must have been made. Indeed, in 1971, in both these two districts a referendum was held in which the local population was asked if the districts were to be transferred to Transkei or to remain part of Ciskei. The referendum was a blow to Matanzima's image since more than four fifths of the voters in both districts were in favour of remaining part of Ciskei.(93) However, despite the clear indication that the local population did not want the annexation to Transkei, the South African government decided that these two districts were the territorial price to be paid for the independence of Transkei. In 1975 Ciskei agreed to cede them to South Africa in exchange for more land around the southern blocks of its territory in order to achieve proper consolidation in one single block. South Africa, in its turn, gave the two districts to Transkei. A sizeable part of the population left these districts not wanting to live under Matanzima's rule and ended in miserable resettlement camps in Ciskei. This was a heavy human price to be paid for the independence of Transkei, but since those who paid it were neither white South Africans nor Transkeians, both South Africa and Transkei were content with the result. The South African government saw the first of its homelands opting for independence, certainly helped along this path by that parting gift, and Matanzima gained more than 5 000 square km. of land which increased the territory of Transkei by about 14%. (See Map 1)

b) Bophuthatswana

In regard to territory and territorial consolidation, Bophuthatswana is in a far worse situation than Transkei; indeed, of all the homelands only KwaZulu is worse off than it. In the early 1970s Bophuthatswana consisted of eight relatively big blocks and eleven smaller blocks or black spots, extending from the Northern Cape (to the north west of

Kuruman) to Central Transvaal (to the north east of Pretoria) with the enclave of Thaba 'Nchu in the Orange Free State, and covering an extension few hectares short of 38 000 square km.

The territorial aspirations of the Bophuthatswana government were directed at the consolidation of the homeland in one single block covering the north eastern Cape and the north western Transvaal (retaining Thaba 'Nchu as an enclave in the Orange Free State). Given the great distance between the scattered blocks of Bophuthatswana, the territory claimed by its government was large indeed. The whole area lying between the scattered blocks was claimed with the towns of Kuruman, Vryburg, Delareyville, Mafeking, Lichtenburg, Zeerust, Swartruggens, Rustenburg and Brits and great part of their districts.(94) There was, of course, no chance that the South African government could seriously take into consideration such claims.

Although Mangope, too, did not think that his claims could be accepted, he hoped that when the South African government talked about consolidation it meant it. Thus, when the 1975 consolidation proposals were published the Bophuthatswana government was shocked. According to these proposals, Bophuthatswana was to be 'consolidated' into six blocks covering less than 40 500 sq. km., and this consolidation was to be achieved mainly with the excision from the homeland of all the minor blocks and black spots and of the whole Morotele 2 district (the easternmost of the original eight blocks).

Although the solution to the problem of territorial consolidation was totally unsatisfactory for Bophuthatswana, Mangope decided to opt for independence. During the independence negotiations the land issue was again one of the most contentious points of disagreement. This time, however, Mangope had no delusion about consolidation, and his efforts aimed at avoiding the excision of land from Bophuthatswana in order to avoid being saddled with the forced resettlement of tens of thousands of people. His efforts were complicated by the inability of the South African government to go beyond the 1936 legislation and by its decision that, as a result of this, the only modifications of borders that were possible were those due to exchange of land within the limits of the total area which had been allocated to Bophuthatswana in the 1975 consolidation proposals. In these conditions Mangope had to fight almost for every inch of land, and almost every piece of land whose excision was avoided had to be paid for with the renunciation of some piece of land

which had been earmarked in the 1975 proposals for transfer to Bophuthatswana.

In the end, the South African government accepted to waive the excision of some of the areas which according to the 1975 proposals should have reverted to South Africa in exchange for Bophuthatswana's renunciation of some of the areas earmarked for cession to it. In announcing to Parliament that "as a result of negotiations with Bophuthatswana, we have now decided not to excise some of these sections (those for whose excision from Bophuthatswana authorisation was granted by Parliament in 1975) any more", M.C. Botha also said that as a result of these negotiations the territory of Bophuthatswana would be greater than it was envisaged by the 1975 proposals.(95) Bophuthatswana retained two relatively big areas in the districts of Ganyesa and Tlhaping-Tlharo (the westernmost block), few other small areas in the central block and great part of Morotele 2 district. (The parts of this district which were actually excised were inhabitated mostly by Ndebeles and formed the core of the newly constituted KwaNdebele.) In exchange, it renounced to some small and not so small areas adjacent to the districts of Tlhaping-Tlharo, Taung, Disotobola, Mankwe, Odi 1 and Morotele 1. At the time of independence, however, almost no land had been added to Bophuthatswana, and only in 1978, by the Bophuthatswana Extension Act (No. 8 of 1978) some parts were. Most of the land added in 1978 included those areas which according to the 1973-75 proposals were to be excised from Bophuthatswana. These areas, in particular the Morotele 2 district, had always remained under the administration of Bophuthatswana, but were not included in the schedule of the Status of Bophuthatswana Act, by which South Africa relinquished its sovereignty over the land that formed Bophuthatswana. (See Maps 2 and 3)

It was very little to show for the long and hard negotiations Mangope held with the South African government, but at least it was something, and it made unnecessary the resettlement of many tens of thousands of people who were living in the areas thus retained. It was also important because the South African government was induced to give Bophuthatswana more land than it planned in the 1975 proposals. It is true that in those proposals a small portion of quota land was kept as a reserve just in case such rounding off became necessary. However, the small extension of land kept in reserve in the Cape Province

(18 000 ha.) and in the Transvaal (22 000 ha.) had been used up, if not already exceeded, and any further rounding off of other homelands would require the abandonment of the 1936 legislation.

c) Venda

As in the case of all the other homelands, also the Venda government claimed large areas since its establishment. The areas claimed by it included large tracts of the Messina and Soutpansberg districts with the towns of Messina and Louis Trichardt to the west of Venda plus other areas to the south west of the homeland, including areas belonging to Gazankulu and Lebowa as well as to South Africa, up to include the town of Pietersburg.(96) Such claims had even less probability of being accepted than those made by Transkei and Bophuthatswana.

In the early 1970s Venda was composed of one big block to the east of the main line to Messina, extending from the Limpopo to the Middle Letaba and from the borders of the Kruger Park to the vicinity of Louis Trichardt, plus two smaller blocks, one to the west of Louis Trichardt and the other south of the main block and north west of Soekmekaar, covering a total areas of about 6 181 sq. km.. The 1973-75 consolidation proposals provided for increasing the total area of Venda by about 500 sq. km.(97) The block of land to the west of Louis Trichardt was to be excised from Venda(98) together with an almost uninhabitated strip of land five kilometres wide along the banks of the Limpopo (to isolate Venda from Rhodesia), and a few farms whose borders projected out from the main block. In exchange for these excisions, a large piece of land at the north west borders of the homeland and a few farms all around would be added to the main block of Venda and another large piece of land would be added to the remaining smaller block to the south. In this way, Venda would be 'consolidated' in two blocks covering an extension of about 6 680 sq. km. (See Map 4)

When Mphephu decided to opt for independence the land question was again one of the most important topics of the negotiations. The result of these negotiations was that in exchange for Venda's renunciation of part of the area along its north west border earmarked for it in the 1975 proposals, all the small areas protruding from the main block which were earmarked for excision would remain Venda's. Furthermore, the two blocks that constituted the 'consolidated' Venda according to the 1975 proposals would be linked by a narrow strip of land along the northern

boundary of the 'Elim finger' of Gazankulu. The third block of Venda, the Kutama and Senthimula area to the west of Louis Trichardt, although having been earmarked for excision was still under Venda control. By an agreement on the eve of independence, it was agreed that this area, although remaining scheduled for excision and thus not being included in the areas over which Venda received sovereignty, would continue to be administered by Venda for the time being, pending further examination of the matter.(99)

In this case too, very little was obtained by the homeland negotiators, but again the South African government agreed to the cession of more land than was scheduled in the 1975 proposals. This time the cession of land to Venda caused the total surface of the black areas (at least of the land scheduled to pass under black control) to exceed slightly the provision of the 1936 legislation. Although the practical effect of this was limited because the areas thus earmarked for cession to the independent states was not immediately given to them (and in 1984 most of these areas still had to be transferred), it was nonetheless significant.

This enlargement of the black areas beyond the limited established in 1936 did not happen by chance: the change in the South African government from the Primeministership of Vorster to that of P.W. Botha introduced a new and apparently more dynamic approach also to this aspect of interracial relations. For the first time, the 1936 Land Act, the taboo which had thwarted any attempt to meaningful consolidation of the homelands, was not regarded as an immutable proposition (as far as the extent of the black areas is concerned). Already during the first year of Botha's tenure a commission was appointed to propose new solutions to the consolidation issue. The more open approach to the land question of the new South African leadership, however, met with strong resistance from the white communities involved, and much of the commission work remains as an enunciation of good intentions, without practical effects.

8.2.2 The Primeministership of P.W. Botha and a new approach to the land question

Even if the practical results of the new course regarding the land issue have been up to now limited, the importance of this change must not be underestimated.

The position of the Vorster government was that although

> It is ideal to leave one piece of land for these people as their eventual territory ... various physical factors ... made anything of this kind entirely impossible. The first was the issue of finances. The cost involved ran to vast sums of money ... it could have landed us in financial difficulties ... (if) ... an attempt had been made to consolidate ... in this way so that each separate government could have one separate territory. Furthermore the resettlement of people in their thousands would have resulted in inconvenience on a vast scale. One of the most important ... factors ... was the issue of the quota land provided by the 1936 legislation. Even though we had had the finance and even though we had been able to carry out the necessary resettlement of people, the quota land would still have remained ... and the matter could only have been negotiated by mutual exchange of land.(100)

(from which it appears that the 1936 legislation was a greater physical obstacle than the financial availability and the problems of resettlement.) The government was unwilling to exceed the limits of the 1936 Land Act both because it was afraid of the reaction of the farmers, particularly those in the Transvaal and the Northern Cape, and because of the reluctance, in principle, to give away land to the Blacks. How strongly the land question was felt is proved by an earlier statement made by Vorster, who said that "if a homeland does not want to become independent as a result of the fact that I do not want to give it more land, then that is its affair".(101) Certainly, he knew that he could exert enough pressure to convince some of the homeland leaders to opt for independence even if their land claims were not met and their homelands were a patchwork of scattered pieces of land. But he could not be sure if this could happen in many cases or not even in one. Therefore he was prepared to risk the failure of, or at least, a long stalemate in the policy of separate development rather than give the homelands more land than it was provided for in 1936. It is true that in 1973 the South African government did not feel the urgent need for practical results from this policy, but one would think that in the middle of its push for detente with the African countries, it would be prepared to make concessions to the homeland leaders, since progress in the constitutional development of the homelands was its main weapon in this political offensive. Refusing to take into consideration any concession on the land issue when the homeland leaders were maintaining that they would not opt for independence unless more land was given to

them, meant at least jeopardizing the work of the last few years and the hope of a success in foreign policy.

Vorster realised that real consolidation would be a great incentive for the homeland leaders to opt for independence, but the only way he was prepared to consider in order to obtain a more meaningful consolidation than obtained in the 1975 proposals was through exchange of land within the limits of the 1936 legislation. He was prepared to give the homelands a considerable extent of white land but only if an equivalent extent of black land were given back to the Whites.(102) However, the homeland leaders often stated that this was not their interpretation of 'consolidation' and that they were unwilling to give away any part of their land, and face the problem of resettling all the people living on that land, in order to solve South Africa's problems about consolidation.

In these conditions the only ways to satisfy the desire for more land of those leaders who were inclined to opt for independence were either to give them land belonging to other homelands, as in the case of Transkei, or using the limited amount of land kept as a reserve in the 1975 proposals, as in the case of Bophuthatswana. However, both were short term expedients: the conditions of the three-cornered deal regarding Glen Grey and Herschel were unrepeatable, and the amount kept as a reserve was small and would rapidly be exhausted. The Vorster government was unable to find a constructive alternative, and immobilised itself in the strict observance of the 1936 taboo: "We stand by it ... that undertaking we shall honour in the minutest detail ... We cannot go any further than that".(103) Vorster wanted to see more homelands become independent, but not at the price of more white land: "the land question is not negotiable beyond the 1936 Agreement",(104) and that was the last word.

Indeed, it was the last word of the Vorster government. A few months later a new Prime Minister came to power and he had a different opinion on this as on many other topics. The first statement of P.W. Botha on the land question, that the 1936 Land Act was 'a step in the right direction', implied that the new government was considering a change of policy in this regard. The confirmation that the policy was changing arrived shortly thereafter with the establishment of the Central Consolidation Committee, and with the confirmation arrived also a clarification of the limits of this change:

> Although it is not Government policy to exceed the 1936 Land quota unnecessarily, the investigating team is not being limited in its recommendations to so recommend if it is found essential for the achievement of our aims.(105)

The Central Consolidation Committee started to work in earnest, and after his appointment as its chairman, H. van der Walt illustrated in broad outline its aims and said that the highest priority facing the country was the greatest possible meaningful consolidation of the homelands.(106) After that, at its first meeting, P.W. Botha made it clear that the government was prepared to go farther than the 1936 legislation,(107) the committee started to think about new ways to solve the problems of consolidation. The most apparent obstacle was the considerable expenditure that the government would incur in simply implementing the 1975 proposals. This expenditure would obviously increase noticeably if more land than was allocated by the 1936 Land Act was to be added to the homelands to consolidate them properly. To lessen the costs of massive consolidation one of the first recommendations of the committee was that white farmers in the areas to be transferred to the homelands be encouraged to remain on their farms. Two reasons were given to justify this recommendation. One was that since in that case it would not be necessary to buy the land, the cost for the South African taxpayer would be minimised. The other was that if the white farmers remained on the land, their expertise would remain at the disposal of the homelands and they would assure a sound management of the land, avoiding one of the most widespread drawbacks of the system in vigour, i.e., the rapid decrease of productivity and economic value of the land when it is transferred to the homelands. To give security to those white farmers who accepted to stay on their land, it was proposed that after the transfer of their land to the homelands, they would not have to surrender their South African citizenship and that the value of their land would be guaranteed by the South African government.(108)

The task of the committee was not an easy one and numerous problems had to be solved. The scope of the committee activity had to be extended because "when we speak of the consolidation of the Black areas, we are not only speaking of geographical lines that have to be drawn, but also of economic development that has to take place within the boundaries".(109) To spread the work load of the committee, four regional committees representing local interests were appointed to make representations to

the central committee concerning their areas. For the first time, representatives of the homelands were to take part directly in the works, and two representatives were to be nominated to serve in each regional committee by the homelands situated in the region concerned.(110)

The work of the Central Consolidation Committee and the regional committees, which was co-ordinated with the work of the Commission for Co-operation and Development, immediately aroused protest and opposition in all the quarters whose interests were affected by it. By the end of 1980, thirteen interim reports regarding territorial consolidation and related matters had been submitted to the government. Not one of these reports was released to the public(111) and some of them were referred back to the commission for further examination.(112) This was to be the fate of almost all the commission reports. By 1983 more than forty reports had been submitted to the government, many of them have been referred back for reconsideration, very few have been released to the public and only two or three have been approved by the government. Most of what is known of the works of the commission and committees is known from more or less authorised and authoritative leaks to the press. The reasons for this are that on the one hand, although the committees could not propose large additions of land, their recommendations were controversial enough to induce the government to keep them confidential; and on the other hand the government itself was not able to decide what it really wanted to do about land consolidation. While it was clear that the viability of the homelands and their attractiveness for the Blacks would be enhanced by a proper consolidation, it was also realised that to attain a proper consolidation much more land than the 1936 quota had to be given to them, and this would not include only farm land but also towns. If the usual procedure of buying out the white owners were to be followed, the financial costs would have been staggering and insurmountable. However, the financial aspect is not the most important, also because there is always the alternative suggested by the committee in 1979, i.e., to transfer the land leaving it to its owner.

The main problem was, of course, political and the government, still afflicted by the verligte-verkrampte tug of war, could not summon enough courage and political will to fight for adding three or four per cent of South African territory to the black areas. How controversial and politically dangerous could be to accept or even only to make public the commission's recommendations is proved by the story of its proposals for

the Ciskei, which became public knowledge at the beginning of 1981, the year in which Ciskei was to become independent. The commission proposed the addition to Ciskei of approximately 137 000 ha. of land[113] in which were included the 'industrial' area of Berlin and the town of King William's Town. The government neither accepted nor refused the recommendations, but decided to take its time in examining all their implications. Unfortunately for Ciskei, these proposals were made public in the period preceding the elections for Parliament. The reaction of the Whites concerned by these proposals - from farmers to townspeople, from PFP supporters to those of the HNP - was a howl of protests and the government was frightened by it. It started to say that these were only proposals and that the decisions would be taken only after having considered the opinion of the people concerned. Thus, the closer the elections approached the more numerous the recommendations were discarded. Sound reasons were found to keep one area after the other under white control, and in the end Ciskei had to be satisfied with the crumbs of the original proposals. (See Map 5)[114]

The hamfisted management of the affair of the consolidation proposals for Ciskei (hamfisted unless the aim of all the sectors of the government was to sink them), was the visible symptom of the lack of a clear idea on what to do about consolidation and of the hard fought rearguard battle of the verkrampte in the National Party, and in the government itself, in defence of the 1936 Land Act. This double obstacle to an innovative consolidation policy had already caused, in 1980, another of those usual shifts of stress on the various aspects of separate development which are the normal government answer to a confused or problematic situation.

The impression was given that, after the establishment of the Central Consolidation Committee, the policy on territorial consolidation had undergone a major redefinition. It was no longer a question of drawing lines on a map because the stress was now put on economic development. As in the mid-1960s, when internal resistance to the prospect of self-governing and independent black territories was particularly strong, the government covered its incapacity or reluctance to face evolutionary moves in the constitutional development of these territories by stressing the importance of economic development and the need of an improvement in this field before further steps could be taken in other fields.

This time the stress was put on the need for a harmonious economic development in the whole of South Africa, if not of the subcontinent,

and for inserting the policy for the development of the homelands in the new policy for regional development in South Africa and in the framework of the constellation of states. The establishment of a constellation of states might cause a redistribution of power at regional level. Then the whole South African economic structure would have to be re-examined on a regional basis and the need for territorial consolidation as a way of enhancing the viability of the homelands would lose importance.(115) The insistence on regional development and the concept of a constellation of states led to a proliferation of suggestions about the establishment of a system of co-property or multi-racial condominium between South Africa and the homelands over areas of economic interest adjoining the homelands (such as the Quail Commission proposal regarding East London and the 'white corridor'),(116) or at least of a sharing of existing South African facilities and infrastructures with the homelands (such as proposals reported to be under consideration of the Central Consolidation Committee to share, in an unspecified way, the infrastructures of East London with Ciskei and Transkei, or those of Richards Bay with KwaZulu).(117)

Also another aspect of the process of territorial consolidation appeared now to worry the government and to give it a justification for further slowing down the transfer of land. This was the fact that usually the land which was transferred to the homelands was badly used - from the economic point of view - and its value and productivity sharply decreased after the transfer. Therefore, the government decided that further land would be transferred to the homelands only if the government was satisfied that it would be used productively and on an economic basis. Considering that the homelands needed the land to settle a great number of traditional peasant-farmers, and that this land usually consisted of big farms under modern management, it meant almost stopping the land transfers. Furthermore, to realise how little progress had been made in the consolidation issue, it must be remembered that this land was nothing but that earmarked for transfer to the homelands in the 1975 proposals, i.e., it was still part of the quota set apart in the 1936 Land Act. Even the 'step in the right direction' was far from being finally taken.

The position of the government on the consolidation issue was explained at some length by P.W. Botha at the beginning of 1981:

> The land consolidation programme cannot be viewed in isolation. It must be seen as part of our overall plan for decentralization, for regional development and to assist in creating new growth points ... We should not simply continue to add land. We do have an undertaking in terms of the 1936 legislation, and we shall abide by the undertaking that the 1975 proposals will be implemented. All new land, apart from that which was agreed upon in the 1936 legislation, which can be added, or considered for addition, will not be added unless we receive guarantees on the question of private ownership ...
> ... We want to discharge our obligations in terms of the 1936 legislation, and where it is in the interest of South Africa and of the Black States concerned, we shall go further in certain respects and made adjustments ...
> ... It must be emphasized that there is a close relationship between the consolidation processes and the policy of establishing a confederation or constellation of States, based on the inter-dependence of States in Southern Africa.(118)

It then appeared that the government had definitively taken the decision to increase the amount of land to be given to the homelands beyond the 1936 limits, if it was necessary, and that to alleviate the costs of this cession the white owners would be encouraged to stay on their properties which the government would not buy.

This actual change of policy had already been experimented in 1980 with the cession of the town of Mafeking to Bophuthatswana. The decision that it was not necessary for the government to buy all the white properties before transferring a piece of land to the homelands, not only opened the way to an acceleration in the implementation of the 1975 proposals, but also to an important modification of the policy followed by the government up to that point in regard to consolidation, i.e., to the possibility of transferring to the homelands not only farm land but also towns with their infrastructures.

The opinions within the government, however, were not all in agreement. The realisation that the addition of a few tens of thousands of hectares here and there would not change the situation of the homelands, induced some to consider the task of consolidation as a hopeless enterprise which would drain away much needed resources almost uselessly:

> I think the time is past in South Africa to speak about consolidation in terms of merely drawing lines and borders. It is no longer possible. Geographic consolidation in South Africa is definitely not possible. If we wanted to carry out consolidation on a geographic basis, then we could possibly have succeeded forty years ago, but today it is no longer possible. If we think of geographic consolidation today, we must think of 3 million ha. plus ... which

> have to be added ... at a cost ... of R6 000 million over a period of ten years. Once one has done this, one has not increased the economic potential of the independent and national States by a half of a per cent. Therefore, the addition of land is not the answer.(119)

Perplexity about consolidation was not a monopoly of those who wanted to stress the need for economic development. The verkrampte were still alive and kicking in the government and were quick in appropriating the doubts about the effectiveness of consolidation to strengthen their opposition to any concession beyond the 1936 quota:

> When we intimated that we were prepared to have another look at the proposals of 1936, ... that was not to say that we were going to grant more land, but that we were going to reconsider the allocation of land on the basis of the question whether the consolidation of the national States was consonant with our striving for freedom and the striving for freedom of various Black peoples.(120)

At this point then, two different currents about consolidation can be individuated within the National Party and the government. One was the verkrampte's opinion that the 1936 division of land between Whites and Blacks was untouchable, that all that was necessary in regard to consolidation was the implementation of the 1975 proposals and this also without hurrying because there were more important ways of spending taxpayers' money than buying land for the Blacks, and that if some modification to the 1975 proposals was necessary, it could come only through exchange of land. The second was that of most of the verligte headed by P.W. Botha and P. Koornhof, who were prepared to go beyond the 1936 division of land in order to bring about a better consolidation of the homelands, but were reluctant to press for the implementation of their views because of the potential costs, economic and political, of such an implementation. Within this second current, however, a differentiation was taking place between those who regarded political and economic problems as temporary obstacles which, in the long term, could and would be surmounted when the circumstances allowed, and those who felt that a different interpretation of 'consolidation', if not a rejection of the concept, was becoming necessary. This latter group was that of those National Party politicians and experts who were working in the various committees concerned with consolidation. Most of them, after having started their work following the government guidelines about

the extension of the homelands beyond the 1936 limits and the 1975 proposals if it were necessary, and having seen almost all their suggestions and recommendations being rejected, realised that the material and political obstacles to a proper consolidation were almost insurmountable. Therefore, they tried to find alternative approaches to the question of the viability of the homelands, approaches which would not require a great effort as far as consolidation was concerned and which at times appeared to suggest the relinquishment of some aspects of separate development:

> Land alone is not the answer. Economic development is the answer, and economic development that is not necessarily based on the policy of separate development, because one thing is as plain as pikestaff and that is that there cannot be nine or ten economies in Southern Africa.(121)

No wonder that in such a situation the consolidation issue remained at a standstill and even the implementation of the 1975 proposals was still in its initial phase.

The situation became a little clearer in 1982, after the split in the National Party and the formation of the Conservative Party. At least the continuous sniping of the verkrampte from within the government every time the latter tried to do something in regard to consolidation had ceased, and the government could at least consider exceeding the 1936 limits without having to backtrack on its decisions for fear of causing a split in the party and Afrikanerdom.

Despite the fact that in the three years after P.W. Botha became Prine Minister the government was not able to take a definite decision about consolidation and in which cases to exceed the 1936 limits, the pattern followed by the acquisition of land, both black and white, for the implementation of the 1975 proposals had unwittingly, or perhaps wittingly, created a situation in which de facto the 1936 limits were continuously exceeded. As a member of the Conservative Party complained:

> ... the first guide-line ... was that the 1975 proposals ... had to be ... implemented as quickly as possible. These proposals involved, inter alia, the declaration of certain poorly-situated Black areas to be White areas. It is now 1982 and I do not know of a single poorly-situated Black area in my region which has finally been declared to be White.(122)

Therefore, while in the government the verligte were trying to have an official endorsement to exceed the limits of the 1936 Land Act, and for one reason or the other could not succeed in their attempts, these limits had already been exceeded by 170 000 ha. in the Transvaal and by 59 000 ha. in Natal (end 1982).(123)

The reason for this was that the acquisition of land for the Blacks had continued to go on at the same speed as in the mid-1970s, the process of turning 'black spots' and 'badly situated Black areas' into white areas had been much slower. It is difficult to say if this was the result of a precise policy, or if it happened almost by chance, or if it was due to a newly acquired sensitivity on the part of the government to the protests that the excision of each 'black spot' and the consequent resettlement of the people living therein aroused.

At any rate, even the 1975 consolidation proposals were far from being implemented and the whole issue of consolidation was in such a fluid state that even the people who had suggested putting the stress on economic development rather than on consolidation were compelled to ask for a speedy implementation of the 1975 proposals in order to have some sort of basis to build on:

> We cannot undertake the planning and the development of the Black States properly if we do not know where the boundaries are. We must therefore complete consolidation ... I ask ... a specific fund so that we shall know we have R500 million or R600 million annually with which we can undertake this matter.(124)

R500 million or more annually was a considerable amount, and the government had to give its attention to more impellent issues such as the split in the ranks of the National Party and the question of the constitutional reform, and the consolidation issue faded into the background of the political scene. Nevertheless it is difficult to avoid the sensation of confusion and lack of direction in examining the statements of the government side on this matter.

The government was positive that "the geographic consolidation and the arrangement of borders is of course a priority to give each of the Black national states meaningful content with regard to their political future".(125) It was less clear if this consolidation should be based on the 1975 proposals, which had already been considered partially inadequate at the beginning of the Botha Primeministership, or if and in which measure these proposals should be exceeded. Even the man who

was most involved in trying to find a solution to this question, H.J.D. van der Walt, was at times unable to disentangle himself from the confusion:

> If we want to consolidate properly, we shall have to exceed the quota ... At the end of 1982, the quota had already been exceeded ... The fact is that the land acquisition programme had been proceeding extremely rapidly since 1973, while the process of turning the Black spots or badly situated areas into White areas has not been proceeding at the same pace. Therefore the situation could not be rectified ... We have decided that if we do not remove badly situated Black areas or Black spots, the compensatory land that has already been bought for them will have to be returned ... So the quota was only exceeded in the book entry. (126)

It is true that the Commission for Co-operation and Development continued to work on the various aspects of consolidation and to make suggestions about the way to bring it about, but almost all its recommendations met the fate of those relating to Venda: "the Cabinet ... did not accept a single recommendation of the commission relating to Venda."(127)

Although it had been decided that if black areas earmarked for excision were not excised the compensatory land would be retained under white control, thus bringing everything again within the 1936 limits, it appeared that the government was prepared to contradict itself if this could lead to some precise objective:

> Let me take KwaNdebele as an example. If we are going to exceed the Transvaal quota in order to make KwaNdebele independent, then I say that we can exceed the quota to do that ... If I say that we are going to exceed the quota for Bophuthatswana, then we shall exceed it for the purpose of promoting constitutional development in the form of our confederation idea. (128)

The trickiness of the land question had bogged down Botha's aspirations to innovation. After four years as Prime Minister he has been unable or unwilling to set clear directives to put into practice the innovations he implied when he said that the 1936 Land Act was a step in the right direction. In 1983 this step in the right direction had yet to be totally implemented and further steps were almost completely dismissed as impossible:

> The Government regards its obligations in terms of the 1936 legislation as having been met as soon as the acquisition in terms of the 1975 consolidation proposals have been made ... I personally regard any additional land ... as bonus land which is allocated to

> the Blacks ... I can guarantee ... that if the essence of my commission's proposals is accepted, more than 60% of all the Black people will be living in the Black States ... None of us ... could bring about consolidation today in the way in which it was done in the past ... we used the word 'consolidation' when we were working with the 1936 quota. Thenceforth we should rather talk about 'border adjustments' ... (nobody) could bring about more geographical consolidation. It is simply no longer possible in South Africa.(129)

Indeed, as far as territorial consolidation is concerned, the practical results of the first four years of the Botha government have been scarce and, from the point of view of the homelands, disappointing. The 1975 consolidation proposals have still to be implemented in great part, and it means that part of the land promised to the Blacks in 1936 is still in white hands. The decision to opt for independence has given the TBVC countries only a slight advantage over the other homelands in this field. Also in their case not all the land earmarked for them in the 1975 proposals has been transferred. Most of the gains these countries obtained in negotiating independence regarded land earmarked for excision which they have been able to retain only by renouncing other land which would otherwise have been given to them.

Of the three homelands which opted for independence before P.W. Botha became Prime Minister, Transkei and Venda were promised extra land beyond the limits of the 1975 proposals. Transkei was promised the districts of Glen Grey and Herschel, and it duly received them a short time before independence. However, it is safe to say that the prompt fulfilment of the promise to Transkei was much facilitated by the fact that the land concerned was already black land, only belonging to Ciskei. Indeed, in the case of Venda, where the extra land promised was white land, the only step made towards the fulfilment of the promise is the insertion of that land in the schedule of the Borders of Particular States Extension Act (No. 2 of 1980) as land which the State President may determine by proclamation that shall "cease to be a part of the Republic of South Africa and become a part of the sovereign and independent state mentioned". In this regard, therefore, the Act is nothing but the insertion in the statute book of the independence agreement signed with Venda.

In reality, this Act, which was the first move of Botha's government on the issue of cession of land to the independent states, in its original form was merely the unification in a single document inserted

in the statute book of the agreements entered into with the TBVC countries at the moment of their independence. The silver lining for the homelands is that this Act has been amended four times, and each time the amendment consisted of the addition of some land to the schedule without any excision therefrom.(130)

In relation to the amendments of this Act and its implementation, Transkei appears to be less favoured than the other black states. In the original Act, land was scheduled for transfer to Transkei in the districts of Mt.Currie, Elliot, Maclear, Indwe and Queenstown. This was the land that the 1975 proposals assigned to Transkei and had not yet transferred. Not one of the amendments provided for further land to be transferred to it. Of the land scheduled in the Act, all that situated in the district of Queenstown became part of Transkei on the 1st November 1982,(131) part of that situated in the district of Mt. Currie was transferred on the 1st October 1983(132) and part of that in the districts of Maclear and Indwe on the 1st January 1984.(133) (See Map 1)

The land earmarked for Bophuthatswana was in the districts of Vryburg, Taung, Kuruman and Mafeking in the Cape, and in the districts of Warmbaths, Brits, Rustenburg, Swartruggens, Marico, Delareyville, Thabazimbi and Mdutyana in the Transvaal. By the Laws on Co-operation and Development Second Amendment Act (No. 94 of 1980) the town of Mafeking with the surrounding land was added to this schedule, and further land was added to the districts of Taung and Brits by the Border of Particular States Extension Amendment Act (No. 25 of 1983). By the same Act, land in the districts of Bloemfontein was also added, and the Borders of Particular States Extension Second Amendment Act (No. 109 of 1983) added land in the district of Excelsior, including the town of Thaba 'Nchu. Of this land, the town of Mafeking with its surrounding land was transferred to Bophuthatswana on the 20th September 1980.(134) Further land was added on the 18th December 1981, in the districts of Taung and Thabazimbi,(135) and other land situated in the districts of Mafeking and Vryburg was transferred on the 1st January 1982.(136) Towards the end of 1983 there was a new round of land transfers to Bophuthatswana. On the 1st October, the town of Thaba 'Nchu was given to it,(137) and further land in the districts of Vryburg and Rustenburg was transferred on the 1st January 1984.(138) (See Map 6)

As regards Venda, the original Act included in the schedule all the land promised to Venda in the independence agreements (land situated in

the districts of Messina and Soutpansberg). There has been an addition to this schedule by the (first) Amendment Act of 1983 (No. 25 of 1983), which added the area of Kutama and Senthimula situated to the west of Louis Trichardt. Also in the case of Venda, the implementation of this Act has been slow and is still far from being completed. By the beginning of 1984 it has affected little more than half the land scheduled. The land scheduled in the district of Messina, excluding one farm and parts of another, was transferred to Venda on the 1st October 1982, and another addition came on the 1st January 1984 when it received the area of Katima and Senthimula.(139) (See Map 7)

The original Act made, of course, no mention of Ciskei, but in 1983 the (first) Amendment Act provided for the addition to its schedule of land to be ceded to Ciskei. This land is situated in the districts of East London, Queenstown, Stutterheim, Stockenström, Cathcart and Victoria East. These are mostly areas not included in the 1975 proposals and, therefore, are beyond the 1936 quota. Also in this case the implementation has not been particularly fast and by early 1984 the only area which has been given to Ciskei is the area situated in the district of Victoria East, which was transferred on the 1st January 1984.(140) (See Map 8).

Of the TBVC countries, Ciskei appears to be the one for which further addition of land, beyond that scheduled in the Borders of Particular States Extension Act as amended, is contemplated. It is the only independent state in regard of which the recommendations of the Commission for Co-operation and Development have been made public(141) and if these recommendations are accepted, further land will be given to it in a number of districts (See Map 5). However, the extension of these proposed additions is limited, and also in this case it would be better to speak of 'border adjustments' rather than of 'consolidation'.

8.2.3 Perspectives

Despite the statements of good intentions which from time to time come from the government, it appears that with the 1975 consolidation proposals, the period of the comprehensive approach to consolidation has been concluded. These proposals were the last occasion in which large extensions of land had been considered for cession to the homelands, and also the last occasion in which the land thus ceded was to become

simply black land. All the later discussions and the following few concessions regarded limited extension of land and a specific homeland, mostly a homeland already independent or on the point of becoming independent.

The will of the government to move in 'the right direction' which had been hinted at by P.W. Botha at the beginning of his Primeministership must therefore be qualified. There will be no more wholesale transfer of land to black ownership (or, to be more precise, no more statements of intention of wholesale transfer of land). In future, the cession of land will be discussed and implemented on an ad hoc basis, and will regard limited extensions of land to be given to a particular homeland (they will be the 'border adjustments' mentioned by H.J.D. van der Walt).

Two different sorts of land will be the subject of these discussions. One of them is the land which according to the 1975 proposals is to be excised from the black areas ('black spots' and 'badly situated black areas'). It appears that the government has definitely abandoned any hope of being able to implement the 1975 proposals in their original form. And indeed, the most important difference between these proposals and the present situation is given by the amount of black land which has not been excised.

In this case, both independent states and non-independent homelands are concerned. The government has often stated that if badly situated black areas were not excised, the compensatory land for them would not be given to the homelands, and if it has already been bought by the SADT, it would be sold back to the Whites. It is possible that the South African government intends to use these particular areas as a form of pressure on the homeland governments, to nudge them towards independence and to reward them for their collaboration. At least in the case of the Katima and Senthimula area of Venda this seems to have happened. This is a 'badly situated black area' due to be excised from the black quota, but it has been transferred under Venda sovereignty at the beginning of 1984. Although the government said that as a consequence of the fact that this area would remain black, "land would be excised from the Soekmekaar-Bandelierkop area originally compensatory for Katima and Senthimula",(142) when it was transferred to Venda, no excision was made in the Schedule of the Borders of Particular States Extension Act relating to Venda.(143)

At any rate, it seems that at least the bigger blocks of the badly situated black areas will remain under black control, regardless of the fact that the homeland to which they belong is independent or not.

The other sort of land which could be object of further discussions is white land adjoining the existing main block of the homelands. This land would be beyond the 1936 quota and would perhaps include some towns. In this case, only independent states and homelands which have opted for independence will be involved. Although the independent states have lost most of their leverage for obtaining extra land and, therefore, it seems unlikely that the South African government could give them more land out of sheer generosity, it cannot be excluded that they could benefit from some South African concession. The case of Bophuthatswana, which after independence has been given, extra quota, the towns of Mafeking and Thaba 'Nchu, indicates that this is a real possibility.

It is possible that the South African government considers some 'ad hoc border adjustments' as a prize for good behaviour. In other cases, particularly when towns are concerned, the cession of land to these states is the result of the unsustainable situation in which the town, almost completely surrounded by the independent state, finds itself, in particular because of the economic decline due to the development just across the border of a twin town which drains away from it its former customers. In this light, King William's Town appears to be the most likely candidate for a transfer to black sovereignty. It is possible that in order to enhance the attractiveness of the independent states, the government might take into consideration an enlargement of their territories on the lines of the recommendations of the Van der Walt Commission or of the Select Committee on Co-operation and Development. In all these cases, however, the governments of the independent states are merely passive recipients of South African decisions. Their ability to influence these decisions is almost non-existent, and where it exists, it derives not from any kind of bargaining power they have, but from their skills as mendicants.

As it has already been pointed out, the only time when the homeland leaders have a real bargaining power towards the South African government is when they have expressed their acceptance of independence, but are not yet firmly committed to it. This is the only time when the homeland leaders have a carrot of their own to dangle in front of South African

leaders' eyes. This is the time when they can extract some concessions. Even Transkei and Bophuthatswana were able to obtain territorial concessions in that period, although they negotiated with Vorster's team of hardliners. Venda, negotiating in the transition period from Vorster's to Botha's Primeministership obtained little more. In this regard, Ciskei has been the most favoured of the independent states, despite the fact that most of the original recommendations of the Van der Walt Commission were rejected. In its negotiations before independence, it could obtain the South African commitment to cession of land beyond that earmarked for it in the 1975 proposals and the promise of further border adjustments (See Map 8).

The KwaNdebele leaders are playing the same card, apparently more successfully than anybody else. In the 1975 proposals, the land earmarked for KwaNdebele covered an area of about 72 000 ha.(144) By April 1983, its size was 98 000 ha., which according to the proposals of the Commission, could be increased to 340 000 ha.(145) (See Map 9). Admittedly, the Commission's recommendations have not yet been approved, and might not be approved in their totality. Furthermore, the influx of KwaNdebele of a great number of Ndebeles and other Blacks in the latest years has created a potentially explosive situation which could be improved only by addition of land. Nevertheless, a fourfold or, if the Commission's recommendations are accepted, an almost fivefold increase of the land area of the homeland as a result of the independence negotiations is not a mean achievement. In its negotiations with KwaNdebele, the South African government has shown that although it is reluctant to face the economic and political costs it would incur in adding to the homelands sizeable extensions of land, if this cession is necessary to achieve a determined objective, then it will be done. As H.J.D. van der Walt has explained: "If we are going to exceed the Transvaal quota in order to make KwaNdebele independent, then I say that we can exceed the quota to do that".(146)

This attitude can be considered as a gauge which helps to assess the perspectives in the subject of territorial consolidation beyond the next two or three years.

It is evident that the land question is a very sensitive topic. Many in the National Party and the government realise that if separate development and the independent states are to be credible and successful, even with the more modest objectives that the present government has apparently assigned to this policy, it will be necessary to give the homelands more

land. However, for any government national territory is not something easily given away, and for a nationalist one it is something almost sacred. This is a first basic obstacle to the enlargement of the homelands. To this inherent reluctance to relinquish national territory must be added the practical obstacles that such a move has to overcome. Up to now the economic cost of buying the white land before giving it to the homelands and the reluctance to budget the considerable amount of money necessary for a speedy fulfilment of the 1936 commitment, have been the major obstacle. However, it seems that the government has finally accepted the Commission's recommendations about the opportunity to give the land to the homelands without first buying it. Possibly this line will not be followed for the remaining quota land, but for most of the further 'border adjustments', in particular if they regard towns, it will. Indeed, it has already been adopted in the case of the cession to Bophuthatswana of Mafeking and Thaba 'Nchu. In reality, however, the financial problems were a useful screen for the lack of political will (although stubbornness is one of the characteristics of the South African government, it is not possible that it took almost twenty years to realise that it is not physically necessary to buy the land before it can be given to the homelands).

The political dangers for the government of a policy of land cession are well known and have been only slightly diminished by the formation of the Conservative Party. The foreseeable evolution of South African politics points to a likely increase of the dissatisfaction among nationalist Afrikaners, due to the 'progressive' moves of the Botha government and their consequences. Land to the homelands is not at the moment a priority for the short term success of these moves. Therefore, it appears likely that the government in the next few years will move carefully on the land question to avoid swelling the ranks of those crying 'treason'. There will probably be enough of them without adding those who would be indignant for the 'selling of the forefathers' land'.

It is also not likely that in the next few years the intensity of the homelands' claims will increase, nor that the South African government will be induced by moves of the homeland governments to change the order of priority of the land question. The South African government appears to have its hands full with the additions already scheduled in the Borders of Particular States Extension Act and with the Commission's proposals for Ciskei and KwaNdebele. Other homeland leaders do not seem

to have the intention, for the moment, of dangling the carrot of their independence in front of the government's eyes. And at least the Bophuthatswana government, whose country presents the most complicated consolidation problem amongst the independent states, has apparently found some virtue in a temporary acceptance of the present scattered form of its country. In fact, many economists reckon that the scattered blocks of some homelands facilitate their economic growth. The more scattered a homeland, the easier it is for it to be affected by the pull of the more developed economy of the white areas. In the light of this constatation, it would be worthwhile for the homelands to accept their division in many blocks. Also the South African government would find it easier to invest in order to develop growth points if these area situated in the white areas rather than in the homelands. At times, when the national territory is concerned, economic considerations take the back seat, but it is possible that for a few years a country like Bophuthatswana will put the stress on economic development rather than on territorial consolidation.

This is not to say that territorial consolidation has been disposed of. If, and when, the South African government reckons that without it the progress of its policy is threatened, then territorial consolidation will again take first priority. In this case, the government is likely to find the will to fight its conservative adversaries on this field and to face and defy their resentment. However, until it is not considered to be really necessary for the success of a policy aimed at preserving Afrikaner rule over South Africa, the government will avoid taking important steps in this sensitive matter.

MAP 1
TRANSKEI



NOTE: The "Approx. borders of Transkei, 1984" include only the areas over which the RSA has relinquished its sovereignty as reported in the Government Gazette. Eventual areas under RSA sovereignty but administered by Transkei are not included.

P 2

PHUTHATSWANA



BOTSWANA

KAAPPROVINSIE

TRANSVAAL

ORANGE FREE STATE

Bophuthatswana in 1974.

Areas to be excised according to the 1973-75 consolidation proposal

Areas to be added according to the 1973-75 consolidation proposals.

Bophuthatswana at independence.

NOTE: Within the borders of Bophuthatswana at independence are included the areas over which South Africa relinquished its sovereignty by the Status of Bophuthatswana Act. Other areas which were taken or remained under Bophuthatswana administration but under South African sovereignty are not included

Tuislandgrense punte
Homeland growth points

Grense gekeurde punte
Scheduled growth points

PRESENT SEAT OF GOVERNMENT


MAP 3
BOPHUTHATSWANA
SLEUTELKAART
KEY MAP
0 200 400 800 km
BOTSWANA
TRANSVAAL
KAAPPROVINSIE
ORANGE FREE STATE
Metropole
Gaberones
Kanye
Kirstonia
Terra Firma
Vorstershoop
Lobatsi
Dwaalboom
THABAZIMBI
Vaalwater
NYLSTROOM
WARMBAD
Northam
Nietverdiend
Settlers
Marble Hall
GROBLERSDAL
Babelegi
Hammanskraal
ZEERUST
Groot Marico
SWARTRUGGENS
RUSTENBURG
BRITS
Motutlhung
Rosslyn
PRETORIA
CULLINAN
BRONKHORSTSPRUIT
WITBANK
Ottoshoop
MAFEKING
Koster
Itsoseng
LICHTENBURG
Coligny
VENTERSDORP
Soutbos
Stella
Geysdorp
Sannieshof
DELAREYVILLE
POTCHEFS
Ottosdal
KLERKSDORP
VRYBURG
WOLMARANSSTAD
SCHWEIZER-RENEKE
Amalia
Hotazel
KURUMAN
Reivilo
Sishen
BLOEMHOF
HARTSWATER
Andalusia
CHRISTIANA
Boetsap
Tuislandgroeipunte
Homeland growth points
Grensgebiedgroeipunte
Verkeerdevlei
Excelsior
Tweespruit
THABA'NCHU
DEWETSDORP
Hobhouse
Bophuthatswana at independence
Areas to be added according to the independence agreement
Areas added by the Bophuthatsw Border Extension Act (No. 8 of 1978)
NOTE: Only the area over which sovereignty was transferred to Bophuthatswana are included within Bophuthatswana borders. Areas under Bophuthatswana administration but under South African sovereignty are not included.

MAP 4

VENDA



Venda in 1973.

Land to be excised according to the 1973-75 consolidation proposals.

Land to be added according to the 1973-75 consolidation proposals.

Venda at independence.

Land to be added according to independence agreement.

NOTE: Only areas over which sovereignty was transferred to Venda are included within the borders of Venda at independence. Areas under Venda administration but South African sovereignty are not included.



NOTE: Only areas over which sovereignty was transferred to Ciskei are included within the borders of Ciskei at independence. Areas under Ciskei administration but South African sovereignty are not included


MAP 6
BOPHUTHATSWANA
SLEUTELKAART
KEY MAP
BOTSWANA
KAAPPROVINSIE
TRANSVAAL
ORANGE FREE STATE
Moiepole
Kanye
Zeerust
Ottoshoop
Mafeking
Vryburg
Taung
Stella
Delareyville
Sannieshof
Lichtenburg
Coligny
Ventersdorp
Potchefstroom
Klerksdorp
Ottosdal
Wolmaransstad
Schweizer-Reneke
Amalia
Bloemhof
Hartswater
Christiana
Andalusia
Boetsap
Reivilo
Taung
Hotazel
Kuruman
Sishen
Vryburg
Sourbos
Terra Firma
Vryburg
Versfontein
Swartruggens
Rustenburg
Groot Marico
Northam
Thabazimbi
Nylstroom
Warmbad
Baviaanspoort
Pretoria
Cullinan
Bronkhorstspruit
Witbank
Johannesburg
Krugersdorp
Vereeniging
Verkeerdevlei
Taung
Thaba Nchu
Dewetsdorp
Hoopstad
Tuislandgroeipunte
Homeland growth points
Grensgebiedgroeipunte
Border area growth points
Bophuthatswana in 1979.
Areas to be added according to Borders of Particular States Extension Act (No. 2 of 1980) as amended.
Bophuthatswana in mid-1984.
NOTE: Only areas over which sovereignty was transferred to Bophuthatswana are included within the borders of Bophuthatswana at independence. Areas under Bophuthatswana administration but South African sovereignty are not included.

MAP 7

VENDA



Venda at independence.

Land to be added according to the Borders of Particular States Extension Act (No. 2 of 1980).

Land to be added according to amendments of the said Act.

Venda in 1984.

NOTE: Only areas over which sovereignty was transferred to Venda are included within the borders of Venda. Areas under Venda administration but South African sovereignty are not included.

[X] According to H.J.D.van der Walt (Hansard 7/1983 col. 3265), the farms Lukin and Salaita have been added to Venda. I have not been able to find the Proclamation by which sovereignty over this area is transferred to Venda. It is possible that the land in question has been released for acquisition by the SADT and bought by it but not yet transferred to Venda. This appears to be the situation also in other cases.


MAP 8
CISKEI
ZASTRON
OFS
LESOTHO
Sterkspruit
HERSCHEL
LADY GREY
0 10 20 30 40 km
Lady Frere
GLEN GREY
QUEENSTOWN
Cofimvaba
SLEUTELKAART
KEY MAP
R S A
NGAMAKWE
BUTTERWORTH
TRANSKEI
CATHCART
KAAPPROVINSIE
STUTTERHEIM
KOMGA
STOCKENSTROM
KEISKAMMAHOEK
Kei Road
FORT BEAUFORT
MIDDLEDRIFT
Elimbeza
KING WILLIAM'S TOWN
Berlin
TWEELITSHA
MZANTSAN
EAST LONDON
Pineries
Haga Haga
Indian Ocean
PEDDIE
Xpha
BATHURST
PORT ALFRED
Alexandria
Areas still to be excised, 1983. Ciskeian Administration, South African sovereignty.
Ciskei at independence.
Approximate areas to be add according to the Van der Wa Commission Proposals.
Areas to be added according to the Borders of Particula States Extension Act (No. 2 of 1980).
Ciskei in 1984.
Areas to be added according to the proposals of the Commission for Co-operation


KAAR
MAP 9
KWANDEBELE
Nebo distrik
LEBOWA
Groblersdal
Marble Hall
Makeespvlei
Mabuswa
P 130-1
Rhenosterkop
Bronkhorstspruit
P 48-0
Rustler Winterdam
Elandsrivier
Culilinan
Roodeplaatdam
PRETORIA
Warmbad
BOPHUTHATSWANA
BOPHUTHA-TSWANA
SLEUTELKAART
KEY MAP
R S A
BOTSWANA
KwaNdebele in 1977.
KwaNdebele in 1983.
Areas to be added according to the proposals of the Commission for Co-operation and Development.

CHAPTER 9

THE BENEFICIARIES OF INDEPENDENCE

The decision to opt for independence required an evaluation of the advantages such a choice would present to the people involved. These advantages could be found in the socio-political field as well as in the economic one. It has already been pointed out in Chapter 7 that those homelands which opted for independence have received an increased amount of financial aid from South Africa. It is therefore possible to say that one of the most important advantages of independence had been the influx, under various forms, of more South African money than the TBVC countries would have received had they not opted for independence. In order to evaluate what independence has meant for the people of these countries it is necessary to see how the increased resources available to them have been allocated among their population.

Independence also meant reduced South African presence and influence in every-day life. This decrease in South African presence, too, has affected in different ways different groups within the independent states, and some groups have been able to take advantage of this change more than others.

Without any doubt, the group which was in the best position to take advantage of independence was the political élite. These people had the control of the new state and therefore were in the condition to decide how its resources would be allocated. The traditional élite of the black society, the chiefs, are included in this group. Indeed, thanks to the peculiar way in which the devolution of power from South Africa to the homelands has taken place, the chiefs are the largest component of the political élite.

The traditional structure of the black society was not conducive to the emergence of a middle class, and in the South African situation there were limited possibilities for the establishment of a viable and active black bourgeoisie. The middle class in the homelands was made up of two main groups, the civil service - including the teachers - and the traders, plus a splattering of professionals. These groups, too,

have been affected by independence, and the way in which it has affected them may be one of the most important factors for the medium term stability of the independent states.

However, the viability of the independent states as a factor in the long term solution to the South African problems rests on the support they can enjoy amongst the majority of the population. Most of the people living in the homelands are peasant and lower class wage earners, many of the latter migrants. Although they had almost no influence on that choice, nor on the subsequent policy decisions taken by the leadership of the independent states, they too have been affected by independence. It is, however, doubtful that for the majority of the population independence has meant significant improvements in their everyday life. Despite this, something has changed also for them, and much depends on whether for them these changes have been positive or negative.

9.1 The political and traditional élite

This is certainly the group which has received the greatest advantages from independence. They are the people who hold the power and can decide in which way the resources of the country are allocated.

Since the early 1950s, the Nationalist government has used the traditional tribal structure as the foundation of its policy of separate development. Chiefs and headmen had 'inherited the political kingdom' and have fared quite well. With independence they have strengthened their control on the resources of their countries, and have used them to their advantage. Although in most cases their salaries are not particularly high in absolute terms, those who are appointed to a position in the tribal hierarchy or have a seat in the National Assembly have a remuneration which few can enjoy in a society where jobs are scarce and salaries low. Furthermore, the increase in their salaries has been much higher than the increase in the average wages in their territories. For example, in Transkei in 1964 the salary of chiefs sitting ex officio in the TLA was £400 and the salary scale for headmen was R64-112; in 1978 these were R3 300 and R340-540 respectively, this in a country where in 1978 the GDP per capita was R153.[147] Besides their salaries, chiefs receive an extra payment based on the number of taxpayers in the area of

their tribal authority, and chiefs and headmen receive travelling and other allowances and a pension when they retire from their official position. This is not a lavish treatment, particularly when headmen and petty chiefs are concerned, but also in their case it is enough to free them from the necessity of migrating in search of a job. This allows them to follow more closely their local interests and to take advantage of the favourable occasions that present themselves.

Moreover, the influence they have because of their position of authority, and the administrative dominance they enjoy as a consequence of this, make it possible for them to increase their wealth through the unopposed and unchecked use of corruption and coercion. Of course, the higher up in the hierarchy one is, the greater are the prizes.

Headmen and petty chiefs can substantially increase their income thanks to the 'presents' their tribesmen give them for being assigned a plot of land or for having the precedence in the list of the local labour bureaux.

The President, the ministers and their retinues can find themselves owner of a recently transferred white farm as 'a sign of the gratitude of their people' for their efforts in the 'struggle for national liberation'.(148) Or they can receive a profitable sinecure as figurehead of some department, corporation or office. Furthermore, their high income, their position of power and their knowledge make them the greatest beneficiaries of almost all the economic enterprises which provide for the participation of private black shareholders.(149) In addition, if everywhere corruption is rife, at the higher levels the sums are bigger, and it is possible to surmise that a not inconsiderable boost to the income of those who are in a decision-making position comes from the activity known as 'greasing the wheels'.

There is also a brighter side to this situation. This is the fact that amongst the many headmen, chiefs, ministers, relatives thereof (and with the traditional Bantu extended family there are many of them) and friends thereof who simply enjoy the power they have and the economic benefits which derive from a more or less unscrupulous use of it, there are also active and able people who constitute the bulk of the budding entrepreneurial class of these territories.

Indeed, as the years pass and the effects of the increased availability of money and opportunities are more widely felt, there is a change in the social condition of the traditional élite. The most able amongst this élite are becoming more involved in the modern economy and are

drawing a greater proportion of their wealth from their activity in this field. For them wealth, and therefore influence and power, are ceasing to be the result of their semi-feudal lordship over their tribe to become the result of their membership of an economically active entrepreneurial class in an almost modern context.

This process, by which the most resourceful part of the traditional élite is changing from being a sort of nobility to being part of a growing bourgeoisie might have important repercussions on the future of these countries. For example, it is possible that if a sufficient number of chiefs becomes less dependent on their right to assign land to their tribesmen as a source of wealth and power, it might lessen their opposition to what is widely considered as a reform essential for improving the viability of these countries, i.e., the switch from the tribal land tenure to freehold tenure. At least a first step in this direction has already been taken. Also because of South African pressure (See 8.2.2), the land that has been transferred to the independent states since 1980 has not been given to the tribes but has been sold to private buyers or leased to farmers, including white farmers who are often the previous owners.(150)

Although the political élite is formed mostly by members of the traditional élite, it has also a different component. Commoners can be members of the National Assembly and prominent members of the ruling party. And, of course, many commoners are in the retinues of the most important figures. These people, too, partake of the economic and social benefits accruing to the members of the political élite. Their number is not great, but usually they are amongst the most influential people of their own area. This co-option of commoners into the political élite has been more noticeable after independence, also because in occasion of independence the number of elected members of the National Assembly has been increased in each one of the TBVC countries.

This co-option of commoners had not only the effect of enlarging the social basis of the political élite, but also the one of giving the ruling group the capacity to control more tightly the population or to manipulate more efficiently their opinion. In fact, these men - who are men of prominence in their area, having been co-opted into the ruling group and enjoying the economic benefits of this, are likely to use their position of influence among the local population to promote support for the independent states and to suppress eventual resistance to it. Conversely, the activists of the ruling parties in the independent states

view these parties as a channel by which they may gain access to the resources distributed by the state.

9.2 The middle class

The line of drawing the most influential, educated and active segment of the population into a form of economic dependence upon the apparatus of the independent states was not, of course, limited to the small number of prominent people co-opted in the ruling group. Indeed, the establishment and development of a stable middle class has been one of the main tactical objectives of the South African government and of the governments of the independent states. The successful establishment of such a class is an important factor for the success of the policy of separate development.

First of all, a development along these lines would create a numerous group of people having a vested interest in the preservation of the system. In this way the proportion of people in support of the independent states would increase, and, at the same time, a preventive blow would be dealt at the opposing side by enlisting the support of the very people who, because of their higher education and/or initiative, could be the most effective leaders of a challenge to the ruling group.

As important as the political role is the economic one which is anticipated for the middle class. Unless a stable and growing middle class is firmly established in the independent states, their economic development will always totter. It is impossible to develop a territory merely with intervention and influx of capital from outside. In this way most of the income thus generated flows directly back without benefitting the territory in question where the only impact on the local situation is limited to the establishment of some low-pay employment opportunities. The only real chance of an autochthonous development lay in the creation of a thick network of small economic activities in the hands of the local people. Therefore, economic and political motives combine to make the development of the middle class one of the priorities of the independent states.

However, the emergence of an entrepreneurial group is slow and difficult, particularly in the case of underdeveloped countries. Therefore, the bulk of the middle class in the independent states is formed by civil servants and people employed in various services, such as education, who

are all in the employment of the government. The former in particular have an important function as one of the main supports of the establishment.

9.2.1 The civil service

All the components of the civil service, as well as teachers and health workers, are on the government pay-roll. This, of course, facilitates the control of potential sources of dissent, since all the government employees know how easily they can lose their job if they show any propension to making trouble for their employer. This is particularly significant in the cases of Transkei and Venda where government employment constitutes the majority of the jobs, as shown in Table 32.

TABLE 32: Economically active population (excluding agriculture) and government employment in the independent states. 1980.

COUNTRY	ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION	GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
Transkei	133 541	66 700
Bophuthatswana	176 142	28 500
Venda	9 071	8 650(1)
Ciskei	124 680	13 180

(1) Particularly in Venda, government employment includes a number of agricultural projects.

SOURCE: Elaboration from BENSO Data. BENSO, Statistical Survey 1981, part II.

The threat of dismissal is the stick that keeps government employees toeing the line. However, there is also a carrot to induce them to identify with the fortunes of the independent states. The rapid extension of the civil service and other sectors of qualified government employment after independence has not only increased the number of people depending for their livelihood on the very existence of the independent states, but has also offered them particularly enticing career prospects. The civil service proper has particularly benefitted from this.

The expansion of the bureaucracy in the independent states has been one of the most significant and substantial aspects of independence. To give the example of Transkei, in 1953 its civil service establishment was of 117, of whom only 43 were Blacks; in 1963 it was 2 446, of whom 445 were Whites; and in 1979, it was 19 800, of whom 140 were Whites.(151) The same increase is noticeable also in the other independent states (See Table 33). The increase is not all attributable to the creation of new posts: the greatest single yearly increase happened between the year before independence and the year of independence and reflects the takeover by the government of the independent states of a number of services formerly run by privates (such as hospitals) or by the South African government (such as postal services). Nonetheless, the real increase due to actual new jobs makes the public service the fastest growing source of employment in the independent states.

It is these public servants who constitute the main core of the middle class of the independent states. They emerge from the mass of the local population and are differentiated from it by their education and by the level of their financial remuneration. The rapid expansion of the establishment has provided for fast and numerous promotions, with accompanying schemes for the improvement of the educational and technical qualifications of the people involved.

The civil servants have emerged as the most influential pressure group in the independent states. Despite the ban on trade union activities in these territories, they have their own Public Servants' associations which articulate their request about their conditions of service, requests that are in general sympathetically considered by the holders of power.(152) They have been quite successful in fostering their interests and, in particular, their remuneration scale is very good if one considers the general conditions of these territories, and they have obtained numerous salary increases by which they have kept far ahead of every other category of salaried people.(153) All these improvements have been justified on the grounds of shortage of qualified personnel and on the basis of the policy that the civil servants of the independent states should have at least the same salary as South African black civil servants.

The economic advantages enjoyed by the civil servants, however, are not the only reason for their identification with the independent states. It seems possible to say that the civil servants, particularly those in the higher echelons, have been recruited among that part of the Blacks which has been politically prepared to accept and support the notion of

TABLE 33: Public Service establishment in the TBV countries from 1975 to 1982 (excluding teachers).

YEAR	FIXED ESTABLISHMENT	SECONDED WHITE OFFICIALS	PERCENTAGE SECONDED
		TRANSKEI[1]	
1975	10 291	258	2,5
1976	17 320	358	2,1
1977	17 300	314	1,8
1978	17 310	232	1,3
1979	19 800	140	0,7
1980	20 000	119	0,6
1981	20 505	94	0,5
1982	23 874	104	0,4
		BOPHUTHATSWANA	
1975	6 868	209	3,01
1976	8 728	242	2,77
1977	15 891	312	1,99
1978	15 359	314	2,04
1979	18 334	250	1,36
1980	21 355	360	1,69
1981	23 190	243	1,05
1982	28 657	261	0,91
		VENDA[2]	
1978	1 571		
1979	2 521		
1980	2 739		
1981	2 907		
1982	3 200		

(1) Transkei excluding Police and Prison Services.

(2) Venda excluding Venda National Force.

SOURCES: Republic of Transkei, Annual Report of the Public Service Commission;
Republic of Bophuthatswana, Annual Report of the Bophuthatswana Public Service Commission;
Republic of Venda, Department of Public Service Commission, Annual Reports,
of the appropriate years.

separate development first, and independence afterwards. The only circumstantial evidence of this is pointed out by Southall[154] in regard to Transkeian civil servants. No information in this regard is available for the other independent states, but it makes sense to presume that those who entered the civil service of the homelands (and now are in the higher echelons of the civil service of the independent states) came from that 10% to 30% of Blacks which is found by most surveys to support the idea of separate and independent ethnic states. Therefore, the economic benefits strengthen the opinions already held by these individuals, but in general are not the cause of their conversion in favour of independence. The fact that most of the civil servants supported separate development even before they joined the civil service, coupled with the substantial economic benefits they enjoy in their present condition, makes them the most dependable support of the existence of the independent states.

A particular category of government employees are the teachers. Like the civil servants, they depend on the state for their income and are subject to official control. In their case too, their number has increased noticeably since the homelands have taken over the control of education in their territories, and in the latest years (i.e., after independence, even if not as a consequence of it) the increase has been particularly noticeable in secondary education. Consequently, for them too, the years after independence have meant career advances and pay increases. However, they cannot, in general, be considered as dependable as the civil servants in their support for the system. Indeed, the teachers have been for years one of the main components of the 'old' A.N.C. and in their majority had strongly rejected separate development and the homelands. To break the teachers' opposition the stick has been used more often than the carrot, and, particularly in the early years of separate development, a wide-ranging operation of 'weeding out' the most open opponents to the government policy was undertaken. The effects of this on the teachers as a category has been almost traumatic. Many of the most able among them lost their job and many others, in order to avoid the same fate, had to silence their inner convictions and work within and for a system which they rejected. This situation, which remains widespread also today, may be one of the reasons of a certain demoralization among the teachers, which is reflected in "an excessively high rate of drinking and an allegedly low level of professional conduct".[155] The teachers are not,

TABLE 34: Numbers of teachers and pupils in the independent states

	1974				1981			
	PRIMARY		SECONDARY AND TRAINING		PRIMARY		SECONDARY AND TRAINING	
	TEACHERS	PUPILS	TEACHERS	PUPILS	TEACHERS	PUPILS	TEACHERS	PUPILS
Transkei	7 687	455 236	949	32 493	9 042	579 322	6 281	159 063
Bophuthatswana	4 819	303 527	881	28 864	5 716	312 536	4 190	146 142
Venda	1 429	88 944	206	5 613	2 736	119 312	978	31 826
Ciskei	3 369	188 441	565	15 379	4 245	184 260	1 570	48 299

SOURCES: BENBO, Black Development in South Africa, 1976;
BENSO, Statistical Survey 1981, Part II.

however, an homogeneous group and it would be mistaken to conclude that they are as a group at least potentially opposed to the independent states. This is not the case even in Transkei and Ciskei, where their dissatisfaction with the homelands policy and their opposition to it has been particularly lively. Indeed, not only the most hostile among them have left the independent states and other potential opponents are kept in check by repressive action, but also many of them have found in the increased opportunities now available in their field for personal advancement a good reason to reconcile themselves to the notion of independent states. Furthermore, in some of the TBVC countries, a form of active control of the teachers (on the lines of KwaZulu's requirement of teachers' membership of Inkatha) is in vigour, and many of them have been converted to supporters and fosterers of the homeland idea. Nevertheless, in particular in Transkei and Ciskei, there has been continuously a degree of antagonism towards the government which has at times flared into fairly open disaffection. At least in these two countries the teachers can be considered as a group of middle class which still has in great part to be won over to wholehearted acceptance of the existence of separate ethnic states.

9.2.2 Traders and businessmen

The fact that the most numerous component of the middle class is that of the qualified people employed by the government should not detract from the evaluation of the importance of traders and businessmen in the socio-economic context of the independent states.

An integral aspect of the homelands policy has been the creation of conditions conducive to the establishment of a productive middle class based on trade and small service enterprises. The governments of the independent states have used their increased financial resources and wider discretion to support the expansion of this sector of the middle class.

Originally, the only noteworthy component of business-orientated middle class were the traders. The expansion of black traders, however, has been severely hampered in the past by lack of capital and by a system of licensing which had the practical effect of establishing a virtual monopoly by Whites over trade in all the reserves. This virtual monopoly was maintained also with the help of a provision that established

a five mile radius exclusivity zone around each trading station. The first relaxation of this measure came in 1934, when the radius was reduced to two miles in respect of some kind of commercial undertaking. As a result of this, the number of black general dealers in the 'native areas' increased from 119 (9,1% of the total) in 1936 to 1 199 (45,5%) in 1952.(156)

It was in the 1950s that the black traders started to have official encouragement from the government. Indeed, as the policy of separate development began to be implemented, the government provided black businessmen or prospective businessmen with various forms of assistance. The establishment of the Bantu Investment Corporation (now CED) in 1959, and later that of the various homelands' Development Corporation, represented an important step in this direction. These corporations were empowered to make loans to Blacks without requiring security and thus eliminating one of the main stumbling blocks on the path of the expansion of a black middle class.

Although the assistance rendered to black businessmen by the corporations has been criticised both in regard to its quantity and to its quality,(157) it had, and still has, critical importance in promoting the development of a black middle class in the homelands. Certainly, the amount of money utilized to this end was limited: by 1975 the BIC had loaned a total of R13 million to black businessment and the XDC R9,5 million.(158) This, however, was enough to cause a manifold increase in established blackowned businesses in the homelands. In 1952 there were 1 199 of them (all general dealers), in 1973 they had increased to 9 675 (86% general dealers).(159)

During their early years of operation, however, the BIC and the homelands' Development Corporations were strongly criticised by many black businessmen and homeland politicians on the grounds that they were working with an eye to South African interests rather than to promote homeland development. Complaints were aired about the limited amount of loan capital they advanced to black businessmen, high interest rates, favouritism in the granting of trading licences, and, in particular, about the fact that the direction of these corporations was totally in white hands.

With independence, all the assets of the development corporation of the homelands concerned were ceded to their governments, which by agreement were granted the power to nominate half of the board of directors of their own National Development Corporation. Blacks nominated to the direction

boards were mainly drawn from the local business community, which, therefore, has increased its influence on the activity of the corporations. If control over the major activities of the corporations is not in black hands (the South African government still hold, in one form or another, the purse strings), nevertheless, after independence, the Blacks have gained a decisive voice in the issues which most directly affect black entrepreneurs, in particular the distribution of trading licences and the allocation of loans.

The allocation of loans is perhaps the sector in which the effects of the increased power of the local business community are more evident. In the case of Ciskei, up to 1974 the then XDC had loaned an amount of R1 420 950 to 160 businessmen;(160) by 1980 the cumulative amount of loans to Ciskeian businessment by the CNDC had increased to R3 962 436 for a total of 334 loans, and in 1983 the figures were R8 683 857 for a total of 517 loans.(161) The yearly figures given in Table 35 show that from 1981 the amount loaned by the CNDC was in each year almost double the amount it loaned in 1980. Unfortunately I have not been able to find data as detailed for the other independent states, but it seems possible to say that the same applies for them. For example, the total amount of loans to Transkeian businessmen up to 1976 was R6 519 700(162) plus a negligible amount for housing loans; by 1981 the total amount loaned by the TDC, including housing, was R29 million.(163)

This increase in loans has helped to establish firmly a growing number of trade concerns and small businessmen in the independent states. The political effect of this is that the productive middle class is as dependent on the continued existence of the independent states as the burocrats are. There is no data available on the social origin of these businessmen. However, from various bits and pieces of information I gathered in interviews during a period of fieldwork in Ciskei and Transkei and from odd data found in different publications, I am inclined to say that a considerable number of them has family links with chiefs, headmen and prominent politicians. This can mean that a sizeable proportion of these people was already part of that minority of Blacks favourably predisposed towards independence. Nevertheless, the net result of the policy tending to support the expansion of local traders and businessmen has been the enlargement of the number of people having a vested interest in the preservation of the independent states, and the enlistment of the budding business community amongst the supporters of independence.

TABLE 35: Business and housing loans granted by the Ciskeian National Development Corporation

	BUSINESS LOANS		HOUSING LOANS (TOTAL)		HOUSING LOANS: SPECIAL SCHEME FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (100% BOND) (included in HOUSING LOANS (TOTAL))	
	NUMBER	AMOUNT (R)	NUMBER	AMOUNT (R)	NUMBER	AMOUNT (R)
1975	36	330 436	17	70 330	-	-
1979	22	505 176	477	1 195 040	-	-
1980	48	831 750	538	1 719 930	-	-
1981	60	1 520 150	708	3 470 000	149	1 396 000
1982	51	1 414 232	637	4 698 680	219	2 862 910
1983	61	1 688 769	387	3 299 885	148	2 090 000

SOURCE: Ciskeian National Development Corporation, Annual Reports 1979 to 1983.

9.2.3 Professionals

Another component of the middle class is that of the people in professional occupations. Their number in the independent states is small both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the economically active population (See Table 36 below).

TABLE 36: Number of people in professional occupations in the independent states. (Census of 1970.)

	PROFESSIONALS	PROFESSIONALS AS % OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
Transkei	11 545	2,7
Bophuthatswana	7 499	3,3
Venda	1 360	2,6
Ciskei	4 407	3,3

SOURCE: Republic of South Africa, Population Census 1970, Report No. 02-05-06.

Unfortunately, the data for the 1980 census are not yet available and therefore the information given by the table is outdated. Nevertheless, it is safe to presume that people in professional occupations still constitute a very small proportion of the population. (The report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Economic Development of Ciskei gives the number of professionals in 1975 as 3 059. Considering too the excision of Glen Grey and Herschel, this number indicates a minimal increase in those five years.)(164)

It is not possible to say how many of these professionals are in government employment, but if it is taken into consideration the fact that education, health and welfare services are under the control of the government, and that a number of professionals are employed by businesses and public corporations, the proportion of professionals depending, in one way or another, on the apparatus of the state is certainly high. The others, mainly church ministers, lawyers and medical doctors, are the elements of the middle class more peripheral to the state and, therefore, they have less interest in the existence of the independent states

than the other components of the middle class. Their independence from the economic lure of the system makes them potential candidates for an opposition role. Indeed, it is from this group that most of the opposition politicians came. Potentially, this group may have a leading role in challenging the legitimacy of the system. However, a number of factors contribute in making this role hypothetical.

Although these people have generally widespread contacts with the mass of the population, they are powerless in helping to change the conditions of life. In a society where misery is widespread and employment scarce, patronage is the most powerful instrument for controlling and mobilising the population at local level. Therefore, potential opposers have few chances of building up followers. Even if they were able to do so, the repressive apparatus of the state would insure that they were stopped before they could become a threat to the ruling élite. Furthermore, another factor makes even less probable that from this group could come a challenge to the system. It is the fact that amongst the educated Blacks, those who are in principle opposed to the existence of independent ethnic states, and therefore could form the core of a potential opposition, are for this very reason most reluctant to settle in the homelands or the independent states.(165) The professionals who have settled in the independent states, therefore, are mostly those who accept, or are indifferent to their existence, and thus are unlikely to feel the urge of becoming politically involved on the side of the opposition.

In conclusion, the expanding middle class has considerably benefitted from the establishment of the independent states and as a consequence has a strong interest in their preservation. The expansion of this middle class is one of the most important instruments for the entrenchment of the system, and up to now it has been reasonably successful.

9.3 Peasants and salaried workers

Despite the expansion of the middle class, the great majority of the population of the independent states is still obviously formed by peasants and lower class salaried workers. The support, or at least the neutrality, of these people is of vital importance for the long term stability of the independent states, and therefore, it is important that

they too could find advantages in independence. However, it is difficult to say that independence has a great effect on their conditions.

As far as the peasants are concerned, the general situation has not changed much. Most of them have land rights in the tribal areas, where, however, the number of landless people is inevitably on the increase. They eke out a living from subsistence farming, integrating it with spells of work in the white area when the products of their plots are insufficient to assure the survival of the family. Their present condition is, in general, similar to that of five or ten years ago. There have been some improvements, such as a limited increase in capital available under form of loans and better opportunities to market the products of the land. These improvements, however, have been not only limited in magnitude but also circumscribed to particular areas, and few people have benefitted from them. The areas where these improvements were mostly felt are those in which agricultural development projects have been undertaken, such as Tyefu in Ciskei, Taung in Bophuthatswana and Ncora in Transkei. These development schemes have not always been successful, but in the cases where they established themselves, and lately these cases appear to be more numerous than in the past, they had a considerable impact on local conditions. In most cases, they have also changed the conditions of land tenure, substituting the traditional tribal tenure with probatory leasehold, convertible to freehold, for a certain number of economic plots (less numerous than the plots assigned to the households of the tribe in precedence) plus communal areas where the rest of the tribespeople are employed as seasonal labourers. In some cases (again Tyefu is an example), those who formerly had land rights but are unable or unwilling to become full-time farmers, are entitled to subsistence plots of 0,25 ha. under irrigation, from which they can produce enough to cover most of the elimentary needs of their families. The result of these agricultural schemes is that some peasants (who might be the most able, or the most lucky or those with better connections) have become small landowners, have noticeably increased their income and are becoming part of the middle class, while many others have become 'proletarianized', having lost all or most of their traditional rights to land and pasture. However, considering that in any case many tribal households are landless and that many of those who have land rights do not produce enough to maintain all the members of the household,[166] it is possible that the standard of life of many,

if not all the households of the tribes involved in the scheme have actually improved. At least in the case of Tyefu, this is borne out by the claim of the management of that scheme[167] that the number of migrants from the tribe has been drastically reduced in few years after the implementation of the project.

Although most of the few improvements of the conditions of the rural people cannot be considered as a direct or indirect result of independence (however, the establishment of the agricultural corporations such as TRACOR in Transkei, Agricor in Bophuthatswana and AgriVen in Venda happened after independence and as a result of political decisions taken by the leadership of the independent states), it is possible that they are perceived by those affected by them as a consequence of independence, since they happened after it. And certainly, the authorities of the independent states will not miss the occasion of making political capital out of this.

Independence had even less practical effects for the lower class salaried workers. This group can be divided into two categories: those who are in paid employment within the independent states and those who work in the white area as commuters or as migrants. The workers and labourers in paid employment within the independent states are growing in number as a consequence of the economic growth of these countries. As far as a proportion of this economic growth can be attributed to the increase in the resources available to the independent states because of their having opted for independence (See Chapter 7), it is possible to say that independence has meant more local employment. Of course, most of this increase in local employment would have happened even if these countries had not chosen independence, and it is impossible to quantify the 'independence factor' in this regard.

The conditions of employment are less favourable to the workers in the independent states than to the black workers in the metropolitan areas. Their wages are lower, sometimes much lower,[168] than those in white South Africa. They have no rights to organise themselves, indeed trade unions are banned and actively repressed, and they have even less contractual power than their fellows in South Africa. On the other hand, it has to be said that workers in white South Africa are in a relatively privileged condition and the situation in the homelands is similar to that which prevails in the independent states.[169] Furthermore, in the independent states a few fortunates among the mass of the workers have the chance of making a career out of their jobs in a way that would be

impossible in white South Africa.

For the migrants too, little has changed with independence. Their material conditions are similar to what they were previously, and where they have changed, they have changed for everybody regardless of their origin. In the case of Transkei, the number of migrant workers has noticeably increased in the years after independence (from 311 100 in 1974 to 499 012 in 1979),[170] but this was due to the contemporary decrease of migrant workers coming from the other African countries as a consequence of revolutionary changes (as in the case of Mozambique) or other political decisions (as in the case of Malawi). The number of migrant workers depends on the conditions of the South African economy and not on the fact that they come from an independent state or a homeland. It is possible that their place of provenience might become an important factor in the case of a deterioration of the South African economy and consequent drastic reduction of employment opportunities. In this case, it might be easier for the South African government to limit the number of 'foreign' migrants from the TBVC countries, and leave the authorities of the independent states to face and solve the problems this situation would bring about, than to reduce the number of migrants from the homelands and having to use South African forces to maintain order. This is, however, only a speculation on what might happen, and at the moment there is no sign that the South African government is considering such a line of conduct.

At any rate, the idea of letting the black authorities of the independent states manage the recruitment of the migrant workers and to involve them in the system of migrant labour and to bind them to it is being rapidly implemented. Excluding those who have 'call-in' cards, all the other migrants, or would-be migrants, have to go through the local labour bureaux which are under the control of the local authorities of the independent states. This gives the chiefs and, in general, the independent states' apparatus a further instrument for controlling the population, punishing opposition and rewarding collaboration.

In general, for the bulk of the population of the TBVC countries independence has changed little. This makes the improvement of the conditions of life of the small, albeit somewhat growing, middle class more conspicuous and potentially dangerous. The difference between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' is widening and becoming more rigid, and since the majority of the population is formed by 'have-nots' independence may

be seen by them as a cause of their relative impoverishment in comparison with the middle class 'collaborationists'. This could cause the majority of the population to deny the legitimacy of their political leaders and to refuse independence for good. However, one result of independence has affected everybody in the independent states. This is the abrogation of the racial legislation which is in vigour in South Africa. The effects of the elimination of discriminatory legislation in these countries are not easy to gauge and are not economically quantifiable. However, it is possible to say that even if independence was not supported by the majority of the population of the independent states, and the ruling group has little legitimacy in their eyes, it is hardly believable that the opposition of the same majority to the present system goes as far as being prepared to fight for the reintroduction of that discriminatory legislation. As long as South Africa remains reasonably stable and the racial legislation in regard to the Blacks remains in force, it is likely that a large majority of the population of the independent states will accept, even if not support, the status quo.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

Since the National Party has come to power, the South African government's policy towards the Blacks has developed along two lines. The first aimed at enforcing the separation between Blacks and Whites, with influx control as its main instrument. The second aimed at establishing an alternative outlet to the political aspirations of the Blacks. The political and economic development of the homelands has been the most important element in the latter aspect of the government's policy towards the Blacks in the last quarter of a century. It is a period sufficiently long to enable the evaluation of the effects such an effort has had on the South African body politic and its contribution, if any, to the solution of the problems of South Africa.

Verwoerd's objective in launching the homelands policy and in setting the independence of these black ethnic states as its target was to buy "for the white man the right to retain his domination in what is his country". In his anticipation, independent homelands would gain international respectability for themselves and for South Africa, making South African again accepted and welcome in the international community. Furthermore, the homelands would be the instrument which all the Blacks would accept as the means of fulfilment of their political aspirations. Last but not least, economic development in the homelands would attract therein a growing number of Blacks, causing, in the long run, a net decrease of the number of Blacks living in the 'white area'.

Twenty-five years after the enactment of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill, it is possible to judge if Verwoerd's anticipation has become reality. There has been economic development in the homelands, and the number of Blacks in local employment there has increased manifold; and while in 1951 61,2% of the Blacks were living in the white area, in 1980 only 48,3% of them were. However, how successful the homelands have been in attracting back the Blacks and decreasing their number in the 'white area' is shown by the census results: in 1951 there were a little more than five million Blacks therein, in 1980 they were a little more than ten million.

In these years a growing number of Blacks had the opportunity to vote to send representatives to the legislative assemblies of the homelands. About five million of them have become resident citizens of independent ethnic states and a small but slowly growing proportion of them is finding independence remarkably to their benefit. However, how successful the homelands have been in becoming accepted by the Blacks as the centre of fulfilment of their political aspirations is shown by the results of all the surveys of black opinion made up to now: more than 90% of them considers 'one man one vote' as the ideal solution, and only between a fifth and a quarter of them accepts the homelands as they are as their political home.

Four homelands have been granted independence. Unofficial relations between them and at least the countries of the 'pariah' group are developing; scores of foreigners, if not hundreds, have invested in the TBVC countries; and certainly, if a letter is sent to other countries from any of them, it will arrive to destination. However, how successful the homelands have been in gaining international respectability and in making South Africa welcome again in the international community is shown by the fact that they have not received diplomatic recognition from any country bar South Africa. South Africa is still the polecat of the international community, and the granting of independence to the TBVC countries not only has not alleviated international pressure on it and has not bought for the white man international acceptance of "his domination in what is his country", but has become a further cause of condemnation from every international organisation and every other country. No country in the world is prepared to consider openly as final any solution of the South African problems in which the Whites would maintain their domination.

Therefore, it is possible to say that Verwoerd's anticipation was nothing but a dream. After twenty-five years of homelands policy not one of its main objectives has been achieved in its totality, and most of them appear as far as ever from their attainment.

Despite this, the homelands policy is still the policy of the government and considerable resources are every year devoted to its implementation. One of the most important reasons for the government to continue implementing this policy is the fact that its perception of the possible alternatives facing South Africa and of the role of South Africa in the world have changed.

The government has always considered and presented South Africa as the faithful watchdog of western interests in a strategically important area. As a consequence of this stance, it expected western sympathy for its attempts at solving, in its own way, the internal problems of the country and western support in case of danger. In this light, the homelands policy and homelands' independence were to be the answer to western criticism of the internal set-up of South Africa and the means by which, after the homelands become independent, white domination over the rest of South Africa would gain acceptance, guaranteeing in this way expanding economic relations and continuing military links. The events of the mid- and late-1970s provided the South African government with a few shocks and with the occasion to reassess the basic assumptions that it would always have the tacit understanding of the West and that, if the country were to be faced by an overwhelming threat, the West (meaning mostly the U.S.A. in this case) would come to the rescue. After that on a number of occasions, affecting South Africa directly (such as the Angolan adventure of 1975, the ignored or condemned independence of Transkei, the arms embargo) or by analogy (such as the solitary fall of the Shah of Iran), western attitudes and actions were almost the contrary to what the South African government assumed they would be, it had to realise that most of its expectations regarding western support were groundless.

It became clear to it that a white-ruled South Africa could never be accepted by the international community and that the West would not openly accept it either. Despite the presence in the West of important interest groups which are in favour of South Africa or of closer links with it, the support of the western countries for the present South African government is heavily qualified. The western countries have decided that their interest in South Africa lies in peaceful change that leads to an internationally accepted South Africa, and any internationally accepted solution of the South African situation would include the end of white rule. In the existing circumstances, the West would oppose as far as possible any move against South Africa that would hurt its interests therein and threaten the prospective of peaceful change, but would continue to exert pressure on the South African government to encourage it to change the internal set-up of the country.

Not only would the West neither aid the South African government to entrench some form, however modified, of white rule nor come to its rescue in the case of a sudden deterioration of the situation, but even

its benevolent neutrality cannot be taken for granted forever. Even its participation in eventual economic sanctions cannot be ruled out a priori.

'Constructive engagement' can easily go out of fashion in Washington; and as far as the other western countries are concerned, if they can go out of step with the U.S.A. when they move towards South Africa, they most certainly will not do so if the U.S.A. adopt a hostile attitude towards it. American attitudes towards countries or governments situated in what are considered secondary theatres can easily change, also, if not mostly, as a result of internal events, and every new administration tends to modify them to a certain extent. There are very few places in the world in relation to which the attitudes and the policy of the U.S.A. can change so easily at the change of the administration as South Africa. The present Reagan administration is almost certainly the most favourable South Africa can hope for in the present circumstances. Therefore, every change of administration in the U.S.A. would be a change for the worse as far as the South African government is concerned.

Furthermore, even in the case of a favourably inclined administration in the U.S.A., the South African government can expect only a limited and qualified support. It has been demonstrated again and again that at least for controversial countries the U.S.A. are an unreliable ally. Therefore, the South African government can consider the U.S.A., and a fortiori the other western countries only as 'fair weather' friends, and cannot count on their help in case of danger. In this condition there is little point for the South African government to bend to external pressure: since no amount of change will ever be sufficient to make this government and its basic aim respectable to and acceptable by the international community, it can as well stop worrying about trying to obtain its approval, and exploit instead the condition of South Africa as 'regional superpower' to compel the international community to accept it.

Once such an assessment had been made, the South African government had only one path left to follow. This is to try and find an 'internal' solution supported or accepted by the majority of each racial group. Such an 'internal' solution has by necessity to include a separate constitutional framework for the Blacks, or at least for most of them.

In this context the homelands maintain much of their original importance. They are the separate constitutional framework in which about half of the Blacks of Greater South Africa (i.e., the Republic of South Africa within its original borders) more or less willingly are accommodated. For the government it is of great importance to link politically also most

of the Blacks living in the white area to the homelands, and to have as many homelands as possible opt for independence.

Although the four homelands that have opted for independence are still almost totally dependent on South Africa, particularly for employment opportunities for their resident population, and despite the fact that their independence is not recognised by any other country, from the point of view of the government they cannot be considered merely as an expensive failure. Indeed, in their regard one aspect of the homelands policy, and the most important one, has been successful: about 4,5 million Blacks are now citizens of the independent states and not South African citizens. It does not matter if they still have to come to South Africa to find a job and if they have to use South African documents when they want to travel abroad (but not always). For the South African government and for South African law, they are foreigners; as far as their political rights are concerned, they are foreigners like the Greenlanders or the Fijians. This is what the South African government most wanted, and this is what it has obtained.

The citizens of the TBVC countries have lost any claim to a direct share in the political affairs of the Republic of South Africa. Even if some form of confederal agreement is implemented, they would be barred from interfering with the internal affairs of the 'white homeland'. Since it is not likely that they could regain the possibility of participating directly in South African politics (barring the case of a total defeat of the government, which could only mean military defeat. And in this case, it would not matter any longer), the result of the granting of independence to the TBVC countries is that at least 4,5 million Blacks (i.e., at least the de facto population of these countries) have been eliminated from the political and demographic balance of South Africa. This represents about one fifth of the total black population of Greater South Africa.

In reality, this is not enough to make any important difference: according to the figures of the 1980 census the Blacks constituted around 73% of the population of Greater South Africa and around 68% of the population of the Republic of South Africa. This is still far from what the government wants and from what it needs to make possible the long term survival of the 'white homeland'. Nevertheless, it means that one fifth of the Blacks has been put out of the political game. And it is the evidence that within determined limits it is possible to achieve some of the original objectives of the homelands policy.

It is difficult to foresee whether the South African government will be able to achieve its aim of a secure 'white homeland', and the odds, in particular the demographic odds, are certainly not in its favour. The attempt to achieve this aim would tax South African resources to the extreme. The implementation of the homelands policy has been expensive, and to continue implementing it would mean ever increasing expenses. South Africa is a wealthy country but its wealth has a limit. From the purely economic point of view, the homelands policy, and indeed, the whole political set-up in South Africa, have been mostly a waste of resources which could have been used more profitably in other ways. It is certainly not by chance that the most important representatives of the private capital are, and have consistently been for the last thirty years, opposed to the policy of the government. (Incidentally, this should induce an observer to question the validity of the theories that explain the homelands policy and apartheid in all its aspects as the adaptation of capitalistic exploitation to the peculiar conditions of South Africa.) The fact is that separate development is not directed at the maximisation of profits or at the most efficient utilisation of economic resources. Of course, it implies that those whose interest is paramount in the eyes of the government (the Afrikaners, and by extension, the Whites) enjoy, on average, a higher standard of life than other components of the population, but its main aim is the ethnic survival of a people which, rightly or wrongly, feels that in a unitary South Africa its identity would be threatened by the numerical superiority of the 'others'.

In this context, the utilization of a sizeable portion of South African resources for the implementation of the homelands policy is not a waste of resources any longer. It constitutes part of the price, in reduced immediate wealth and profits, that the Whites are paying for maintaining their political supremacy (not only the Whites are paying this price, but the immediate economic benefits of a change of policy would go, in the short and medium term, mostly to the White). In this context, the independence of the TBVC countries has been a success for the government, a success big enough to justify the continuation of the efforts to induce other homelands to opt for independence, and the utilization of a sizeable proportion of the South African resources to the improvement of the conditions in the independent states so that a growing number of Blacks would find their interest in the preservation of independence.

The independent states are an important component of the 'internal' solution which the South African government is pursuing. However, even an 'internal' solution cannot be successful if it has not the support of the majority of the Blacks. At the moment, this support is conspicuous by its absence. As it has already been pointed out, between 80% and 90% of the Blacks living in the white area considers 'one man one vote' as the best solution, and only around 10% of them supports the homelands per se. This is, of course, an uncomfortable fact for the government, since the Blacks living in the white area are the very group which constitutes the biggest problem for it. However, despite the higher visibility of the urban Blacks and despite the fact that they constitute the most sensitive political problem for the government, it should not be forgotten that half of the Blacks live in the homelands or the independent states. These Blacks have a better opinion about the usefulness of the homelands and see more positive aspects in the prospective of independence. Although those who support independence are still a minority, they are a sizeable minority: around 30% of the Blacks living in the homelands approve of it and this proportion increases in some particular categories (for example, in rural Ciskei it was over 40%).

Furthermore, among both urban and rural Blacks the number of those prepared to accept independence, even if only considering it as the lesser of two evils, is noticeably higher than that of those who support independence per se. In the homelands for which elaborate opinion surveys exist (Ciskei and KwaZulu), those who support independence and those who accept it, constitute more than half of the population. It is reasonable to think that also in the other homelands the proportion is more or less the same. Therefore, the minimum requirements exist for the involvement of the majority of the Blacks living in the homelands and independent states in an 'internal' solution which would protect white interests.

Of course, to achieve a willing involvement of the homeland Blacks in such a solution it is necessary that they can feel that they benefit from it. It is difficult to say whether independence can be positively judged from the point of view of the Blacks, excluding, of course, the small ruling group which has 'inherited the political kingdom' and for which the advantages of independence are great indeed.

The Blacks living in the urban areas are opposed to independence and indeed to the whole homelands concept. For most of them the independent

states are irrelevant. Only for those who are related to them independence had some effects, mostly negative. De jure they have lost their South African citizenship and therefore are potentially worse off than before independence. Despite the provisions concerning citizenship in the Status Acts, most of those Blacks who in terms of the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 were considered as citizens of the TBVC homelands although they lived in the white area, have not up to now been forced to take up formally the citizenship of their independent state. Nevertheless, their condition of 'potential foreigners' can easily change to one of 'actual foreigners' every time they enter into contact with South African authorities. Those Blacks have lost, if not for themselves, but for their children born after independence, Section 10 rights to live in the urban areas; they can be more easily subject to resettlement than those Blacks who are not de jure foreigners; and, together with the people living in the independent states, they have been cut off from future constitutional developments in South Africa: as the slogan goes, their birthright as South Africans has been sold for a dish of lentils and their right to claim as South Africans a bigger share of the wealth of South African has been taken away from them.

However, this is only a part of the picture. These Blacks have been indeed excluded from any future favourable political development in the Republic of South Africa, at least under the present government. But these developments are merely a possibility in the future and it is undisputable that it will take at least a bit longer before such a possibility becomes actual and the political conditions of the Blacks in South Africa undergoes a meaningful change. Therefore, the citizens of the independent states have not been cut off from a situation in which they could exert political power, or even foresee to be able to exert it in the medium term, and restricted instead to a condition of political irrelevance. They have been cut off from a situation of political powerlessness and from the apartheid legislation. At least in the short and medium term their situation has not worsened. Indeed, for those who live in the independent states, in some aspects it has improved: at least they are not constricted and oppressed in their everyday life by the racial legislation of South Africa. This does not mean that their space of liberty has greatly widened: most of the independent states are typical third world style tyrannies. However, in the case of Bophuthatswana a Bill of Rights has been included in the Constitution. Although stringent security legislation has been subsequently enacted, the citizens

of Bophuthatswana are more protected by law against abuses of power than the Blacks in South Africa. Also the establishment of an Ombudsman office at departmental level enhance this protection (besides allowing official or semi-official contacts between a Bophuthatswana department and similar institutions in other countries).(171)

Also as far as the prospects of a bigger share of the wealth of South Africa are concerned, it is doubtful that the citizens of the independent states are worse off now than they were before independence. In the independent states there are no trade union rights and no minimum wage regulations, therefore, for labourers and salaried workers there is less protection from exploitation than there is in the urban areas of South Africa. However, the same conditions applied before independence, as they apply to the other homelands. Furthermore, in the urban areas the conditions of the citizens of the independent states are not different from those of the other Blacks.

There is no doubt that the citizens of the independent states have lost the right to claim a bigger share of the wealth of South Africa through the eventual future application of political influence within the Republic, but again this is only a potential loss, not an actual one. And in reality, the desire of the South African government to see the independent states work has meant that since independence they have received a larger share of South African resources than they received before it.

However, for the TBVC countries the benefits of independence have not been as great as one could expect. All of them have been promised more land than that earmarked for them in the 1975 consolidation proposals, but by mid-1984 only part of this land has been transferred to them. Furthermore, the amount of extra land to be given to them is small and far short of what their leaders hoped for. Land is certainly a thorny issue, but it is surprising that the South African government did not feel opportune to reward the choice of independence more generously in terms of land. Also in terms of economic benefits the advantages for the TBVC countries have been limited. As a consequence of independence they have received more money and aid than they did before it, and more than comparable homelands have received. However, this extra South African aid, which can be ascribed more or less directly to the decision of these states to opt for independence, has been concentrated in the years around and immediately following independence. Four years after

it, the rate of increase in South African transfers to the independent states was back at the average rate of increase of the transfers to all the homelands and independent states. Again, also in this regard, the independent states are better off than if they had not opted for independence, but it is only a small improvement.

Furthermore, this increase in the resources at the disposal of the independent states has not spread its benefits evenly to all the people. The greatest benefits have been for the ruling élite, the political 'collaborationists', who have greatly increased both their power and their wealth. The fledgling bourgeoisie, composed of middle and high ranking civil servants, traders and businessmen and commercial farmers, is the other component of the population which has most benefitted from independence. However, it constitutes only a small, although slowly growing proportion of the population. Furthermore, most of its members are amongst those who originally supported the decision to opt for independence. Therefore, the most visible advantages of the first years of independence have not gone to that majority of the population which was opposed or passively accepted it and which must be won over if the independent states are to play a constructive role in the future of Greater South Africa.

While the noticeable economic benefits which the small bourgeoisie is enjoying vindicate its decision to support independence and strengthen this support, the high visibility of its newly gained standards of life can be unsettling for the majority of the population whose conditions have remained unchanged, and this could be the origin of many political troubles. The increase in the number of local job opportunities, however lowly paid they are, can have a stabilizing effect, but this increase has generally been too low to influence the outlook of many people. Therefore in the first years of independence, the independent states have not been able to enlarge noticeably the degree of support they have among their own population. On the other hand, the abrogation of the discriminatory legislation has certainly had some impact on the daily life of the people. The fact that, despite a general improvement in the situation of the Blacks in the urban areas of the Republic, such a discriminatory legislation is still in force in South Africa and there are no signs that it can be modified in the medium term (at least as far as the Blacks are concerned), is a strong argument for inducing the majority of the people living in the independent states to conclude that independence is still the lesser of two evils.

It is possible to say that the decision of the TBVC leaders to opt for independence has strenghtened the position of the South African government and, therefore, has helped in perpetuating a system which is repugnant to most of the Blacks. However, it is also possible to say that the fact that some million Blacks have ceased to be South African citizens, and the prospective that some more will follow, has made the government more amenable to the idea of accepting the urban Blacks as a different political entity and, therefore, of finding a way to acommodate their political aspirations outside the homelands framework.

It can be argued that the changes in the conditions of the Blacks since the mid-1970s are due to the pressure for change on the South African government caused by the modification for the worse of both internal and external situation and by the failure of the homelands policy in its original form. From this point of view, the only way to transform the South African society according to the wishes of most of the Blacks is to maintain this pressure to compel the South African government to bring about meaningful change or face the active opposition of four fifths of the population. In this light, the decision to opt for independence has been detrimental to the long term interests of the Blacks and the work of a handful of traitors of the people. However, this view can be shared only by those who want a change not merely in race relations but in the very fabric of the South African society. To bring about a new society it is necessary to destroy the old one; therefore, the heavier the pressure on the South African government and the worse the situation in South Africa the better it is, since this brings closer the day of the 'triumph of the people'.

It is possible that if the pressure on the South African government increases and it feels its position threatened it could make more concessions to the Blacks. But if the threat is too great it is possible and likely that the reaction of the Whites would be uncompromising: after all, if the result of peaceful change would be, in terms of loss of power and lower standard of living, similar to that of a military defeat, the alternative of a violent struggle which might be won could become attractive to many Whites.

The present condition of the Blacks is not enviable, and some aspects of the homelands policy are distasteful. However, in the present situation, the South African government is fortunately not ruthless enough to implement methodically these most distasteful aspects of its policy. But if the

government, and the white community at large, feel that they are fighting with their backs to the wall they could be tempted to use every means at their disposal. The determination of the Whites, and in particular of the Afrikaners, to fight for what they consider their land cannot be underestimated. This is an important weapon in the hands of the government, because nobody can afford the risk of considering merely as a bluff statements such as

> If all our efforts to ensure peace should fail, ... if all our goodwill and methods of upliftment are set to nought, and people try to dictate to us by means of violence, something will happen to the West on this subcontinent which they cannot imagine at the moment ... If people drive us until we have our backs to the wall, we shall strike and the consequences even the West cannot imagine today. We have not been sleeping. We have been preparing ourselves.(172)

It is possible that the South African government would shrink from such a 'Göttersdammerung' solution, but even if it were so (and it is not certain), the destruction caused by a conventional fight to (almost?) the bitter end would be so great that the winner would find itself in possess of a heap of rubble. In this case, everybody would certainly be the loser.

Of course, it is not merely a question of moralizing about the necessity to avoid violence, or of using in an opposite political environment the slogan of 'better red than dead' so dear to some currents of the pacifist movement, although obviously even a political observer cannot but wish that violence and suffering are reduced to a minimum. The point is that neither an open struggle for supremacy between the two main race groups, which would certainly be a long, bitter and destructive struggle, nor the eventual establishment of a People's Republic of Azania, which would be the almost certain outcome of a white defeat in such a struggle (a defeat which is not, however, certain), would be in the interest of the greatest part of the South African population nor in the interest of the western countries. Both in the interest of the majority of the population of South Africa and the western countries the best solution would be an evolutionary, and therefore step by step, process of change which would improve the conditions of life of all the groups which compose the population of South Africa.

The independent states are part of such a process. Their independence had the support of important sectors of their population, as important

dynamic forces among the population of the other homelands support independence, even if not mainly as a result of the benefits it has brought to the independent states but because they think that both the status quo and violent opposition to it would be a worse alternative.

However, the majority of the population of the homelands does not support independence, even if many are prepared to accept it for dearth of more enticing alternatives. Therefore it is difficult to foresee whether after KwaNdebele, other homelands would opt for independence. This decision would depend on three factors. The first concerns the condition of independence. If the South African government is prepared to make more concessions in terms of land, economic development before independence and financial aid after it, then it is possible that other homelands could find worth their while to become independent. Such concessions would be expensive for the South African government and would require some time to be implemented. Thus the South African government would have to concentrate its efforts on a single homeland for a longer period of time around its independence than it has done up to now. This would slow down the tempo of the independence process. This is already happening: after that Transkei and Bophuthatswana became independent in successive years, both Venda and Ciskei did so after two years had passed from the independence of their predecessor. Three years have passed since the independence of Ciskei, and KwaNdebele is in the process of following suit. It is possible that if in future other homelands will opt for independence this would happen at a five or six years' interval between one and the other.

This introduces the second factor, which concerns the possible developments of the condition of the Blacks within the Republic of South Africa. It seems logical that if these conditions, particularly in the political field, appear to improve, or if the situation appears to deteriorate rapidly and deeply enough to make the fall of white rule a possible outcome in the short- or medium-term, the attractiveness of independence would decrease noticeably.

As regards the latter eventuality, the government appears to be firmly in control of the situation. There are good prospects that the international attitude towards South Africa could remain for some time as positive (as attitudes towards South Africa go) as it is now, or even improve if friendly governments in some western countries (and moderate

African countries, perhaps) remain in power. If nothing untoward happens, it will be the end of this decade or the early 1990s before the situation could worsen again, even to the point of becoming dangerous. Therefore, there should be enough time for at least another homeland, besides KwaNdebele, to become independent.

Also as far as the first eventuality is concerned, holding out should not bring great rewards in the short or medium term. The government has realised that the independent states will never attract the support of all the Blacks, and therefore it is tentatively searching for different solutions. However, two facts make this attitude of scarce interest for the homeland governments and perhaps also for their population. The first is that it will take a long time before this tentative search could be translated into practical policy. Considering that from the first detailed enunciation of the plan for a tri-cameral assembly to its implementation seven years have passed, it is legitimate to think that it will be the 1990s before a constitutional reform involving the Blacks could become reality. (Again bar unexpected happenings.) And, at any rate, such a constitutional reform could not bring the Blacks in on an equal footing with Whites, Coloureds and Indians (otherwise the 'white homeland' could not exist), and it would concern the urban Blacks only. For the population of the homelands, and particularly for their leaders, this would not change the present situation.

The third factor concerns a possible evolution of the constellation of states concept. The South African government is establishing structures that allow a joint decision-making with the governments of the independent states and the homelands in many fields. In this framework, black leaders will enjoy considerable power, although the size of their countries and of their countries' economy will still leave the South African government with greater power. The fact that the homelands participate in this structure could make independence pointless. However, if the homelands remain part of South Africa, they will always be subject to the laws of South Africa and to the overall control of the South African government. This would put the homelands in a somewhat inferior condition than the independent states and increase the attractiveness of independence.

The situation of South Africa is complex and a solution to its many problems difficult to find. However, if it is accepted that a violent

struggle would be detrimental for all the people involved and for the western interests, it must be remembered that a peaceful solution requires not only that the economic and political aspirations of the Blacks be satisfied, but also that the interests of the Whites be protected and their aspirations respected. In this light, the independent states have an important role to play.

NOTES TO PART I

1 Even if one complied with these qualifications the franchise was not automatic. One had to petition the Governor-General for admission to the franchise and the petition had to be accompanied by a number of documents, comprising a certificate of good character signed by three white electors and endorsed by a Resident Magistrate or a Justice of the Peace. And of course, the Governor-General was not compelled to grant the application.

2 The constituencies were: Victoria East, Fort Beaufort, Somerset East, Queenstown, Wodehouse, Aliwal North and Tembuland.

3 South Africa Act, 1909; Section 24 (iii).

4 Amongst those early discriminatory laws of the Union there were:
The Native Labour Regulation Act (Act No 15 of 1911) which continued an already established tendency - both in the British Colonies and the Boer Republics - to make certain actions, when committed by Blacks, a criminal offence - in this case a breach of labour contract; and
the Dutch Reformed Church Act (Act No 23 of 1911) whose clause 10 prohibited non-European members in the Cape from membership in the Transvaal or Free State.

5 Walshe, P., The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, London 1970, p.30.

6 P. Seme, then member of the executive of the Congress.
Quoted in Walshe, P., op.cit., p.37.

7 General Smuts' famous speech at the Savoy Hotel, London, although pronounced a few years later (May 1917) is indicative that at the time there was a wide agreement on the opportunity of a total territorial and political segregation of the Blacks. In this speech he said that it was useless to attempt to govern Blacks and Whites in the same way, that its government's policy was to keep the Blacks apart as much as possible in land ownership, in forms of government and in many other ways, and that in the long run large areas governed and cultivated by Blacks would exist side by side with White areas.
Quoted in Walshe, P., op.cit., p.58.

8 Hertzog's Native policy legislative programme consisted of four interdependent bills published in July 1926. The first of these was the Coloured Persons' Rights Bill which removed

the Blacks from the Cape common voters' roll. The Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill provided for seven White M.P.'s (two each for Cape, Transvaal and Natal, one for the Orange Free State), to be elected by chiefs, headmen and prominent Blacks nominated by the Governor-General. These M.P.'s were to have a reduced status, being able to vote only on 'Native matters'. The Union Native Council Bill established an advisory council composed of fifty members, fifteen nominated by the Governor-General, the others elected in the same way as the seven M.P.'s. The fourth bill, the Native Land (Amendment) Bill was to be the solution of the land problem and proposed to give the Blacks the possibility of acquiring ownership rights in those areas suggested by the Beaumont Commission.

9 Sections 12 to 15.

10 Every district outside the Transkeian Territories, excluding the areas which were native reserves or for which a native advisory board was established, had an electoral committee composed of members elected by all the Black taxpayers of the district (which for this purpose was divided into wards). Section 5.

11 Sections 8 to 11.

12 Sections 20 to 29. The Council was to consist of twenty-two members, of whom were White officials, four were nominated Blacks and twelve elected Blacks.

13 See Walshe, P., op.cit., ch. IV and VI.

14 About the influence of the mining industry on the early elaboration of the pass-law system, see, among others: Smalberger, J.M., The Role of the Diamond-mining Industry in the Development of the Pass-law System in South Africa, in The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. IX, No 3 (1976), pp.419-434.

15 Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, Census of the Cape of Good Hope 1904, Final Report, G.19-1905, para. 139.

16 Ibidem, para. 228.

17 Union of South Africa, Third census of the population of the Union of South Africa, Report, Part I, U.G. 15-'23.

18 By Section 10. They were to consist of not less than three elected Blacks, resident in the area, and a chairman 'who may be a European'.

19 Sections 12 and 17.

20 Native (Urban Area) Amendment Act of 1930 (No 25 of 1930).

21 In this period there were some amendments to the laws of 1923 and 1936, but not of great importance. The Native Laws Amendment Act (No 43 of 1937) in addition to introducing the principle of the removal of 'redundant' Blacks from the urban areas, modified the previous laws in the general sense of toughening the measures of those laws, extending the restrictions of the right of Blacks to acquire land to the rural townships and further restricting the right of the Black to enter urban areas. The Native Laws Amendment Act (No 46 of 1944) worked in the same direction, but also enlarged (slightly) the powers of the native advisory boards.

22 Section 9.

23 Sections 14, 28 and 29.

24 See for instance Ballinger, M., From Union to Apartheid, a Trek to Isolation, Cape Town 1969, ch. 10.

25 The terms of reference of the Fagan Commission were: (1) to enquire into: (a) the operation of the laws in force in the Union relating to Natives in or near urban areas and in areas where Natives are congregated for industrial purposes other than mining; (b) the operation of the Native Pass Laws and any laws requiring the production by Natives of documents of identification; (c) the employment in mines and other industries of migrant labour; its economic and social effects upon the lives of the people concerned, and the future policy to be followed in regard thereto; and (2) to draft such legislation as might be necessary to give effect to its recommendation.
Union of South Africa, Department of Native Affairs, Report of the Native Laws Commission 1946-49, U.G.28-1948.

26 See Brookes, E.H., The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to the Present Day. Cape Town 1924, ch. XV.

27 See Bundy, C., The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry. London 1979.

28 South African Natives Affairs Commission 1903-5; Report of the Commission; Cape Town 1905, para. 193.

29 Ibidem, para. 207.

30 For a discussion of this act, see Brookes, E.H., op.cit., pp.334-340.

31 BENSO, Black Development in South Africa. Pretoria 1976, ch. 3.

32 Union of South Africa, Report of the Natives' Land Commission. (U.G. 19/1916)

33 See Walshe, P., op.cit., chs. III and V.

34 From 1918 to 1935 four acts regarding the land question were signed:
- the Natives' Lands (Natal and Transvaal) Release Act (No 28 of 1925);
- the Natives' Lands Further Release and Acquisition Act (No 34 of 1927);
- the Natives' Lands Adjustment Act (No 36 of 1931); and
- the Natives' Lands Further Release and Acquisition Act (No 27 of 1935).

All of them were almost meaningless, regarding as they were only slight adjustments of borders or the cession of a few farms here and there.

35 See for example the declaration of J.G. Strijdom - then an M.P. of the then official Opposition Party, Dr. Malan's National Party - during the debates in the first session of 1938, in which he emphatically attacked the Government for 'squandering' the White man's money on buying land and some technical improvements for the Natives.
Hansard, vol. 31, col. 1052 et seq.

36 South African Institute for Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1980, pp.393-394.

37 The first participation of Blacks in local self-government was within the Village Management Boards, set up by the Village Management Boards Act of 1881. The Boards in each village were free from supervision, and the Black villages had a completely Black Board. The Boards apparently did not function too well, and in 1921 the Cape Provincial Administration abolished all existing Native Village Management Boards.
See Brookes, E.H., op.cit., pp.252-253.

38 For a discussion of this law see: Hammond-Tooke, W.D., Command or Consensus, the Development of Transkeian Local Government. Cape Town 1975, chs. 5 and 10.

39 The last district to be added was Xalanga in 1925 (By Proclamation No 310 of 1924).

40 By Proclamation No 169 of 1911 in the three districts of Western Pondoland, with a General Council (Pondoland General Council). The Council was extended to the four districts of Eastern Pondoland by Proclamation No 166 of 1927. The main difference between the district councils in Transkei and those in Pondoland was that in the latter only two members of the council were elected (instead of four), two being nominated by the Paramount Chief. The other two were appointed by the magistrate on behalf of the Governor-General.

41 By Proclamation No 279 of 1930.

42 For instance, the estimates of expenditure for the year 1932-33 were of £150 238 (revenue £148 336). From Evans, I.L., Native Policy in Southern Africa. Cambridge 1934, ch. 7.

43 Section 21.

44 The Executive Committee was to consist of the Chief Magistrate, three other district magistrates and four Black members of the Council nominated by the Council itself for the appointment by the Governor-General.

45 Sections 28 to 36, and Section 54.

46 Sections 1 to 4.

47 Sections 5 and 14.

48 By Proclamation No 34 of 1934.

49 This matter was regulated by the Native Affairs Amendment Act of 1926 (No 27 of 1926).

50 For a detailed description of the structure and work of the Council System, see: Brookes, E.H., op.cit., ch. IV and XII; and Rogers, H., Native Administration in the Union of South Africa. Johannesburg 1933, ch. IV.

51 See, for example, the discussion on the social composition of the Bunga and the various degrees of support it had from different groups of the Transkeian population in Hammond-Tooke, W.D., op.cit., pp.186-194.

52 Walshe, P., Black Nationalism in South Africa. Johannesburg 1973, p.31.

53 Union of South Africa, Population census, 8th May 1951. U.G. 42/1955.

54 See Gerhart, G.M., Black Power in South Africa; the Evolution of an Ideology. Berkeley 1978, ch. 3; and Benson, M., The African Patriots, the Story of the African National Congress of South Africa. London 1963, chs. IX and X.

55 See Walshe, P., The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, op.cit., ch. XIV.

56 See Benson, M., op.cit., ch. XIII.

57 The most important of these measures were, in 1949: the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (No 55 of 1949), the Natives Laws Amendment Act (No 56 of 1949); in 1950: the Immorality Amendment Act (No 21 of 1950), the Population Registration Act (No 30 of 1950), the Group Areas Act (No 40 of 1950), the Suppression of Communism Act (No 44 of 1950); and in 1951: the Native Building Workers Act (No 27 of 1951), the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (No 52 of 1951), the Bantu Authorities Act (No 68 of 1951).

58 In particular in February 1950 on the Reef. See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1949-1950, pp.19-20 and 71-72; and in October-November 1951 in the Eastern Cape and Johannesburg, see S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1951-1953, pp.27-34.

59 From about 7 000 to about 100 000. See Walshe, P., op.cit., pp.402-403.

60 For example, the Suppression of Communism Amendment Act (No 50 of 1951), the Public Safety Act (No 3 of 1953) and the Riotous Assemblies and Suppression of Communism Amendment Act (No 15 of 1954).

61 During the war many emergency measures were proclaimed. To ensure the smooth working of the industrial machine measures providing for the settlement of labour disputes, prohibiting strikes, were introduced. (Proclamation 318 of 1942, War Measure No 145 of 1942; and following amendments of 1944.) This measure was continued after the war by Acts 18 and 48 of 1948, and by Act 29 of 1950 (all called War Measures Continuation Act).

62 Section 77. To safeguard the 'economic welfare' of employees of any race, in any undertaking, industry or occupation, the Minister of Labour could begin a lengthy process of investigations and recommendations at the end of which it might be possible to reserve certain kinds of work for persons of a specific race. The undertaking, industry, trade or occupation concerned had to be defined determining the area or class of the premises involved, the type of work and whether it was to be reserved wholly or in part for members of the racial group specified.

63 Benson, M., op.cit., ch. 5.

64 Gerhart, G.M., op.cit., ch. 5.

65 On the P.A.C., see Gerhart, G.M., op.cit., ch. 5.

66 Only in the townships around Vereeniging and those of Cape Town the P.A.C. was able to mobilise a significant proportion of the Black population. See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1959-1960, pp.55-60.

67 See Soukosi, Z., African Opposition in South Africa from 1948-1969; an Analysis of the African National Congress of South Africa's Non-violent and Violent Actions. Berlin 1975, pp.237-244.

68 On Poqo and in particular on its activity in Transkei see: Lodge, T., Poqo and rural resistance in the Transkei 1960-1965, in: University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar Papers No 24, pp.137-147.

69 Section 27 of the Native Laws Amendment Act (No 54 of 1952) extended the provisions and limits of Section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (No 25 of 1945) to women. This extension was not immediately implemented. However from 1954, it was applied in the Cape Peninsula and a few other areas mainly in the Western Cape. From 1956 it was applied gradually in the whole Union, beginning with small towns. This was a precautionary measure in consideration of the strong resentment the issue of these documents to the women caused amongst the Blacks.

70 About the betterment schemes, see Yawitch, J., Betterment; the myth of homeland agriculture. Johannesburg 1982.

71 S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1954-1955, p.90.

72 Union of South Africa; Summary of the Report of the Commission for Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa. U.G. 61/1955, pp.45-46.

73 H. Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs. Hansard, vol. 18, col. 7548; 20 June 1955.

74 Up to 1961 sixteen black spots measuring 15 252 morgen in the Transvaal, and sixteen measuring 4 398 morgen in the Cape had been cleared.
"Acquisition of Land by the S.A. Native Trust and the Consolidation of Bantu Homelands" in Bantu, July 1961.

75 From January 1959 to the end of 1961 more than 26 000 Blacks had been 'endorsed out' of the Western Cape, 14 272 from the Cape Town municipal area.
Hansard 10, col. 3542; 30 March 1962.

76 The machinery for the gradual abolition of the labour tenant system was provided by the Bantu Laws Amendment Act (No 42 of 1964).

77 It is extremely difficult to quantify the number of people affected by the removals. From Maré, G., African Population Relocation in South Africa, Johannesburg 1980, it appears that up to 1970 well over one million Blacks had been relocated, about 97 000 due to black spots clearance and around a million due to the abolition of the labour tenant system and squatting on white-owned farms. pp.7 and 10.

78 According to BENSO, op.cit., 1976, in terms of the 1975 consolidation proposals about 175 000 Black families would have to be removed from the areas they were occupying and resettled elsewhere in their consolidated homeland. p.23.

79 - Category I: clearance of black spots; - Category II: relocation due to the abolition of the labour tenant system and 'squatting' on white-owned farms; - Category III: relocation through the operation of influx control legislation;
- Category IV: urban relocation; -Category V: relocations due to the institution of betterment schemes; - Category VI: relocation for strategic or infrastructural schemes;
- Category VII: relocation as resistance; - Category VIII: Homeland consolidation; - Category IX: other.
Maré, G., op.cit., pp.2-43.

80 Surplus People Project, Forced Removals in South Africa. Cape Town 1983, vol. 1. The categories are: 1) Farm removals; 2) The clearing of Black spots; 3) Removal of 'badly situated' Black areas in terms of the territorial consolidation of the homelands; 4) Urban relocation from de-

proclaimed Black townships to the homelands; 5) Removals of informal settlements in urban and peri-urban areas; 6) Removals because of the operation of influx control legislation, including repatriation of foreign Blacks; 7) Group areas removals; 8) Removals as result of implementation of infrastructural development schemes or agricultural projects; 9) Removals for strategic-military purposes; 10) Directly political removals (including banishment of individuals); and 11) Removals due to the institution of betterment schemes. The estimated number of people removed for all the reasons in the period 1960-1982 is put at 3 522 900 plus and the estimated number of people under threat of removal is 1 765 000 plus.

81 Section 5(a).

82 Only in 1963 the first Urban Bantu Councils were established, in Benoni and Welkom. Up to 1967 only three others were established: Vereeniging in 1965, Kroonstad in 1966 and Parys in 1967. Seven were established in 1968 and eleven in 1969. S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1968, p.180; id. 1971, p.151.

83 By Section 8 of the Third Bantu Laws Amendment Act (No 49 of 1970).

84 For example the percentage poll of the elections of the Urban Bantu Council of Soweto in October 1974 was 14,3%. S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1974, p.170.

85 See Gerhart, G., op.cit. ch. 8.

86 Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (National Cultural Liberation Movement) was first founded in 1928 by King Solomon Ka Dinizulu (Chief Buthelezi's grandfather). Under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi it was transformed into a political movement open to all the Blacks.

87 Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Riots of Soweto and elsewhere from the 16th of June 1976 to the 28th of February 1977. RP 55/1980. Part E.

88 Arguably the most important effect of the riots was to urge the Government to change its policy in regard to the Coloureds. It was the first time that a Black protest gained important Coloured support and that a great number of Coloureds joined the Blacks in rioting. Although the Nationalist Government did very little to endear the Coloureds to itself, the Coloureds had always been considered a potential ally of the Whites against the Blacks. The attitude of many Coloureds during the riots was thus unexpected and

traumatic for many Whites. The new constitutional dispensation, for Coloureds and Indians, can be considered as the most important result of the 'Soweto' riots.

89 Specified in Section 5, subsection (1)(a).

90 According to S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1978, pp.341-342, the percentage poll in the Soweto wards varied from 4,4% to 6%; but in Meadowlands and Dobsonville which had separate community councils, it was 16% and 42% respectively.

91 The Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation and Other Related Matters, chaired by Professor N. Wiehahn, was appointed in 1977. The investigations into the labour legislation were to be made with reference to:
- the adjusting of the existing system for the regulation of labour relations in South Africa with the object of making it provide more effectively for the needs of South Africa's changing times;
- the adjustment, if necessary, of the existing machinery for the prevention and settlement of disputes which changing needs may require;
- the elimination of bottle-necks and other problems which are at present being experienced within the entire sphere of labour;
- the methods and means by which a foundation for the creation and expansion of sound labour relations may be laid for the future of South Africa.

The Wiehahn Commission presented the first of its seven reports to the Government in 1979. Among the most important recommendations of the Commission were that legal recognition should be extended to African unions; that individuals should be free to join any trade union of their choice; that trade unions should be free to prescribe such membership qualifications as they saw fit; that regulations which governed the segregation of facilities should be repealed; and that the principle of statutory work reservation should be abolished.
See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1977, pp.301-304; 1979, pp.274-278.

92 By the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979 (No 94 of 1979).

93 Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation affecting the Utilisation of Manpower (excluding the legislation administered by the Departments of Labour and Mines), RP 32/1979, ch. 4.

94 Notwithstanding the improvement of the conditions of the urban Blacks, there was no place for them in the political dispensation in South Africa: the Minister of Plural Relations, C. Mulder, reaffirmed this: "If our policy is

taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the Black people are concerned, there will not be one Black man with South African citizenship".
Hansard, 2/78, col. 579, 7 February 1978.

95 Section 8 of the Black Local Authorities Act (No 102 of 1982).

96 Section 23(1)(l). The Schedule mentions 29 matters, from the "promotion of the moral and social welfare of the residents" to the "allocation of bursaries for educational purposes", and from the "establishment, construction, maintenance ... within or outside the area ... of works for supplying power" to the "prevention or combating of the unlawful occupation of land and buildings".

97 Section 23(1)(a) to (i).

98 The lowest percentage polls were those of Evaton, in the Vaal Triangle (5,05%), and of the Grahamstown's township, Rini (5,87%). In the important area of Soweto the polls were: Soweto 10,7%, Diep Meadow 14,7%, Dobsonville 23,53%, while in Mamelodi it was 27,97%. The places with the highest percentage poll were Kagiso (Krugersdorp) with 36,05%, Seeisoville (Kroonstad) with 33,53% and Jouberton (Klerksdorp) with 31,72%. In most of the other places the percentage poll was between 22% and 29%.
Financial Mail, 6 December 1983.

99 See, for example, one of the earliest statements on separate development which can be found in the draft Republican constitution of 1942, declaring in Article IX, Section 2: "To each of such segregated race groups of Coloured subjects of the Republic, self-government will be granted within their own territory under the central management of the general Government of the country, in accordance with the fitness of the Group for the carrying out of such self-government for which they will have to be systematically trained". Quoted in Carter, G.M., et al,. South Africa's Transkei: the Politics of Domestic Colonialism. London 1967, p.34.

100 For a discussion of the political climate in which those changes took place, and for their ideological background as it was presented during the debates in Parliament, see Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., chs. 2 and 3.

101 Although only at its lower level, that of the tribal authority, it was really reflecting (and not completely) the traditional Bantu power structure, the upper levels being an artificial elaboration on the theme. See Hammond-Tooke, W.D., op.cit., ch. 11.

102 Section 2.

103 Sections 3, 4 and 9.

104 Sections 3, 5, 6 and 10.

105 Sections 3, 7 and 11.

106 Section 8: On the political climate in which this law was enacted and the Black reaction to it, see: Carter, G., et al, op.cit., chs. 2 and 3 and Ballinger, M., op.cit., chs.

107 At the 1955 session the General Council, having been asked whether or not it was prepared to accept this new system, decided to accept "the principles of the Bantu Authorities Act, but, in order to preserve the integrity of the Transkei, it requests the Chairman to appoint a Recess Committee to consider how best to integrate the Council system with the Bantu Authority policy". The main committee suggestion was to keep the district councils as a fourth tier between tribal and regional authorities, in order not to disrupt the by now consolidated administrative structure of Transkei. These proposals were unanimously and with little discussion approved by the Council at a special session held on 23rd and 24th November 1955.
See Hammond-Tooke, W.D., op.cit., pp.202-205.

108 About the effects this sudden coming into the spotlight had on the institution of the chieftainship and as its credibility amongst the tribesmen, see Hammond-Tooke, W.D., op.cit., ch. 12.
For the reason of the 'recruiting' of the tribal chiefs as the backbone of the Bantu Authorities System, see amongst others, Hepple, A., Verwoerd. London 1967, pp.110 et seq.; and Mayer, P., The Tribal Elite and the Transkeian Elections of 1963, in The Elites of Tropical Africa, O.V.P., London 1966, pp.286-308.

109 The general terms of reference of the Tomlinson Commission were:
"to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into and to report on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and based on effective socio-economic planning."
Union of South Africa, Summary of the Report of the Commission for Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa. Pretoria 1955, p.xviii.

110 Ibidem, ch. 50, para. XIV.

111 Ibidem, ch. 50, para. II.

112 "Taking into account the cultural-historical background, the systematic expansion of seven blocks around historico-legal centres is recommended by the Commission, namely Tswanaland, Vendaland, Pediland, Swaziland, Zululand, Xhosaland and Sotholand, in each of which, on the basis of the Bantu Authorities Act, the Bantu themselves will exercise administrative functions to an ever-increasing extent, suited to the normal process of development and according to the demands of the time."
Ibidem, ch. 50, para. XIII, sec. iv.

113 "Of the entire territory 30% is badly eroded and 44% moderately so."
Ibidem, ch. 12, para. 62. But it is referred to the Transkei only and not to the whole of the black areas as many authors report.

114 Ibidem, ch. 24, para. 16.

115 Ibidem, ch. 28, paras. 20 to 23.

116 Ibidem, ch. 47, para. 9.

117 Ibidem, ch. 12, para. 29.

118 Ibidem, ch. 36, paras. 21 to 27. This was not an unanimous recommendation. Two commissioners, Mr. C. W. Prinsloo and Mr. C. B. Young, recommended in a minority report that the black areas should not be open to white industrialists, and therefore they wanted that the development of industry in those areas be undertaken only by "Bantu" or "bodies controlled by the state".
Ibidem, ch. 36, para. 29.

119 Ibidem, ch. 36, paras. 4 to 20.

120 Government Decisions on the Recommendations of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa.
White Paper F-1956.

121 W.P. F-1956; decision 9(i).

122 Ibidem, decision 10.

123 Ibidem, decision 9 (vii). On this matter the Government will change its mind in 1959.

124 Ibidem, decision 10.

125 Ibidem, decision 20.

126 Ibidem.

127 Some of the decisions taken in the White Paper, however, were changed.

128 Section 15.

129 Section 2. Those national units were North Sotho, South Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa, and Zulu.

130 Section 8 and Section 12, subsections (1) and (2).

131 Section 12, subsection (6).

132 Sections 4 and 5.

133 Sections 2 and 3. At the beginning, commissioner-generals were appointed respectively to the North Sotho unit, the Tswana and South Sotho units, the Venda and Tsonga units, the Xhosa unit, and the Zulu and Swazi units.

134 See for instance the words of the then Prime Minister, Dr. H. Verwoerd, during the debate of the second reading stage of the Bill:
"I say that if it is within the powers of the Bantu and if the territories in which now lives can develop to full independence, it will develop in that way."
Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6221 (20th May 1959).

135 Hansard, vol. 99, col. 63 (27th January 1959).

136 For a discussion of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act and for the political debate it aroused, see: Carter, G.M., et al; op. cit., pp. 51-67.

137 Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6222 (20th May 1959).

138 In the words of Dr. Verwoerd:
"The policy of the National Party is to strive for a permanent White South Africa, whatever dangers are threatening it, whilst being prepared to develop the areas where the Bantu control may be extended under the leadership of the White man as a guardian and on the understanding that even if it should lead to Bantu independence, it would be ensured by wise statemanship that that development takes placed in such a spirit and in such a way that friendship will remain possible although the White man will never be under any form of Bantu control."
Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6241 (20th May 1959).

139 Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6215 (20th May 1959).

140 Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6032 (18th May 1959).

141 Situation in May 1959. The nine regional authorities were established in the districts of Potgietersrust, Taung, Pilansberg, Herschel, Keiskamahoek, King William's Town, Middledrift, East London and Victoria East.

142 To give a summary of the implementation of the Bantu Authorities System as modified by the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, the dates of the establishment of the territorial authorities are the following:
Transkei: Transkei Territorial Authority and Executive Council - 1st September 1956.

Ciskei: Ciskei Territorial Authority - 24th March 1961; Executive Council - 20th September 1968.

Bophuthatswana: Tswana Territorial Authority - 21st April 1961; Executive Council - 14th October 1968.

Lebowa: Lebowa Territorial Authority - 10th August 1962; Executive Council - 16th September 1969.

Venda: Thohoyandou Territorial Authority and Executive Council - 9th November 1962.

Gazankulu: Machangane Territorial Authority - 9th November 1962; Executive Council - 1st August 1969.

QwaQwa: Basotho-Ba-Borwa Territorial Authority and Executive Council - 1st April 1969.

KwaZulu: Zulu Territorial Authority - 22nd May 1970.

Kangwane: Swazi Territorial Authority and Executive Council - 28th November 1975.

KwaNdebele: South Ndebele Territorial Authority and Executive Council - 24th November 1977.

143 For example, the Buthelezi tribe consistently refused to accept the betterment schemes and the institution of any authority above the tribal level. Only in 1968 was it possible to establish the Mahlatabini Regional Authority, of which Gatsha Buthelezi became the chairman, and this only after the South African Government exerted heavy pressure on the tribes of the area, who made clear that they were not supporting the system but merely obeying the law. See Butler, I., et al: The Black Homelands of South Africa. Berkeley 1977, pp. 79-80.

144 In the words of the then Prime Minister, Dr. H. Verwoerd: "The Bantu will be able to develop into separate states. That is not what we would have liked to see. It is a form of fragmentation that we would not have liked if we were able to avoid it. In the light of the pressure being exerted on South Africa, there is however no doubt that eventually this will have to be done, thereby buying for the White man the right to retain his domination in what is his country."
Hansard, vol. 107, col. 4191 (10th April 1961).

145 Transkei Territorial Authority, Proceedings and Reports of Select Committees at the Session of 1961. Umtata: Territorial Printers, 1961, p. 49.

146 The decision of not allowing a multiracial electorate became very controversial (although it was really naive to think that the Government could ever consider such a thing), but at least this time Matanzima did not take the tune from the Government, and his decision to strive for a black government and a black electorate was clear long before the meeting with the Prime Minister, as is proved by his declaration at the end of the debate of the Transkei Territorial Authority during which the select committee was appointed, in which he said that the T.T.A. decision was an "unequivocal rejection of the policy of a multiracial society". Quoted in Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., p. 114.

147 "In the case of the Transkeian Authority the stage was reached where the body which speaks on behalf of their national group specifically asked to be given a form of self-government. The Government then declared its willingness to grant self-government to the Transkei."
Hansard, vol. 2, col. 74 (23rd January 1962).

At least a third of the Prime Minister's speech, on the no-confidence motion, was dedicated to the decision of giving self-government to Transkei and to the limits within which this autonomy would be exerted, and to the reasons for which the Government adopted a policy which could result (as it did) in the partition of South Africa.
See Hansard, vol. 2, coll. 60-99 (23rd January 1962).

148 Again in the words of Dr. Verwoerd: "If the Opposition is correct and we are now dividing the country, then now I have to choose between dividing it (and thereby retaining control over the area settled by our White forefathers) or regarding the country as one governmental unit (and thereby turning it in a multi-racial state which ... will be under Black domination). I choose division. If I have to choose between division with all the dangers that may be attached to it, and the so-called territorial unity with its attendant White racial suicide, then I unhesitatingly choose division."
Hansard, vol. 2, col. 89 (23rd January 1962).

149 See: Republic of South Africa, Department of Information, The Transkei; Emancipation without Chaos. Pretoria 1963.

150 About the drafting of the Transkeian constitution of 1963 see: Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., pp.113-120; and Laurence, P., The Transkei; South Africa's Politics of Partition. Johannesburg 1976, pp.63-67.

151 The main opposition was to the composition of the future Legislative Assembly which was to be composed by sixty-four ex-officio (chiefs) and forty-five elected members. Some members of the T.T.A. wanted a fully elected Legislative Assembly, and many wanted at least a numerical parity between elected and ex-officio members. (An amendment to change the membership of the Legislative Assembly to sixty-four ex-officio and sixty-four elected members was defeated only by forty-eight votes to forty-three.) The main opposition both in the T.T.A. and in the country came from the Thembu and their Paramount Chief, Sabata Dalindyebo.
See Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., pp.118-119.

152 For a discussion of the debate for the introduction of the Transkei Constitution Act, see: Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., pp.67-69.

153 Constitution Amendment Act (no. 9 of 1963).

154 Sections 2, 59 and 60.

155 Section 7.

156 First Schedule, Part A. The government departments of Transkei were to be: Department of the Chief Minister and of Finance, Department of Justice, Department of Education, Department of Interior, Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Department of Roads and Works. Three other departments, namely the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the Department of Transport and the Department of Information were added in 1966.

157 Part IV, Sections 9 to 22.

158 Part IV, Sections 22 to 43.

159 First Schedule, Part B. The subjects ranged from direct taxation of Transkeian citizens residing inside or outside the territory, Bantu education, agriculture, soil and water conservation, roads and bridges (excluding national roads), labour matters and welfare services to intoxicating liquors, establishment of inferior courts, control of police personnel transferred to the Transkeian government, and in general to "all matters which ... are of a merely local or private nature in Transkei".

160 Section 39. "... establishment, control, entry, movement or operation of any military unit ... or any other military matter of whatever nature"; "... the establishment and control of factories working for the armament industry or producing explosives", all the matters regarding foreign policy, use of police forces not expressly assigned to the Transkeian government, telecommunications, railways, harbours and civil aviation, "the entry of persons other than Transkeian citizens into Transkei", currency, public loans, banking and control of financial institutions, customs matters and the amendment or repeal of this act, were all matters expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Legislative Assembly.

161 Part VIII, Sections 51 to 58.

162 See Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit. p.124.

163 See the speech of Dr. Verwoerd at the no-confidence debate on 23rd January 1962.
Hansard, vol. 2 coll. 60-99.

164 See note 142.

165 Act no. 86 of 1965, Section 4.

166 Act no. 46 of 1968, Section 5.

167 Act no. 46 of 1968, Section 4(1)(m).

168 Act no. 46 of 1968, Section 10.

169 Speech of Mr. M.C. Botha, then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, at the second reading of the Bill. Hansard, vol. 24, col. 1766 (7th March 1968).

170 Section 23.

171 Section 4(1)(j) and Section 4(1)(d).

172 White Paper F-1956, Decision 9(i). See above p. 51.

173 Hansard, vol. 24, col. 1772 (7th March 1968).

174 For example the GDP of the homelands (i.e. excluding migrants and commuters), excluding the subsistence sector was, for the year 1959/60, R98 668 000, and in the year 1965/66 R140 416 000 of which respectively R6 975 000 and R8 848 000 were the contribution of "manufacturing, electricity, gas, water, and construction". BENBO (1976), op.cit., table B.7.2.

175 Hansard, vol. 24, col. 1773 (7th March 1968).

176 Dugard, D.J.R., Political Options for South Africa and Implications for the West; in Rotberg, R., et Barratt, J. (eds.); Conflict and Compromise in South Africa, Cape Town 1980, p.19.

177 Section 3 of this Act provided that: "every person falling within any of the undermentioned classes of persons shall be citizen of a particular territorial authority area, that is to say
(a) every Bantu person born in that area, either before or after the commencement of this Act;
(b) every Bantu person who is domiciled in that area;
(c) every Bantu person in the Republic speaking any Bantu language used by the Bantu population of that area, including every Bantu person belonging to any associated linguistic group which normally uses any dialect of any such language;
(d) every other Bantu person in the Republic related to any member of the Bantu population of that area or who has identified himself with any part of such population or who is associated with any part of such population by virtue of his cultural or racial background."

178 Republic of South Africa, Explanatory Memorandum on the Bantu Homelands Constitution Bill, 1971. W.P. 1-1971, Para. 1.

179 The preamble reads: "Whereas it is desirable that further provision be made for the development of Bantu nations to self-government and independence ...".

180 W.P. 1-1971, Para. 9.

181 In the speech of the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.C. Botha, at the second reading of the Bill. Hansard, vol. 32, col. 482 (8th February 1971).

182 Some of these matters were also added to the jurisdiction of the Transkeian Legislative Assembly when the number of departments of Transkei was increased.

183 Also added was "the registration and control of dogs". Schedule 1, item 29. But the political relevance of this addition can safely be considered not very high.

184 Not extraneous to this precautionary move was the remarkable independence showed in educational matters by the T.L.A. which, much displeasing the Government, abolished in Transkei the Bantu Education system.

185 Section 4.

186 Sections 6 to 10.

187 The establishment of the legislative assemblies with Chapter 1 rights was much swifter than the institution of the territorial authorities, and less than a year after the enactment of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, all the seven existing homelands had their legislative assemblies. Only in regard to the Swazi (whose national unit received the territorial authority in 1975) and the South Ndebele (who were recognized as a national unit in 1977) the implementation of this act took longer. The dates of the establishment of the legislative assembly for each homeland were:

Bophuthatswana	Tswana Legislative Assembly	1st May 1971
Ciskei	Ciskei Legislative Assembly	1st June 1971
Venda	Venda Legislative Assembly	1st June 1971
Lebowa	Lebowa Legislative Assembly	1st July 1971
Gazankulu	Machangane Legislative Assembly	1st July 1971
QwaQwa	Basotho-QwaQwa Legislative Assembly	1st October 1971
KwaZulu	KwaZulu Legislative Assembly	30th March 1972
Kangwane	Kangwane Legislative Assembly	1st October 1977
KwaNdebele	KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly	1st October 1979

188 The date of attainment of self-government (Chapter 2 rights) for each homeland was:

Transkei	30th May 1963 (by virtue of Act 48 of 1963)
Bophuthatswana	1st June 1972
Ciskei	1st August 1972
Lebowa	2nd October 1972
Venda	1st February 1973
Gazankulu	1st February 1973
QwaQwa	1st November 1974
KwaZulu	1st February 1977
KwaNdebele	1st April 1981

Kangwane is not yet a self-governing territory, and it will not attain such a status until the question of its proposed cession to Swaziland is resolved.

189 Babelegi in Bophuthatswana, Seshego in Lebowa, Witzieshoek in QwaQwa, Isithebe in KwaZulu, Butterworth and Umtata in Transkei. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on the Report by the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Decentralization of Industries. Para. 53.

190 It was announced by the Prime Minister, Mr. B.J. Vorster, in a speech before the S.A. Federated Chamber of Industries, in Pretoria on the 2nd October 1974:
"... time has now come for homeland governments to decide for themselves the conditions under which they will be willing to allow the establishment of White enterprises in their areas. If, for example, a homeland government has no objections to White enterprises being established in the homeland without a restriction of term, it would be free to make such a decision."

191 Of them: 5 559 in Bophuthatswana, 2 287 in Transkei, 1 192 in Lebowa and 983 in KwaZulu.
All the data are from BENBO (1976), op.cit., Annexure to ch. 9.

192 "The ideal was of course, at its best, to obtain one single territory for every homeland. That is the ideal. We all strive after ideals, but it may not always be possible for us to attain them. The second best would then be to acquire as few scattered areas as possible ... I hope that we, having had regard to practical considerations, have accomplished this ..."
Hansard 17/1973, col. 8135 (4th June 1973).

193 The members of the Committee were Messrs. M.C.Bothma, R.M.Cadman, H.J.Coetsee, P.Cronje, J.P.du Toit, M.S.F.Grobbler, Dr.F.Hartzenberg (elected as Chairman), Messrs. F.Herman, J.H.Hoon, Dr.G.de V.Morrison, Messrs. N.J.J.Olivier, W.J.C.Rossouw, Mrs.H.Suzman, Messrs. H.J.D.van der Walt and W.T.Webber (substituted by Mr. T.C.Huges before the beginning of the works of the Committee).

194 The second report concerned the exchange of portions of two farms (respectively of ha.42,08 and ha.45,72) in the district of Umvoti in Natal; and in the third report, the Committee "having perused

the Proclamations and Government Notices issued by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development during the period 25th October 1974 to 9th May 1975 ... (begged) ... to report that it has no comment to offer thereon."

195 The extension of the surface area of the black territories was not due to any extension of the area allocated in the 1936 legislation, but to the failure to implement that legislation: in 1975 1 239 600 ha. of the quota land to be ceded to the Blacks were still outstanding.

196 See for example a speech of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi at the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in early 1975: "We do not and can never accept the map which resembles rags of a tattered quilt as a country for 4¼ million Zulu people ... We would not consider even less than ten pieces of territory as one country."
Quoted in Parliament by Mrs. H Suzman. Hansard, no. 14/1975, col. 5987 (14th May 1975).

197 The total amount of land to be purchased was the following:

1)	Outstanding quota land (under Land Act, 1936)	ha. 1 239 600
2)	Black spots	ha. 157 100
3)	Badly situated Black areas	ha. 788 700
4)	Compensatory land (for Black spots and badly situated areas)	ha. 945 800
	Total planned takeover of White land	ha. 2 122 900[a]
	Total planned takeover of Black land	ha. 157 100[b]

(a) Given by 1 + 4 minus 62 500 ha. of land already purchased and kept as a reserve.
(b) Black spots. The badly situated Black areas being property of the S.A.B.T. and thus not needing to be purchased.

The total cost of this programme was estimated as follows:

Land purchases	R417 million
Population movement	R380 million
Maintenance and development (essential services only)	R 10 million
TOTAL (at current money value)	R807 million

From BENBO (1976),op.cit., ch. 3.

198 The participants to this summit meeting were Chief K. Matanzima of Transkei, Chief G. Buthelezi of KwaZulu, Chief L. Mangope of Bophuthatswana, Prof. H. Ntsanwisi of Gazankulu, Mr. L. Sebe of Ciskei, and Mr. C. Ramusi, Minister of the Interior of Lebowa, as representative of Dr. C. Phatudi, who was overseas. Absent were the leaders of Basotho QwaQwa and Venda or their representatives.

199 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1973, p. 164, and Butler, J., et al., The Black Homelands of South Africa, Berkeley 1977, p. 87.

200 See Laurence, P., The Transkei: South Africa's Politics of Partition, Johannesburg 1976, pp. 100-101.

201 See his declaration to the press in April 1966: "The road to freedom is a long one which has to be negotiated carefully, step by step."
Quoted in Laurence, P., op.cit., p. 91.

202 The areas claimed were the districts of Elliot, Maclear, Mount Currie, Matatiele and Port St. Johns.

203 Quoted in Laurence, P., op.cit., p. 95.

204 Hansard 6/1974, coll. 415-419 (questions) (10th September 1974).

205 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1977, pp. 322-335.

206 Clause 5, proposed sections 36B and 36C.

207 Explanatory Memorandum on the Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill, 1977. White Paper 9-1977, Clause 5(c) (proposed section 36D).

208 As by Section 4 of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971.

209 Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill (B9-'77), Section 36E(1) and (2).

210 Ibidem, Section 36E(3).

211 For particulars of this bill, see: S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1977, pp. 318-320.

212 Mr. P.T.C. du Plessis, M.P., Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission to the press. The Argus, 1st February 1977.

213 The Argus, 26th March 1977.

214 The Argus, 29th March 1977.

215 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1977, pp. 319-320.

216 The Argus, 29th March 1977.

217 The Argus, 16th March 1978.

218 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1977, pp. 359-360.

219 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1978, pp. 296-298.

220 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1978, p. 289.

221 For all the particulars of the terms of reference of the Ciskei Commission, see: The Quail Report. Feb. 8 80. Ciskei Commission Report, Silverton 1980, pp. 12-14.

222 The political recommendation of the Quail Commission are given in paras. 340-348 of the report (pp.126-127). Considerations about independence are in para. 347 which reads:

> "We consider independence as at present understood to be an unattractive option at this time. The following are the main reasons.
> (1) The terms on which separation is currently available (e.g. as in the case of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda) are not favourable.
> (2) In terms of size and economic viability, the Ciskei would rank among the world's least endowed states.
> (3) An independent Ciskei would not be accorded recognition as a bona fide member of the international community of nations.
> (4) According to our attitude survey two out of three Ciskeians oppose separation on present terms.
> (5) Finally ... South Africa is changing: this is not the time to risk cutting itself off from the prospects of gaining its rightful share of political and economic benefits within South Africa."

223 Paragraph 348 of the Report of the Ciskei Commission reads:

> "... we consider that the Ciskei should opt for independence only if the following conditions can first be satisfied.
> (1) That majorities of Ciskeians both in the Ciskei and in the South African common area vote in favour of independence in a carefully supervised referendum on this issue.

(2) That citizenship on satisfactory terms is negotiated which gives non-resident Ciskeians the choice of either Ciskeian or South African status or both, and that the South African government relinquishes its rights to expel, deport or otherwise remove from the common area Ciskeians who have chosen South African status.

(3) That on land, an enlargement of the Ciskei to an extent acceptable to the Ciskei government has been agreed with the South African government ...

(4) That the rights of Ciskeians to seek work and remain employed in South Africa are explicitly preserved.

(5) That South Africa agrees to provide equitable financial support."

NOTES TO PART II

1 The draft Republican constitution of 1942 provided for self-government to be granted to the various non-White groups "within their own territory under the central management of the general Government of the country". See note 99 in the Part I.

2 Quoted in Lacour-Gayet, R., A History of South Africa. London 1977.

3 "Although the High Commission Territories were artificially excluded from the Union in 1910, these territories remain the 'heartlands' of Bantu inside the Territories as well as outside the Territories, in the Union. In 1913, and again in 1936, the legislators of the Union very clearly set aside the Bantu Areas, taking into account the cultural-historical bonds of the Bantu including those of the three High Commission Territories."
Union of South Africa. Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa. Chapter 46, para. 14.
See also ibidem, para. 16, where the commission outlines the proposed consolidated blocks in this way:

"A. The Tswana Block, with Bechuanaland as nucleus of a block to which is added complexes A(1), A(2) and A(3) situated in the Western areas.
...
D. A Swazi Block, with Swaziland as nucleus and the addition thereto of adjacent areas of the Union inhabited by Swazi.
...
G. A South Sotho Block, with Basutoland as its 'heartland' and with the addition of areas in the Union (Witzieshoek and Northern Transkei)."

4 Government Decisions on the Recommendations of the Commission etc., White Paper F-1956, Decision 20.

5 Ibidem.

6 Dr. Verwoerd explained this during the debate for the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill with the following words:
"What we are trying to achieve under our apartheid policy is a South Africa which endeavours to build up reasonable opportunities for the Bantu in such a way and of such a nature that we can secure their permanent friendship and co-operation without giving them domination over the whole of our own area in addition to that."
Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6228, (20th May 1959).

7 Hansard, vol. 99, col. 63, (27th January 1959).

8 Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6221, (20th May 1959).

9 The official announcement of this decision to Parliament was given during the no-confidence debate at the opening of the 1962 session:
"... this announcement will prove that the policy of separate development is not just theory but practical politics ... The Government will therefore grant the Transkei self-government."
Hansard, vol. 2, col. 75, (23rd January 1962).

10 "It is hardly possible for us to change the international situation except by surrendering everything and doing everything they want us to do. If that is to be the price of international support, namely the suicide of a nation, we will not pay the price."
Hansard, vol. 2, col. 97 (23rd January 1962).

11 Hansard, vol. 2, col. 97, (23rd January 1962).

12 See Carter, G., et al., South Africa's Transkei: the Politics of Domestic Colonialism. London 1967; and Stultz, N.M., "Creative Self-Withdrawal" in Transkei, in Africa Report, vol. 9, No 4, April 1964, pp.18-23.

13 Ibidem, p.183.

14 Hansard, vol. 5, col. 234, (25th January 1963).

15 "The question has been asked here as to when the Transkei is going to become independent ... history has taught us that the road to independence in our case took more than a full century."
Hansard, vol. 6, col. 3162, (21st March 1963).

16 Hansard, vol. 5, col. 2240, (6th March 1963).

17 Statement of the chairman of the commission to the press quoted in a House debate.
Hansard, vol. 5, col. 2326, (7th March 1963).

18 During the no-confidence debate at the opening of the 1965 parliamentary session, Mr. G.H. van L. Froneman, Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission said: "When will they get independence? ... if they are ready for it, it may be within five years, it may

happen within ten years, it can possibly be 20 or 30 years ... . It is not for us to determine. No, it is for them to determine ... when they have reached the stage where they can accept the responsibility of properly exercising independence, they will get it ... no time limit has been laid down."
Hansard, vol. 13, col. 165, (27th January 1965).

19 Hansard, vol. 16, col. 65, (25th January 1966).

20 About the elections of 30th March 1966, see Worral, D., South Africa's "Partition Election", in Africa Report, vol. 11, May 1966, pp.25-26, from which this quotation has been taken.

21 Vorster's message to the Nation on 14th September 1966, the day after his election as Prime Minister.

22 "They (Transkei) will get it (independence) in due course."
Mr. M.C. Botha, the new Minister of Bantu Administration and Development in the House.
Hansard, vol. 18, col. 4144, (13th October 1966).

23 Mr.M.C. Botha, during the debate of the vote of his Department.
Hansard, vol. 18, col. 4129, (13th October 1966).

24 Ibidem., col. 4131.

25 Ibidem.

26 Ibidem.

27 Hansard, vol. 18, col. 4132, (13th October 1966).

28 Ibidem.

29 "We have always maintained ... that the policy of separate development in respect of every Bantu nation in South Africa can proceed as rapidly as the Bantu nation in question is able to absorb it ... When they have reached a stage where it is within their power to become independent, we accept that they will become independent. We shall therefore help them along that road. But at the same time I want to say that we can give no guarantee that they will become independent because only Good Lord knows whether they have that ability in them".
Handard, vol. 21, col. 6285, (18th May 1967).

30 See for example this statement of Mr. B. Coetzee, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development:
"If he (an Opposition M.P.) thinks that we shall permit capitalists to be turned loose like vultures in the Transkei and these areas, he is badly mistaken ... Because then Kaizer Matanzima will no longer have a country in two years' time ... we are not going to allow this economic colonialism which will cripple those areas to such an extent that they will never become independent."
Hansard, vol. 18, coll. 4107-4108, (12th October 1966).

31 The same Deputy Minister two years later.
Hansard, vol. 22, col. 2228, (15th March 1968).

32 "It is in their own interest that they do not become independent until they are economically viable. (It is not possible) to say ... that by the year 2000 four, five or six of them would have attained independence."
Hansard, vol. 23, col. 4022, (24th April 1968).

33 Hansard, vol. 24, col. 6656, (6th June 1968).

34 Hansard, vol. 24, coll. 6656-6661, (6th June 1968).

35 Hansard, vol. 22, col. 2465, (19th March 1968).

36 In Vorster's words: "We are prepared to co-operate with all neighbouring states ... on a friendly basis, provided they respect our independence, provided they do not interfere in our affairs."
Hansard, vol. 23, col. 4020, (24th April 1968).

37 Hansard, vol. 27, col. 8165, (16th June 1969).

38 Ibidem.

39 See above, chapter 3.

40 "We accept that the end of the political road for each Bantu nation is independence, if they are capable of that."
Hansard, vol. 28, col. 202, (25th February 1970).

41 Hansard, vol. 30, col. 4211, (15th September 1970).

42 For example, at the 30th June 1969, there were only 42 400 Transkeians with paid jobs inside Transkei.

43 Hansard, vol. 30, col. 5157, (28th September 1970).

44 Hansard, vol. 33, col. 4869, (21st April 1971).

45 Hansard, vol. 34, col. 9115, (14th June 1971).

46 Hansard, vol. 38, col. 5280, (19th April 1972).

47 A good example of this is given by the Malagasy Republic. It seemed for a while that the Malagasy Republic could follow the lead of Malawi and forge closer ties with South Africa. In 1971 an eight-man Malagasy diplomatic and economic mission headed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, visited South Africa for talks on economic and trade links. As a result of this visit, among other things, a permanent commission was set up to explore fields for further co-operation. This commission started to meet at regular intervals, alternatively in Madagascar and South Africa. In May 1972, however, the government of President P. Tsiranana collapsed after a revolt. The new government of General G. Ramanantsoa complete repudiated dialogue with South Africa and broke all links with the Republic

48 "If a homeland does not want to become independent as a result of the fact that I do not want to give it more land, then it is its affair."
Hansard, vol. 38, col. 4995, (25th April 1972).

49 Hansard, vol. 47, col. 1226, (19th February 1974).

50 Hansard, vol. 51, coll. 414-419, (10th September 1974).

51 Hansard (Senate), n. 9/74, col. 3340, (23rd October 1974).

52 Zambia Daily Mail, 30.10.74.

53 Hansard, vol. 55, coll. 378-380, (7th February 1975).

54 This conference was a follow-up of an earlier meeting which had been held in Addis Ababa in February, and at which there were differences of opinion over the issue of detente between OAU states and South Africa. (The main topic of both conferences was however the negotiations for a settlement in Rhodesia.)
S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1975, p.295.

55 Hansard, vol. 56, col. 4380 (18th April 1975).

56 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1971, p.107.

57 Hansard, vol. 55, col. 380 (7th February 1975).

58 Senegal's President. L.S. Senghor, Africa, Middle East and South Africa, in Africa Report, vol. 20, No. 5 (Sept-Oct 1975), pp.18-20.

59 It is my opinion that it was not the presence of South African troops in Angola in support of UNITA which alienated African trust in South Africa, but the failure of this intervention and what was widely considered the defeat of South African troops at the hands of the Cuban expeditionary force. It was only at the end of March 1976 that South Africa was singled out as the villain of the situation (U.N. Security Council resolution condemning South African aggression adopted with nine votes to nil and five abstentions (U.K., U.S.A., France, Italy, Japan); China did not participate in the voting.). Thus, only when the MPLA victory was certain, the African states could find enough common ground on the subject to put the blame on South Africa: at an O.A.U. meeting held in mid-January 1976 a motion urging recognition of the MPLA government and condemning South African intervention received 22 votes, another 22 votes going to a Senegalese motion calling for a ceasefire and denouncing all foreign intervention in Angola.

60 This was well known by Vorster who said in Parliament:
"We are saddled with problems, and I have no illusion about this ... that the Transkei might not be recognised by certain Western countries, except if it declares war against us on the eve of its independence! Then they may recognize it the following day. But to do so in a peaceful way will probably not entail recognition for it."
Hansard, vol. 61, col. 5130 (21st April 1976).

61 See, for example, Breytenbach, W.J., The Republic of Transkei's International Relations with the B.L.S. States. Paper delivered at a Conference of the South African Institute of International Affairs in Umtata (24th-27th November 1976) on "International Implications of the Independence of Transkei".

62 The Legislative Assembly of an 'internally autonomous country' would have been empowered to make laws in respect of all matters not mentioned in Schedule 1 to the Act (Act 21 of 1971). This would have given it the possibility of scrapping most of the

55 Hansard, vol. 56, col. 4380, (18th April 1975).

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apartheid laws, at least within the territory under its jurisdiction. However, the State President still had a right of veto over a bill of a Legislative Assembly if 'its implications for the Republic' were deemed too important. It can be surmised, though, that too frequent a use of this right of veto would be felt to be embarassing by the Government; and that this self-constraint would give the 'internally automous country' more freedom of manoeuvre than it would be apparent at first sight.

63 One of the earlier but articulated allusions to some sort of confederation as point of arrival of separate development can be found in this statement of M.C. Botha, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development:
"It has already been foreshadowed by the National Party and the Government that a type of association of States between the States and/or the government of the white and non-white peoples will come into being here to deliberate matters of mutual interest and relations between neighbours, but naturally only on the basis of the retention of each one's own independence, with no interference in each other's affairs and no central authority exercised over any of them."
Hansard, vol. 28, col. 1998, (25th February 1970).

64 In the present situation the idea of any O.A.U. country formally entering in a Southern African Constellation of States led by South Africa borders on the ridiculous. However, Lesotho, and in particular, Swaziland, are at the moment nothing but informal members of a still formally inexistent constellation of this kind. And possible developments in the land question (such as the Kangwane-Ingwavuma deal with Swaziland) can cause an ever higher integration of these states in the constellation.

65 South Africa and the homelands are mutually interdependent. Even in what can be considered the worst case for a future collaboration in Southern Africa, i.e., a long and bloody civil war followed by a partition and by large scale population movements, the realities of geography will compel these two states to a certain degree of co-operation. It is thus evident that if the partition of South Africa will be attained with peaceful means and along the lines of the government's ethnic policy - and this means that the white section will be the economic fulcrum - the need of co-operation will be so great that bilateral agreements will be insufficient, and a wider arrangement will be necessary.

66 Hansard, vol. 107, col. 4191, (10th April 1961).

67 See for example this statement of M.C. Botha:
"We know that wherever Western norms or recipes have been applied in the rest of Africa, they have failed to a large extent. How many states there are in Africa today where the policy of "one man one vote" was originally followed and where today it is a case of

"one man - no vote"? There are even parts in those states where one has the position of "no man no vote". We do not intend following that road here in South Africa."
Hansard, no. 17/1973, col. 8160, (5th June 1973).

68 Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6241, (20th May 1959).

69 M.C. Botha, Hansard, vol. 18, col. 4132, (13th October 1966).

70 See pp. 67-68 and 98-102.

71 Of the political parties which have or had an important role in homeland politics only the Ciskei National Independence Party and the Venda Independence People's Party were not established by a traditional leader (chief). The persons around whom these parties crystallized, however, had some prominence in the political affairs of their homeland even before the formation of their party. If it is valid only to a limited extent for the founder of the V.I.P., Mr. Baldwin Mudau, who was the representative of the Venda Territorial Authority in the urban areas of the Witwatersrand, there are no doubts about the prominence of the founder of the C.N.I.P., Mr., later Chief, Lennox Sebe, who was Minister of Education and then of Agriculture in the Ciskeian Executive under Chief J. Mabandla.

72 For the events which led to the formation of political parties in the homelands, see: Kotzé, D.A., African Politics in South Africa 1964-1974, London, Pretoria 1975, pp.39-65.
For the formation of political parties in Transkei, see: Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., pp.153-171.

73 The homeland leaders have always presented themselves as the defenders of the traditional elite. Their first preoccupation in the period of mobilitation of consensus which preceded their election was towards assuring for themselves the support of this elite acting as the mouthpiece of their interests.

This is noticeable, for example, in the manifesto of Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima for the Transkei General Election of 1963, in which at point 2 one can read that "Chieftainship should be preserved", and where in the final exhortation, underlining his decisive role in the instauration of the Bantu Authorities in Transkei he says:
"My colleagues, the chiefs of Transkei, will admit that their status socially and economically improved as soon as the Bantu Authorities Act was introduced."
in Van der Merwe, H.W., et al., (eds), African Perspectives on South Africa, Stanford, Cape Town 1978, pp.385-387.

74 See Charton, N., Profile of the Homelands, in van der Merwe, H.W., et al, (eds.), op.cit., pp. 364-368. It is certainly impossible to disagree with her remark that "the traditional elite, the chiefs and the headmen, have inherited the political kingdom."

75 See Kotzé, D.A., op.cit., pp. 108-117.

76 Transkei Democratic Party: Statement of Objectives in the Constitution, point (i). Point (k) asked for "The development of a non-racial loyalty to the government of the Transkei and the republican government of the Republic of South Africa." This document can be found in van der Merwe, H.W., et al. (eds.), op.cit., p. 410.

77 Transkei Democratic Party, Statement for the General Election, 1968, in van der Merwe, H.W., et al. (eds.), op.cit., pp. 411-412.

78 Transkei National Independence Party. Manifesto, General Election, 1968. Points 1 and 2. Ibidem, pp. 392-391.

79 In the Statement of Principles of Ciskei National Independence Party we can read that the party stood for "The drawing up of a well worked-out plan of granting independence to the Ciskei homeland ..." while the Ciskei National Party declared that "For a meaningful independence the party strives for a clear definition of the boundaries of the Ciskei and for a fair and just programme of consolidation ...".
Ibidem, pp. 430-431 and 437-439.

80 Seoposengwe Party: Manifesto, Bophuthatswana General Election, 1972. Point (a). Ibidem, pp. 513-515.

81 Bophuthatswana National Party: Manifesto, Bophuthatswana General Election, 1972. Points 7(1) and 1(b). Ibidem, pp. 507-512.

82 Venda Independence People's Party: Manifesto, Venda General Election, 1973. Point 8 (National Unity). Ibidem, pp. 549-552.

83 Mphephu Faction: Policy Declaration, Venda General Election, 1973. Point B(6). Ibidem, pp. 541-546.

84 A by-election was necessary for two seats in the Nqamakwe constituency. This by-election was held on the 18th October, just a week before the day of independence.

85 The results of the previous Transkei general election were:

	1963	1968	1973
T.N.I.P.	15	28	27
D.P.	29	14	10
Independents	1	3	8

Although the number of non T.N.I.P. representatives elected in 1973 was higher than in 1968, T.N.I.P.'s share of the total vote rose from 44% in 1968 to 55,2% in 1973.
See Stultz, N.M., Transkei's Half Loaf; Race Separatism in South Africa, Cape Town 1980, pp. 52-54.

86 It is at least credible that the incarceration of the leading figures of the D.P. cooled the enthusiasm of prospective candidates. However, there was no open charge in this regard and the statement appeared in the Survey of Race Relations for the year 1976, p. 243, that "some members (of the D.P.) who had intended standing for election opted out rather than risk detention" is unsupported, although perfectly credible.

87 Quoted in Laurence, P., The Transkei; South Africa's Politics of Partition, Johannesburg 1976, p. 11.

88 In total there were 137 166 votes in favour and 27 133 against independence. Of the 229 bodies polled, 148 did not record a single no-vote, and of 60 urban bodies in 'white' South Africa, only seven recorded opposition against independence.
Ibidem.

89 Transkei In Dependence. Report of the Transkei Study Project. Mimeographed. Johannesburg: Wages and Economic Commission, SRC, University of the Witwatersrand, 1976, p. 6.

90 For an examination of the results of the Transkei General Election of 1976 and its meaning as support, or lack thereof, for the decision to opt for independence, see Stultz, N.M., op.cit., ch. 3.

91 Rand Daily Mail, 28th July 1977. Quoted in S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations, 1977, p. 334.

92 BENSO, Statistical Survey of Black Development 1980, tab. 4.

93 Report of the Ciskei Commission, Appendix 1.

94 The main points of the 'package deal', or better, of the Ciskeian request to the South African government were:
- Ciskeians could retain their identity and nationality while at the same time not surrendering their citizenship in greater South Africa. A confederal agreement would make all Ciskeian citizens of the confederation, entitled to a confederal passport, and able to take up employment anywhere within the confederation.
- Ciskei would be granted all the land between the Stormberg and the Indian Ocean and between the Great Kei and Great Fish rivers.
- A planned programme would phase out discriminatory legislation in South Africa before a fixed date.
- Proper infrastructures, services, schooling and clinics would be provided by South Africa to the various relocation camps it had established in Ciskei.
- Ciskei would be guaranteed membership of the Rand monetary area and the S.A. Customs Union.
- A formula for the provision of development aid on an indefinite basis would be negotiated.

From S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations, 1981, pp. 297-298.

95 Ciskei Commission, The Quail Report, Attitude Survey Tabulations, Table 27.

96 Ibidem, Table 29.

97 Ibidem, Table 72.

98 The Buthelezi Commission, vol. I, table 12, p. 260.

99 Ciskei Commission, Tabulations, Tables 65-72.

100 Ibidem, Tables 47-48.

101 From a joint statement released after the meeting of senior representatives of all the homelands, except Transkei, held at the Jan Smuts Airport at the end of August 1976. (The Bophuthatswana representative did not sign the statement.) Quoted in S.A.I.R.R., 1976, p. 247.

102 Buthelezi, M.G., White and Black Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Future of the Homelands. The Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture 1974. Published by S.A.I.R.R., p. 7.

103 Amongst these conditions the least acceptable to the government was that all the exiles and political prisoners should be let free as a means to enhance the concept of independence. Other conditions were that there should be no interference with the homeland

governments, that more concessions should be made spontaneously by the South African government and that there should be collaboration and consultation with the homeland governments before new moves were implemented.
Ibidem.

104 Ibidem, p. 11.

105 Ibidem.

106 Quoted in Kotzé, D.A., op.cit., p. 161.

107 H. Ntsanwisi, quoted ibidem, p. 165.

108 Buthelezi, M.G., My Perspectives of the Methods to Use to Satisfy the Requirements for Just Political Representation of All Race Groups in South Africa, address to the Third International Christian Political Conference, Sioux Center, Iowa, U.S.A., 25th August 1979, p. 9.

109 "Homelands development ... was a revolutionary idea from its very inception" from a speech delivered to an Afrikaner club.
In Buthelezi, M.G., Power is Ours, New York 1979, p. 51.
(But he then added: "But there can be no alternative to majority government in the evolutionary context.")

110 Speech to a group of visiting Americans. Johannesburg, October 1976.
Ibidem, p. 6.

111 Ibidem, p. 2.

112 From the speech delivered to an Afrikaner club. Ibidem, p. 58.

113 Such was also the opinion of Lebowa's leader, Dr. C. Phatudi, who stated that to seek independence would be fatal for Blacks, who were in any case not prepared to accept only 13% of the available land in South Africa. On another occasion he said he envisaged a federation of multi-racial states with complete control of their internal affairs and full South African citizenship for all inhabitants, as a solution to South Africa's political problems.
See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1977, p. 356.

114 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1978, p. 290.

115 Buthelezi, M.G., My Perspectives of Methods to Use, etc., op.cit., p. 9.

116 Ibidem, p. 6.

117 From a speech at Ulundi, March 1977, in Buthelezi, M.G., Power is Ours, op.cit., p. 89.

118 "Apartheid cannot be brought to its logical conclusion unless the South African government brings all the so-called black homelands to the point where they voluntarily opt for Pretoria-style independence. If every homeland other than KwaZulu opted for independence, the blacks who remained in a common South Africa, i.e., the Zulus alone, will still outnumber the whites. KwaZulu will not become independent Pretoria-style."
Ibidem, p. 187.

119 Buthelezi, M.G., My Perspectives, etc., op.cit., p. 9.

120 From a speech at Ulundi, March 1977, in Buthelezi, M.G., Power is Ours, op.cit., p. 92.

121 Buthelezi, M.G., My Perspectives, etc., op.cit., p. 13.

122 The most known and important of these attitude surveys are:
the one made in 1977 for T. Hanf and appeared in Hanf, T., et al., Südafrika: Friedlicher Wandel? München-Mainz, 1978 (appeared in English as South Africa: The Propects for Peaceful Change, London, 1981);
the one made for the Quail Commission in 1979 and appeared in the Quail Report, op.cit.; and
the one made in 1981 for the Buthelezi Commission and appeared in the report of that Commission.

123 The Buthelezi Commission; The requirements for stability and development in KwaZulu and Natal, Durban 1982, vol. I, p. 187.

124 See the discussion of the conclusion reached on the subject by the Quail Commission and its closeness to the reality in the Buthelezi Commission, op.cit., pp. 191-192.

125 Ibidem, p. 249.

126 Ciskei Commission Report, op.cit., Appendix I, Table 86.

127 The alternatives were: "I am a Zulu before anything else", "I am first a Black South African and then a Zulu" and "I am only a Black South African". The highest percentages of Zulu exclusivity were registered among the squatters (43%) and people with less than Std. 2 (57%). The Buthelezi Commission, op.cit., p. 251.

128 Again the highest proportion was found among squatters (56%) and people with less than Std. 2 (54%). Remarkable is the result in rural KwaZulu where only 40% of the respondents felt that KwaZulu or Zululand is the country of the Zulus.
Ibidem.

129 Ibidem, p. 215.

130 The Zulu migrants in Transvaal and people with less than Std. 2 gave the highest postive answer (both 9%). Most of the different categories remained on the average for Natal/KwaZulu (5%), but among Witwatersrand Zulus and the metropolitan Natal the positive answer as low as 2%.
Ibidem, p. 252.

131 Ibidem, p. 253.

132 Ibidem, p. 255.

133 Ibidem.

134 Ibidem, table 11, p. 258.

135 Ibidem, table 12, p. 260.

136 Ibidem, table 11, p. 258. All the subsequent figures come from the same place.

137 Ibidem, p. 257.

138 Rand Daily Mail, 20th April 1966.

139 Sinaba was not satisfied that Transkei was "not yet ripe for independence", and at the 1968 elections the T.P.F.P. contested some seats with an independentist programme. It received just 2.4% of the total vote and was eliminated from the Transkeian political stage.

140 In the budget speech in the T.L.A., 11th May 1966.

141 Chief Matanzima's speech in the T.L.A. quoted in a House debate. Hansard, vol. 21, co.. 6286 (18th May 1967).

142 The T.N.I.P. manifesto for the 1968 general election is to be found in: Van der Merwe, H.W., et al., op.cit., pp. 392-7.

143 From a letter written by Chief Matanzima to Mr. Vorster. Quoted in Lawrence, P., op.cit., p.92.

144 Speech delivered at the conference of the South African Institute of Race Relations. January 1974.
In: Mangope, L.M., A Place for All, Cape Town 1979, pp. 130-9.

145 At point 6 the manifesto reads: "We stand for complete independence and the federation of Black states ...".
The T.N.I.P. manifesto for the 1973 general election is reported in: Matanzima, K.D., Independence my Way, Pretoria 1976, p. 63.

146 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1973, p. 164.

147 Mangope, L.M., Will Bophuthatswana Join Botswana? in Munger Africana Library Notes, vol. IV, no. 20, August 1973, p. 22.

148 Matanzima, K.D., op.cit., pp. 75-80.

149 From a speech delivered at the Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town, January 1976. Reported in:
Mangope, L.M., A Place for All, op.cit., pp. 83-91.

150 Die Burger 26th March 1976.

151 See for example S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1976, p. 255, and Survey 1977, p. 334 and 357.

152 See for example S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1978, pp. 277-8.

153 Surplus People Project, op.cit., vol. V, pp. 47-50.

154 From the speech delivered at U.C.T.. Reported in:
Mangope, L.M., op.cit., pp. 83-91.

155 Mangope. L.M., op.cit., p. 56.

156 From a speech delivered at the national congress of the Federal Coloured People's Party on the 1st July 1977. Reported in: Mangope, L.M., op.cit., pp. 54-60.

157 Independence speech, midnight 5th December 1977. Reported in: Mangope, L.M., op.cit., pp. 35-43.

158 Mangope, L.M., op.cit., p. 24.

159 The terms of reference of the Quail Commission are contained in Government Notice No. 14, Ciskei Official Gazette, vol. 6, no. 177, 4th August 1978.

160 Quoted in Charton, N., and Nash, M., (eds.), An Empty Table? Johannesburg 1981, p. 1.

161 Speech delivered at the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce on the 23rd May 1978. In: Mangope, L.M., op.cit., pp. 8-18.

162 Although this might have unpleasant results sometime in the future because about a third of the Ciskeian population consists of Fingos; and the Fingos, after all, constantly fought on the British side against the Xhosa.

163 Sebe, L.L., Challenges, Cape Town, p. 16.

164 Sebe, L.L., Ciskei's Independence within the R.S.A., unpublished mimeo.

165 Ibidem.

166 Sebe, L.L., Challenges, op.cit., p. 17.

167 Mangope, L.M., op.cit., p. 133.

168 Speech delivered at a conference of the International Association of Economics and Commerce Students in July 1978. Reported in: Mangope, L.M., op.cit., pp. 1-7.

169 Mangope, L.M., op.cit., p. 24.

170 Sebe, L.L., op.cit., p. 188.

171 See Streek, B., and Wicksteed, R., Render unto Kaiser; a Transkei Dossier. Johannesburg 1981.

172 See, for example, the manifesto of the Seoposengwe Party (Bophuthatswana) for the 1972 general election which at point (a) reads: "We accept the policy of separate development only ... for the promise of granting Bophuthatswana its ultimate sovereign independence".
To be found in van der Merwe, H.W., et al., (eds.) op.cit., p. 513.

173 Mabandla, J.T., The Problems of Homeland Transition. Ibidem, pp. 440-4.

174 From a speech delivered on the 11th October 1972 at the University of Stellenbosch. Reported in: Mangope, L.M., op.cit., p. 145.

175 Both the quotations are from: Matanzima, K.D., op.cit., p. 40.

176 Sebe, L.L., Why Ciskei has decided on Independence. S.A. Forum, Position Paper, vol. 4, No. 22.

177 Matanzima, K.D., op.cit., pp. 80-1.

178 Buthelezi, G.M., White and Black Nationalism etc., op.cit., p. 10.

179 Buthelezi, G.M., My Perspective of Methods etc., op.cit., p. 3.

180 In this regard it is worth reminding that the only political defeat of the government in its policy towards the Blacks in the late 1960's was when the Transkeian government rejected the Bantu Education system and adopted a different syllabus in its schools.

181 See, for example, the manifesto of the Bophuthatswana National Party for the 1972 general election, which in this regard says: "The Bophuthatswana National Party firmly reaffirms its acceptance and support of the positive aspects of the policy of separate development, e.g., separate but equal development in all spheres of life, ..."
in van der Merwe, H.W., et al. (eds.), op.cit., p. 512.

182 Bophuthatswana Government, Debates of the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly, First Session, First Assembly, 21.3.1972-27.4.1972, p. 43.

183 Quoted in Kotzé, D.A., op.cit., pp.148-9.

184 Buthelezi, G.M., The Past and Future of the Zulu People. In Munger Africana Library Notes, No. 10, Jan. 1972.

185 For example, in the financial year 1974-75, the proportion of revenues of the governments of the undermentioned homelands deriving from 'internal revenue' was the following: Transkei 18,4%, Ciskei 21,6%, Bophuthatswana 23,3%, Venda 21,6%, KwaZulu 22%, Lebowa 26,7%. From S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1976, p. 225.

186 Sebe, L.L., Why Ciskei had decided on Independence, op.cit., col. 12.

187 Ibidem.

188 Mangope, L.M., op.cit., pp. 135-6. From a speech delivered at the conference of the S.A.I.R.R. in January 1974.

189 Matanzima, K.D., op.cit., p. 81.

190 Sebe, L.L., op.cit., col. 10.

191 Buthelezi's foreword to Kotzé, D.A., op.cit.

192 See his statement quoted at p. 144.

193 "So-called independence for KwaZulu is no longer an option Pretoria can seriously entertain ... Because KwaZulu has refused to accept independence, so-called, South Africa will be faced with an internal black majority even if every other homeland takes independence. The Zulus outnumber whites and the Zulu population grows faster than whites."
in Buthelezi, G.M., Christian perspectives etc., op.cit., p. 4.

194 In Sebe's words: "We are not participating, co-operating in black state development for any other reason than the restitution of our former national entity."
From the address at the S.A. Defence College, Pretoria, 27 June 1979. Reported in Sebe, L.L., Challenges, op.cit., pp. 19-24.

195 In Sebe's opinion "Ultimately Ciskei is seen as part of a Federation of Southern African States, with a large degree of power at the centre and a common nationality of the Federation for all people of whatever colour. ...

In the negotiations on independence with the Government of South Africa, Ciskei has tried to achieve a commitment to the Federal concept. This has not been successful, but they have achieved something very relevant, and that is a commitment on the part of the Government of the Republic of South Africa to enter into a confederal agreement with Ciskei concomitantly with the attainment by Ciskei of independence. This is a major step forward in white South African political thinking."
In Sebe, L.L., Why Ciskei has decided on Independence, op.cit., col. 11.
Sebe was selling the cat before having bagged it. The South African commitment fell much short of a confederal agreement on the day of Ciskeian independence. At most, the South African government committed itself to take into consideration some ways and procedures which might lead to some form of confederation sometime in the future. It gave embryonic form to the constellation of states and nothing more.

196 Mangope, L.M., op.cit., foreword.

197 From the independence speech, delivered on the night of 5th-6th November 1977. Reported in Mangope, L.M., op.cit., p. 38.

NOTES TO PART III

1 The number of agreements entered into between South Africa and Transkei when the latter became independent was 54 (although only 53 were published in the Government Gazette, one of them having been apparently forgotten); between South Africa and Bophuthatswana, 63; between South Africa and Venda, 67 (the Government Gazette published 68 agreements between South Africa and Venda, but two of them were duplicate, turning up under a different heading but under the same title a few pages after appearing for the first time. Perhaps in return for this, however, the Government Gazette did not publish the non-aggression treaty which was signed in August 1979 together with all the other treaties and agreements. This adds up to the total of 67 agreements I mentioned - E.&.O.E.); and the number of agreements entered into between South Africa and Ciskei was 81.

2 The agreements entered into between South Africa and Transkei have been published in the Government Gazette No. 5320 of the 22nd October 1976;
those between South Africa and Bophuthatswana in the Government Gazette No. 5823 of the 6th December 1977;
those between South Africa and Venda in the Government Gazette No. 6652 of the 12th September 1979;
those between South Africa and Ciskei in the Government Gazette No. 8204 of the 14th May 1982.

3 Non-aggression Pact, Article 1. The treaties with the four independent black states have all the same wording.

4 Non-aggression Pact, Article 2.

5 The extradition agreement with Transkei has been published in the Government Gazette No. 5813 of the 25th November 1977.

6 Article 1 of the agreement in regard to development co-operation.

7 The relevant parts of the agreement are Article 3 and Annexure.

8 Article 7.

9 In particular in the Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Annexure.

10 Article 1.

11 Article 2.

12 Personal communication. The absence of those agreements from the list is certainly due to a faulty channel of communication between government sectors, or to inattention and lack of checks. The non-aggression pact with Venda, for example, was regularly signed on the 13th August 1979, and being equal to the non-aggression pacts with Transkei and Bophuthatswana, should have been published together with the other agreements in the Government Gazette No. 6652.

13 Government Gazette No. 8204, 14th May 1982, pages 14-18.

14 Article 1 of the agreement. As an example I quote from the "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana relating to the Economic Development of Bophuthatswana" which appeared in the Government Gazette No. 5823 of the 6th December 1977, p. 10. The agreements entered into between South Africa and the other independent black states on this subject are equivalent.

15 Ibidem, Art. 3.

16 Ibidem, Art. 2.

17 Section 3(1) of the Economic Co-operation Promotion Fund Act, 1968 (Act No. 68 of 1968).

18 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1981, p. 310.

19 Ibidem.

20 Preamble of the agreement. Again I give as an example the agreement signed with Bophuthatswana, which appeared in the Government Gazette No. 5823 of the 6th December 1977, p. 17. The agreements signed with the other independence black states are, mutatis mutandis, a repetition of this one.

21 Ibidem, Art. 4.

22 Ibidem, Art. 5.

23 For example, in the case of Bophuthatswana there are five projects to be completed after independence: namely, a military base, a road over rail bridge, a border post, another road over rail bridge, and a mass water supply.
See Government Gazette No. 5823 of the 6th December 1977, p. 12.

24 These acts are:
- Financial Arrangements with Transkei Act (Act No. 106 of 1976);
- Financial Arrangements with Bophuthatswana Act (Act No. 93 of 1977);
- Financial Arrangements with Venda Act (Act No. 105 of 1979);
- Financial Arrangements with Ciskei Act (Act No. 118 of 1981).

25 Section 2(1)(a) of the Financial Arrangements acts.

26 Ibidem, Section 2(1)(b).

27 Ibidem, Section 2(1)(c).

28 Ibidem, Section 2(1)(b)(i).

29 Ibidem, Section 2(1)(b)(ii).

30 Ibidem, Section 2(1)(b)(iii).

31 For variety's sake this time I quote as an example the agreement "relation to the development of certain areas and the undertaking of resettlement projects ... by the Government of the Republic of South Africa" signed with Venda.
See Government Gazette No. 6652 of the 12th December 1979, pp. 145-148.

32 Ibidem, Art. 3(2) and (3) and Art. 2(d) respectively.

33 At least in the interest of South Africa as seen from the government's point of view.

34 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations, 1979, p. 399.

35 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations, 1980, p. 430.

36 Hansard, 3/82 Questions, cols. 112-114.

37 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations, 1981, p. 310.

38 See R.S.A., Department of Foreign Affairs and Information; The Promotion of Industrial Development: an Element of a Co-ordinated Regional Development Strategy for Southern Africa, Pretoria 1982.

39 The plan identifies eight national development regions to which an order of priority in the development efforts is assigned on the basis of an index of Relative Development Need. These regions are:
- Region A: Western Cape, Relative Development Need: 6;
- Region B: Western Transvaal/Northern Cape/Bophuthatswana, R.D.N.: 6;
- Region C: O.F.S./QwaQwa/Bophuthatswana (Thaba Nchu), R.D.N.: 6;
- Region D: Eastern Cape/Ciskei/Transkei (southern part), R.D.N.: 9;
- Region E: Natal/KwaZulu/Transkei (northern part), R.D.N.: 8;
- Region F: Eastern Transvaal/Kangwane/parts of Lebowa and Gazankulu, R.D.N.: 6;
- Region G: Northern Transvaal/Venda/parts of Lebowa and Gazankulu, R.D.N.: 8; and,
- Region H: the P.W.V. area, R.D.N.: 4.

Ibidem.

40 Ibidem, Appendix A.

41 In this regard see the figures in BENSO, 1980, op.cit., tables 107 and 108.

42 Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971.

43 Transkei Constitution Act of 1963.

44 Bophuthatswana is in this regard an exception, since the proportion of SADT expenditure out of the total South African expenditure, which was 21,4% in 1975/76 and rose to 28% in the years of independence, in 1981/82 was still 16,8%.

45 These figures are taken from BENSO, 1980, op.cit., but also in this regard BENSO's figures are questionable. See, for example, Abedjan, I., National Accounting Statistics for the Less Developed Economies (with Special Reference to Transkei). Unpublished thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts (Economics), U.C.T., 1982, Passim. In particular, ibidem p. 108, table 27, gives the income of the Transkeian Government from transfers received from South Africa in 1980/81 as follows:

SOURCE	AMOUNT (R)
General Tax	13 238 686
Rand Currency Circulation	3 166 333
Budgetary Assistance	118 378 000

The budgetary assistance in my figures is included in the direct South African expenditure: for the General Tax and the Rand Currency Circulation, BENSO's figures are R7 000 000 and R1 000 000 respectively for a total of R8 million. The total for the same

headings in Abedjan (who obtained the data for his tables from the Auditor-General's Office, Income Section, Republic of Transkei) is R16 405 019, more than double the amount given by BENSO.

46 BENSO 1980, op.cit., table 108, referring to the source of finance of the governments of the independent black states, gives the following figures for Bophuthatswana in the year 1981/82:

Self-generation	R117 052 000	General Tax	R10 390 000
Customs Union	R114 944 000	Statutory Grant	R22 000 000
Rand Monetary Area	R 1 000 000	Project Aid	R17 600 000
Loans	R 2 300 000	Opening Balance	R53 315 000

for a total of R338 601 000. The very high opening balance (15,7% of the total) suggests the existence of bottlenecks in the process of allocation of resources and indicates serious inefficiency.

47 The figures for this diagram are the following:

	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82
Bophuthatswana	113,7	160,1	210,2	244,2	309,8	327,8
Ciskei	117,4	115,2	135,7	164,3	241,3	393,5
Gazankulu	111,5	122,8	147,5	265,0	307,5	479,4
KwaZulu	111,4	118,3	147,0	167,1	210,5	273,5
Lebowa	120,2	129,0	159,2	194,0	265,5	322,4
Transkei	150,4	188,6	208,0	230,6	255,5	272,1
Venda	116,2	130,9	231,2	295,5	405,2	498,9
All homelands and independent states	123,0	142,4	179,2	212,6	269,1	339,2

48 The figures for Diagram 2 are the following:

	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82
Bophuthatswana	92,4	112,4	117,5	114,9	115,1	96,6
Ciskei	95,4	80,9	75,7	77,2	89,6	116,0
Gazankulu	90,6	86,2	82,3	124,6	114,2	141,3
KwaZulu	90,5	83,0	82,0	78,6	78,2	80,6
Lebowa	97,7	90,5	88,8	91,2	98,6	95,0
Transkei	122,2	132,4	116,0	108,5	95,0	80,2
Venda	94,5	91,9	129,0	139,0	150,5	147,0
All homelands and independent states	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

49 That these figures are nothing more than educated guesses is demonstrated by the discrepancy existing between the mid-year

estimates for 1980 and the results of the census of the same year.

50 Both the figures of the 1970 census and the population estimates for the following years up to 1975 were made considering the borders existing at the time. The transfer in 1975 of the Herschel and Glen Grey districts from Ciskei to Transkei changed considerably the population of these two homelands. The modified figures have been elaborated by BENSO only for the year 1970.

51 The figures for Diagram 4 are the following:

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Bophuthatswana	60	55,5	74	93	111	136
Ciskei	124	111,3	98	111	118	173
Gazankulu	55	52	55	64,5	86	100
KwaZulu	57	52,5	53,5	64,5	67	84
Lebowa	39	39	40,5	48,5	52,5	70
Transkei	48	60	74,5	80,5	87,5	94
Venda	54	52,5	57,5	99	136	181

52 About the unreliability of some of the figures published by BENSO on the economy of the homelands and the independent black states, see: Abedjan, I., op.cit., pp. 72-78; and Thomas, W.H., Research note on BENSO's Statistical Survey on the Independent States, in Development Studies Southern Africa, vol. 5, No. 4, July 1983, pp. 475-493; and for the other side of the coin, the reply to Prof. Thomas' note by F.J. van Eeden, ibid., pp. 493-513.

53 The only figures available regarding the number of baTswana employed in the mines in Bophuthatswana are from 1970. In that year there were 22 607 people working in the mining sector. Of these, only 2 462 were Tswana.

54 Thomas, W.H., Unemployment and Job Creation. Transkei's Perspective; in Development Studies Southern Africa, vol. 5, No. 2, January 1983, pp. 222-247.

55 Republic of Bophuthatswana, Department of Economic Affairs, Statistical Report No. 5, 1978.

56 BENSO, Statistical Survey of Black Development, 1981, Part II, Table 7.

57 Hansard 5/1981 (7th Parliament) col. 2367, 31.8.81.

58 Grobler, M.S.F., Hansard 13/1976, col. 5615; 28th April 1976.

59 In Schedule B of the Status of the Transkei Act (No. 100 of 1976) the categories of persons who in terms of Section 6 are citizens of Transkei and cease to be South African citizens are so listed:

(a) Every person who was citizen of the Transkei in terms of any law at the commencement of this Act;
(b) every person born in the Transkei of parents one or both of whom were citizens of the Transkei at the time of his birth;
(c) every person born outside the Transkei whose father was a citizen of the Transkei at the time of his birth;
(d) every person born out of wedlock (according to custom or otherwise) and outside the Transkei whose mother was a citizen of the Transkei at the time of his birth;
(e) every person who has been lawfully domiciled in the Transkei for a period of at least five years ... and on application in the prescribed manner has been granted citizenship of the Transkei by the competent authority in the Transkei;
(f) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory within the Republic of South Africa, is not a citizen of the Transkei in terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), and speaks a language used by the Xhosa or Sotho speaking section of the population of the Transkei, including any dialect of any such language;
(g) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory within the Republic of South Africa, is not citizen of the Transkei in terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), and who is related to any member of the population contemplated in paragraph (f) or has identified himself with any part of such population or is culturally or otherwise associated with any member or part of such population.

60 Although section 6(3) of the Status of Bophuthatswana Act does not explicitly mention the fact that those who renounce the Bophuthatswana citizenship do so to regain the South African one, it is evident that it refers to this case: it would make no sense otherwise.

61 At the end of 1982, 4 304 Blacks had recovered the South African citizenship in terms of Section 3(3) of the National States Citizenship Amendment Act. There were: Transkeian citizens 3 735, Bophuthatswana citizens 541, Venda citizens 14, Ciskeian citizens 14. They took up the citizenship of the following homelands: Ciskei 2 104 (and they lost again the South African citizenship in 1981), KwaZulu 1 097, QwaQwa 1 065, Gazankulu 23, Lebowa 15. Hansard 3/1983, Questions, col. 213; 18th February 1983.

62 C.P. Mulder, Hansard 1/1978, col. 228; 1st February 1978,

63 M.C. Botha, Hansard 13/1976, col. 5564; 28th April 1976.

64 See, for example, the text of the agreement with Transkei, in Government Gazette No. 5320 of 22nd October 1976, p. 59. The text of the equivalent agreements with the other states is identical.

65 In February 1978 C.P. Mulder still said: "If our policy is taken to its full logical conclusions as far as the Black people are concerned, there will not be one Black man with South African citizenship."
Hansard 2/1978, col. 579; 7th February 1978.

66 'Star' of 20th February 1979 quoted in S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1979, p. 305.

67 "We have taken the question of citizenship into account ... we admit ... that there are certain facets which prevent people from accepting other citizenship because they have certain benefits in terms of the South African citizenship they enjoy."
P.W. Botha, Hansard, 1/1980, col. 260; 6th February 1980.

68 Idem, ibidem.

69 Idem, ibidem.

70 Hansard, 1/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 149; 4th August 1981.

71 A.E. Nothnagel, Hansard, 5/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 2392; 31st August 1981.

72 S.J. De Beer, Hansard, 5/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 2415; 31st August 1981.

73 L.L. Sebe, quoted in Hansard, 9/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 5293.

74 C.J. van der Merwe, Hansard, 5/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 2482; 31st August 1981.

75 Idem, col. 2483.

76 "The grossest example of this ... (ideological preconceptions) ... that I have ever heard is the description that the Black man in White areas is only here temporarily and on a causal basis, for as long as the White man tolerates his presence here. In the times and the century we are living in, there is no longer place for this kind of unscientific semantic day-dream."
The Deputy Minister of Co-operation, G. Morrison; Hansard, 3/1983, col. 1332; 18th February 1983.
(Not a bad performance for a deputy minister in a N.P. government...)

77 A.E. Nothnagel, Hansard, 11/1982, col. 4969; 21st April 1982.

78 Idem, Hansard, 3/1983, col. 1312; 18th February 1983.

79 Idem, ibidem, col. 1311.

80 P. Koornhof, Hansard, 1/1983, cols. 160-164; 1st February 1983.

81 P. Koornhof, Hansard, 1/1984, col. 133; 31st January 1984.

82 Idem, ibidem, cols.138-9.

83 M.C. Botha, Hansard, vol. 18, col. 4141, 13th October 1966.

84 "Where is the land belonging to the Blacks, and where are the boundaries? ... The final reply ... was given in 1936 ... black land in South Africa is that land which belonged to the Blacks in 1936, plus the $7\frac{1}{4}$ million morgen which the Whites have to purchase for them from the white land in South Africa ... there will be a clearance of black spots, black spots will be exchanged in order to consolidate as far as consolidation is practicable."
Vorster, Hansard, vol. 25, col. 363; 7th February 1969.

85 Vorster, Hansard, vol. 30, col. 5485; 1st October 1970.

86 "The government will keep the word the White man gave by way of this act ... (the Land Act of 1936) ... and the process of purchasing ... will continue until the $7\frac{1}{4}$ million morgen of land has been given. However, once that $7\frac{1}{4}$ million morgen of land has been given, then territorial demands, as far as this government and I personally are concerned, will have disposed of."
Vorster, Hansard, 11/1971, col. 4867; 21st April 1971.

87 Vorster, Hansard, 11/1972, col. 5277; 19th April 1972.

88 Those 61 100 ha. were thus subdivided: 22 000 ha. in Transvaal, 21 000 ha. in Natal, 18 000 ha. in the Cape Province and 100 ha. in the Orange Free State. They were from the quota provided for in the 1936 Land Act and kept as a reserve for 'rounding off' the homelands if and when the necessity should arise.

89 Vorster, Hansard, 1/1976, cols. 382-383.

90 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1972, p. 34.

91 In particular, the Second Report of the Select Committee on Bantu Affairs, 1973, referring to consolidation in Natal and Transvaal (A. 2 -'73); the Third Report of that committee (S.C. 12 -'73) referring to land consolidation in the Northern Cape and Transvaal in regard to Bophuthatswana; and the First Report of the Select Committee on Bantu Affairs of 1975 (S.C. 9 -'75) with additional proposals regarding all the homelands.

92 Republic of South Africa, First Report of the Select Committee on Bantu Affairs (S.C. 9 -'75), Map C.

93 In the Glen Grey district, where the people whose Paramount Chief is Matanzima live, the results were: 37 842 votes (83,7%) against the transfer to Transkei, 6 634 (14,7%) in favour. From Kotzé, D.A., op.cit., p. 162.

94 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1973, p. 155.

95 Hansard, 17/1977, cols. 8645-8647; 27th May 1977.

96 Interview with the Venda Ambassador in South Africa, S.R. Ramabulana.

97 BENBO, Black Development in South Africa, op.cit., 1976, p.23.

98 In regard to the Katima and Senthimula block of Venda, the 1973-75 proposals are bizarre. While most of the block is considered as a 'badly situated Black area' and therefore its excision is compensated, some farms at its extremities are considered as 'black spots' and therefore excised without compensation. Even stranger is the fact that the compensatory land for the block results to be land already included in the released areas and already under the jurisdiction of the Venda and Gazankulu homelands. See: Republic of South Africa, Second Report of the Select Committee on Bantu Affairs, 1973, A.2 -'73, p. 56 and map A.

99 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 7/1983, col. 3263; 16th March 1983.

100 J.P. du Toit, Hansard 17/1977, col. 8454; 25th May 1977.

101 Hansard, vol. 43, col. 4995; 25th April 1973.

102 Referring to the exchange of land between South Africa and the Homelands, Vorster said: "There is no one who would not like to see a contiguously consolidated homeland. I hope and trust that in the many years which lie ahead it will be possible for this to happen."
Hansard 10/1978, col. 4511; 12th April 1978.

103 C.P. Mulder, Hansard 13/1978, col. 6037; 1st May 1978.

104 V.A. Volder, Hansard 18/1978, col. 8991; 9th June 1978.

105 P.W. Botha, Hansard 1/1979, col. 242; 7th February 1979.

106 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1979, p. 303.

107 Ibidem.

108 Ibidem.

109 J.C. Heunis, Hansard 13/1979, col. 6320; 11th May 1979.

110 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1979, p. 304.

111 Republic of South Africa, Commission for Co-operation and Development, Annual Report for the Period 1st January 1977 to 31st December 1980.
R.P. 12/1982, p. 18.
It is noteworthy that this report for the years 1977 to 1980 was released only in 1982.

112 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1979, p. 304.

113 Hansard 3/1981, Questions col. 129.

114 J.J.G. Wentzel, then Deputy Minister of Development and Land Affairs, made the point of the situation in regard to the consolidation of Ciskei during the debate on the Status of the Ciskei Bill:
"(the agreement reached on this subject will be implemented in phases) ... Phase 1 entails the areas which were declared to have been set aside in 1913 as well the areas which were proclaimed to be released areas in 1936 ... which (were) state land and which will be incorporated on 4 December. This is the territory which ... is to be incorporated under the jurisdiction of the Ciskei. Phase 2 principally concerns those territories designated by Parliament since 1972-1975 for addition to the Ciskei, but which have not

all been bought out yet, but which will, in terms of our agreement, be bought out by the R.S.A. by 30 December 1982 ... There is Phase 3 as well ... it concerns further additions which will be dealt with and discussed when finalizing the consolidation of Ciskei and which will eventually have to be passed by Parliament as well."
Hansard 9/1981, cols. 5104-6, 29th September 1981.

The following day he went back on the subject to give more details about Phase 1. "Phase 1 determines the territory defined in this status legislation. This consists of three groups of land. In the first place there is the 1913 land ... in the second place, there is the land added in terms of the 1936 Act, i.e., prior to the proposals of 1973 and 1975. This gives us a total surface area of 533 000 ha. However, after the 1972 and 1975 proposals, we continued to buy up land ... This means an additional 100 000 ha. was included, and this gives us a total of approximately 630 000 ha. The rest of the territory ... is land still in the process of being bought up."
Hansard 9/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 5229, 30th June 1981.

115 According to H.J.D. van der Walt "in the framework of the constellation of states concept, the whole question of land might not be all that important."
Quoted in S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1980, p. 391.

116 Ciskei Commission Report, op.cit., paras. 333-339.

117 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1980, p. 392.

118 Hansard 1/1981, cols. 241-3, 28th January 1981.

119 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 1/1981, col. 376, 29th January 1981.

120 A.P. Treurnicht, Hansard 1/1981, col. 350, 29th January 1981.

121 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 1/1981, col. 377, 29th January 1981.

122 W.J. Snyman, Hansard 11/1982, col. 4970, 21st April 1982.

123 Hansard 5/1983, col. 2259, 3rd March 1983.

124 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 11/1982, cols. 5028-9, 21st April 1982.

125 A. Fourie, Hansard 5/1983, col. 2237, 3rd March 1983.

126 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 5/1983, cols. 2259-60, 3rd March 1983.

127 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 7/1983, col. 3265, 16th March 1983.

128 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 18/1983, col. 8738, 6th June 1983.

129 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 18/1983, cols. 8826-32, 7th June 1983.

130 The Borders of Particular States Extension Act (No. 2 of 1980) has been amended by:
- the Laws on Co-operation and Development Second Amendment Act (No. 94 of 1980),
- the Borders of Particular States Extension Amendment Act (No. 77 of 1981),
- the Borders of Particular States Extension Amendment Act (No. 25 of 1983), and,
- the Borders of Particular States Extension Second Amendment Act (No. 109 of 1983).

131 By Proclamation No. R. 211 of 29th October 1982.

132 By Proclamation No. R. 141 of 30th September 1983.

133 By Proclamation No. R. 214 and R. 213 of 30th December 1983 respectively.

134 By Proclamation No. 180 of 19th September 1980.

135 By Proclamation No. R. 258 of 18th December 1981.

136 By Proclamation No. R. 259 of 31st December 1981.

137 By Proclamation No. R. 142 of 30th September 1983.

138 By Proclamation No. R. 212 of 30th December 1983.

139 By Proclamation No. 187 of 24th September 1982 and No. 210 of 30th December 1983 respectively.

140 By Proclamation No. 211 of 30th December 1983.

141 Republic of South Africa, First Report of the Select Committee on Co-operation and Development. (S.C. 7-'83)

142 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 7/1983, col. 3265, 16th March 1983.

143 The real situation regarding the Katima and Senthimula area appears to be confused. The facts are that the government stated that since this area was given to Venda, another area earmarked for cession to it would be sold back to the Whites. From what I could gather from the text of South African legislation and of the agreements with Venda, the only areas officially earmarked for cession to Venda are those reported on Map 4 plus Katima and Senthimula which was added to the schedule in 1983. When this area was given to Venda, no modification was made to the schedule, and none has been made to it up to mid-1984. Therefore, it seems clear that no "compensatory land in the Soekmekaar-Bandelierkop area" earmarked for Venda has been returned to white ownership as a consequence of the cession of Katima and Senthimula. However, in the 1975 proposals, the compensatory land for Katima and Senthimula is not situated in the Soekmekaar-Bandelierkop area, nor in any other area mentioned in the schedule of the Borders of Particular States Extension Act. As already pointed out in note 98, the question of the compensatory land for Katima and Senthimula appears to be bizarre, and I have not been able to find a satisfactory answer to it. The latest turn of events seems to have added new interrogatives to it. The answer to all this might be very simple, but since most of the proceedings of the various commissions and committees working on consolidation are confidential, I cannot find it.

144 BENBO (1976), op.cit., p. 23.

145 P. Koornhof, Hansard 12/1983, Q. col. 1120, 27th April 1983.

146 Hansard 18/1983, col. 8738, 6th June 1983.

147 Southall, R., South Africa's Transkei. The Political Economy of an 'independent' Bantustan. London 1982, p. 174.

148 Ibidem, p. 196.

149 Ibidem, p. 197, and Streek, B. and Wicksteed, R., Render unto Kaiser, op.cit., ch. 7.

150 For example, according to the Bophuthatswana Land Act, 10% of the land incorporated under the consolidation process is reserved for the state, 20% is to be sold to private buyers and the remaining 70% is to be leased to farmers, including Whites. No new land will be given to the tribes.
S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1983, p. 329.

151 Southall, R., op.cit., pp. 176-7.

152 Ibidem, p. 180.

153 For example, in Transkei, from 1963 to 1980 salary increases were awarded to the public service in 1964, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971 (twice), 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1978.
Southall, R., op.cit., p. 178.

154 Ibidem, p. 180.

155 Commission of Inquiry into the Standard of Education in Transkei. Quoted in Southall, R., op.cit., p. 184.

156 Ibidem, p. 186.

157 Ibidem, pp. 37-8 and 187-8.

158 Ibidem, p. 38.

159 BENBO (1976) op.cit., ch. 9.

160 Ciskeian National Development Corporation, C.N.D.C. Annual Report. p. 12.

161 C.N.D.C., Annual Reports 1980 to 1983.

162 BENBO (1976), op.cit., ch. 9.

163 Transkei Development Corporation, Annual Report 1981.

164 Government of Ciskei, Office of the Presidency, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Economic Development of the Republic of Ciskei, p. 32.

165 Southall says that "in a survey of students at Fort Hare ... it was found that only one-third of those interviewed were prepared to consider working in the Ciskei or Transkei, a major reason for rejection of such opportunity by the remaining two-thirds being that they rejected the homeland concept."
Southall, R., op.cit., p. 180.

166 See for example: Bekker, S.B., et al., A Socio-Economic Survey of the Amatola Basin. Interim Report. Rhodes University, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Working Paper No. 2, September 1981, Ch. IV.

167 R.F. Loxton, Hunting & Associates, Notes on the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme. Undated mimeo. (Covering the period up to mid-1981)

168 For example, the average pay in the manufacturing industry in Bophuthatswana in February 1979 was R109,50 (Republic of Bophuthatswana Statistics, compiled by the Department of Economic Affairs, 1981, table C 10); during the same year the average wage of a black worker in the manufacturing industry in white South Africa was in the range of R97-R201 per month. (S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1979, p. 228).

169 It is difficult to find consistent data in this regard, however, as an example the case of Venda in 1978 can be quoted. In that year, the average wage in the manufacturing industry in Venda (only 466 employees) was R468 per year.
S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1979, p. 359.

170 BENSO, Statistical Survey 1978 (for the 1974 figure), and S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1980, p. 115.

171 About contacts between the Bophuthatswana Ombudsman and those of other countries, see:
Republic of Bophuthatswana, Office of the Ombudsman, First Annual Report, 1982.

172 P.W. Botha, Hansard, 1/1980, col. 253, 6th February 1980.

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J.A.S. = Journal of African Studies, University of California Press.
J.C.A.S. = Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Africa Institute of South Africa Press.
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C O N T E N T S

COURSE PAPERS

THE CONCEPT OF STRESS

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1. INTRODUCTION

A study of the concept of stress in the literature immediately reveals a confusing lack of consistency in the use of the term.

> The concept of stress is elusive because it is poorly defined. There is no single agreed definition in existence. It is a concept which is familiar to both layman and professional alike; it is understood by all when used in a general context but by very few when a more precise account is required, and this seems to be the central problem. (1)

According to C.B. Dobson (2) there are over 300 definitions of stress and words that are semantically akin to it. This is perhaps partly the result of the upsurge of general interest in stress in recent years and the popularisation of the concept in the media. A further factor is its use in a variety of disciplines such as physiology, psychology, sociology, management, psychiatry and pharmacology.

Derived from Latin (stringere, strictus, meaning 'to bind or draw tightly'), the word stress was used popularly in seventeenth century England to signify hardship and adversity. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it was being used to denote a force acting on and tending to distort or strain a person's body or mental powers, causing ill-health. (3) The word 'stress' was also introduced into physics to refer to the internal force generated within a solid body by the action on it of an external force or 'load', the resulting distortion of the body being termed 'strain'. This led to the use of the expression 'being under stress', with resulting physiological strains. L. Levi referred to stress as 'the rate of wear and tear in the organism.' (4)

Most references to stress in the literature are associated with negative and harmful consequences or symptoms. These fall into three categories, namely, psychological, behavioural and physiological manifestations.

The psychological ill-effects of stress are negatively-toned emotions such as anxiety, uneasiness, depression, frustration, tension, conflict, confusion, apathy, a feeling of not being able to cope, and a feeling of not being in control of oneself and the situation.

The behavioural responses to stress include poor performance, loss of motivation, absenteeism from work, and the abuse of alcohol, tobacco and and drugs.

Physiological symptoms that are common are increased blood pressure and heart rate, headaches, muscular tension especially in the neck and back, fatigue, sweating, loss of appetite, dryness of the mouth and throat, skin rashes, over-secretion of hydrochloric acid in the stomach (possibly causing ulcers), and sexual dysfunctions.

Stress is an inevitable part of human experience because all people face demands, threatening situations, challenges and adjustments which call for coping behaviour. When the coping response is appropriate and successful, the disequilibrium (stress) caused by the perceived discrepancy between the demand and the individual's capability of responding successfully, is removed. Stress in this case may be a positive force rather than a negative one, a stimulus to achievement, motivation and satisfaction.

W. Gmelch asserted that a moderate amount of stimulation and stress is necessary for optimum performance in life. Excessive stimulation (and stress) and insufficient stimulation (and stress) both lead to a drop in performance levels.

> Mild stress - or rather the desire to relieve it - is an energising not a debilitating force. (5)

Gmelch illustrated the relationship between stress and performance diagrammatically, as follows:



STRESS AND PERFORMANCE (GMELCH) (6)

2. DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF STRESS

2.1 Three main approaches have been adopted in the definition of stress.

The first views stress as a person's response to a threatening or disturbing environment. It is treated as a dependent variable.

The second approach regards stress as a stimulus in the environment external to the person, causing extraordinary demands and threatening him

in some way. It is seen as an independent variable 'out there' in a noxious environment, impinging on a person and stimulating unhealthy reactions.

The third approach, the interactional one, regards stress as reflecting a lack of 'fit' in the interaction between a person and his environment. Stress is a state that occurs in the person when there is an imbalance between the environmental demand made upon him and his capacity for coping successfully. What is important in this interaction between the individual and his situation is his perception of the discrepancy between the demand and his ability to cope, and not the actual, objective levels of these two variables. The person's cognitive appraisal of the situational demand and his personal capability makes stress an individual phenomenon. According to this approach, stress is an intervening variable between stimulus and response.

> Stress resides neither in the situation nor in the person, but depends on the transaction of the individual in the situation. (7)

One outcome of the existence of three very different approaches to the definition of stress is confusion over terminology, particularly in the mushrooming popular literature on the subject and in everyday conversation. Thus, when using the word 'stress', it is possible to mean the events, forces and circumstances that tend to pressure and overwhelm one (a stimulus definition), or the physiological and psychological reactions and changes that result from being exposed to extreme pressure (a response definition). Alternatively, the word 'stress' may denote a psychological state resulting from the perception of threat and leading to successful or unsuccessful coping responses (an interactional definition).

A short account of the response-based and stimulus-based definitions of stress is provided, after which an attempt is made in this paper to

describe more fully the interactional models of stress favoured by the more recent writers in this field.

2.2 RESPONSE-BASED DEFINITIONS

This approach to stress focuses on the person's response pattern to disturbing elements in his environment. The response pattern is viewed as stress, and people are referred to as being 'under stress' or 'stressed'. The stress response manifests itself physiologically and psychologically. The disturbing demands or threats in the environment are termed 'stressors'. The simplest form of this stress model is a linear stimulus --- response one, but a response may act as a further stimulus to produce another stress response.



RESPONSE-BASED MODEL OF STRESS (8)

Probably the best-known response-based moel of stress is Hans Selye's biological model. He reversed the traditional view of stress as a stimulus or force upon a person, and instead regarded stress as the result or response produced within the organism by the presence of a demand or stimulus.

He defined physiological stress as

> the non-specific response of the body to any demand made upon it. (9)

The response, or defence reaction, is non-specific because the body's initial pattern of adaptation is the same for healthy and pleasant demands or stressors as for unpleasant and noxious demands.

Selye named the stress response the General Adaptation Syndrome. Briefly, the first stage of the G.A.S. is the alarm reaction', during which adrenalin is released into the bloodstream causing racing of the heart and shallower breathing. Hormonal secretions mobilize other parts of the body for action. Additional red blood cells carry oxygen and nourishment to other cells in the body, and the ability of the blood to clot is increased. Muscular tension occurs, particularly in the lower back and neck. Hydrochloric acid is released in the stomach. Having been prepared to meet the stressor, assuming that the demand is still present, the person enters the 'resistance stage' during which the body actively combats the stressor. If the demand is particularly severe or prolonged, bodily resources may be so depleted that the third phase, the'exhaustion stage', may be reached. At this point stress-related diseases begin to set in.

Selye's ideas have had great influence on and been transferred to the psychological field, but there is growing evidence that the notion of the 'non-specificity' of the stress response has been overstated. (10)

Kagan and Levi in Sweden developed Selye's response-based model by stating that psychosocial stimuli elicit physiological responses that prepare the person for the physical activity of coping. If these responses are intense and prolonged, they may produce 'wear and tear' and disease. (11)

2.3 STIMULUS-BASED DEFINITIONS OF STRESS

According to R.D. Allen et al.,

> Stress may be defined as a force that creates physiological or psychological strain. (12)

This type of definition emphasizes the stimulus characteristics of the environment that give rise to strain within the person. Stress is seen as an independent variable, something external to the person, impinging on him and acting as a disruptive force. The following simple linear model represents this approach.



STIMULUS-BASED MODEL OF STRESS (13)

This use of the term 'stress' to represent an external force causing strain, originated in engineering. For instance, Hooke's Law of Elasticity describes how a load (stress) placed upon a metal produces internal strain and deformation. The metal returns to its original condition when the load is removed, providing the strain falls within the elastic limit of the material. Permanent damage is caused if the strain exceeds this limit.

In accordance with the engineering analogy, just as metals have different elastic limits and tolerances to stress, so individual people vary in their resistance to stress. As with metals subjected to stress, people are able to tolerate a certain amount of stress, but suffer harm when that level is exceeded.

In terms of the stimulus-based definition, stress is viewed in terms of demand and focuses attention on the conditions that can be accepted as stressful. In the literature there are references to many of these conditions, but this highlights one of the problems of this model. Some of the conditions or situations that are stressful to some people are by no means stressful to other people. It is sometimes said, 'One man's stress is another man's challenge.' The highly individual nature of people's responses to circumstances poses problems for this model. In addition the mechanistic approach in which people are passive recipients of stress, places further limits on its usefulness.

2.4 INTERACTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF STRESS

2.4.1 Interactional approaches to the definition of stress emphasise the importance of the individual person's perceptions of demands (stimuli) and his capability of coping successfully with those demands. Accordingly, stress is viewed as an internal perceptual state intervening between stimuli (stressors) and responses (psychological, physiological or behavioural strain). This differs from the response-based and stimulus-based definitions which are represented as stimulus-response models. Strümpfer represented the simple interactional model as follows:



S - O - R MODEL OF REACTION TO STRESSORS (14)

According to interactional definitions, stress is the result of a particular relationship between an individual and his environment.

There is no predictable pattern of reaction to demands (stressors) both environmental and internal. By means of the psychological processes of perception and cognitive appraisal, each person defines for himself those situations that he finds to be stressful. Unlike the stimulus and response approaches, the person has an active, and not a passive, role in the occurrence of stress. McGrath expressed this perceptual, interactional definition of stress as follows:

> There is a potential for stress when an environmental situation is perceived as presenting a demand which threatens to exceed the person's capabilities and resources for meeting it, under conditions where he expects a substantial differential in the rewards and costs from meeting the demand versus not meeting it. (15)

In accordance with this formulation, environmental demands are neutral, but may become stressful for a particular person when they are perceived to constitute a threat. When the consequences of not coping are minimal, stress is insignificant, but when they are serious, stress is likely to be great.

When demands and resources are well balanced, there is minimal stress. When this balance is destroyed, stress develops, causing the person to take coping action to restore the balance and remedy the situation. Usually this imbalance is in the form of an excess of demand in relation to resources, but Cherniss (16) pointed out that the reverse can also be the case when resources exceed demands (quantitatively or qualitatively). This also produces stress manifested by boredom, lack of stimulation, and frustration in one's job, for instance, and a suitable coping response to restore the balance is necessary in order to reduce the stress.

2.4.2 The concept of <u>demand</u> is an important one in the context of stress. According to Cox (17) the term demand denotes a request or requirement for physical or mental action, usually with the implication of a perceived time constraint. If demands are not met by means of successful adjustment

or coping behaviour, they have harmful consequences for a person. Lazarus (18) referred to external or environmental demands, which are largely social and interpersonal, and internal demands, which are biological or arise from personal moral values and needs.

2.4.3 Lazarus (19) defined threat, another key psychological element of stress, as anticipation of harm of some kind. The harm, or undesirable consequences, may be physiological or psychological. The greater the anticipated harm, the greater will be the threat and the more intense the accompanying emotion and the efforts to adjust. People experiencing threat try to eliminate the danger of harm to themselves, or at least lessen it. The anticipation of possible harm is based on the person's appraisal of the situation but may equally be distorted by a lack of information or objectivity on the part of the person feeling threatened. Thus, the anticipated danger or harm may be more imaginary than real. Perception of threat is the key psychological process referred to in the definitions of most recent writers on stress.

The person - environment fit model outlined by Marshall and Cooper brings this out clearly:



A PERSON - ENVIRONMENT FIT MODEL (MARSHALL AND COOPER) (20)

2.4.4 Of prime importance in all interactional models of stress are the processes of perception and cognitive appraisal. The individual ultimately defines stress himself by his perceptions of the demands of the situation, his ability to cope, and the importance of coping.

> Stressors are "there" ..... only if they are psychologically there. (21)

For example, it is not only the ill-equipped examination candidate who experiences stress before the examination, but also those highly capable candidates who perceive their preparation to be inadequate to meet the demands of the examination. Furthermore, a person of limited ability placed in a very demanding work situation, may not experience stress

if his interpretation of the situation is based on faulty perceptions of his ability or of the degree of difficulty of the work, or of the importance of succeeding. Once he tackles the work and realises his limitations or the demanding nature of the work or the importance of success, he may well start feeling threatened and experience stress.

Cognitive appraisal goes beyond the perception of the individual elements of the situation, and involves a judgement or interpretation of the significance of a potentially threatening situation. The appraisal is cognitive, and not emotional, because it is a function of the person's accumulated knowledge, experience and understanding. It may be seen as an individual's evaluation of his interaction with his environment, including its perceived demands, limitations, resources and opportunities. Lazarus defined two kinds of appraisal, namely primary and secondary. (22) During primary appraisal of a situation or demand, a person judges whether it is potentially beneficial or harmful, important or unimportant, challenging or threatening. This initial appraisal is greatly influenced by the person's estimation of the adequacy of his coping resources, his values, goals, and personality. It is also affected by past experiences of success or failure in similar situations.

Once the person starts to deal with the situation or demand, successfully or unsuccessfully, secondary appraisals take place. In these he re-evaluates his initial perceptions of the demand and his resources for meeting the demand. The extent to which the coping action meets the demand may alter the person's cognitive appraisal of the situation.

Differences in people's perceptions of themselves and of environmental conditions, as well as in their cognitive appraisal of the situations in which they find themselves, help to explain the highly individual and personal nature of the stress phenomenon. With some truth it has been

said that stress is in the eye of the beholder. A person does not simply react to a situation, but to the situation as he perceives and evaluates it, especially with regard to his ability to cope.

2.5 SOME FACTORS INFLUENCING COGNITIVE APPRAISAL

A person's appraisal of a situation is influenced by a highly complex set of factors, both environmental and internal. In order to illustrate this, some examples of such factors, mentioned by writers in this field (23), are listed.

2.5.1 Personal values and goals. A person judges the importance of meeting demands upon him by reference to his value system which places constraints upon him. Situations that endanger the achievement of important personal goals are judged to be threatening. A problem inevitably arises, for example, when a person sets unrealistic goals for achievement, advancement, and status and is reluctant to modify them.

2.5.2 Importance of outcome. If the outcome of the event is perceived by the individual to be unimportant, it will influence his cognitive appraisal in the direction of evaluating the situation as safe and non-threatening.

2.5.3 Severity of the demand. The demand may pose performance requirements which exceed or severely tax the individual's capabilities. The severity of the demand may also be related to the conflict, frustration or anxiety inherent in the situation. By conflict, in this context, is meant the simultaneous presence of two or more incompatible goals or demands, where actions designed to satisfy one goal necessarily threaten the other. Frustration arises from the thwarting or delaying of the satisfaction of a need or desire. Anxiety is an emotional state which involves generalized feelings of fear or dread. The degree of difficulty of the demand may also be increased by its prolonged duration and its multiple nature.

Demands that are ambiguous, in that what is required is not clear, and those that are novel, having never been experienced before, tend to be perceived as being more threatening than others.

2.5.4 The imminence of harm. If the potential harm is distant in time, there will tend to be less threat to the individual than if it is near at hand. The prospect of death, for example, seems to be remote from a young person, who tends to give it relatively little thought until he is caught up in a highly dangerous situation.

2.5.5 Experience and information. Successful past experience increases a person's competence and confidence in handling situations, and encourages favourable cognitive appraisals. Likewise, the possession of sufficient information about a situation reduces unpredictability and enables the individual to make an accurate assessment of the demand and the coping possibilities.

2.5.6 Available resources. The individual's perceptions of the personal and environmental resources available to him clearly influence his evaluation of his adequacy in the face of a particular demand. Included among these resources are technical and interpersonal skills, specific training, time, authority and status, and supportive and trustworthy helpers.

2.5.7 Personality factors. Threat appraisal is affected by a wide range of personality characteristics. Some people have a cheerful and optimistic disposition, while others are excessively introspective and readily indulge in self-condemnation which magnifies perceived inadequacy and inhibits motivation. Some individuals are very competitive and experience anxiety as a result of comparing themselves with others. They may react badly in evaluation situations, such as speech-making, in which they feel they are being judged. Some people do not find it easy to relate to

others and worry about failing in their dealings with them. There are those who are 'perfectionists', setting unreasonably high standards and constantly facing the possibility of personal defeat and a consequent lowering of self-esteem.

Two cardiologists, Rosenman and Friedman(24), studied the personality types associated with coronary heart disease and arrived at a twofold classification, designated Type A and Type B.
According to their research, nearly all people fall into these two broad personality and behavioural categories. Type A people are competitive and achievement-oriented, have a marked sense of time-urgency, are extremely involved in their work, often feel under pressure, are self-critical and easily become annoyed and frustrated. They tend to over-extend themselves in terms of the relationship between demands and capabilities. Type B behaviour is characterised by the converse of these traits. Rosenman and Friedman's ten-year research programme, involving 35 000 men, showed that people exhibiting Type A behaviour were three times more prone to coronary heart disease than others. They estimated that 10 percent of urban employed men in the U.S.A. are Type A, while 76 percent of managers exhibit this type of behaviour.

While this classification may be felt to be rather simplistic, since Type A's and B's are probably at opposite ends of a continuum with many people falling in between , it does point to important personality differences which affect the way in which people react to demands and and situations.

Kobasa et al. (25) studied the stress and general health of a sample of 670 managers in an attempt to identify a 'hardiness factor' that enabled some to be more resistant to stress and stress-related illnesses than others. It was found that those with high scores for three variables

were more likely to be able to cope with stress. The three components of the so-called 'hardiness factor' are: (1) challenge, the tendency to face up to problems in a positive way, to regard threatening situations as challenges to be met, and to view changes as opportunities; (2) commitment, the willingness to become fully involved and actively interested in those aspects of life identified as important; and (3) control, the belief that one can influence one's environment, that one can take control through various actions and not be a helpless victim of circumstances which threaten to overwhelm one. Some people have an internal locus of control, believing that they can exert control over their environment, while others, with an external locus of control, feel that they are unable to influence events and situations, largely being victims of circumstances. People who do not see themselves as effective copers are more likely to appraise demands as being personally threatening. In a study of 130 secondary school teachers, Kyriacou and Sutcliffe (26) obtained a significant correlation between self-reported teacher stress and externality on Rotter's Internal-External locus of control scale.

3. COPING

Coping is a key concept in stress theory. When a person perceives an imbalance between demand and resources, he experiences discomfort and stress, and he is motivated to take steps to remedy the situation. He employs problem-solving or adjustment responses, called coping, to remove or alleviate the anticipated harm. Effective coping removes the stress experienced by the person, because the person's cognitive appraisal of the situation changes to a favourable one. Ineffective coping serves to reinforce the stress, because the secondary cognitive appraisal confirms the person's inadequacy in meeting the demand or threat.

A detailed account of the coping processes is given in a separate paper on the management of stress.

The final section of this paper is devoted to a brief description of three recent stress models.

4. COX AND MACKAY'S TRANSACTIONAL MODEL OF STRESS (27)

Stress is defined as a perceptual phenomenon arising from an imbalance between a person's perception of the demand made upon him and his ability to cope, when coping is regarded as important. The experience of stress gives rise to responses which represent efforts to cope with the source of stress. If coping is ineffective, stress is prolonged, and abnormal responses and damage may occur.



TRANSACTIONAL MODEL OF STRESS (COX AND MACKAY) (28)

An important aspect of this model is that it is not linear, but cyclical, with feedback components at various points among the five stages.

The first stage consists of the actual, objective internal and environmental demands and the person's actual capability of meeting the demands. During the second stage there is a cognitive appraisal of the perceived demand and the person's perceived capability of meeting that demand. If there is an imbalance, it gives rise to the emotional experience of stress. Cox and Mackay illustrated the main components of the transaction between a person and his environment, through the process of cognitive appraisal, diagrammatically as follows:



THE BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE TRANSACTIONAL MODEL (29)

The stress response is the third stage. This is both physiological, in the form of bodily changes, and psychological, in the form of behavioural and cognitive attempts to cope with the stress. The fourth stage represents the consequences, both perceived and actual, of the coping responses.

The fifth stage consists of feedback to the cognitive appraisal process of the successful or unsuccessful consequences of coping. Successful coping leads to a favourable secondary cognitive appraisal and the consequent reduction or elimination of stress. The reverse is the case with unsuccessful coping. Feedback also occurs when a physiological response, such as the release of adrenalin, affects the person's perception of the demand, or when a behavioural response changes the actual demand.

This model has the advantage of representing a dynamic, cyclical process of transaction between an individual and his environment, unlike those linear models that do not provide for feedback mechanisms.

5. McGRATH'S STRESS CYCLE (30)



McGrath's four-stage, four-link stress cycle also represents an interactional approach.

This model is simpler than Cox and Mackay's, but is very similar except that it is represented as a closed loop. Emphasis is also placed on the importance of the cognitive appraisal process in subjectively interpreting

a situation as stressful. On the basis of his appraisal and past experience, the person decides on an appropriate coping response. This leads to particular coping behaviours, the outcomes of which may either have the desired effects in dealing with the stressor, or alternatively may be ineffective and even generate new stresses.

6. McLEAN'S MODEL OF STRESS (31)

This model was devised with work stress in mind, and focused particularly on the conditions under which certain stressors tend to produce a stress response. An unfavourable context and internal vulnerability of the person were identified as the two main factors influencing the stress response.



McLEAN'S WORK STRESS FACTORS (32)

The first factor that helps to determine whether a stressor will produce stress symptoms is the context in which the interaction takes place. The social and work context covers a wide range of elements and norms, such as the nature of the social relations and expectations, the work ethic, and the economic conditions. For example, in times of mounting unemployment, the possibility of losing one's job is much more likely to produce stress than when there is full employment and it is easy to obtain another job. Strümpfer (33) in his interactional model of organizational stress, included a variable which he called 'cultural antecedents.', emphasizing that no individual can be viewed out of his cultural context.

Individual vulnerability to stressors varies widely and is influenced by personality factors, moods, stage of development, self-concept, past experiences, and skills. McLean underlined the importance of the person's perceptions of his personality and capabilities in determining his vulnerability to stressors. He also drew attention to particular vulnerabilities of each life stage, drawing on Levinson et al.'s conceptualization of the seasons of a man's life, e.g. the 'mid-life crisis.' (34)

Stressors form the third set of variables in McLean's model. Literally anything can be a stressor if the individual is vulnerable and the context unsupportive or unfavourable in relation to the particular stressor. McLean maintained that the common denominator among stressors is that they involve some form of change. Individuals have a built-in resistance to change. Consequently, they find events that demand change stressful. This is consistent with Holmes and Rahe's (35) research on stressful life events. They produced a schedule of forty-three critical life events, necessitating personal and social adjustment, and gave a value (life change units) to each one on the basis of the amount of adjustment each required, e.g. death of spouse 100, son or daughter leaving home 29. A combination of events

produced a higher L.C.U. score, which indicated a danger to a person's health.

The final feature of McLean's model is that the three circles, representing the three sets of variables, move and sometimes overlap. A stress response is indicated when the three circles overlap.

A.



Here, there is the probability that the stressor will produce stress because the interaction between the stressor and the vulnerable person takes place in an unfavourable context.

B.



Although the person is vulnerable within an unfavourable context, there is no stress because no stressor is present.

C.



This stressor is less likely to produce a stress response because the interaction between the stressor and the vulnerable individual does not take place in an unfavourable context. The environment may be supportive and help the person to withstand the destructive effects of the stressor.

D.



The stressor operates within an unfavourable context, but this will not lead to stress because this particular person is not vulnerable in this situation.

McLEAN'S WORK STRESS SITUATIONS (ADAPTED) (36)

McLean's model can be developed further by varying the size of each circle to reflect symbolically the relative importance or magnitude of the three variables at a particular time.

7. CONCLUSION

Simple, linear stimulus-response models of stress, which give insufficient recognition to the part played by the individual's subjective perceptions intervening between stimulus and response, have given way to interactional models. In these, there is a dynamic interplay between the individual and his environment. During this interaction, the person's cognitive appraisal of his ability to cope, based on his perceptions of his personal resources, the demands made upon him, and the importance of the outcome, defines his stress. His coping responses either reduce or remove the stress or, if they are ineffective, reinforce it in terms of harmful physiological, emotional and behavioural responses. Since these are cyclical models, by feedback, the coping response re-defines other elements in the system, such as the demand (stimulus) or perceived resources.

The interactional models are more satisfactory representations of the stress phenomenon because they account more fully for individual differences in reacting to situations than the rather mechanistic earlier stimulus-response models. They direct attention to the importance of the person's thought processes and this has implications for stress management, as is explored more fully in a separate paper. The interactional models also represent a dynamic, rather than a static situation, and make greater allowance for the complexity of the human response to demand and the multidimensionality of stress.

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SOURCES OF MANAGERIAL STRESS

with particular reference to

the school principalship

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July 1984

1. INTRODUCTION

The approach to stress on which this study is based is an interactional one such as that formulated by Joseph McGrath.

> Stress involves an interaction of person and environment .... there is a potential for stress when an environmental situation is perceived as presenting a demand which threatens to exceed the person's capabilities and resources for meeting it, under conditions where he expects a substantial differential in the rewards and costs from meeting the demand versus not meeting it. (1)

This type of stress model emphasizes the key part played by the person's perceptions of demands placed upon him and his resources for coping, as well as his cognitive appraisal of the extent to which the situation poses a threat to him.

This conceptualization of stress underlines the highly individualistic nature of the stress phenomenon in terms of which a situation is not stressful unless it is perceived by a person to be stressful. People's perceptions are strongly influenced by personality factors, self-concept, and past experiences of coping or failing to cope with threatening demands. As a result, it cannot be assumed that particular dimensions of a job are intrinsically stressful. Almost every aspect of working life, in fact, is a source of stress to some person at some time. In some cases directly opposite conditions are both sources of stress for different people, for example, work overload and underload, overpromotion and underpromotion. (2)

Although it is inappropriate to categorize certain situations as stressful per se, some aspects of managerial work have been identified as common potential stressors on the basis of numerous research studies and observations. In this study brief reference is made to some of this research, after which one of the classifications of sources of managerial work stress, that of Cooper and Marshall, is described more fully and related to the school principalship.

2. SURVEY OF RESEARCH STUDIES

2.1 A survey of the literature on sources of stress yielded reference to only two research studies specifically concerned with school administrators. One was carried out by Tung and Koch (3) in America in 1978, and attempted to identify the different sources of work stress experienced by 1156 administrators of educational institutions. A 35-item Administrative Stress Index questionnaire was compiled using the Index of Job Related Strain of Indik et al. (4), with other items added from the occupational literature and suggested by 40 school administrators. Analysis of the responses (62,3% response rate) revealed that the median percentage of total life stress attributed to work was 75%. Over 60% of the administrators perceived that more than three-quarters of their life stress resulted from their work.

Tung and Koch found that the Administrative Stress Index clustered around four dimensions or factors. The first factor concerned the school administrator's role-based stress and had to do with his beliefs and attitudes about his role in the organization, e.g. lack of clarity about the scope and responsibilities of the job, insufficient authority to match the responsibilities, no knowledge of superiors' evaluation of administrator's performance, insufficient information to perform work satisfactorily. The second factor, task-based stress, arose from the day-to-day performance of administrative duties, e.g. supervising the work of a large number of people, frequent interruptions, excessive work load in the time available, time-consuming meetings, high self-expectations. The third factor represented conflict-mediating stress, e.g. student discipline, problems between students, solving parent-school issues. The fourth factor reflected boundary-spanning stress in those situations in which the external environment impinged on the school.

2.2 Swent and Gmelch (5) compiled a Managerial Stress Index which was applied to over 1200 school administrators in Oregon, U.S.A., in 1977. This revealed five main categories of managerial stressors. Managerial constraints included interruptions, abnormal work load, compliance with employer's policies and rules, and over-lengthy meetings. Managerial responsibility related to tasks characteristic of all managerial work, such as supervision, evaluation, planning, and speaking in front of groups. Interpersonal relations included resolving differences with superiors and between members of staff, and the feeling of the administrator that staff members did not understand his goals and expectations. Intrapersonal conflicts involved conflicts between performance and internal beliefs and expectations, e.g. not feeling qualified to cope with the job, having unrealistically high expectations, and feeling frustrated about lack of career progress. Role expectations concerned differences in expectations of the administrator and the various people serviced, for example, not being clear about the scope and responsibilities of the job.

Swent and Gmelch's survey, using the Managerial Stress Index outlined above, pointed to the following ten main managerial stressors in rank order :

1. Complying with state, federal, and organizational rules and policies.
2. Feeling that meetings take up too much time.
3. Trying to complete reports and other paperwork on time.
4. Trying to gain financial support for programmes.
5. Trying to resolve personnel conflicts.
6. Evaluating staff members' performance.
7. Having to make decisions that affect the lives of individuals that I know, e.g. colleagues.
8. Feeling that I have too heavy a work load, one that I cannot possibly finish during the normal work day.
9. Imposing excessively high expectations on myself.
10. Being interrupted frequently by telephone calls.

2.3 Gorton and McIntyre (6), while surveying characteristics of sixty 'effective' senior high school principals in the United States in the National Association of Secondary School Principals' National Survey in 1978, reported that only one-sixth of the principals felt that stress was not a problem in their work.

2.4 Although not specifically concerned with work stress, Cawood's analysis of the school principalship in the Cape Province, Orange Free State and South-West Africa in 1976 (7) included the 312 principals' perceptions of their biggest problems. These were as follows:

	Quoted by
1. Overloading with administrative matters	54%
2. Finding staff	35%
3. Control over teaching	31%
4. Problems with teachers	21%
5. Need to do too much teaching	19%
6. Problems that stem from Department and inspectors	13%
7. Problems with parents and other social problems	12%
8. Shortage of time for principals' tasks	9%
9. Problems with pupils	8%
10. Inadequate preparation for the principalship	7%
11. Problems to do with the cirriculum	7%

Other problems reported by some of the principals included:
the unmanageable scope of the principal's work;
problems to do with rising or falling enrolment;
the diminishing authority of the principals;
the maintenance of healthy human relationships;
co-operation and problems with the school committee;
insufficient private time and time for family life;
the loss of teachers from the profession;
restrictions such as those on the married woman teacher;
too much emphasis on examination results.

2.5 Numerous studies of sources of stress among teachers have been reported in the literature (8). These have confirmed

that occupational stress represents a serious and growing problem among teachers, for example in Western Europe and North America. Cox et al. (9) matched 100 teachers and 100 semi-professionals in England for age, sex and marital status, and asked them to comment on the main sources of stress in their lives. Seventy-nine percent of the teachers pointed to work compared with 38 percent of the non-teachers. The International Labour Organization estimated that almost 25 percent of the teachers in Britain, America and Sweden are experiencing sufficient stress to cause significant health problems. (10)

2.6 In a study of sources of stress by Kyriacou and Sutcliffe (11), 257 secondary school teachers in England were asked to rate 51 stressors on a five-point scale (from 'no stress' to 'extreme stress', scored 0 to 4). Although not directly concerned with the principalship, the findings are of interest. Four factors predominated, namely, pupil misbehaviour (e.g. difficult classes, difficult behaviour problems), poor working conditions (e.g. poor promotion opportunities, inadequate salary, shortage of equipment), time pressures (e.g. too much work in the available time, administrative work), and poor school ethos (e.g. inadequate disciplinary policy of school, lack of consensus on minimum standards, attitudes and behaviour of headmaster). The most highly rated single stressors were, in descending order of means, 'pupils' poor attitudes to work', 'trying to uphold values and standards', 'poorly motivated pupils', 'covering lessons for absent teachers', 'too much work to do', 'lack of time to spend with individual pupils', and 'individual pupils who continually misbehave.'

2.7 Much research has been carried out into the sources of occupational stress in general, and managerial stress in particular.

For example, Kiev and Kohn (12) undertook a survey of executive stress on behalf of the American Management Association in 1979 involving 1375 top management and 1197

middle management executives. The five major sources of stress (in rank order) were perceived as follows:

1. Heavy work load, time pressures, and unrealistic deadlines
2. Disparity between what I have to do on the job and what I would like to accomplish
3. The general 'political' climate of the organization
4. Lack of feedback on job performance
5. Long working hours

2.8 A useful overview of this research was compiled by Cooper and Marshall (13) and over forty interacting factors were identified. On the basis of this analysis, a conceptual model of sources of managerial stress was devised, and this was used in a survey research project involving 208 senior managers. Among the conclusions drawn, were the importance of work overload, lack of autonomy, and concern about career development as stressors, and of ambitiousness and anxiety-proneness as personality characteristics contributing to stress vulnerability.

3. COOPER AND MARSHALL'S CLASSIFICATION OF MANAGERIAL STRESSORS

Of more importance, in the context of this review, is Cooper and Marshall's sevenfold classification of sources of managerial stress, because this provides the framework for the discussion of sources of stress in the school principalship in the remainder of the study.

According to this model, work stress is individually defined by the interaction between environmental sources of stress (numbered 1 to 6 in the diagram) and the characteristics of the individual at a particular time (number 7). Potential sources of stress evoke different reactions from different people, because a person's perception of threat is strongly influenced by personal characteristics such as emotional stability, tolerance of uncertainty, security, competitiveness, flexibility, interpersonal competence, and stability of self-concept.



SOURCES OF MANAGERIAL STRESS IN A PERSON-ENVIRONMENT FIT FRAMEWORK (after Cooper and Marshall) (14)

Some personality types appear to be psychologically predisposed to stress in that they are less able to cope with or adapt to stress-provoking situations. Examples of personal characteristics that tend to increase vulnerability to stress are neurotic tendencies, insecurity, rigidity, impatience, and perfectionism.

Sources of stress clearly cannot be analysed and classified by reference to environmental factors alone, and for this reason Cooper and Marshall included a seventh category, 'characteristics of the individual,' in their classification.

It should also be emphasized that each of the environmental demands in this model may be either a stimulus to development and achievement or a source of stress, depending on how it is

perceived and coped with. The person's perceptions are strongly influenced by his self-concept, past experiences and personality, that is, those factors that are intrinsic to the individual. There is thus a close association between stress and satisfaction. For example, demands such as work overload, time pressure, and change may bring satisfaction to one person and stress to another. To the same person, these environmental demands may cause stress in the short-term and satisfaction in the long-term, or vice versa. Cooper and Marshall allowed for this association in their research design by providing rating scales for both 'satisfaction' and 'pressure' opposite each environmental demand in their Job Characteristics Questionnaire.

3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JOB

3.1.1 According to the research conducted by Kiev and Kohn for the American Management Association (15), heavy work load, with associated time pressures and unrealistic deadlines, was the most commonly perceived source of stress among managers.

French and Caplan (16) distinguished between quantitative overload and qualitative overload, having too much to do as opposed to having work that is too difficult with regard to the skills, abilities and knowledge required. In research carried out at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center and NASA headquarters they produced strong evidence that work overload, both quantitative and qualitative, causes various symptoms of stress, such as job dissatisfaction, job tension, lower self-esteem, threat, embarrassment, high cholesterol levels, increased heart rate, skin resistance, and more smoking. McGrath (17) suggested that it is not work overload per se that causes stress, but rather overload that leads to a reduction in the quality of performance or to the inability to perform all the role demands. He also cautioned that apparent overload can readily be used to legitimize non-performance of especially difficult or unenjoyable other demands of the job on the grounds that there is no time for them.

Research studies of business executives by Caplan et al. (18) and Weiman (19) showed that under certain circumstances quantitative and qualitative work underload is a source of job dissatisfaction and stress as a result of boredom, stagnation, and the absence of challenge.

The surveys carried out by Swent and Gmelch in America and Cawood in South Africa (quoted earlier in this paper) both indicated that a significant proportion of school principals regarded work overload as one of their main problems and pressures. The 1131 high school principals, who took part in the NASSP's survey in America, reported an average working week of 56,5 hours. Cawood's sample of 151 high school principals in South Africa claimed to be working 10,8 hours per day in a six-day working week. It is suggested that the scope of the principalship is elastic and ill-defined and that, as in other human service organizations, there is a real sense in which 'the job is never done'. Personality factors, such as idealism, motivation, ambitiousness and conscientiousness influence the principal's workload, as does his leadership style as it affects such matters as the amount of consultation with colleagues, counselling and training staff, and the extent and manner of delegation. Clearly, too, the principal's workload is affected by his attitude towards the extent to which he should become involved with individual pupils and parents.

Qualitative overload refers to the complexity of the work. In this respect the principal is charged with an exceptionally wide variety of responsibilities, including the supervision of the teaching programme, staff development, pupil discipline, interaction with parents, community and Departmental officials, the management of facilities and finance, and public relations work. A correspondingly wide range of technical, human and conceptual skills is needed by a principal in the execution of these varied tasks. Teachers who do not have the opportunity to acquire these skills before assuming their first

principalship are faced with a serious skills deficit and a qualitative overload problem which leads to job strain.

3.1.2 Related to work overload, with its attendant time pressures, are the frequent interruptions (reported in Tung and Koch's survey), the fragmented nature of the work, and the immediacy of many of the tasks, e.g. disciplinary crises.

3.1.3 Another characteristic of the principal's work that is a potential source of stress is ambiguity concerning the outcomes of his work. Edelwich and Brodsky (20) in their analysis of 'burn-out' in the helping professions identified as a built-in source of frustration the lack of objective criteria for measuring accomplishment, in situations where there are so many influences at work and where many results are long term. Lortie (21) referred to this as the problem of 'authorship', of lacking objective feedback about the results of one's work so that one does not know what one is achieving. In Kiev and Kohn's survey of managerial stressors (22) 'lack of feedback on job performance' was ranked as one of the main sources of stress.

3.1.4 Staffing the school constituted a major problem for 35% of the principals in Cawood's survey in South Africa. Although not specifically stated, this probably referred mainly to the difficulty of finding teachers of 'scarce' subjects such as mathematics and the sciences, and also the problems and frustrations associated with the employment of married

women teachers and attempts to retain their services. Changes in service regulations would remove this latter pressure.

Another potential source of stress associated with staff is the difficulty experienced in terminating the services of an unsuitable teacher. The investigation carried out into 'the effective principal' by Blumberg and Greenfield (23) revealed this particular difficulty to be one of the three most frustrating and emotionally threatening problems in their work. It is probable that South African principals experience similar frustrations in this regard.

3.1.5 A further aspect of the principal's work, related to his staff, that is a potential stressor, is his responsibility for evaluating his teachers. In Swent and Gmelch's survey in America, 'evaluating staff members' performance' was quoted as one of the main sources of stress. In South Africa, evaluation is linked with the granting of achievement awards (leading to salary increases) and enhanced promotion prospects. Although similar functions are also carried out by managers in other organizations, it is suggested that the evaluation of teachers is more complex and demanding because of the subtleties of the teaching-learning interaction, the values-intensive nature of the situation, and the consequent problems inherent in agreeing on objective performance criteria. Formal evaluation procedures in the context of a tightly-knit group of fellow-professionals may well be more problematical than in the industrial and commercial context in their effect on relationships within the group. This is

particularly the case when evaluation is perceived as deciding on a person's worth in general rather than indicating their effectiveness in terms of the quality of their work.

3.1.6 The principal's responsibility for pupil discipline can weigh heavily, depending on the size of the school, the type of community, and the competence of the staff. In Tung and Koch's survey, 'handling student discipline problems' featured prominently among sources of stress perceived by principals. Similarly, discipline headed the list of stressors experienced by teachers in Phillips and Lee's survey of the research in America (24), while in Kyriacou and Sutcliffe's (25) research in England, problems with pupil discipline, negative attitudes, and lack of motivation were found to be prime causes of teacher strain. The evidence points to heavier demands being made upon principals in discharging their disciplinary function within an environment experiencing significant changes in social norms and attitudes towards authority. Serious disciplinary problems, including those involving the possibility of expulsion, tax a principal's resources to the full.

3.1.7 The final characteristic of the job selected for this analysis of stressors is change. Growth and development, and the accompanying changes, are inevitable and indispensable elements of life, calling for appropriate adjustment. What are referred to here are changes that are perceived as producing extraordinary pressure on the manager. Those

innovations that produce uncertainty, threaten the existing power structure, disrupt established role relationships and daily work patterns, and which are seen to be imposed from above on an unconvinced and uncommitted manager, were regarded by Moss (26) as extraordinary pressures.

In the Cape Province, a number of innovations have been introduced in the schools in the past decade. While these have been stimulating professionally, they have brought with them new demands, because in each case the principal has been responsible for introducing and sustaining the innovation at the level of the individual school. Inevitably this involves, in varying degrees, overcoming suspicion, apathy and resistance, apart from the technical and conceptual skills needed.

3.2 ROLE IN THE ORGANIZATION

Various research studies (27) have shown that a person's role at work is another major source of stress.

3.2.1 Role ambiguity exists when a person does not have sufficient information about his work role, including its scope, responsibilities, authority, success criteria, and the expectations of co-workers. Lack of feed-back about how performance is assessed by others may also generate ambiguity, uncertainty, self-doubt, a lowering of self-esteem, and a consequent perception of threat.

Kahn et al, found in their study in 1964 that 35 percent of all employees experienced role ambiguity resulting

in such symptoms as lower job satisfaction, high job-related tension, low self-confidence, and increased blood pressure. French and Caplan obtained similar results at the Goddard Space Flight Center, as did Margolis, Kroes and Quinn with a representative national sample. Role ambiguity has a more marked effect on people with a high need for structure and a low tolerance for ambiguity. It arises more frequently because of the greater size and complexity of organizations, as well as changes in technology, social structure, and personnel.

Tung and Koch's Administrative Stress Index contained several items referring to role ambiguity, notably 'Being unclear on just what the scope and responsibilities of my job are', 'Not knowing what my supervisor thinks of me, or how he/she evaluates my performance', 'Knowing I can't get information to carry out my job properly.'

School principals may also find themselves asking such questions as, 'To what extent should I be involved in fund-raising activities?', 'Where should I draw the line with social work-type activities in helping pupils and their families?', 'How far should I concern myself with my pupils' out-of-school misdemeanours in exercising discipline?' All of these relate to the ambiguities in the principal's role.

3.2.2 Role conflict exists when a person in a particular work role is torn by conflicting work demands or by doing things

he does not really want to do or does not think are part of the job. Forty-eight percent of the employees in the Kahn et al. study reported being caught in the middle between two groups of people demanding different kinds of job behaviour, while 67 percent in the Goddard survey reported some role conflict, resulting in physiological symptoms, lowered job satisfaction, and tension. Greater role conflict tends to be experienced in boundary roles, for example, between departments or between the organization and the outside world.

McGrath (28) referred to four different forms of role conflict. The first is the 'man-in-the-middle' situation, where superordinates and subordinates hold conflicting expectations for the focal person's role behaviour, so that satisfying the one automatically means dissatisfying the other. In the second form of role conflict, the role demands contain internally contradictory expectations, for example, love and discipline in the parent's role. In the third form, role expectations conflict with some attribute of the focal person, e.g. trait, preference, value, or moral principle. Finally, there is inter-role conflict, 'wearing many hats', when certain roles held simultaneously may conflict, e.g. the demands of job and family.

A principal is liable to experience all these forms of role conflict. He may find himself under pressure to assist certain subordinates in attaining their personal goals, which may conflict with his superordinates' requirements

for his role.

> By virtue of being closest to the teachers, the principal may be placed in a situation of role conflict which can be dysfunctional as well as personally painful, if the teachers expect the principal to express their norms, sentiments, and needs, even when they are not congruent with organizational purposes. (29)

He will certainly experience some of the emotional 'pain' involved in taking strict disciplinary action for the sake of the pupil as well as in the long term interests of all the pupils. Conflict also arises when the principal's personal values are violated by certain policies or job requirements, ('having to do things against my better judgement'). Time pressure brings about conflicts over the allocation of time to job and family, working life and 'private' life.

3.2.3 Boundary roles are associated with high levels of stress, largely because it is the person at the interface between departments, or between the organization and 'head office' and the community, who is in the firing line when there are conflicts of interest. This is precisely the position in which the principal finds himself as he mediates between different departments of the school, between the school and the parents and community, and between the school and the education authorities.

3.2.4 One aspect of the managerial role that has been identified in the literature as a potential stressor is responsibility for people. French and Caplan (30), in their Goddard study, found that responsibility for other people's work and wellbeing constituted a significantly greater source of stress than responsibility for 'things', the impersonal aspects of the organization. McLean (31) referred to the significantly higher incidence of suicide, alcoholism and drug abuse among doctors in America, and felt that the burden of responsibility for other people's welfare was

the key variable accounting for this. Cherniss (32) considered anyone in a human service organization (including teachers, social workers, and medical service personnel) to be particularly vulnerable to stress because the sense of responsibility for the wellbeing of others makes the demand for effective performance particularly strong. Doubts, on the part of the worker, about possessing sufficient resources to meet this powerful performance demand would be especially threatening and conducive to stress. An analysis of the school principal's responsibilities and work activities makes it clear that he is exposed to this stressor.

3.3 RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION

Managerial positions, including the school principalship, are 'human-intensive' and involve numerous encounters with a variety of people. A number of behavioural scientists have identified good relationships between people at work as a central factor in individual and organizational health.

Morris (33) represented this aspect of managerial work in a model called the 'cross of relationships', in which the manager is the 'man-in-the-middle' of a set of relationships with, and between, seniors, colleagues, juniors and outsiders (users). There is much potential for stress in this focal position unless harmonious relationships are maintained and the interests of the various groups and individuals are balanced. Inevitably this involves mediating and resolving conflicts between individuals and groups.

In Cawood's (34) survey of the problems perceived by principals, 'problems with teachers' was quoted by 21% of the principals. Supervision of the work of others is not easy and calls for a high level of interpersonal skill.

Participatory leadership styles have good potential for developing strong team spirit and commitment, but require skilled and sensitive handling.

Relationships with parents sometimes produce difficult situations, as is the case with some misunderstandings and complaints. These may be complicated by fundamental differences in values between the people concerned. The principal who makes praise-worthy efforts to be readily accessible to parents, is likely to find himself involved in far more time-consuming counselling work as well as related follow-up actions resulting from interviews. Apart from the heavier work load, frequent involvement with parents is also likely to increase work strain as problems are shared and possibly agonized over.

In their survey of 'effective principals' in America, Blumberg and Greenfield (35) found that the principals perceived themselves to be isolated from their fellow-principals. Apart from relationships based on personal friendships, there was very little helping, supporting, collaborating, or sharing of expertise. The principals expressed the desire for interaction and opportunities to share problems and frustrations with fellow-principals, and saw this as a critical factor influencing their motivation and psychological health.

3.4 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CLIMATE

Cooper and Marshall also referred to those aspects of an organization that can make a person's working life either satisfactory or stressful. They included such matters as little or no participation in decision making, no sense of belonging, lack of effective consultation, poor communications, restrictions on behaviour, and organizational politics.

3.4.1 Numerous studies have pointed to a link between greater participation and consultation and employee satisfaction, morale, and productivity. Margolis, Kroes and Quinn (36) found that non-participation at work was a significant

indicator or predictor of stress. Delegation, which is an important aspect of greater participation by subordinates in the management of an organization, is not without its problems. Delegated authority may be misused, and responsibilities may be neglected or mishandled, thus producing situations that pose a threat to the manager who delegated. In addition, by delegating many of the more routine, structured, predictable responsibilities, the manager may be left with a high proportion of complex functions and intractable problems, with a high potential for stress. On the other hand, Donaldson and Gowler (37) pointed out that a common cause of anxiety and stress among managers to whom responsibilities are delegated is that there is a mismatch between formal and actual powers. In Tung and Koch's Administrative Stress Index this was expressed as, 'Feeling that I have too little authority to carry out responsibilities assigned to me.' The principals in Blumberg and Greenfield's (38) survey stated that one of their three major problems was the powerlessness they felt relative to their prerogatives inside and outside the school. They considered themselves to be 'under-powered' for the role they had to assume.

This sense of powerlessness, in certain circumstances, is part of organizational life in a bureaucracy, such as a school system, particularly if the organization is of the 'tall' variety with many status levels. Giammatteo and Giammatteo (39) in their Stress Awareness questionnaire, had this in mind with the item, 'I am restricted in my use of my own ideas and professional behaviours due to numerous laws, rules, and policies.' According to Blumberg and Greenfield, a school system's emphasis in its organizational value system on smooth running and keeping the peace, places serious constraints on initiative and innovation, with consequent potential for stress manifested in frustration. Innovativeness carries with it a greater risk of mistakes occurring. If, in accordance with the

bureaucracy's value system, such mistakes count against the principal, he will tend to refrain from using his initiative, but will also experience frustration.

3.4.2 Professionals working in bureaucratic organizations face restrictions on their autonomy that may result in stress, since bureaucracies emphasize supervision, conformity to laid down procedures, particular success criteria, and a considerable amount of uniformity.

3.4.3 Another possible frustration of middle management in a bureaucracy is an inadequate flow of information from 'above', or the delay in this information reaching them. For the purpose of this argument, principals occupy middle management positions in a school system, while the head office personnel represent senior management. There may also be frustrations over inordinate delays in receiving decisions or responses to correspondence because of the procedures that are typical of a large bureaucracy. These particular weaknesses in bureaucratic organizations may weaken the sense of 'belonging' and commitment felt by middle managers, especially when they are also members of a profession.

3.4.4 The internal politics of the school as an organization may also be a source of stress to the principal. Within organizations the distribution of power and influence is not always as rational as the organization chart may seem to indicate. People lower in the hierarchy often develop informal power bases which principals have to take into account in decision making. Unfortunately, such groups may tend to further their own sectional interests with self-serving behaviour at the expense of other groups or the organization as a whole. Power struggles may take place between subject departments, different extra-mural societies, the 'young turks' and the 'old guard' etc. Such struggles may even spill over into the parent body.

Hoyle very aptly described this as the

> dark side of organizational life which provides the source of much staff gossip. (40)

Handling it successfully calls for rare insight and human relations skills, and may be the cause of anxiety and stress.

3.5 EXTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL SOURCES OF STRESS

A person functions as a totality, and his behaviour at work and in other parts of his life are interdependent. There are a number of interfaces between working life inside the organization and life outside which may give rise to managerial stress.

3.5.1 An important extra-organizational source of stress is the home-work interface. Work overload, time pressures, and the overflowing of duties related to work into home life may conflict with family demands. Such conflicts may place a strain upon the manager's relationship with his wife unless they have reached a satisfactory accommodation. Gowler and Legge (41) called this 'the hidden contract' by which the wife consents to adopt a supportive role to her husband so that he can further his demanding managerial career. Such a career requires a level of commitment that leaves reduced time and energy for home life. In return for her supportive role the wife expects the sharing of certain leisure time, including weekends and holidays, as well as sharing in the material rewards and prestige of the husband's managerial career. Problems arise when the organization starts claiming additional time, or when the wife becomes dissatisfied with her role, perhaps because she wishes to pursue or re-commence her own career or because domestic help becomes too expensive and she becomes more disenchanted with household chores. Gowler and Legge made the point that the organization employing the executive tends to take the existence of the 'hidden contract' for granted, enabling it to lay claim freely to the executive's time and full commitment.

It is suggested that the school principalship, with its emphasis on service to the community and its 'elastic' hours of work, tends to make inroads into home life, requiring special understanding on the part of the wife. When the intrusion of the job into home life becomes excessive, or the wife becomes dissatisfied with the situation, stress will result.

3.5.2 Business transfers involving moves to other towns, as a result of promotion up the management ladder, also contain potential for family problems and stress. Wives, in particular, may find it difficult to adjust to the new environment, and the whole family may be affected by insecurity caused by a feeling of mobility and temporariness. School principals and their wives are as prone to stress from this source as any other type of manager.

3.5.3 The interface between the school and the community-at-large also brings its pressures in the form of expectations, which the principal may feel to be unrealistic, misunderstandings based on misinformation, and changing social and moral norms which conflict with the values propagated by the school. In some cases the pressures are valid and constructive, forcing the principal to re-evaluate situations and policies, and possibly bringing about development. In other instances, the pressures merely exert a negative influence.

3.5.4 An important aspect of the school-community interface is the school's reputation. It is suggested that principals are sensitive to this because of its effect on their professional pride and standing, their job satisfaction and self-esteem, and their career prospects. They may also be in a competitive area, in which the reputation of the school has a marked effect on its pupil enrolment and its ability to attract and retain a good teaching staff.

The public may adopt very superficial criteria when judging the relative merits of schools, and those principals who feel that their school suffer as a result of this superficiality are likely to experience frustration. Often a single damaging event or situation, given adverse press publicity, affects the reputation of an institution out of all proportion to its seriousness. In circumstances where the school's reputation in the community is a sensitive issue, anxiety about unfortunate situations and harmful publicity is likely to be a source of stress for the principal.

3.6 CAREER DEVELOPMENT

Fears that managers may have of demotion (perhaps as a result of their company being taken over by another company), redundancy or obsolescence (through changes in the economy or in technology), or losing their position on flimsy, personal grounds, hardly apply to school principals who enjoy exceptional security. What a principal may suffer from is status incongruity in the form of under-promotion or over-promotion.

3.6.1 A blocked career, resulting in what the principal perceives as under-promotion, may be a powerful stressor particularly if the principal believes that less worthy candidates for promotion are being preferred to him. The blows to his pride and the negative effect on his self-concept, are likely to be more serious consequences of a blocked career than the prospect of continuing in a position that has become routine and predictable.

3.6.2 Over-promotion, resulting in inadequacy in meeting the demands of the position, is an obvious source of stress, unless the principal is unaware of his inadequacy or indifferent to its consequences. (42) It should be borne in mind, too, that a principal who is capable of meeting the demands of the position at the start of his career as

a principal, may become inadequate at a later stage. One of the reasons for this could be changes in the nature of the job, such as a larger school, the necessity of a participatory style of leadership involving greater use of interpersonal skills, more involvement with parents and the community, and changes in attitudes towards authority and discipline. Principals who fail to adjust and to develop the necessary skills, become progressively less suited to the position, and more threatened by the demands of the job.

3.6.3 Another reason for growing inadequacy is changes in the person himself. At the age of thirty-eight a principal may feel comfortable dealing with teenagers, whereas at the age of fifty-eight the same principal may feel out of touch with his pupils and also possibly many of his teachers. He may also grow weary of and dissatisfied with the disciplinary role that he has to play in the school. He may find it very hard to maintain the enthusiasm and vitality that teenagers and teachers respond to so well. At this stage in his career he may feel that he is stagnating and is not the right person for his school, but is trapped in the position until retirement. Such a situation is conducive to depression, anxiety and other symptoms of stress.

3.7 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

3.7.1 Individual people vary greatly in their vulnerability to specific stressors, some being able to cope better than others. Gmelch suggested that we view stressors through personal filters which influence our response to stressors.



STRESS FILTER SYSTEM (GMELCH) (43)

3.7.2 Numerous personal characteristics affect threat appraisal, including one's pattern of motivation, one's perceptions of the expectations of others, one's perceived capacity for controlling or altering situations, inner conflicts, self-concept (concerning competence and problem solving ability, for example), state of health, past experience, and levels of competence. In this account, a limited number of personal characteristics have been selected for treatment.

3.7.3 Rosenman et al. (44) showed that people exhibiting certain behavioural characteristics were significantly more at risk to stress and coronary heart disease. Such behaviour was called Type A, as opposed to Type B (low risk of CHD). Type A behaviour is characterised by competitiveness, extreme achievement-orientation, aggressiveness, impatience, haste, feelings of being under pressure of time and the challenge of responsibility, hyper-alertness, explosiveness of speech, and tenseness of facial and other musculature.

3.7.4 A person's self-concept plays a major part in his evaluation of the demands made on him. According to Argyris

> ... the self influences what the individual is able to see in the environment, how he evaluates it, and how he deals with it. If what he is experiencing "out there" is consonant with his self-concept, then he will tend to "see" it in an undistorted manner. If what he is experiencing is antagonistic to his self, it is a threat. The greater the discrepancy between the self and what it is experiencing, the greater the threat. (45)

3.7.5 An important facet of a person's self-concept is his expectations of his performance. If his expectations are excessively high and there is a significant gap between his aspirations and his accomplishments, the resulting sense of failure has a negative effect on his self-concept. It is likely that school principals, because of the idealism and sense of calling that is associated with human service professions, are particularly vulnerable to excessive self-expectations. Cherniss (46) believed this to be a potential stressor because the threat of failure has more serious personal consequences for people who regard their work as a calling rather than a job. For those who view their work as a calling, their identity and self-esteem are related to a considerable extent to the successful accomplishment of their work. Dobson (47) pointed to the dangers of achievement anxiety, manifested as a pervasive fear of failure, for 'perfectionists' who set unreasonably high standards which are beyond their capabilities. Levinson (48) regarded intense self-criticism and internal dissatisfaction as part of the make-up of dynamic, motivated business executives, making them exceptionally vulnerable to feelings of failure.

3.7.6 Writing about the problem of burn-out in the helping professions, notably social work, Edelwich and Brodsky referred to over-identification with clients as a dangerous tendency, because it causes the helper's emotional wellbeing

to be too dependent on clients living up to what may be unrealistic expectations.

> It is difficult, but necessary, to decide how much is too much..... If a person is to succeed - or just survive - in the human services field, over-identification must give way to a degree of detachment. (49)

A particular form that over-identification may take in a principal, is for the principal to associate himself so closely with the school ('my' school) that any setbacks or defects are taken so personally that they hurt very deeply. Such a principal is vulnerable to stress because a very wide range of demands or situations are likely to be perceived as personally threatening.

3.7.7 Tolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity, which was found by Bray et al. (50) to be the fifth most effective trait predictor of managerial advancement, is an important personal characteristic having a direct bearing on threat perception and stress. Related to this is the person's locus of control, the amount of control which he perceives he has over his environment. People with an external locus of control believe that they have little control over events that affect them and are subject to greater uncertainty than people with an internal locus of control.

3.7.8 A person's values play an important part in determining the degree of importance he attaches to meeting or failing to meet a demand which has an important bearing on stress. In addition, situations or demands which conflict seriously with his values would cause stress.

4. CONCLUSION

> The first step in this (stress) management is to become aware of the things that cause stress..... Identified stressors allow us to choose how much or how little weight we will grant to each. (51)

This review has ranged very widely in identifying potential sources of stress, and this is in keeping with the multidimensionality of the concept. The causes of stress are highly individual because they are to be found not only in the environment and in the person, but in the interaction between the person and the environment. The key role of the person's perceptions of demand, personal resources, and the degree of importance attached to meeting the demand, further complicates the identification of stressors, because perception is a highly individual process. Cooper and Marshall's classification of managerial stressors provides a useful framework for attempting to analyse and isolate particular sources of stress. It must, however, be remembered that a person is subject to a number of stimuli at any one time, and it is often the cumulative effect of a number of stressors from various sources acting together than produces stress. Identifying the causes of a person's stress may, therefore, be a more complex matter than it first appears to be.

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PRINCIPALS UNDER PRESSURE

A study of the school principal's work and of the increasing demands being made upon him.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Very few people would dispute the key position of the school principal within the education system. The opinion expressed by the Inspectorate in England in their publication, "Ten Good Schools", that the quality of the principal's leadership is the main single factor influencing the success of a school, is one with which anyone with a good insight into schools would readily agree. It is also common knowledge, certainly among experienced principals, that the scope and complexity of the principal's work have increased greatly in recent years, and that the demands of the position are indeed heavy.

> The sum of all the responsibilities adds up to an enormous job for school principals. (1)

The pressures on principals should not be under-estimated, either by the principals themselves, or by their staffs and the education authorities. Being aware of the special demands of the position is a necessary first step towards coping successfully with those demands. In this paper an attempt is made to present certain characteristics of the principal's work that give greater insight into the demands made upon him. The last section of the paper examines various recent trends that have added to the complexity and pressures of the principal's work. Throughout the paper the writer has in mind the principalship of large urban high schools of the Cape Education Department.

2. TEN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL'S WORK

It must be acknowledged that principals, like any other leaders, vary in such matters as their perceptions of the scope of their work, their priorities, and the amount of time they are prepared to devote to their work as opposed to their leisure time and family lives. Some aim at efficiency and stability, a smooth-running school, while others are restlessly innovative.

Leadership styles also vary considerably according to the personality, philosophy, training and experience of the individual principals. Circumstances at a particular time, such as an extensive building programme, the integration of an unusually large number of new teachers into the staff, or a major innovation or reorganization, may distort the principal's work temporarily in a particular direction. But, even allowing for these individual differences, it is possible to identify a number of characteristics common to the work of all principals.

2.1 The principal's work is exceptionally varied.

Viewed as an educationist, a school principal is a specialist, but when regarded as the leader and manager of an organization he is a generalist performing a variety of functions. It was with this in mind that Knezevich (2) referred to the school principalship as a constellation of positions. Schools are staffed for their primary function of teaching and other aspects of their educational work, such as extra-mural activities, yet there are numerous other functions that have to be attended to. Work that would be performed by a personnel manager, a public relations officer, a company secretary, an accountant, or a social worker in other organizations, has to be handled by the principal in the case of a school. Certain duties of this type may be delegated to teachers, but this does not alter the fact that the principal is involved in an exceptionally wide variety of work tasks.

Richard Gorton (3) drew up a classification of the principal's task areas which demonstrated the degree of variety present in his work. Although this classification referred to the work of principals in the United States, it corresponds closely with the concerns of a typical high school principal in the Cape Province. Gorton identified seven main task areas as follows:

2.1.1 Staff, e.g. selection, allocation of duties, briefing, observing, evaluating, helping, co-ordinating work, fostering team-work, stimulating development.

2.1.2 Pupils, e.g. enrolment, orientation, attendance, safety, guidance, discipline, extra-curricular programme, assessment, reporting on progress.

2.1.3 School-community interaction, e.g. arrangements for parental and community involvement, conferring with parents, handling complaints, P.T.A., co-operation with community organizations.

2.1.4 Instruction and curriculum development, e.g. planning curriculum, allocating resources of personnel/time/space/materials, providing for supervision of teaching, providing for in-service staff development.

2.1.5 School business management, e.g. budget, accounting, controlling expenditure, accounting for school property, smooth running of office.

2.1.6 School plant, e.g. planning for growth and improvement of school facilities, implementing plans for improvements, maintenance of facilities.

2.1.7 General tasks, e.g. public relations work, handling delicate interpersonal problems, evaluating the school's programme, attending school and other related functions, correspondence, reports, record-keeping, attending meetings and conferences.

Bearing in mind also that many principals try to continue with a limited amount of teaching, which requires preparation and keeping up to date with developments in the teaching of the subjects concerned, it will be

appreciated that a principal's work is exceptionally varied.

Another factor which contributes to the wide scope of the principal's activities and responsibilities is his involvement with the full range of school subjects, most of which were of little concern to him before his elevation to the principalship. This is particularly true of the high school principal. Some of the decisions he needs to take concerning the curriculum require a deep insight into school subjects outside of his own area of specialization. This type of problem is not unique to school principals and is experienced by leaders and managers in other fields, but it is suggested that the breadth of the principal's involvement goes far beyong that of most other organizational leaders. The need for an unusually wide range of knowledge poses many problems for a newly-appointed or inexperienced principal, unless he has been fortunate enough during his deputy-headship to have worked under a principal whose practice was to involve him in the whole spectrum of issues and problems. Such in-service training or coaching is of great value in the preparation of future principals, although clearly further training after assuming duties is also essential in order to cope successfully with the greatly increased variety of work.

2.2 The principal fulfils many roles.

Given the wide range of duties of a principal, it is understandable that he finds himself fulfilling a number of differnent roles. Some of these roles are implicit in the brief summary of the principal's functions contained in the Cape Education Department's Handbook for Principals.

> Besides his primary duty as an educator, the principal is in the first place a professional leader .... He is responsible for determining policy, planning, organization, effective management, and supervision and control of all facets of school life ..... (4)

The prime roles indicated in this short job description are those of educationist, professional leader, manager, supervisor, and politician (policy maker).

Richard Gorton (5) summarised the major roles of a school principal as follows.

* Manager, the person who, by careful planning and organization ensures that the school is administered smoothly and efficiently.
* Leader, particularly with regard to the school's educational programme, ensuring that objectives are set, and progress and development achieved.
* Disciplinarian, maintaining order and dealing with misbehaviour, and fostering a positive attitude to self-discipline.
* Facilitiator of human relations, developing co-operative and harmonious relationships among the staff and in the school as a whole.
* Change agent, assessing needs, developing and implementing solutions, orienting staff, and evaluating results.
* Conflict mediator, a growing role in view of the conflicts associated with changed attitudes towards authority and less agreement among people over values.

Among the other important roles played by a principal are those of co-ordinator (harmonising the activities of the different groups and individuals), resource allocator (allocating time, space and money, among other resources, according to the priorities established for the school), monitor (seeking and receiving information about the actual functioning of the school for the purpose of future policy-making), censor, (the lonely, usually controversial, high-risk role of preventing or stopping what he is convinced are harmful or dysfunctional situations, according to his value system), disturbance handler (solving organizational problems, "putting

out fires"), figurehead (the highly influential role of being, saying and doing the kind of things that inspire the confidence and pride of pupils, parents and teachers in the school; symbolising what the school stands for).

A particularly important role of any principal is that of maintaining a balance between elements within a school which sometimes come into conflict. This is not an easy role because the choices are often not at all clear-cut, being between two or more good things, rather than between good and bad. Examples of this are the balancing of innovation with stability; an examination-success orientation with broader personal development goals; the academic programme with extended extra-mural activities; sport with cultural activities; initiative (with the accompanying risk of mistakes) with efficiency. A principal's broader perspective of the school, and his tendency to think longer-term than the average teacher or school committee member, help him to exercise this balancing role.

Enough reference has been made to the principal's roles to show what a wide range of knowledge, insight and skills is needed to occupy these roles successfully. There are times when a principal finds himself in a role overload situation where he is called upon to perform a variety of roles simultaneously or in bewilderingly rapid succession.

With so many roles to fulfil, the principal is especially exposed to the pressures of role conflict. J. Lipham and J. Hoeh (6) identified four main types of role conflict.

"Wearing many hats." Some of the roles held simultaneously by the principal may conflict. Often the pressures of the administrative role interfere with the teaching role. Out-of-school roles, such as family man, church member, and Rotarian, may on occasion conflict with work roles.

There is always the problem of the conflicting claims on the principal's time of job and family.

"Man-in-the-middle." The principal holds an intermediate position between various reference groups, such as the Department of Education and the teaching staff, the teachers and the pupils, the parents and the teachers, the members of one subject department and another, the sports coaches and the producers of the annual play, etc. Being the "man-in-the-middle" holds much potential for conflict. An example of this is the uncomfortable postion in which the principal finds himself when mediating between the parent, with a justifiable complaint, and the teacher concerned, who needs to be upheld in the eyes of his pupils.

"Caught in group crossfire." This involves different expectations held by teachers for the role of the principal, resulting in conflict. Some expect strong uniform disciplinary action from the top, while others expect discretion to be allowed to individual teachers. Some expect the maintenance of the smooth-running status quo, while others feel that the principal should be an innovator.

"The man versus the job." This type of role conflict arises from discrepancies between the demands of the job and the personality characteristics and needs of the principal. As a person, he may thoroughly dislike public speaking and disciplining others, for instance, whereas as a principal he is inevitably called upon regularly to do both of these things.

2.3 The principal uses many skills.

Apart from the wide range of tasks performed and roles occupied, another heavy demand placed upon a school principal is the acquisition and use of a formidable repertoire of skills required for the tasks and roles.

According to Katz's analysis (7) these skills fall into three main categories: technical, human, and conceptual.

Technical skills are behavioural competences, specific techniques, knowledge of procedures, and the possession of information necessary for the work. Examples of some of the technical skills needed by principals are: public speaking, interviewing, letter writing, timetabling, conducting meetings, budgeting, analysing a colleague's teaching skills, planning, decision making, and co-ordinating.

Human skills used by principals include couselling, motivating, negotiating, resolving conflict, team-building, encouraging, inspiring confidence and developing a climate that encourages initiative.

Conceptual skills include comprehensive understanding, the ability to integrate all the elements involved in a situation, and the ability to perceive possibilities and to relate events to principles. These are manifested in such activities as setting goals, weighing alternative choices against priorities, evaluating effectiveness, assessing the needs of the community and the schools, and balanced judgement.

The array of skills required of the effective principal is indeed formidable. The situation is complicated by the fact that a number of these skills are not exercised by teachers and that some of them, particularly in the conceptual and human categories, are not easily acquired. This points to the need for staff development policies within schools that provide scope for the acquisition of these skills by senior teachers, some of whom are likely to be promoted to principalships. Much of this professional growth should result from on-the-job coaching and experiential learning, but seminars, short courses, informal reading programmes, and formal studies can all make

valuable contributions towards preventing a demoralizing skills-deficit when a teacher commences his first principalship. Naturally, the acquisition and refining of skills should continue throughout a principal's career to meet his particular needs, for example, time management and stress management.

2.4 The principal's work is human-intensive.

The dominant mode of the principal's work is through personal contacts. He spends much of his time interacting with a wide variety of people in carrying out the whole range of tasks and occupying the multiplicity of roles mentioned earlier. In accordance with their differing personalities, priorities and leadership styles, principals vary in the extent to which they involve themselves with pupils, parents and teachers, respectively. Some seek to maximise contact with the teachers by limiting their involvement with pupils, while others feel strongly that they should keep in touch with the pupils at all costs. Some are prepared to have an open-door policy, with the risks of time-wasting and interaction overload. Others prefer a more formal system of scheduled interviews. The wise principal, of course, tries to maintain a balanced approach by ensuring that he remains in touch with all sections of the school community, for he cannot afford to drift away from any of them. It is this fact that makes his work human-intensive and very demanding as a consequence.

John Morris (8) of the Manchester Business School in England provided a simple human relationships model of any managerial situation, and this can also be applied to the school principalship.



MORRIS'S CROSS OF RELATIONSHIPS MODEL

Morris viewed the work of a manager from the point of view of the relationships and influences that he has to deal with. These come in from four directions: from his seniors, his juniors, his working colleagues, and a variety of people outside the organization. Morris called this the "cross of relationships." It has a very different appearance from the usual organization chart, which takes the form of a pyramid divided into status levels. The advantage of the "cross of relationships" is that it can be applied to any management position, because every manager, whether senior or junior, sees himself as being at the centre of a cross. Influences, expectations, and activities reach the manager along all four arms, and he in turn affects others along the four arms by his expectations and actions. The manager is the "man-in-the-middle" and day by day he must find ways of balancing the respective claims of the four complex and changing sets of relationships.

This simple model fits the situation in which the principal finds himself and may be adapted as follows.



A RELATIONSHIPS OR INTERACTIONAL MODEL OF THE SCHOOL PRINCIPALSHIP

In this model there is a constant flow of expectation, influence and activity in both directions along each arm representing the main working relationships. Being in the pivotal position, the principal finds himself interacting frequently with many reference groups. The trend towards participative management and leadership styles involving more consultation, the proliferation of people with specialist functions (e.g. teacher-psychologist, teacher-librarian, co-ordinator of programmes for the gifted), and the rapid increase in external links, have increased the principal's working relationships and the demanding human-intensive character of his work.

A further implication of his man-in-the-middle position in the cross of working relationships is that he is often faced with the exacting and sometimes stressful task of mediating between parents and teachers, teachers and pupils, one teacher and another, and the Department of Education and the teachers.

Frequent human interaction places a heavy premium on communication skills, particularly oral communication which predominates in a principal's work. The spoken word is, in fact, his main tool, and accurate and effective speech, accompanied by appropriate body language, is an important requirement. Written communication is also important; ambiguous statements in newsletters to parents or in correspondence may cause misunderstanding and problems.

Successful interaction with other people also calls for empathy, sensitivity, tact, and persuasiveness. Other requirements are a willingness to listen properly to others, flexibility and a willingness to abandon preconceived ideas in the face of convincing arguments, and sufficient self-confidence to interact with others on the basis of seeking what is right, and not who is right.

2.5 The principal's work is values-intensive.

Unlike industry and commerce, schools are not involved in producing and selling material objects, but with the intensely human activity of providing for the personal development of young people. While it is not suggested that the activities of industry and commerce are value-free, it is clear that a human service organization, like a school, is more intensely concerned with moral values. Consequently, many of the decisions made in schools need to be based on carefully considered values rather than on expediency. The basis on which decisions are made is, "What is right?" What is for the good of the child? What is best for the school?" rather than "What will work? What will be easiest? What do they want? What will make us more popular?"

Arriving at broad agreement on basic values that affect many aspects of school life is obviously essential, but is not easy because teachers,

with their extended academic training, are probably more accustomed to formulating their own personal philosophies than most other occupational groups. Examples of the issues that arise are: the aims of school education; the extent to which authority should be exercised and freedom curtailed; the extent of a teacher's responsibilities to and for his pupils; the notion of a balanced curriculum; the place of competition in the school; the meaning and importance of good school spirit; loyalty to the school as opposed to following one's own interests; conformity as opposed to individuality; the relative importance, in taking disciplinary action, of the interests of the individual and those of the group (the school); the role of the parents in the affairs of a school; the relative importance of sport and cultural acitivities in the school; the importance of success in sport; the extent to which teachers have a right to be consulted about matters that affect them; the importance of neat appearance (of teachers as well as pupils); the importance of developing the skills of learning relative to memorising a substantial body of useful knowledge.

These examples should be sufficient to demonstrate that those who work in schools are involved in value judgements at almost every turn. As professional leader and chief executive, the principal finds himself having to think through his own values more frequently than anyone else on the staff. There are also occasions when lack of consensus concerning certain values may undermine the effectiveness and unity of a staff. It cannot be taken for granted, by any means, that all teachers subscribe to the same set of basic values as the principal. The writer recalls an occasion when, as principal, he called upon all teachers to support a drive to eliminate the carving of graffiti on the pupils' desks, only to find a reluctance on the part of one teacher on the grounds that graffiti developed a sense of tradition.

It is suggested that the values-intensive nature of the principal's decision making and work contributes greatly to the complexity and demands of the position. The fact that he knows that he is dealing with people's most precious possession, their children for whom they want the best, adds to this particular pressure.

2.6 Much of the principal's work is fragmented and immediate.

A principal's work, because it is so varied and people-oriented, contains many brief encounters concerning the whole spectrum of the school's activities. Interruptions are caused by immediate, non-scheduled events, such as telephone calls, and important events are interspersed with routine and even trivial ones, calling for rapid shifts in moods. P. Webb and G. Lyons (9), who conducted empirical research into the managerial behaviour of senior staff in schools in England, found that the duration of individual activities fell mostly within the range of 5 - 25 minutes. The frequency and fragmented nature of the principal's interactions with others, apart from causing work pressure, creates the danger of a preoccupation with relatively superficial activities. If he spends much of his time reacting to situations and people, the principal may find himself doing too little creative planning and reflective thinking. Many principals find that the only solution to this problem is to engage in this type of activity after everyone else has gone home!

2.7 The principal bears responsibility for all facets of school life.

According to the Cape Education Department's Handbook for Principals (10), the principal "is responsible for ... the supervision and control of all facets of school life." This is indeed a heavy responsibility, and one that is deeply felt by principals, because it includes the physical safety of the pupils and their moral well-being, as well as their educational progress. Bearing responsibility for people weighs far more heavily

than responsibility for things, such as money and equipment. The consequences of an error of judgement in permitting an inexperienced and rather immature teacher to lead an outdoor club mountain climbing expedition, or of allowing a film that is highly controversial on moral grounds to be shown to the whole school, are likely to be far more serious than an error of judgement that leads to damage to an item of equipment. The human element makes all the difference.

What adds to the burden of responsibility is the particularly broad span of control of the principal of a large school. To supervise the work of forty-five, or more, teachers is a demanding responsibility, even allowing for the authority and supervisory functions delegated to other members of staff.

2.8 The principal's mistakes and controversial decisions are subject to high visibility.

The public expects especially high standards of school principals, as is also the case with doctors and ministers of religion. Teachers and pupils, too, hold high expectations of their principals. When a principal makes a significant mistake or fails to deal effectively with a serious disciplinary situation, for example, he knows that news of his failure will spread rapidly throughout the school, thus undermining his credibility and authority. If this type of negative information spreads too often, the principal will steadily forfeit the respect, trust and confidence of pupils, teachers and parents, and he will be unable to exercise effective leadership.

A principal has to accept his high visibility as one of the challenges of his position, and do all in his power to avoid costly mistakes which would tarnish his reputation. Controversial decisions and actions that could easily be misunderstood need to be explained to the individuals or groups

concerned, as far as possible, in order to minimise the difficulties that tend to arise. Press publicity can cause problems and needs to be handled with care.

2.9 There is ambiguity over the outcomes of the principal's work.

It is impossible to obtain accurate objective measurements of the successfulness of the school in the way that other organizations can measure their effectiveness in terms of sales, profits, production output, and production costs. Many of the school's achievements are not measurable in such precise terms. Even a seemingly objective measure of success, such as the Senior Certificate examination results, needs to be interpreted with caution. In addition some of the most important effects of school education are long-term and consequently not know to the schools.

This ambiguity affects teachers as well as principals, but in the case of principals there is the additional factor that in many respects they exert their influence through others. This adds to the uncertainty experienced by principals as to how important and efficacious their contributions are towards the success of the school.

2.10 The principal works in relative isolation.

The principal works in relative isolation from principals in other schools and the Department of Education. He has an "inside focus"; overwhelmingly he interacts with subordinates (teachers and pupils) within his own school. There is a real danger of receiving virtually no feeback from others concerning his performance and effectiveness, and his own development needs. At times, when he needs the supportiveness and encouragement of other principals, he may remain isolated. Fortunately, there has been a tendency for this isolation to be broken down as principals interact more with other principals and the inspectorate.

The activities of the teachers' associations, and the in-service seminars organized by the Department of Education and the teachers' entres, have played an important part in this regard.

3. RECENT TRENDS CAUSING INCREASED PRESSURE ON PRINCIPALS

3.1 There has been a far greater emphasis on the need for the principal to be a leader, particularly an instructional leader, than in the past. It has been realised anew that high quality performance in the schools cannot be brought about by the actions of Head Office planners and administrators alone, but requires the good leadership of the principal at the individual school level.

Leadership involves more than the efficient administration of an organization.

> Although it is critically important for organizations to be kept in motion, merely to do so is not to be equated with the exercise of leadership. The process of leading involves attempting to influence the behaviour of others to do things differently. (11)

Leadership involves a proactive approach rather than a reactive one; leaders shape ideas rather than respond to them. It has to do with determining future directions and obtaining the commitment of others to them. This is obviously more difficult than keeping a school running smoothly through sound administration, and for this reason the Department of Education (through its in-service courses), the faculties of education of several of the universities in the Cape, and the South African Teachers' Association (through its PROGRO programme), have emphasized leadership development.

The precise nature of the principal's instructional leadership role varies according to the circumstances and the principal's resources. The fact

that he is not a specialist in all subject areas obviously imposes certain limitations. W.L. Nell (12) argued that the principal's instructional leadership should be exercised largely through his subject heads, and should also include providing the necessary resources and motivation. J. Cawood (13) went further than this and stated that ideally a principal should devote 50% of his time to the supervision of teaching, including regular class visits and follow-up discussions.

Surveys and experience have consistently shown that principals of large schools struggle to do justice to their instructional leadership role. For instance, J. Cawood's survey of 151 principals of high schools in the Cape Province, Orange Free State and South-West Africa in 1976 revealed that as little as 14% of the principal's time was being devoted to instructional leadership, whereas 42% was being spent on administrative and routine clerical work. (14) Blumberg and Greenfield, commenting on the same problem in the United States, suggested that the main cause was that

> most principals find themselves besieged on a daily basis with the nitty gritty administrative tasks involved in keeping the ship on an even keel.... (15)

3.2 Another noteworthy development has been the greater awareness of principals of the need for managerial competence in the administration of the school. This has arisen because the school has become a more complex organization which demands greater managerial expertise of its principal. Staffs are larger, authority is delegated more widely, subject teachers form departments of the school, numerous activities need co-ordinating, careful planning and organizing are essential, consultation is a necessary part of the decision-making process, there is more potential in a more complex organization for interpersonal or intergroup conflicts which need resolution, and communication is an essential and basic managerial function. The material and financial resources of the schools have increased greatly and

require efficient management.

Teachers and parents expect schools to be well managed. Disorganization and amateurish administration are not readily tolerated, with the result that there is pressure on principals to learn and apply management techniques.

3.3 Much emphasis in recent years has been placed on the professional status of teachers. On the strength of their training and their membership of a profession with its own code of ethics, teachers expect greater autonomy and the right to use their own discretion and judgement in their work. Yet they work within a bureaucratic system which imposes controls and rules through superiors in the hierarchy. E. Litwak (16) suggested that the conflicts between these two orientations could best be solved by distinguishing clearly between administrative duties (subject to bureaucratic control) and professional tasks (allowing professional autonomy). This may work well in highly developed and well established professions such a medicine and law, but in teaching it has not been possible to separate administrative and professional functions in such a clear-cut way.

M.G. Hughes (17) viewed the principal as a professional-as-administrator with two major roles, namely that of chief executive of a sub-system of the larger bureaucratic system, and that of leading professional of a group of professional teachers. It is his responsibility to achieve an accommodation between the organization's emphasis on superordinate control and the professional's desire for accountability only to fellow professionals. Inevitably there are times of role strain for the principal when certain teachers claim professional autonomy in situations where bureaucratic control has to be imposed.

As part of their evolving professional status, teachers expect to be consulted, not only on the level of the profession as a whole, but also

within their individual schools. They also expect greater participation in the leadership of the school. Today's principal needs to be skilled in the techniques of participative management, and must also be sensitive to the kind of situations that call for consultation and those that do not.

A further consequence of the professionalization of teaching is the responsibility that this places on teachers themselves to develop their own expertise and keep up to date, as do doctors and other professionals, without this being imposed by the employer. A professional derives his authority from his acknowledged expertise, in contrast to authority in a bureaucracy which is based on the office or position held in the organization. It has, therefore, been pleasing to note the professional growth activities of a teachers' professional body such as the South African Teachers' Association. Within each school the principal, as leading professional, has an important staff development function, and many principals are currently trying to come to grips with this particular role.

3.4 Recent years have witnessed a number of innovations in the high schools of the Cape Education Department. These have included differentiated education, evaluation of teachers for promotability and achievement awards, teacher-psychologists, Youth Preparedness, media centres and media-oriented learning, the Gifted Child Project, Family Guidance, and the internal Senior Certificate examination project. Each of these innovations has been of the "top-down" type, being planned outside the schools and disseminated through in-service meetings and printed materials. The principal has in each case been given responsibility for implementing the innovation. This has been a major challenge because it has involved mastering the ideas behind the innovation so as to be able to communicate them accurately and effectively to the teachers concerned. Other problems have been motivating teachers who may be unenthusiastic because they do not share the vision of the

planners and are very conscious of the ever-increasing demands of their work, and mobilising the necessary resources of time, space, manpower and materials.

Apart from the change agent role described above, more principals are aware that the rapidly changing times demand that they be innovators in their own schools. This is not easy because as Crowson and Porter-Gehrie showed, the overwhelming pressure in the daily work of a principal is towards managing for stability and maintenance. (18)

3.5 Another mounting demand upon the schools and their principals is the expansion of the community's expectations of the schools. This may be interpreted partly as an expression of faith in the effectiveness of the school's work and influence, or as a tendency for the community to shift too many responsibilities on to the schools.

Numerous requests for the school to participate in projects are made by a wide variety of enthusiasts in the community, each one quite naturally feeling that his particular area of concern should enjoy the highest priority. These projects cover the whole range of social welfare activities as well as an increasing number emanating from the business community. At times the principal may gain the impression that the community is relying largely on the school to deal with most of society's ailments, such as the rising divorce rate, vandalism, delinquency, road accidents, and the unwise use of money. That the school has an important contribution to make is undeniable, but a problem arises when schools are expected to add too many special projects to their already exceptionally demanding educational programmes. In these circumstances, the principal sometimes has the unpleasant task of declining well intentioned requests for co-operation.

3.6 Social problems have proliferated as a result of rapidly changing values and the weakening of family life generally. This affects schools because

many of the problems that appear in schools are an expression of problems that lie beyond it, for example marital problems and parental alcohol abuse problems.

Keith Blackburn (19) distinguished between pupils with problems and problem pupils. There have always been problem pupils, such as those who are problems to the school because of their disruptive behaviour, and schools have always accepted responsibility for doing something about these problem pupils. Pupils with problems do not jeopardize the smooth running of the school in terms of unacceptable behaviour, and consequently they may be overlooked. Frequently social and personal problems, as well as academic underachievement, arise as a result of unresolved home problems.

Many principals have responded to the needs of pupils with problems, personally and through a pastoral care system in which the teacher-psychologist and heads of standards are key members, but they have found this aspect of their work to be both demanding and exceedingly time-consuming. The number of pupils in need of help in a typical large urban high school is often so great that the principal may feel swamped and agonise over where he should draw the line as far as the school's involvement is concerned. The principal tends to find this aspect of his work emotionally draining, for so often satisfactory solutions lie beyond his grasp. D. Hargreaves, writing about the situation in England, expressed these pressures as follows:

> There has been a broadening of educational objectives in which teachers stand in for parents, policemen, priests and social workers ..... Other professionals get tired, teachers become exhausted. (20)

3.7 In keeping with the trend in society, authority is questioned and challenged more frequently in schools. Parental authority has weakened in an increasing number of homes, with the result that it has become more difficult to maintain sound discipline at school. Under pressure and provocation,

teachers sometimes commit indiscretions which may cause acute problems for the principals concerned. Principals also grapple with the delicate problem of how far the school's jurisdiction extends off the school premises. Many within the school and in the community at large expect decisive disciplinary action from the principal in situations in which he has no legal authority, but must rely on the co-operation of the parents of the offending pupils. When this co-operation is not forthcoming, extremely difficult and stress-inducing circumstances arise for the principal.

3.8 Principals today realise that their schools are subjected to public scrutiny to a greater extent than before, and that they are held accountable. The publication of the Senior Certificate results, for instance, tends to be an anxious time for the principals of many schools! Parents and members of the public are more prone to voice their disapproval if they are dissatisfied, or at least to seek clarification. Unfortunate and embarrassing events in schools are more likely to be publicised in the press.

A different type of accountability is involved in the evaluation of teachers, which makes heavy demands on principals, particularly when the evaluation is linked with nomination for achievement awards or promotion. Depending on the relationships that exist within the staff, a principal may encounter pressures affecting his objectivity, or find himself in the midst of cross-currents and resentments among his staff.

3.9 Problems of staffing the school occupy much of the principal's time and attention, and produce strain. Finding teachers of "scarce subjects", such as mathematics and the sciences, causes anxiety. The absence of teachers on military service or at in-service courses, while being understandable and necessary, disrupts the school and poses problems. The high staff turnover, which is now common, militates against building a

team and necessitates measures designed to maintain continuity.

This is an age-old problem. As early as 66 A.D. Gaius Petronius, the the Roman author, complained,

> We trained hard .... but it seemed every time we were beginning to form up into teams we were re-organized. (21)

3.10 The political environment in which schools function is sensitive. Divisions exist and these are reflected in the parent body and the pupils. In these circumstances there is scope for misunderstanding and friction over a variety of matters as diverse as racially-mixed sporting events, Youth Preparedness, the teaching of certain aspects of History, the choice of dramatic productions or debating topics or magazine items, the choice of prize-giving speakers and the attitudes of certain teachers. It is the principal who bears the brunt of complaints and is expected to deal suitably with the problem.

Another dimension to the pressure on the principal arising from political circumstances is the heavy responsibility for doing everything possible to ensure the safety of the pupils and security of the school.

4. COPING WITH THE PRESSURES OF THE PRINCIPALSHIP

4.1 Anyone in a leadership position must expect to have to contend with pressure and strain, and the principal is no exception. Indeed, many of the pressures described in this paper constitute the challenges in the work, and meeting these special demands results in job satisfaction, personal development, and a sense of fulfilment. When, however, a principal experiences what he perceives to be excessive demands upon himself, the pressure may have negative, rather than positive, effects on his performance. This is especially the case when he is subjected to prolonged, frequent, or excessive pressures, which he finds particularly difficult to cope with.

4.2 One of the implications of the specially demanding nature of the school principalship is the importance of an effective system of selecting suitable teachers as principals. Wise selection must be based on a thorough understanding of the nature of the principal's work and the pressures involved. The Cape Education Department's selection system, whereby the promotability evaluation of teachers is carried out periodically by the principals and inspectors, goes a long way towards meeting this need, providing both sets of evaluators constantly bear in mind the criteria against which they are evaluating the teacher concerned.

It is not within the scope of this paper to explore in any detail the coping strategies a principal may employ, but three broad categories are suggested.

4.3 Training and personal development give principals more skills and greater insight with which to tackle their work successfully. This increases principals' confidence and ability to cope with pressure. Ronald Rebore (22) identified six major areas as appropriate for development programmes for principals. These were 1) instructional skills, including the evaluation, supervision and improvement of teaching; 2) management skills; 3) human relations abilities; 4) political and cultural awareness; 5) leadership skills; and 6) self-understanding. Development in these areas should result in increased competence in handling the work, as well as greater self-assurance and resilience in contending with the emotional and moral demands of the principalship.

4.4 Some principals fail to utilize all the resources at their disposal, and this contributes towards pressure and frustration. This applies particularly to the human resources of the staff. Modern approaches to leadership emphasize team-work and the delegation of responsibilities, with commensurate

authority. When principals share their leadership with others, they not only share the burden of the work, but also harness the particular talents and energies of the members of their leadership team. This strengthens the leadership of the school and frees the principal from feeling that the school is totally dependent upon him for its leadership.

Other resources, such as the computerization of certain aspects of administration, may also be used fruitfully to reduce some of the pressure of work.

4.5 Social support is the third form of coping strategy that can help sustain a principal through difficult times. According to Leonard Moss (23), people are said to have social support if they have a relationship with one or more persons that is characterized by relatively frequent interactions, by strong positive feelings, and by an ability and a willingness to give and take emotional and practical assistance in times of need. Research has shown clearly that in the work setting, supportive social relationships reduce various occupational stresses. (24) Social support augments the individual's strengths and facilitates his adaptive coping behaviour.

Applied to the principalship, this underlines the importance to the principal of supportive relationships with his senior staff, particularly his deputy, and also with the school committee and the Inspector of Education. The principal under pressure may also draw support and encouragement from fellow-principals, with whom, under threat-free conditions, he may feel able to share his problems. The supporting role of the principal's spouse should also not be underestimated.

5. CONCLUSION

Any consideration of the administration of large urban high schools, and in particular of the role of the principals of these schools, must take into account the exceptionally demanding nature of the present-day principalship. The pressure on school principals is increasing, and harmful work stress must be recognised as a potential hazard confronting principals. A careful analysis of the sources of pressure and strain is a prerequisite for devising effective ways of coping with the pressure.

Note. For the sake of brevity and convenience, reference has been made to male principals throughout the paper.

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COPING WITH STRESS

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1. INTRODUCTION

Stress is an inevitable part of life. The success with which people cope with stress determines whether it is a stimulus to new levels of achievement, creativity and personal development, or whether it is the cause of anxiety, depression, self-destructive behaviour, and illness. People are characterised not so much by whether they experience stress as by how they cope with it.

A most significant characteristic of stress is the highly individual nature of the phenomenon. People vary greatly in what they perceive to be stressors, as well as in the nature of their stress reactions. This applies also to the coping processes that people employ and the strategies they find useful in managing, controlling, alleviating and preventing stress.

> People use a wide variety of coping processes, depending on their personal characteristics, the nature of the environmental demands and contingencies, and how these are appraised. (1)

In this paper, an attempt is made to analyse the normal stress coping responses, to describe an approach to stress management based on a transactional model, to present the findings of several recent research surveys, and to summarise the strategies commonly advocated for stress management.

2. HOW PEOPLE RESPOND TO STRESS : THE CONCEPT OF COPING

2.1 When people are placed in demanding situations which they perceive to be stressful, they are motivated to do something about it by employing problem-solving behaviour to try to remove the source of the stress or alleviate the discomfort experienced. This psychological response to stress is called coping. Successful coping either eliminates the stress experienced by the person or, if this is not possible, reduces the discomfort and makes tolerance of the demanding situation easier. Unsuccessful coping leads to the continuation of the stress symptoms, and possibly to their intensification as a result of the anxiety produced by the failure to cope satisfactorily. Sometimes, the attempted coping response takes the form of dysfunctional types of behaviour such as alcohol or drug abuse, and further problems are created.

Coping takes two forms. A person may use direct action to deal with the actual problem, the source of the stress. Alternatively, particularly if little can be done about the source of the stress, he may use indirect action (palliation) to deal with the experience of stress by reducing emotional distress. These two forms of coping are examined in more detail.

2.2 DIRECT ACTION FORMS OF COPING

Direct action involves all types of behaviour designed to deal with the stressor. Drawing on the work of Lazarus, Cox (2) referred to four different forms that direct action

coping may take.

2.2.1 Fighting the stressor

This involves identifying the source of stress, confronting it and taking steps to deal with it. An appropriate coping response to a threatening, anxiety-inducing situation at work could well be to work harder to ensure success, to seek advice from others, or to call in the assistance of fellow workers to master the threatening situation successfully. Often a direct confrontation is the most appropriate and effective way of coping with a stressor.

In adversary situations, such as conflict between individuals or groups, the source of stress may be perceived as a particular person, a group of people, or an organization. In such circumstances, a display of aggression and anger towards the source of stress is a common coping response, and in the short term this may have the effect of reducing the stress. Circumstances may prevent the person from showing aggression towards the source of stress, and displaced aggression may be expressed towards an accessible innocent person. In this way a man may vent his hostility on his wife when the real source of his stress is his supervisor at work. Unless he perceives his wife to be part of his problem, such displaced aggression may give rise to feelings of guilt and add to his experience of stress.

2.2.2 Learning and preparing against future threats

This goes beyond responding to present sources of stress and is preventive rather than adaptive as a form of coping. As a person strengthens his resources for meeting future demands, he reduces the actual danger of not being able to meet those demands as well as the perceived threat to himself. A good example of this form of direct coping action is the thorough preparation put in by a student before an examination.

> Learning, as a process of acquiring the ability to control the outcomes in anxiety-producing situations, is therefore clearly an effective and constructive way of coping with stress that leaves the person better able to cope with situations that confront him. (3)

2.2.3 Fleeing from the stressor

Instead of confronting or fighting the stressor, people sometimes respond to stressful situations by fleeing from or avoiding them. This may involve physical withdrawal, for example the soldier who runs from the battlefield or the person who resigns from a job which he finds too taxing to be able to tolerate any further. This type of response may also entail procrastination in tackling unpleasant aspects of the work, excessive sick leave and staff turnover, unfinished projects, and over-delegation of work.

Although these avoidance or escape tactics may be functional in certain circumstances when a person simply

cannot handle the situation or when temporary relief is essential, they are generally inappropriate because they do not solve the problem or strengthen the person's resistance in the future.

2.2.4 Ignoring the demand

This may be a long-term response to chronic stress. Complete inaction in the face of demands made upon a person may represent a learned helplessness or hopelessness in the face of circumstances over which he is convinced he has no control. In this case apathy may be viewed either as a lack of coping or as a form of coping with a situation which the person is incapable of changing.

The modes of coping described above are used by everyone to varying degress. Some direct action responses are functional and deal with the problem on a long-term basis, some have short-term value, while others are dysfunctional and leave the problem unsolved. What is needed are coping responses which equip people to cope effectively on a long-term basis.

2.3 INDIRECT ACTION, OR PALLIATION, AS A FORM OF COPING

When a person feels that he cannot immediately change or avoid the situation causing stress, he may use palliative ways of coping which reduce the discomfort and moderate the distress.

Lazarus (4) referred to two modes of palliation, namely, symptom-directed palliation and intrapsychic palliation.

2.3.1 Symptom-directed palliation methods moderate the psychological symptoms of stress, for example anxiety and frustration, and the physiological effects, such as muscular tension, increased blood pressure and fatigue, without actually dealing with the sources of stress. Included among the palliatives are relaxation techniques, exercise and various forms of recreation, all of which are functional ways of reducing the effects of stress. They are particularly valuable when stress is inevitable.

Of more dubious value are the use of tranquillizers, sedatives and other drugs, and alcohol and smoking, as a means of obtaining relief from the symptoms of stress. When used in moderation, these palliatives may have the desired effect, but when used excessively they become dysfunctional and cause such serious problems as alcohol abuse, drug dependence and a break-down in health.

2.3.2 Intrapsychic palliation involves the use of cognitive defence mechanisms by which a person helps himself to cope with stress by distorting reality and deceiving himself about the dangers he faces. The actual threats persist but the ways they are perceived by the individual are modified in order to reduce discomfort.

According to Burgoyne (5) cognitive defence mechanisms operate to some degree in all people. They can result in

inappropriate behaviour which may increase stress. In addition they tend to leave people less able to cope with stress in the long term. They may, however, be functional if they buy time necessary for survival or for the learning of effective forms of coping.

Denial, intellectualisation and rationalization are three examples of defence mechanisms. In denial, anxiety is reduced for a while by the person simply denying that the problem or threat exists. Often denial is accompanied by the discrediting of other people involved in the situation (e.g. the doctor giving the bad news about an illness) or by the distortion of information. Denial is usually regarded as an ineffective coping response because it leaves the cause of the stress unattended to. Under certain circumstances, when a person needs time in which to be able to adjust to a stressor, denial may be a constructive coping response.

By means of intellectualisation an individual gains emotional detachment from a threatening situation by treating it in abstract, intellectual terms. This makes it more remote and less emotionally taxing. For example, a physician may treat his heart attack patient as emotionally neutral and avoid identifying too closely with the patient or his suffering. The danger of intellectualisation is that it may become so ingrained that it interferes with normal emotional attachments and experiences.

According to Dobson, rationalization involves

> .....finding a suitable excuse for doing something which will be repudiated by the superego. It also means replacing a motive which would receive social disapprobation by one which is logically and socially acceptable. Rationalization gives the appearance of having acted rationally or sensibly..... (6)

Thus, by rationalization, a person may deceive himself that failure to succeed in a particular demanding situation does not really matter, when in fact it does matter. Such a rationalization would be an effective stress palliative if the person were not conscious of rationalizing. Once he became aware of the fact that he was deceiving himself, the defence mechanism would cease to be a palliative.

3. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE COPING PROCESS

Meichenbaum (7) identified three key factors that play a particularly important role in the coping process.

3.1 A sense of personal control

According to Meichenbaum, a number of studies have shown that people who do not perceive themselves to have the ability to influence a threatening situation significantly, are liable to experience much greater stress reactions than those who feel they have some control over the situation. The level of stress is reduced by the mere belief in one's ability to exercise some control. An example of this, quoted by Meichenbaum, is the person who says, 'If I could stop the roller-coaster, I wouldn't want to get off !'

For some, a sense of personal control in trying circumstances comes from their personal belief system or religious faith which provides a potential means of coping with stress.

People vary in their degree of perceived personal control. Some are pessimistic about their ability to exercise control over situations, believing themselves to have little influence over their circumstances. At the other end of the scale are confident, optimistic people, with an internal locus of control and the belief that they can generally exert control over their invironment. In their study of 2300 people in Chicago, Pearlin and Schooler (8) identified 'good copers' and 'poor copers'. The good copers were generally able to meet threatening events successfully, while the poor copers were frequently thrown off balance even by minor demands made on them because of their lack of confidence in their control over the circumstances.

People with low expectations of their ability to cope or exercise control may develop what has been called learned helplessness, the belief that nothing they do will make any difference to the outcome of events or offset the stressful situation. (9)

3.2 The availability of information

Generally, the more information one has about the nature, duration, consequences and warning signs of a stressful event, the more likely one is to be able to find ways of preventing, reducing or coping with stress associated

with that event. Knowing what to expect usually aids the coping process. This was shown by Johnson and Leventhal (10) who compared the stress reactions and coping responses of patients undergoing uncomfortable and difficult medical procedures. Those who were prepared beforehand by being given information about what they would experience were able to cope better than those lacking preparatory information.

Likewise, information about possible crises that may occur, and contingency plans for meeting emergencies, assist a person to cope with stressful events when they occur. For example, astronauts who have trained to meet every conceivable emergency, are able to cope calmly with an emergency and treat it almost as a routine situation.

3.3 Social support

The supportiveness of other people can help a person to cope with stress. Meichenbaum (11) quoted a study in which it was found that women who had a close relationship with a husband or friend were 90% less likely to suffer depression than women lacking such a relationship.

> On the whole, we manifest less fear and stress and greater courage in the presence of others than alone. Somehow, the presence of others acts as a buffer to stress responses. (12)

The quality of these social contacts is an important factor influencing the coping process. According to Moss (13), people are said to have social support if they have a relationship with one or more persons that is characterised

by relatively frequent interactions, by strong positive feelings, and by an ability and a willingness to give and take emotional and practical assistance in time of need.

The extent of the social support available to the individual person is also a major factor affecting coping. People with a variety of support systems tend to be best off because they are able to draw from the appropriate support system, strength to cope with different types of stressors. Examples of these support systems are the immediate family, colleagues at work, the church group, long-standing personal friends, relatives, neighbours, the sports club, and the service club.

In times of crisis people who are able to share their feelings with others, gain a truer perspective of the demands made upon them and tend to augment their personal coping resources. In particular, identification with others in a group can play an important part in reducing or coping with stress.

4. A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH TO MANAGING STRESS

According to Cox (14) the chain of events leading to stress may be broken in various ways. The key elements in the transactional model of stress are the person's cognitive appraisal of the demands made upon him, his resources for coping with those demands, and the consequences of not coping. When these can be altered from negative to positive appraisals, the stress is alleviated. Such

modifications may be brought about by the alteration of the actual demand; the alteration of the actual ability to cope; supporting the existing ability to cope; the alteration of the actual importance of coping; and the alteration of the perceptions of demand, capability, and the importance of coping.

4.1 Alteration of actual demand

If, for example, stress is caused by too much work or too little work, work that is too demanding or work that is too simple, an alteration in the nature of the person's duties and the demands made upon him could alleviate his stress. If the source of his stress is poor working conditions, the improvement of those conditions would tend to reduce the stress.

4.2 Alteration of the actual ability to cope

This may be brought about by training and the development of relevant skills. If, for instance, difficulties, and consequent stress, arise from weaknesses in decision making and resolving interpersonal conflicts, training in these skills would enable the person to cope better and reduce the stress. Innovation and change make new demands and may call for additional knowledge and new skills on the part of the worker, if he is to cope. Likewise, someone moving into a new type of work usually experiences a need for additional skills. A teacher making the transition to his first principalship needs to acquire a greater mastery

of such skills as planning, communicating, delegating, time management, and interviewing, if he is to meet the new demands made upon him. Ability to cope may also be enhanced by the deepening of spiritual resources and by improving one's physical resources through exercise, good nutrition, and relaxation.

4.3 Supporting existing ability to cope

This may involve deriving practical and emotional support from others who are close to one and can be trusted. In this way, a hard-pressed principal may be strengthened by the encouragement and moral support obtained from his deputy, the school committee, the inspector, and his wife and family. It may help him to maximise and draw upon his existing resources in meeting the demands made upon him.

4.4 Alteration of the actual importance of coping

If the failure to cope satisfactorily with a particular demand becomes unimportant (or much less important), the situation will cease to be a source of stress. Thus, a change of priorities or standards of performance expected, may have this effect. Changing certain school rules which have proved exceptionally difficult to enforce and a source of conflict and friction, would alleviate stress emanating from the situation concerned.

4.5 Alteration of perceptions of demand, capability and importance of coping

4.5.1 The experience of stress is related to a perceived imbalance between demand and capability in a situation in which coping is perceived to be important. The alteration of perceptions, consequently, is an important stress management technique. It may be the case that one is overestimating the severity of the demand or underestimating the adequacy of one's capability of coping successfully with the demand. One's perception of the importance of coping may be exaggerated.

What is needed in these cases is an intervention which puts demand, capability and importance of coping in truer perspective and results in more realistic perceptions. What, at first sight, may appear to be a mountain, may turn out to be a molehill. What seemed to be far too difficult to handle, may prove to be well within one's capabilities. What appeared to be a weakness unique to one's own school, may in fact be an unsolved problem shared by all other schools in the area.

Discussion with others, informally or in a counselling situation, helps an individual to achieve more realistic appraisals and perceptions of situations. It may also help a person to establish goals and priorities in life, and to achieve greater self-understanding of his personal resources. This may have the effect of developing more positive attitudes and greater self-confidence.

There are other ways of altering perceptions, through the use of drugs such as nicotine, alcohol and tranquillizers, but these carry with them the dangers of psychological and physical dependence and are not te be recommended.

4.5.2 Burbach (15) referred to a number of cognitive distortions which affect people's appraisals of the situations in which they find themselves. People who manage to deal with these distortions and 'straighten out' their thinking, alter their perceptions, with the result that stress is either reduced or coped with more effectively.

The following are examples of cognitive distortions mentioned by Burbach.

- All-or-nothing thinking - seeing things in black-and-white; regarding yourself as a total failure if your performance is not perfect.
- Over-generalisation - seeing a single negative event as a pattern of failure.
- Mental filter - allowing a single negative detail to colour the thinking about all other reality.
- Disqualifying the positive - rejecting positive experiences that do not match up with a generally pessimistic outlook.
- Jumping to conclusions - making negative interpretations even though there is no definite supporting evidence.
- Magnification (catastrophizing) or minimization - exaggerating the importance of some things (such as your mistakes or the achievements of others), and inappropriately minimizing such things as your own good qualities or other people's imperfections.

- Emotional reasoning - assuming that negative feelings necessarily reflect reality. 'I feel it, therefore it must be true'.
- Personalization - seeing yourself as responsible for a negative event which you were in fact not primarily responsible for.

4.6 Cox emphasised the very individual and personal nature of stress and its causes. It is the result of a transaction between a person and his situation. (16) It follows that ways of preventing or alleviating stress need to be tailored to fit the individual. It is possible that certain measures designed to combat stress could actually increase it in some people. For example, taking away a particular element in the work may reduce stress for some workers who find the task concerned threatening. Other workers may react entirely differently to the removal of the task which they find challenging, stimulating and fulfilling, and perceive the change as a source of stress.

Cooper and Marshall (17) emphasised the desirability of the individual himself taking the initiative in the management of stress because only he has full information about his stress. Under these circumstances loss of self-esteem is also less likely than if other people initiate the intervention.

5. COPING WITH STRESS : RESEARCH SURVEYS

5.1 In their survey of 1207 school administrators in the United States, Tung and Koch (18) asked the administrators

to enumerate the ways they personally found useful in handling the tensions and pressures of the job. The responses were analysed in three categories and there was a significant preponderance of palliation over direct action methods of coping.

5.1.1 Physiological activities

More than 50% of the respondents used physiological techniques as palliatives for coping with stress. These techniques could be divided into three categories. Firstly, there were those activities involving physical work or exercise. Examples were jogging, sport, walking, gardening, and general exercise programmes. Secondly, there were activities in which the respondents purposely isolated themselves from their work environment, in their homes, at week-end retreats away from home, and by establishing social friendships outside of their working environment. Thirdly, there were relaxation mechanisms such as meditation and yoga.

5.1.2 Cognitive activities

These were used by approximately 40% of the respondents, and referred to the positive attitudes and philosophies of life which helped the individual to cope with the tensions of the job. These included cultivating an optimistic attitude; establishing realistic goals and recognizing one's limitations; sharing problems with colleagues, spouses and other members of the family;

maintaining a sense of humour; and applying one's religious faith and using prayer to overcome adversity.

5.1.3 Acquisition of interpersonal and management skills

Although less than 10% of the administrators quoted the acquisition of skills as useful in coping with stress, it is likely that the exercise of these skills could assist significantly in preventing certain forms of work stress. Time management skills, for instance, are of value in dealing with those stressors related to control over time (too heavy a work load, interruptions, many meetings). A principal's role involves many interpersonal contacts, which are potentially stressful, and the improvement of communication, conflict resolution and other interpersonal skills could contribute substantially to stress management.

5.2 The National Association of Secondary School Principals' survey of the Senior High School Principalship in 1978 (19) referred to the techniques used by a group of 'effective principals' in handling stress.

The most frequently used approach was to get away from the stressful environment, at school itself by leaving the office and walking around the buildings or grounds, and after school by becoming involved in some form of recreational activity. The second important approach used by principals was to develop a sense of perspective

about the problem of stress. This perspective included an acceptance of the inevitability of some stress, a realistic appraisal of what it was possible to accomplish on the job, and a sense of humour and optimism.

A third approach used by a minority of principals was to discuss the stress with others, including professional colleagues or their spouses. It was surmised that this method of relieving stress was not turned to by the principals more often because admitting to stress would possibly reflect poorly on them. It was noted in the Survey that this tendency not to share problems with others emphasised the isolation of the principal's position.

5.3 Kiev and Kohn's survey of executive stress on behalf of the American Management Association in 1979 (20) called for responses to 17 ways in which a manager could cope with work-related stress. These techniques were grouped into four categories - self-awareness, on-the-job techniques, away-from-the-job techniques, and programmes/books. 1338 respondents from top management were asked to indicate whether or not they used each technique in dealing with stress and to name the three methods they found to be most effective.

The results were as follows:

AMACOM EXECUTIVE STRESS SURVEY

STRESS COPING TECHNIQUES

	Extent Used		Effectiveness	
	Rank	%	Rank	%
SELF-AWARENESS				
• Develop sensitivity to my physical and emotional responses. Become aware of what are stress-producing situations for me.	4	75,7	5	30,3
• Analyse stress-producing situation and decide what is worth worrying about and what isn't.	2	84,6	1	48,1
ON THE JOB				
• Establish daily goals and set priorities to accomplish the most important objectives.	3	81,0	3	34,0
• Delegate responsibility instead of carrying entire load myself.	1	90,3	2	41,6
• Withdraw physically from situation temporarily/take a break.	10	50,4	10	11,3
• Work harder.	11	49,9	13	4,9
• Talk with colleagues or others on the job.	5	73,5	9	13,4
AWAY FROM THE JOB				
• Engage in engrossing non-work activities. Separate work from home life.	8	64,8	6	24,4
• Allot time for rest and relaxation each day.	12	42,2	12	7,9
• Engage in physical exercise.	7	68,9	4	32,9
• Build regular sleeping and eating habits.	9	62,0	11	8,7
• Take a number of short vacations.	13	41,3	8	16,5
• Talk with spouse or friend.	6	71,4	7	18,4
PROGRAMME/BOOKS				
• Transcendental meditation/ relaxation exercises.	15	7,7	15	2,6
• Psychiatric treatment/ psychotherapy.	17	3,3	16	1,6
• Seminars on "stress management".	16	4,8	17	0,9
• Books on "how to relax"/"how to take charge of your life".	14	17,9	14	3,1

It is significant that the most extensively used and effective methods quoted by the managers were those that improved or supported their ability to cope and those that altered their cognitive appraisal of the demands made upon them.

Falling into the first category of improving the ability to cope with the work were such actions as delegating responsibility, instead of retaining the entire burden, and learning to establish daily goals and priorities in order to achieve the most important objectives.

A number of the other effective coping techniques involved actions which positively influence the cognitive appraisal of demands. Examples of these are analysing difficult situations realistically so as to keep the threat to one in its true perspective, talking with friends or spouse in order to obtain a more objective assessment of a situation, and using self-analysis to establish clearly what situations are potentially threatening.

6. PRACTICAL GUIDELINES FOR COPING WITH STRESS

There is no single formula for managing stress. It is more effective to possess and use a variety of coping methods to suit the particular circumstances. Numerous writers have suggested general guidelines for managing stress, and some of the most commonly expressed ideas are presented here.

6.1 Gmelch emphasized the importance of identifying stressors and distinguishing those that are inherent in the job and must be tolerated, from those that can be controlled and resolved. He quoted the well known prayer to illustrate the point :

> Grant us the courage to change the things we can,
> The serenity to accept those we cannot,
> And the wisdom to know the difference. (21)

6.2 With regard to the stressors which can be controlled, what is needed is tackling the stressors with a view to preventing or eliminating the stress. The following are examples of steps that may be taken :

- Anticipate potentially stressful periods and plan for them.
- Engage in training and self-development in order to acquire or increase the skills necessary for success. Apart from the specifically educational skills and knowledge associated with the position, school principals need to develop the following types of skills, each of which has a bearing on stress management :
  - time management
  - planning
  - decision-making
  - communication
  - delegation
  - problem-solving
  - conflict management
  - interpersonal and group leadership skills

- Develop realistic expectations so as to avoid unnecessary feelings of failure and frustration.
- Prevent feelings of isolation. Communicate freely with others, sharing your feelings and talking out your problems. Develop and be involved with social support groups.
- Avoid procrastination which tends to intensify a problem and increase anxiety. Tackle the demanding situation without delay and gain encouragement and motivation from the progress made.
- Do not be too future-orientated. Focus on the present and achieve a balance between reasonable concern for the future and neglect of it.
- Develop your spiritual resources as a particularly meaningful source of inner strength.
- Learn to say no. The alternative may be to be swamped with work and responsibilities that may become unmanageable and a source of stress.
- Learn to tolerate and forgive others. Intolerance of others leads to frustration and stress. Develop understanding and acceptance of other people.
- Identify stress management techniques that work for you and use them.

6.3 When the actual causes of stress cannot be dealt with, steps can be taken to alleviate the symptoms of stress. In this regard people need to accept that a certain amount of stress is inevitable, normal, and even a stimulus to greater effort. Full recognition needs to be given to personal achievements in order to keep a sense of proportion concerning unsolved problems and failures. Some people find it helpful to take short

short breaks from work that they experience as stressful. Cultivating outside interests in order to avoid dwelling on work problems is another way of alleviating stress.

Most writers offering guidance on the management of stress give prominence to physical fitness, relaxation and proper nutrition as means of equipping body and mind to withstand the effects of stress.

6.3.1 Physical fitness

The holistic approach to health emphasizes the necessity of harmony between the body, mind and spirit, which should be regarded as a single unit rather than separate entities. The Ancient Greeks understood this well and referred to 'a healthy mind in a healthy body'. Illness or stress may result when these parts of the whole body are out of balance. There are implications for handling stress. For example, exercise can help to relieve tension and absorb some of the effects of stress.

6.3.2 Relaxation

Relaxation is another way of relieving tension and reducing the level of physiological arousal and stress. For this reason it is an important element in most stress control programmes. The objective is to be able to relax deeply and quickly in order to cope with stress as soon as it is perceived. Many people

use drugs, such as tranquillizers, to relieve the physiological and mental tensions of the stress reaction, but this carries with it the danger of side effects. Many self-activated relaxation techniques have been devised in order to help people to develop the skill of relaxing as a means of dealing effectively with muscular tension and other stress responses.

Mental relaxation is an important part of most relaxation techniques, and it is practised and achieved in a variety of ways, including pleasant mental imagery, meditation, and recreational activities away from the job.

6.3.3 Good nutrition

Proper nutrition is important for good health, which in turn gives the body the best possible chance of coping with stress.

Much has been written on the subject of healthy eating habits, but it appears that common threads running through this literature are :

- Maintain your recommended weight
- Eat a balanced, varied diet.
- Limit the amount of caffeine, salt, sugar and saturated fats, and cholesterol taken in.
- Use alcohol in moderation or not at all.

7. CONCLUSION

There is no simple recipe for coping with stress because of its very individual and personal nature. Stress is caused by many factors, and its management must therefore be approached simultaneously on various fronts. The strategies employed should include direct action forms of coping, which attempt to confront and deal with the sources of stress, and palliative coping actions which reduce the discomfort experienced during times of stress.

Recent perceptual models of stress lay emphasis on the alteration of perceptions as a powerful means of coping with stress. Any methods, such as social support or counselling, which help a person to alter his negative cognitive appraisal of his ability to cope with the demands made upon him, will have a significant effect on eliminating or reducing his stress.

Successful coping with stress has a positive influence on a person because it not only stimulates personal development but also increases resistance to future stress.

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